


Citizenship as Cultural Flow

Structure, Agency and Power

Subrata K. Mitra *Editor*



 Springer

Transcultural Research – Heidelberg Studies on Asia and Europe in a Global Context

Series Editor:

Madeleine Herren
Axel Michaels
Rudolf G. Wagner

For further volumes:
<http://www.springer.com/series/8753>

Subrata K. Mitra

Editor

Citizenship as Cultural Flow

Structure, Agency and Power

 Springer

Editor

Subrata K. Mitra
South Asia Institute
University of Heidelberg
Heidelberg, Germany

ISSN 2191-656X

ISSN 2191-6578 (electronic)

ISBN 978-3-642-34567-8

ISBN 978-3-642-34568-5 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-34568-5

Springer Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London

Library of Congress Control Number: 2012955864

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. Exempted from this legal reservation are brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis or material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the Copyright Law of the Publisher's location, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Permissions for use may be obtained through RightsLink at the Copyright Clearance Center. Violations are liable to prosecution under the respective Copyright Law.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

While the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication, neither the authors nor the editors nor the publisher can accept any legal responsibility for any errors or omissions that may be made. The publisher makes no warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein.

Cover illustration by Rameshwar Munda, Orissa/India

Printed on acid-free paper

Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

Foreword

With a new and innovative approach to citizenship, Subrata K. Mitra heads a zealous group of scholars, combining methodological innovation from different disciplinary sources with a non-Eurocentric research design. Instead of following an evolutionary rationale, where citizenship as a truly global phenomenon rose in the West, the volume suggests a sea change: using transboundary flows as a new analytical approach, citizenship becomes ambiguous and loses its conceptual narrowness. Interestingly, this “messiness” of citizenship as a global concept is exactly what sheds light on a question which is crucial to the twenty-first century: Does citizenship provide a useful concept that secures individual rights in the globalised world of the twenty-first century? If there is an agreement to discuss citizenship as a traveling or shifting concept, we need to understand to what extent transboundary characteristics influence the way societies gain coherence and identity, both locally and globally, how togetherness and foreignness develop, and why transboundary lives of cosmopolitans can turn so fast into the misery of statelessness. The contributions to this volume have chosen an exemplary combination that considers territorial aspects of citizenship without essentialising the example chosen. Instead of measuring differences between East and West, the multilayered facets of citizenship in India serve as a sounding board for conceptual transformations, their consequences, and applicability.

Thus, even apart from the specific research on citizenship, this volume contributes to the methodological turn from essentialism to disciplinary self-reflexion, and provides a valuable contribution to the Heidelberg Cluster of excellence, “Asia and Europe in a Global Context, Shifting Asymmetries in Cultural Flows.” This research project aims at challenging methodological nationalism and cultural essentialism by discussing Asia and Europe beyond confined territories. While analyzing shifting asymmetries in cultural flows, this project discusses a variety of different topics related to the impact of transboundary entanglements, traveling concepts, and mechanism of exchange. In this laboratory of post cold war approaches in humanities and social sciences Asian and European studies put up the disciplinary mechanics for discussion with the aim of carefully investigating the borders of both the discipline and the topics studied. Within this research

environment, citizenship is one of the well-established topics that provide a crucial testing field. The stimulating results presented in this volume pave the way for further research on traces of traveling concepts, providing the knowledge needed to understand global entanglements as characteristic of the twenty-first century.

Madeleine Herren
Co-Director Cluster of Excellence Asia-Europe
University of Heidelberg

Preface and Acknowledgements

Citizenship is an evocative term. The very mention of this concept brings back a trail of historical memories. One finds citizens in the rampaging crowds of the Parisian *sans culottes* of July 1789, the agitating *suffragettes* of nineteenth century London, the irate American colonists of the Boston Tea Party (1773), protesting against the British Crown, and closer home, in the violent mob of Chauri Chaura (1922), and in the disciplined little band of *satyagrahis* following Gandhi on the Salt March (1930), from colonial India. Nor is the citizen missing from the contemporary sites of struggle, such as among the tribal protesters of central and eastern India, and, in the secessionist movements in Kashmir and North East India. Public grievances and citizenship appear to be historical bedfellows. The universal desire to protest against unjust treatment by the authorities and the right to equality and dignity unites a motley crowd of historical and contemporary actors under the label of “citizens.” As an analytical category, however, the term remains deeply problematic. “Citizens,” in terms of their social origins, geographic locations, ideological orientations, or the very specific grievances that unite them, are radically different from one another—to the point where one might have qualms of methodological conscience about lumping these people together in the same bag. Even conceptually the uneasy balance of rights and obligations makes “citizens” as a social group awkward, unstable, and incoherent. The enraged “citizen” of Kashmir, just as the protesting students of Tiananmen Square (1989), militating against the armed forces of the state to assert their civil and political rights, nevertheless expected the same state to protect them against the high-handed reaction of the forces of state security!

The conceptual inconsistency and empirical incoherence of citizenship as a category points towards “aliens”—the antonym of citizens—as yet another useful but problematic concept. Just as the ideal type citizen conflates rights and obligations to defend those very rights, aliens are devoid of both basic rights, and the obligation to defend that state that vouches for them. The citizen-alien conceptual scale provides the space in which to rank the actual status of people living within a specific territory.

In addition to the conceptual disarray that marks citizenship, the task of citizen making, held by many post-colonial states and transitional societies as one of their central tasks, poses a difficult problem for the makers of public policy. Turning subjects, aliens, and rebels into citizens is a complex process whose pace has been quickened by new technologies of rapid mass communication and the global flow of knowledge. The multiple nodes and contradictions of citizenship—such as the groundswell of support that one finds for Chinese dissidents, forcibly displaced Indian tribals from their ancestral abodes, and peasants from their lifestyles, or in the enraged denizens of the contemporary United States, participants of the “Tea Party movements,” protesting against the distant and dominant state identified as the Washington elites—show that the concept is still unfolding; its script has so far been only partly written.

The complexity of the path to citizenship—context-dependent at the best of times, varying radically between outright violence and peaceful, legitimate participation—matches the intricacy of the concept of citizenship itself. In practice, it is difficult to advance an exhaustive list of strategies of citizen making. Manifestly, the constitution—the fountainhead of all rights—can only lay down the necessary conditions of citizenship, leaving it open for the state and individual to negotiate the terms of citizenship in a given context. Delicately suspended between imported concepts from Europe and indigenous notions of selfhood, between asserting rights and requiring the protection of the state, citizenship is a function of many variables. A full treatment of this concept—in terms of its etymology, social history, ideological depth, and empirical stretch—is beyond the remit of this book. Instead, the 11 essays that form this volume provide entry points to the larger, transdisciplinary debate.

In the course of putting this volume together, I have acquired many debts. First and foremost, I would like to thank the German Research Foundation (DFG) whose support of the Cluster of Excellence “Asia and Europe—Shifting Asymmetries in Cultural Flows” at Heidelberg University, has brought together talent, wide ranging scientific questions, and scholars from around the world to create the most exciting project of which I have been a part in my entire academic career. I am grateful to Professors Madeleine Herren, Axel Michaels, and Rudolf Wagner—the directors of the cluster, and particularly to Madeleine Herren, for taking the time off her busy schedule to write a foreword for this book, and to Andrea Hacker for critical editorial suggestions throughout the publication process. I would like to thank the South Asia Institute of Heidelberg University, my academic home for the past 16 years, and the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi, for valuable help with the fieldwork in India.

I would like to thank the members of the citizenship project—Barbara Harriss-White, Julia A. B. Hegewald, Marie Lal, Jong Hee Lee, James Manor, Prasanna Nayak, Frank Pfetsch, Markus Pohlmann, Jivanta Schoettli, Clemens Spiess, and John Zavos who have laid the course that we set ourselves in Heidelberg in 2008. The home research team consisting of Clemens Spiess, Jivanta Schoettli, Sergio Mukherjee, Lion Koenig, and Markus Pauli has been a source of solid academic support, data management, and helped in the coordination of a far flung research

network. The papers brought together in this volume were initially presented in a series of workshops. Generous support was provided by Heidelberg University, Seoul National University, Sungkyunkwan University, the Korean Sociological Association, the Korean Association of Political Sociology, and Utkal University (Orissa, India) for these meetings. The team owes a special debt to Jivanta Schoettli who has organized the meetings in Heidelberg, and Bhubaneswar with great skill and imagination. I would also like to thank Jonghee Lee and Markus Pohlmann for their contributions to the organization of the conference in Seoul, Lion Koenig, Kai Fürstenberg and Dominik Frommherz who have processed the manuscript in its final stage.

The chapters emerging from the citizenship project were initially put together as a book under the title *Citizenship and the Flow of Ideas in the Era of Globalization: Structure, Agency and Power* by Samskriti publishers, Delhi. I would like to thank Madhu Sengupta and Surit Mitra, for their valuable help with the earlier publication. For this publication by Springer, the text has been substantially revised and a new title has been added. Our collective thanks to Dr. Andrea Hacker for making this possible.

Finally, I would like to thank members of the Excellence Cluster, Heidelberg, for the stimulating environment. Their empathy and conviviality have made it possible for my coauthors and me to see Asia and Europe in terms that are “at once clear and fluid.” The book is dedicated to them.

Heidelberg, September 2012

Subrata Mitra

About the Contributors

Jivanta Schöttli: *From T. H. Marshall to Jawaharlal Nehru: Citizenship as Vision and Strategy.*

Jivanta Schoettli brings in the dimension of European-Indian entanglement. British sociologist, T. H. Marshall and India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru were contemporaries. Sharing the intellectual lineage of British liberalism both were preoccupied with the same issues of national integration and socioeconomic divisions but within very different contexts. The essay seeks to identify some of the shared conceptual tools and institutional remedies that Marshall and Nehru reflected upon and applied. The chapter goes on to examine specific debates in the Indian Constituent Assembly that showcase the *transcultural* nature of decisions and institutions which later framed the discourse on citizenship within India's postcolonial political development.

Clemens Spiess: *Reluctant and Excluded Citizens, Differentiated and Multilevel Citizenship—Where the Indian and the European Discourse on Citizenship Meet.*

Clemens Spiess examines the overlap of European and the Indian discourses on citizenship. Both discourses share the challenges that growing transnationalism poses to their prevailing citizenship regimes. This brings Spiess to two recent ideas of citizenship, namely *differentiated* and *multilevel* citizenship, and how they have resonated in the Indian and European contexts respectively. The chapter asserts that both the Indian concept of a group-sensitive citizenship regime and the European experiments with multicultural citizenship rights have one thing in common. Both implicitly conceive of citizenship as a multilayered concept that sees citizenship as compromised by various "layers"—local, traditional, and transnational—beyond the national.

Subrata K. Mitra: *Turning Aliens into Citizens: A "Toolkit" for a Transdisciplinary Policy Analysis*

Subrata Mitra analyses the debate on the flow of liberal ideas of citizenship to non-Western societies through an inquiry into its philosophical and social construction. A flow diagram is developed to capture the dynamic process of *citizen making* in terms of its underlying parameters, some of which go beyond the realm of everyday

politics. Towards this objective, the chapter undertakes a brief survey of the evolution of the formal category of citizens from antiquity to present day, and the inner differentiation of liberal theory of citizenship, in order to cater to its complex empirical nuances and finally, to unite the various strands of citizen making in the form of a *tool kit*. This neo-institutional model provides the basis for a *transdisciplinary* analysis of policy making with regard to citizenship.

Frank Pfetsch: *European Citizenship: A Concept of Interrelatedness and Conditionality.*

Frank Pfetsch argues that the idea of citizenship in the European Union is different from citizenships known in customary communities or in traditional nation states. It is transnational and dual in the sense that it is linked and additional to citizenship of the member states of the European Union. Every citizen of a member state is automatically a citizen of the Union. His essay explores the various types of relationships between citizenship and political frameworks, the different dimensions of citizenship, as well as the different categories of migration with respective national and European Union regulations. The political role within the institutional settings of the European Union is examined together with the most relevant treaty regulations concerning citizenship.

Jim Manor: *Who is a Citizen? A Multidimensional Question.*

Jim Manor identifies four interrelated ways to understand the term “citizen. These are (one) who qualifies for official recognition by a particular state or government as a full member of its national community? (Two) Upon whom does a particular state or government bestow certain rights which are associated with citizenship—and what are those rights? (Three) Who affirms a set of values which are associated with citizenship: beliefs in democracy, accountability and tolerance? Finally, (four), who possesses sufficient political capacity—consisting of political awareness, confidence, skills and connections—to be able to operate effectively enough in the public sphere? The response to these questions, Manor suggests, is important for *divided societies* and *immigrant nations*. The solution to these complex problems lies in the development of the notions of group (differentiated) and of multilevel citizenship.

Subrata K. Mitra: *Citizenship in India: Evolution, Involution, and Rational Construction*

Subrata Mitra focuses on the concept and measurement of citizenship in India. He delineates the Indian discourse on citizenship from which the current concept has evolved, in three ways. The *evolutionists* see a seamless web that connects citizens of classical India with *nagariks*—the vernacular term that the Constitution employs to denote citizens—of contemporary India. *Hindutva*, *the Khalsa*, *the pan-Islamic identity*, or more regionally focused identities such as the *Naga*, *Mizo*, *Kashmiri* are examples of *involution* where the citizenship bonds point inwards in search of the deeper recesses of the collective self, beyond the mere rituals of food, dress, or social networks, or articles on individual rights enshrined in the Constitution. The third approach conceptualizes citizen making as a deliberate, “*rationally*” designed process.

Marie Lall: *The Effects of Globalisation on Citizenship in India—The Changing Role of Education.*

Marie Lall focuses on the Western concept of citizenship as it has lodged itself in Indian thinking and in the political space that is linked to the changing nature of the nation state. She suggests that the concept has been adapted by India to fit the local context of a postcolonial multicultural and multi-religious society. Education has been the prime political tool to cement citizenship values and India's classrooms are the laboratories where both the linked concepts of citizenship and national identity are forged. Just as globalization is changing the nature of the state it is also altering the nature of the social contract between state and citizens.

John Zavos: *Transnational Religion and Flexible Citizenship in Britain and India.*

John Zavos extends the idea of the political-cultural entanglement of Asian-European citizenships. He argues that religious organizations have the potential to be significant actors as dynamic new ideas of citizenship are fashioned in the challenging contexts of global transnationalism. The chapter focuses on one particular religious organization, the Bochasanwasi Shri Akshar Purushottam Swaminarayan Sanstha (or BAPS), examining its location in two different but related arenas of citizenship development, Britain and India. The chapter explores ways in which religion can operate as an ordering discourse in this context. Religious organizations, Zavos suggests, can navigate the public discourses opened up by these trends in order to enhance their sense of belonging, their status, and their access to rights in relation to national, social, and political arenas.

Barbara Harriss-White, Aseem Prakash, and Deepak Mishra *Globalisation, Economic Citizenship, and India's Inclusive Developmentalism.*

Harriss-White, Mishra, and Prakash argue that citizenship is a *universal concept* that might have a tenuous bearing on reality. There is no consensus about the concept of economic citizenship, which, they suggest is currently being exported from the European heartland to developing countries in private aid-driven projects of social entrepreneurship. It is replete with tensions. Unlike the concept of political citizenship, economic citizenship is not a concept of formal equality. Hariss-White et al. analyze the role of the state, markets and civil society in furthering the project with a range of proxy labels which de facto advances economic citizenship. Through a case study of Arunachal they show the role of a non-state, non-market institution—ethnicity—in structuring and differentiating economic citizenship.

Prasanna K. Nayak: *Inheritance of "Kingly Citizenship": Tribals at Crossroads in the Modern State of Orissa*

Prasanna Nayak highlights the *asymmetry* in the flow of citizenship by examining the case of tribal Orissa. Nayak argues that tribals who inhabit the hills and forests of Orissa enjoyed citizenship rights in their traditional set up. Culturally, they had inherited this variant of citizenship as *padarias* (rightful territorial groups) and *khunt-katidars* (early occupants of land, who slashed and cleared tree stumps). Despite many constitutional safeguards the modern state has failed to address this core issue of tribal citizenship and traditional rights. In consequence, tribal areas in

Orissa, and those in the neighboring states and elsewhere in India have become the breeding ground of Naxalites. Tribal citizenship in modern India, in Nayak's view, is at a crossroads.

Julia Hegewald: *Building Citizenship: The Agency of Public Buildings and Urban Planning in the Making of the Indian Citizen.*

Julia A. B. Hegewald explores the significant role played by *visual elements* in the making of citizenship. By focusing on the two sites of New Delhi and Chandigarh, the chapter examines these issues during two crucial periods of Indian political history: the colonial and the post-independence eras. When planning the new capital city in New Delhi architects and urban planners were conscious of the need to address two distinct audiences: the British public at home and the local Indian population. The second case, Chandigarh, illustrates the challenges the Indian postcolonial elite faced after Independence. Although an entirely national approach to building and planning, drawing exclusively on local South Asian traditions and motives could have been taken at this stage, an even stronger borrowing from the West can be observed.

Contents

1 Introduction: Citizenship as Cultural Flow—Shifting Paradigms, Hybridization, or <i>Plus ça Change</i>?	1
Subrata K. Mitra	
Section I Reimagining the Liberal Canon	
2 From T.H. Marshall to Jawaharlal Nehru: Citizenship as Vision and Strategy	25
Jivanta Schoettli	
3 Reluctant and Excluded Citizens, Differentiated and Multilevel Citizenship: Where the Indian and the European Discourse on Citizenship Meet	45
Clemens Spiess	
4 Turning Aliens Into Citizens: A “Toolkit” for a Trans-Disciplinary Policy Analysis	65
Subrata K. Mitra	
Section II Citizenship in National and Transnational Contexts: The European Union, Sri Lanka, and India	
5 European Citizenship: A Concept of Interrelatedness and Conditionality	87
Frank R. Pfetsch	
6 Who Is a Citizen?’ A Multidimensional Question	107
James Manor	
7 Citizenship in India: Evolution, Involution, and Rational Construction	121
Subrata K. Mitra	

Section III Flow Differentiated: Belief, Education, Class, Tribe, and Space	
8 The Effects of Globalisation on Citizenship in India: The Changing Role of Education	151
Marie Lall	
9 Transnational Religious Organisation and Flexible Citizenship in Britain and India	167
John Zavos	
10 Globalisation, Economic Citizenship, and India’s Inclusive Developmentalism	187
Barbara Harriss-White, Aseem Prakash, and Deepak Mishra	
11 Inheritance of “Kingly Citizenship”: Tribals at Crossroads in the Modern State of Orissa	211
Prasanna K. Nayak	
12 Building Citizenship: The Agency of Public Buildings and Urban Planning in the Making of the Indian Citizen	229
Julia A.B. Hegewald	
Notes on Contributors	265
Bibliography	267
Index	281

Chapter 1

Introduction: Citizenship as Cultural Flow—Shifting Paradigms, Hybridization, or *Plus ça Change*?

Subrata K. Mitra

Abstract Citizens are the basic building blocks of modern states. Citizenship, in this sense, is the essence of political order. It conflates the right to reside and move about within the national territory, and the obligation to defend these very same rights. Citizens share their rights and the duty to defend the integrity of their territorial space on equal terms. Conceptually, the “alien” is the diametrical opposite of the citizen. Being an alien is to be devoid of both rights and obligations. By putting these two concepts—citizens and aliens—at opposite ends of a spectrum, one could generate a scale that defines individuals in countries around the world at different levels of citizenship or alienation. The main objective of the 11 essays brought together in this volume is to describe the state of citizenship in a number of national and transnational sites. The cases and themes analyzed in this book correspond more to the expertise of the author than to a precise typology of the countries of the world. However, attempts have been made to strike a balance between the conceptual and empirical elements and to ensure the inclusion of both Europe and Asia, corresponding to the remit of the larger project of which the citizenship study is a part. (The project on “citizenship as cultural and conceptual flow” forms part of a larger project on “Asia and Europe in a Global context: Shifting asymmetries in cultural flows” supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG)).

The chapters are based on the analysis of citizenship in terms of the theories that underpin citizenship in its many forms, and refer to the infelicities that arise when liberal theory meets illiberal cultures. In the final section, the book addresses the role of education, religion, the economy, identity, and architecture in the making of citizenship. Though based primarily on case studies, the book nevertheless is

S.K. Mitra (✉)
Department of Political Science, Heidelberg University, South Asia Institute,
69120 Heidelberg, Germany
e-mail: Mitra@uni-heidelberg.de

comparative in nature. The book suggests that the variation in levels of citizenship in time and space is the result of the entanglement of two different forces. Firstly, the primary influence on the state of citizenship is the result of the evolution of the concept of citizenship germane to local culture, tradition, and religion of a specific country, refracted by social evolution and political power, articulated and written onto the statute book by the state. The second major influence on citizenship are the forces of globalization, for no nation of the world today is an island, and national citizenship is quickened by the global flow of the concepts of freedom, equity and empowerment.

This complex interplay between structure and agency, intermediated by power and the flow of ideas are crucial to the understanding of citizenship in the contemporary world. In the same vein, the chapters are a part of a larger discourse which seeks to track the course of the global flow of culture and concepts, the moving forces behind which consist of the strategies of coping with asymmetry that marks the world we live in, and attempts to reverse it through counterculture, rebellion or hybridization. The larger project, of which the work on citizenship is a part, seeks to track the course of the transnational and trans-cultural migration of concepts from one context to another. The 11 essays in this volume aim at a re-appraisal of citizenship, and beyond it, to map global cultural flow for which the essays open a valuable window to a wide array of disciplinary, theoretical and comparative perspectives. Each contribution draws out the inherent tensions between a formal definition of the concept of citizenship, institutionalized in terms of a clear set of rights, duties, and affinities, and a more amorphous reality where values, symbols and power constantly intervene. As a result, the essays highlight some of the problems that arise when citizenship is used as a universal category, free of its cultural location, politics and historicity, or as a fixed relationship between the individual and the state.

Each of the chapters focus on a different facet of citizenship, and an accompanying methodology, be it physical structures and the study of architectural plans and urban design; diversity of perception as captured through surveys; ideas and their transfer through individuals and institutions; textbooks and the politics of policy making. Nevertheless, common to each of the pieces is an emphasis on the role of the actor, juxtaposed with the state, supporting, and sometimes undermining the individual through its authority and institutions. Agency is explored both as a culturally-determined attribute as well as a strategic response to structures of domination. Both dimensions grant importance to the flow of ideas and practices over time and space—a process that has been vastly accelerated thanks to new technologies of mass communication and the transparency that, as a visible symbol of democratic accountability, is increasingly required of the holders of power.

These issues are examined in the first section of the book which explores the existing literature on citizenship studies in terms of the process of citizen making (Schoettli), the emergence of innovative concepts such as “multi-layered citizenship” (Spiess), and turning subjects into citizens in transitional societies (Mitra). Section II analyses citizenship within a transnational context (Pfetsch on the European Union), as well as national contexts (Manor on Sri Lanka and Mitra on India). Five thematic essays examine the powers of flow from different angles:

religion and flexible citizenship (Zavos), education and the middle classes (Lal), economic citizenship (Harriss-White et al.), tribal notions of citizenship (Nayak), and architecture and city planning (Hegewald). This introductory chapter sets the theoretical and comparative context for the essays by first outlining the phenomena that affect the nature and diversity of meanings attributed to citizenship in the contemporary world and then assessing the cumulative impact of these factors for a general understanding of this much frequented term of contemporary discourse.

With the endogenous and exogenous forces that account for the dynamism of citizenship as their point of departure, the analysts engage in mapping the dynamism of citizenship as a global phenomenon into the physical and notional spaces crucial to the citizen. This introductory chapter sets the stage for a comprehensive discussion of these issues. It explores the meaning of citizenship in the inner world of the actor and the observer on the basis of conversations with experts and actors. Furthermore, it identifies a lacuna in the conceptual landscape of citizenship that the book seeks to address, and sketches out a preliminary model and research design for a quantitative analysis of citizenship—which can, at best, be a snapshot of a dynamic reality.

National Politics and the Global Flow in the Making of Citizenship

While the concept of citizenship as cultural *flow* (as opposed to being *fixed* in a legal or constitutional sense) constitutes the overall framework of this book, the common approach that unites the essays—from a wide variety of disciplines—questions the character of citizenship as a top-down emanation from the commanding heights of the national state.¹ Though many of the essays have their own definition of citizenship, and follow the approach specific to the disciplines to which the authors belong, they all unite in treating citizenship as a political phenomenon that is amenable to comparative analysis, that draws on factors that go well beyond political and economic transaction, and legal specification, and which find inspiration in memory, visualization, ethnic identity, and social construction. This challenge to re-imagine citizenship emerges as much from the older, liberal democratic states of the world as it does from post-colonial states that joined the comity of nations in the wake of the Second World War.

The essays draw their empirical material broadly from the experience of Asian countries, where the conceptual flow of citizenship was accelerated by colonization, as well as from European life, which, through immigration and the creation of the European Union, is now experiencing the power of counter-flow. This challenge to the fixed parameters of the nation state comes from “neo-Europeans”. These people on the move who live their entangled lives between cultures and contexts, border

¹The modern concept of citizenship which the book draws on chronologically dates back to the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). The concept as such, however, has a much older genealogy.

crossing, and who nevertheless aspire to live a coherent, meaningful and dignified life in many different worlds simultaneously.

Although many of the chapters focus on specific national cases, the research design is comparative and cross-national and aims to open up the analytical space of a comparative and general study of the problem of citizenship. For instance, one learns from the Indian case that the relative success of the country at turning subjects into citizens, compared with the record of neighboring Pakistan or Sri Lanka, is not a unique attribute of the genius of Indian civilization. Instead, the approach adopted here formulates this as a function of India's political structure, process and memory, woven together in an institutional arrangement that draws inspiration from both the modern state and traditional society. Citizenship in a specific national arena within the post-colonial world is a hybrid category, a conflation of the embedded and the imported. More crucially, the authors consider citizenship to be part of the conceptual flow and not one that is fixed to specific nation states. Under this radically new assumption which draws together the chapters, political actors who consider themselves citizens, but are not recognized as such from within the nation state, or those seen as criminals, outlaws, or renegades, can emerge as possible harbingers of new insights into the process of citizen making.

The dual, counter-factual character of contemporary citizenship, affirming the nation state even as it undermines the fundamental basis of national power, gives this book its special take on the world we live in. In the contemporary world, riven by ethnic conflict and ideology, the search for citizenship lends a new, sometimes violent edge, to the sense of identity, space and personhood. Dormant during the post-war enthusiasm for modernization and economic growth, citizenship has emerged in the twenty-first century as a salient issue, thanks to the complementary forces of globalization and the worldwide concern with human rights on the one hand, and the emergence of ethnicity and identity as central political issues in many transitional societies. Nor is citizenship entirely unknown in the "old world" of established, industrial, liberal democracies in whose midst the desire for citizenship is as much in evidence on the part of the transient, border-crossing people on the move, as the opposition to it among the "sons of the soil."

The forces of globalization which accelerate the pace of the flow of people, things and ideas from one location to another, increasingly move the focus of political actors away from the familiar worlds of the locality, region, and nation state. They add new transnational institutions and political forces located outside the exclusive sphere of the national territory to the conventional repertoire of national actors and institutions to the range of forces that affect citizenship today. These forces affect citizenship in ways that are not immediately obvious. The relentless flows of trade, terror and technology across national frontiers challenge the conventional notions of the all-powerful nation state, sovereignty, and an exclusive national territory. Similarly, the limitless global flow of information, opportunities, and anxieties question the exclusive loyalty that the nation state conventionally demanded of its citizens. The sovereignty of the state is also breached by supra-state organizations from above, and non-state actors, refugees, immigrants and diaspora communities with divided loyalties, from

below.² However, contrary to the argument of the advocates of seamless globalization, the world is not yet “flat”—to borrow Thomas Friedman’s expression³—nor has the curtain come down on the nation state.⁴ For a vast majority of people global governance remains as much of a chimera as global citizenship. Even in retreat, states have fought hard to hold on to, and in some cases, enhance, the appurtenances of sovereignty and national interest.⁵ Many have set severe limits to the agency of border crossing, deviant, or disobedient individuals and arrogated to themselves the final say on defining the rights and duties that go into the making of citizenship.⁶

² In the era of globalization, the “structuring” of the citizen has been de-centred as the nation state no longer has exclusive control over the lives of its citizens. We learn from Bo Strath and Quentin Skinner, “It is certainly true that contemporary states attempt to do less than they used to do. They rarely claim the power or even the right to control economies, and increasingly they ask their citizens to take responsibility for their own welfare. It is also true that contemporary states have more rivals than they used to have. They live in a world of supranational agencies—the IMF, the World Bank, the United Nations—which have partly usurped their traditional functions. Meanwhile, investment and employment have fallen so much into the hands of multinational corporations that these agencies, we are constantly told, have now become the true rulers of the world.” Quentin Skinner and Bo Strath (2003), p. 1.

³ See Thomas Friedman (2005), p. 5.

⁴ Friedman explains the process of globalization in terms of the “newfound power for *individuals* to collaborate and compete globally.” He adds, “And the phenomenon that is enabling, empowering and enjoining individuals and small groups to go global is easily and so seamless is what I call the *flat-world-platform*” (emphasis in original). See Thomas Friedman, *The World is Flat: A brief history of the twenty-first century* (Picador: New York; 2005 [2007]). p. 10.

⁵ Despite the dire predictions for the imminent death of the nation state, Skinner and Strath, warn us that “the death of the state can hardly be an imminent or even a readily imaginable event. We can even point to a number of ways in which states are becoming increasingly assertive. Consider, for example, current reactions to the large-scale migration of those fleeing poverty or tyranny. This has turned increasing numbers of desperate people into candidates for citizenship in the rich states of the West. So far the response of these states has been to reassert their powers of exclusion with a new ferocity, while the response of their citizens has often been more stridently nationalistic in tone.” Skinner and Strath (2003), p. 1.

⁶ A recent controversy involving the denial of visas to Indian intelligence officers including a member of the prime minister’s advance party for the G20 Ottawa summit on the grounds that they were involved in activities that contravened Canadian human rights laws. India’s Home Ministry was “offended” and “threatened to apply similar criteria for Canadian armed forces and intelligence officers bound for the ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan.” The issue was taken up at the highest level in Canada and appears to have been solved for now. The Hindu reports: “In a statement aimed at assuaging India’s sentiments, Canadian Citizenship and Immigration Minister Jason Kenney deeply regretted the incident in which letters drafted by his consular officials during routine visa refusal cast “false aspersions” on the legitimacy of work carried out by the Indian defence and security institutions. These organisations, he acknowledged, operated under the framework of “democratic processes and the rule of law,” and assessments of candidates, in no way, questioned the functioning of these organisations. Dissociating Ottawa from the language or the “inaccurate” impression it has created, Mr Kenney felt that the problem arose from the “deliberately” broad legislation on visa policy that led to officials casting the net “too widely.” For this reason, Canada was actively reviewing the admissibility policy.” See Sandeep Dikshit, “Canada expresses regret, says it is reviewing visa policy”, The Hindu, <http://www.thehindu.com/2010/05/29/stories/20100529639001600.htm>.

The main significance of the empirical results reported in the chapters of this book arises from the fact that the ubiquity of citizenship, resulting from its assertion as well as from its contestation is no indication of its conceptual clarity or cohesion. This conceptual “messiness” of citizenship,⁷ its ambiguity and fluidity are the main concerns of this book. Grouped into three sections, the chapters examine some of the empirical untidiness of citizenship as a category of analysis in terms of the liberal theory of citizenship, its application to national and transnational contexts. Empirical in content, the essays consider such general issues as the conceptual flow of citizenship between and within cultures, the hybridization⁸ of the imported concept of citizenship and its entanglement⁹ with indigenous notions of personhood, state policies to promote citizenship and their contestation by ordinary men and women who claim citizenship, or see themselves as excluded from it.

A second important aspect of the book is the light it sheds on the juxtaposition of the power of citizenship as a global concept and its significance for the national and international power structures. The accelerated pace of the global flow of ideas has deep consequences for both the structure and agency of citizenship. New ideas of rights and entitlement have affected the way national states and international organizations view order, governance, national and international laws of travel and residence. The global flow of ideas and new technologies of communication have also affected the perception of ordinary men and women in defining their political identity, belief, faith, worship, ritual, and living space. Today, the old notions of natural and unproblematic asymmetry—the hierarchy of the developed and developing; Western and non-Western; progressive and backward states—are contested. In the contemporary world, where most dictatorships have been discredited, legitimacy that the individual might extend to the authorities or withhold from them is crucial to citizenship. While individual agency is a necessary attribute of citizenship by itself, without the macro-infrastructure of rights and institutions that the state can provide, it is not sufficient to make a citizen out of subjects and those who rebel against the authority of the national state. Political power institutions of the nation state still hold the key.

⁷ Is the slogan of “azadi” in Kashmir an assertion of citizenship (e.g. the right of citizens to participation), or the denial of citizenship (of India, whose constitution extends these rights)?

⁸ Hybridization implies the process of conflation of different concepts, leading to the creation of new ideas. See Subrata Mitra (2011).

⁹ Entanglement differs from hybridisation in the sense that two (or more) elements retain their individual selves when entangled rather than either dissolving themselves for the benefit of the other, or both fusing into one new object or idea. Modernity and tradition get entangled in some postcolonial societies in the sense that people learn to live in different worlds at the same time. See the reference to “*histoire croisée*” below in this book.

Citizen-Making: The Dynamics of Trans-Cultural Flow and Hybridization

Since the concept of flow connects the endogenous concepts of citizenship in their national contexts with the exogenous influence, transmitted through the institutions and processes of globalization, it is important at this stage to dwell briefly on the meaning and significance that the authors of this volume attach to this key concept. Charting the flow of citizenship is a complex theoretical problem. The commonsensical, everyday reference to the flow of objects suggests a movement from one place to another in a steady unbroken stream, a “continuous mass”, in a manner that would be interpersonally visible, rather as one would think about the flow of blood in veins and arteries, of water flowing downstream or electricity moving across a conductive medium. However, can one attribute these characteristics to the flow of citizenship from one context to the other, and how does the agency of individuals and groups affect the momentum—to stop the flow—or, depending on the context, accelerate it? The authors of this volume undertake this task in terms of a juxtaposition of three methodological approaches. They attempt to understand citizenship in terms of their respective disciplines. In addition, they situate citizenship in the liminal space that connects the social sciences and the humanities. Finally, beyond the disciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches, they bring into the analysis concepts and empirical phenomenon that are trans-disciplinary in the sense that these phenomena have not yet been claimed by any particular discipline.

The multiple forms of citizenship are the result of a complex set of forces which include the dynamics of the market, flow of power in international politics, and the growing network of national and international non-governmental organizations. This raises a number of questions that singly, or together, delve into the heart of the debate on citizenship today. What drives the flow of ideas, objects, and people and what significance does this have for the fixed parameters such as the nation state and linear time that underpin the world as we know it? What combination of structure and agency, on the one hand, and culture, context, national policy and conceptual inflow on the other, account for the shape that citizenship—the chosen window through which we look at the larger process of conceptual flow—takes? How does our empirical understanding of citizenship—in national and transnational contexts, but also in comparative perspective—help us to engage with these larger questions of conceptual flow, and the asymmetric relationship of Europe and Asia? How is the practical task of citizen making played out in different contexts such as heritage, education, the economy, religion, tribal identity, and the politics of space, architecture, and cityscapes? Who are “reluctant citizens” and what does the analysis of these cases signify for the whole idea of conceptual flow? Finally, do national arenas—the sites of converging and diverging flows of citizenship—generate any new concepts that are capable of a counterflow to the wider world beyond the immediate case in point?

These questions are germane to the larger project of “Asia and Europe in a Global Context: Shifting Asymmetries in Cultural Flows” that aims to understand the cultural flow marking the historical and political linkage of Europe and Asia.

The visualization of citizenship as cultural and conceptual flow makes it possible to approach citizenship in its various contexts through a “third space”, beyond the fixed structures of nation states, or the all purpose agency that generates the momentum for the flow, egged on by the conscious rejection of asymmetry. The consequences of this flow are seen in the hybridization of the imported categories, through their interaction with indigenous categories, objects, and concepts.

The research design of the cluster starts off with the assumption that transcultural flows are involved in any, even the seemingly most local, phenomena. In addition, there is also a tension between cultural symmetry (homogenization) and asymmetry (differentiation) shaping the flows. This, in fact, constitutes the process of culture, not to be understood as geographical entities, but as transregional and transnational concepts that mostly come into existence only through contact with “others”. The localized and apparently fragmented have a deeper connectivity that may not be apparent at the outset. Cultures, seen from this perspective, are therefore not social groups or geographies, but social *imaginaries* that express or create distinctions and asymmetrical flows. Culture is not seen as a clear entity with social, religious, linguistic, or geographical boundaries. Due to their imbalanced structure, the flows transgress such boundaries and mobilize strategies to prevent or create streams. Ensnared in apparently sealed, localized boxes and approached through specialized disciplines, everyday life is embedded in a deeper reality best approached through conceptual tools that are *transcultural, transdisciplinary and translingual*.¹⁰

The Liberal Canon: Contested and Re-imagined

The flow of ideas can render the fixed into the relative and the “normal” and the “natural” into the contested. Not every essay in this volume is designed to tackle each of these issues, but the fact that they engage with the core concept of the flow of ideas and institutions helps generate a larger debate about the relevance of the concept. The sections below will attempt to adapt the method of entangled history¹¹

¹⁰ One core assumption with regard to the translingual is that the modern Hindi or Chinese terms for “state”, “literature”, “history”, “election”, “religion”, “public opinion”, “health” or “environment” might all be linguistically unrelated, but they have all been formed or calqued from earlier material to accommodate and translate Western notions and have their place in a conceptual hierarchy strongly impacted by these foreign models. The Asian languages, for their part, have mostly followed recent Western models by abandoning their previous bilingualism that separated the written from the spoken language and have moved towards a new written language that is based on the vernacular. This new language, however, in its lexicon, its grammatical structures, and its metaphors is suffused with elements that go back to “Western” contact languages. Image and sound have moved in similar directions.

¹¹ See Michael Werner and Benedicte Zimmermann (2006).

to the flow of citizenship as a method in order to problematize the fixed parameters of citizenship, with the contribution of Michael Walzer (1989) as an example.

Michael Walzer's definition of citizenship has the requisite generality to constitute a bridge between conventional understanding and the radical departure from the norm that we attempt in this project. "A citizen is, most simply, a member of a political community, entitled to whatever prerogatives and encumbered with whatever responsibilities are attached to membership."¹² Deceptively simple as it is, the definition encapsulates the deep contradiction between a Jacobin view of citizenship, and its liberal interpretation. The former equates citizenship with virtue, public spirit, and the hegemony of the political over all and other spheres of life where political participation is both a right and a duty for citizens, as distinguished from slaves, subjects, aliens, and residents who are not free. The liberal interpretation understands citizenship as a necessary foundation of a full life where the individual sets her priorities—such as family, religion, the pursuit of wealth, knowledge, the arts, or leisure. Citizenship, in this sense, is "an important but occasional identity, a legal status rather than a fact of everyday life."¹³ This is in contrast to the republican view which Walzer equates with the usage of the concept in the Greek city state where politics pervaded all spheres of life and played the leading role. The liberal ("Roman", for Walzer) perspective, in contrast to the relatively small and culturally homogeneous Greek city state, is more appropriate to "large and heterogeneous populations whose members had no knowledge of one another and shared neither history nor culture."¹⁴

Tucked under the mantle of the modern state—the passport, rights, duties, frontiers—the perpetual tension between these two views, the Greek and the Roman, describes the everyday politics of contemporary liberal societies. The right to participate in liberal democracies includes the right not to participate. For advocates of issue-based politics who contest the establishment, such as feminists, ecologists, advocates of the rights of immigrants, minorities, and social deviants, apathy resulting from an excess of private pursuits, combined with political apathy, leads to an unintended legitimacy for the status quo. Their call to action—to give politics one's all, reminiscent of "aux armes, citoyens", the refrain of the French national anthem, evocative of the republican fervor of the French Revolution—can however only appeal to the fleeting and momentary enthusiasm of the masses. As Walzer, reflecting his liberal predilections, succinctly puts it, "Jacobinism enacts an inauthentic autonomy, and fails because it cannot sustain the enactment without continuous violence."¹⁵ Lucien Jaume's exegesis of the concept which identifies the three distinctive strands of citizenship—conflicting *and* intertwined—that

¹² Michael Walzer (1989), p. 211.

¹³ Walzer, *op.cit.*, p. 215.

¹⁴ Walzer, *ibid.*

¹⁵ Walzer, *op.cit.*, p. 213.

emerge out of the French revolution, provides a further explanation of the constellation of forces that unpacking the fixed parameters of citizenship reveals.¹⁶

These legacies of the past controversies are seen in the disarray that lies beneath the still surface of the ubiquitous concept of citizenship, and are reflected to various degrees in the chapters. Mitra (Chap. 4) attempts to reconcile the Jacobin and the liberal views lead him to locate it in a “third space” that unites political rights and moral obligations, the individual and the collectivity, activism and quietism. This definition combines the structure of power—be it the state or other collectivities—and the agency of the individual. As the interface of the moral and the political (Fig. 4.1, Chap. 4), this operational definition offers an insight into a dynamic concept of citizenship. Just as the state is entitled to confer the legal rights of citizenship, the moral right to belong to the national space is something that citizens give themselves. When both converge in the same group the result is a sense of “legitimate” citizenship wherein individuals feel both legally entitled to their rights and morally committed to defend them. Noncitizens are either legal citizens devoid of a sense of identification with the soil, or people with a primordial identification with the land but no legal right to it. In a postcolonial context, citizenship thus emerges as a key category, a hinge that connects the state and society. “Layered citizenship”, which underpins the process, suggests the possibility that “one might have citizenship of different political units, the level varying in accordance with the local legislation and the engagement that individuals bring to their own sense of citizenship.”¹⁷

The unpacking of the diverse ideological strands that constitute the concept of citizenship helps explain why identity politics often takes such violent turns.¹⁸ This is also the ground on which the unproblematic and linear view of citizenship, often

¹⁶ Jaume (2003) makes a distinction between three views of citizenship that emerged from the revolution of 1789. The first is the view of the moderates which refers to citizenship as a means to an end, a “form of articulation. . . between “society and power, between the private sphere and the tasks of public order.” Lucien Jaume (2003), p. 136. The second view is that of Condorcet which saw citizenship as “at attempt to liberate the *rational* capacities of the citizen (p. 131). The third Jacobin view is the most radical and saw citizenship as the equivalent of the creation of “a *virtuous* civic spirit.” (p. 132)

¹⁷ Mitra (2010), p. 53. Mitra (Chap. 4) argues that orderly and legitimate citizenship is possible only if the concept is co-authored by the modern state and the traditional society. India, the article asserts, has achieved something along these lines through India’s “layered citizenship.” The Indian strategy has consisted of making rebels into stakeholders. The constitution, innovating institutions and citizenship, has acted as a backdrop to a set of institutions, political processes and policies. This essential tension that marks the multiple strands of citizenship is discussed in greater detail by Spiess (Chap. 3).

¹⁸ As Appadurai notes, “the politics of difference has become so intense precisely because it suggests a basic change in the historical role of citizenship: it indicates the increasing disarticulation of formal citizenship as the principal norm for coordinating and managing the simultaneity of modern social identities in highly differentiated societies” (1996, p. 9).

identified with T. H. Marshall, has come in for criticism.¹⁹ In her essay “From T. H. Marshall to Jawaharlal Nehru: Citizenship as Vision and Strategy,” Jivanta Schoettli brings in the dimension of European-Indian entanglement. She argues that separated by a gap of just a few years, the British sociologist, T. H. Marshall and India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru border crossing, were contemporaries. What makes the parallel between Nehru and Marshall especially interesting is the fact that they shared the intellectual lineage of British liberalism as it had evolved in the nineteenth century and the particular variant of Fabian socialism that grew out of it in the early twentieth century. Both were preoccupied with the same questions of how to foster national integration and overcome socioeconomic divisions but within very different contexts. While Marshall was formulating a theory about the integrative function of citizenship rights to counter growing inequalities within post-war England, Nehru was debating the principles and articles of a draft constitution for a newly independent India.

Jivanta Schoettli’s essay seeks to identify some of the shared conceptual tools and institutional remedies that Marshall and Nehru reflected upon and applied. Both shared a belief in the potential for socioeconomic rights to act as the spur that would overcome divisions and disparities stemming from class in the case of England, and caste and religion in the case of India. In this way, Nehru acted as a carrier of *conceptual* and *cultural flow* from Britain to India. The chapter goes on to examine specific debates in the Indian Constituent Assembly that showcase the *transcultural* nature of decisions and institutions which later framed the discourse on citizenship within India’s postcolonial political development.

The main thrust of Clemens Spiess (Chap. 3) is to look into the overlap of European and the Indian discourses on citizenship. In order to determine this interface, the chapter provides a conceptual approach to the categories of “reluctant and excluded” citizens, and to the ideas of differentiated and multilevel citizenship. Spiess postulates that the idea of citizenship that once traveled from Europe to India got entangled with local culture, but the mutation resulting from this hybridization is confronted with the same challenges of inclusion and exclusion that characterized the European experience. Today, Europe faces similar challenges from growing cultural diversity and social inequality, as did India at the time of independence, and it has to rearrange its citizenship regimes accordingly. Both discourses share the challenges that growing transnationalism poses to their prevailing citizenship regimes. This brings Spiess to two more recent ideas of citizenship, namely differentiated and multilevel citizenship, and how they have resonated in the Indian and European discourses on citizenship respectively. The chapter asserts that both the Indian concept of a group-sensitive citizenship regime and the European experiments with multicultural citizenship rights have one thing in common. Both implicitly conceive of citizenship as a multilayered concept that sees citizenship as

¹⁹ Spiess (below) points to two important insights have been generated: that citizenship rights do not evolve cumulatively but rather in disjunctive, arrhythmic ways, and secondly that citizenship is a strategy used not just by the state but also by the individual to accumulate capital and power.

compromised by various “layers”—local, traditional, and transnational—beyond the national.

Mitra (Chap. 4) concludes this section of the volume with an analysis of the debate on the flow of liberal ideas of citizenship to non-Western societies. He suggests that progress in the field of citizenship is contingent on a rigorous exegesis of its conceptual content, the process of its transmission and its empirical correlates that can lead to a policy of citizenship. Existing theory, he argues, is not a guide to clarity on these issues. As a matter of fact, depending on where one stands in the national and international nexus of power, the status of individuals in terms of their claims to citizenship can be both confirmed and contested, depending on which strand of liberal theory of citizenship one draws on. He continues the analysis of the conceptual basis of citizenship through an inquiry into its philosophical and social construction, and sets the stage for the construction of a flow diagram that seeks to capture the dynamic process of citizen making in terms of its underlying parameters, some of which go beyond the realm of everyday politics. Towards this objective, the chapter undertakes a brief survey of the social constructions of citizenship, the evolution of the formal category of citizens from antiquity to present day, and the inner differentiation of liberal theory of citizenship, in order to cater to its complex empirical nuances and finally, to unite the various strands of citizen making in the form of a tool kit (Chap. 4). This neo-institutional model provides the basis for a *transdisciplinary* analysis of policy making with regard to citizenship.

Multiple Citizenship? The Transnational Challenge to the Nation State

Just as one asks if one could be “both Kashmiri and Indian at the same time” (see Mitra, Chap. 7), so might one ask how has the European Union succeeded in burying the memories of bitter conflicts of the past and produced the concept of European citizenship. In his chapter on the “conditionality of European citizenship,” Frank Pfetsch raises this important question in the European context. The idea of citizenship in the European Union, he argues, is different from citizenships known in customary communities or in traditional nation states. It is transnational and dual in the sense that it is linked and additional to citizenship of the member states of the European Union. Every citizen of a member state is automatically a citizen of the Union. His essay explores the various types of relationships between citizenship and political frameworks, the different dimensions of citizenship, as well as the different categories of migration with respective national and European Union regulations. Also, the political role within the institutional settings of the European Union is analysed together with the most relevant treaty regulations concerning citizenship.

Frank Pfetsch argues that as a *sui generis* model, European citizenship can only be applied within a similar multilevel regional organization. Can one extend the concept of multiple citizenship(s) germane to the European Union to other arenas of contested national citizenship? Towards this objective, Manor (Chap. 6)

identifies four interrelated ways to understand the term “citizen”. When we ask “who is a citizen?” one asks not one question but four. These are (one) who qualifies for official recognition by a particular state or government as a full member of its national community? (Two) Upon whom does a particular state or government bestow certain rights which are associated with citizenship—and what are those rights? (Three) Who affirms a set of values which are associated with citizenship: beliefs in democracy, accountability and tolerance? Finally, (four), who possesses sufficient political capacity—consisting of political awareness, confidence, skills and connections—to be able to operate effectively enough in the public sphere? The response to these questions, Manor suggests, is important for divided societies and immigrant nations. The solution to these complex problems lies in the development of the notions of group (differentiated) and of multilevel citizenship.

In Chap. 7, Subrata Mitra focuses on the concepts and measurement of citizenship in India. He delineates the Indian discourse on citizenship in three ways. The *evolutionists* see a seamless web that connects citizens of classical India with *nagariks*—the vernacular term that the Constitution employs to denote citizens—of contemporary India. Here, a fixed territory and a classical, stable, civilization become the parameters within which the concept evolves from antiquity to the present.²⁰ The concept of an unproblematic diffusion of citizenship within the territorial space of India has been contested over the course of the past decades by the proponents of collective identity as the *sine qua non* of an exclusive bond of citizenship. *Hindutva*, *the Khalsa*, *the pan-Islamic identity*, or more regionally focused identities such as the *Naga*, *Mizo*, *Kashmiri* are examples of *involution* where the citizenship bonds point inwards in search of the deeper recesses of the collective self, beyond the mere rituals of food, dress, or social networks, or articles on individual rights enshrined in the Constitution. Involution privileges identity over territory. Metaphorically, this approach presents a postcolonial landscape of citizens, subjects, and aliens as competing identities which seek to pull together their brethren around well-defined moral foci.²¹

The third approach conceptualizes citizen making as a deliberate, “*rationaly*” *designed* process.²² In this case, the process of citizen making, whether by the actors themselves, or by their mentors such as the state, national, regional, and local leaders, draw up a mixed repertoire of tactics and policies. These stretch from the reuse of heritage to the adapting of conceptual flow through a process of deliberate hybridization. While evolution does not have a clear sense of agency and involution transfers agency from the individual to the community, the third approach endows

²⁰ Readers of Janine Auboyer (2007) and Michael Edwards (1969) might notice a tendency to present the past as a source of evolution of ideas and institutions that have flowed from the past to the present. I am thankful to Julia A. B. Hegewald for bringing this reference to my attention.

²¹ “Who is an Indian?” is a question that divides and unites, and, to paraphrase Forster, the very asking of this question makes the original question disappear and reappear in the form of a larger question.

²² See Spiess, footnote one (Chap. 3) for a detailed discussion of indigenous sources of modern concepts such as civil society.

the state and the designers of institutions in postcolonial countries with the responsibility of combining cultural heritage and individual rights within the framework of modern institutions. Article 1 of the Indian constitution which states, categorically, that “India that is Bharat shall be a Union of States,” referring thereby both to heritage and design, chimes in with this approach.²³

Flow Differentiated: Belief, Education, Class, Tribe and Space

The essays in the third section of the book explore the deep recesses of India’s religions, political philosophy, culture, history, public policy, and architecture to understand the linkage between the sources of citizenship and the actual formation of the citizen in India. John Zavos extends the idea of the political-cultural entanglement of Asian-European citizenships in Chap. 9. He argues that religious organizations have the potential to be significant actors as dynamic new ideas of citizenship are fashioned in the challenging contexts of global transnationalism. The chapter focuses on one particular religious organization, the Bochasanwasi Shri Akshar Purushottam Swaminarayan Sanstha (or BAPS), examining its location in two different but related arenas of citizenship development, Britain and India. BAPS is a modern Hindu *sampradaya* with a marked transnational profile. It has branches across the world but is especially prominent in Britain and the United States as well as in India. Its primary constituency consists of Gujarati caste Hindu communities—mobile and often economically powerful communities in all of these contexts—who frequently seek to project themselves as “ecumenical” representatives of Hindu values.

This chapter is based on a notion of “flexible” citizenship drawn from the writing of Aihwa Ong. Ong argues that the late modern era invokes a flexible approach to citizenship amongst both individuals and nation states, as they seek to negotiate the dynamic flow of capital, ideas, goods, and people in a context of time-space compression. In particular, Ong argues that interdependencies develop, which work to “bring some kind of order to the disorderliness of transnational’s” (1999: 16). The chapter explores ways in which religion can operate as an ordering discourse in this context. Some nation states have increasingly come to view religion as a means of negotiating plurality and dynamism in their populations (variously conceived), and some population groups seek to secure citizenship identities in ways configured by religion. Religious organizations, Zavos suggests, can navigate the public discourses opened up by these trends in order to enhance their sense of belonging, their status, and their access to rights in relation to national, social, and political arenas. Zavos suggests that BAPS plays a significant role in the projection of Hindus as an ethnic community ideally placed to practice

²³ See the tool box on citizen making, Chap. 4, for the framework of policies and institutions that conflate conceptual flow and indigenous categories which generates the policy process to turn subjects into citizens.

the “civic virtues” associated with developing notions of citizenship in the United Kingdom, and that it is also able to position itself as central in relation to a developing civilizational discourse associated with new ideas of Indian citizenship. BAPS is a sophisticated transnational organization. He argues that it deploys its transnational organizational resources in order to adapt core values of social service (*seva*) and a form of “cosmopolitan Hinduism” to these different national contexts, producing flexible and interrelated hybrid concepts that also draw on developing notions of religion in global arenas. As such, it provides us with a significant example of the “conceptual flow” of citizenship-related ideas between states, organizations, and communities in and across Europe (United Kingdom) and Asia (India).

Marie Lall focuses on the Western concept of citizenship as it has lodged itself in Indian thinking and in the political space that is linked to the changing nature of the nation state. She suggests that the concept has been adapted by India to fit the local context of a postcolonial multicultural and multi-religious society. Education has been the prime political tool to cement citizenship values and India’s classrooms are the laboratories where both the linked concepts of citizenship and national identity are forged. Just as globalization is changing the nature of the state it is also altering the nature of the social contract between state and citizens. Lall argues that the concept of citizenship in India has been affected by globalization in two ways. First through the partial withdrawal of the state from education and the rise of private alternatives for the growing middle classes, and second through the delinking of citizenship and national identity, for which education has been the prime political tool.

Is citizenship universal or context specific? Hariss-White, Mishra, and Prakash (Chap. 10) argue that citizenship is a universal concept that might have a tenuous bearing on reality. There is no consensus about the concept of economic citizenship, which, they suggest is currently being exported from the European heartland to developing countries in private aid-driven projects of social entrepreneurship. It is replete with tensions. Unlike the concept of political citizenship, economic citizenship is not a concept of formal equality. The employer fulfils the definition of the individualist entrepreneurial actor far better than the employee. Both the definitions and the practice and propagation of the concept ignore the most common kind of economic participation, which is through wage work. Those definitions laying stress on economic citizenship, as conferred through eligibility for social support, cannot be universal since relations of dependence, which confer eligibility, are socially constructed. Emphasis on the need of active citizens to seize and engage with the vitality of “markets” avoids the consideration of markets as capitalist with a distinctive logic and dynamic that deprive workers of active economic citizenship.

The second part of Chap. 10 examines the practice of the concept of economic citizenship as one that flows from the West *per se* but is not a concept that has lodged in Indian discourse. Hariss-White et al. analyze the role of the state, markets and civil society in furthering the project with a range of proxy labels which de facto advances economic citizenship. They use case material and a mass of

literature to show how each of these major institutions may act as obstacles to what Marshall understood as a class specific and contested process. Through a case study of Arunachal they show the role of a non-state, non-market institution—ethnicity—in structuring and differentiating economic citizenship. They finally turn to India’s engagement with the global economy and analyze how transnational institutions and politics are further differentiating economic citizenship domestically.

Drawing on the “transcultural border crossing” and “translingual” concept of citizenship, the chapter by Prasanna Nayak (Chap. 11) highlights the asymmetry in the flow of citizenship by examining the case of tribal Orissa. Nayak argues that tribals who inhabit the hills and forests of Orissa enjoyed citizenship rights in their traditional set up. Culturally, they had inherited this variant of citizenship as *padarias* (rightful territorial groups) and *khunt-katidars* (early occupants of land, who slashed and cleared tree stumps). Within ethnic communities there was always the idea of citizenship in the context of the community. Tribals, under the rule of the “jungle kings” were accorded citizenship status and dignity as a community of equals. Their loyalty to the king derived from the exclusive rights, accorded by the royal authority that granted it, and with which they identified. In the post-independence decades, due to the intervention of electoral politics, linked to the individual and not the community, the traditional political structure—king-chief-village headman—underwent a transformation and citizenship in its tribal context was affected by the ferment of change. Despite many constitutional safeguards the modern state has failed to address this core issue of tribal citizenship and traditional rights. In consequence, tribal areas in Orissa, and those in the neighboring states and elsewhere in India have become the breeding ground of Naxalites. Tribal citizenship in modern India, in Nayak’s view, is at a crossroads.

Finally, in the concluding essay of this section, Julia A. B. Hegewald (Chap. 12) explores the significant role played by visual elements, in this context the design of public buildings and layout of newly-founded capital cities, in the making of citizenship. By focusing on the two sites of New Delhi and Chandigarh, the chapter examines these issues during two crucial periods of Indian political history: the colonial and the post-independence eras. She shows how, when planning the shape and decoration of governmental headquarters and the plan of a new capital city in New Delhi, built under British colonial rule in India, it becomes apparent that architects and urban planners were conscious of the need to address two distinct audiences: the British public at home and the local Indian population. Although this was strongly debated by politicians and architects at the time, the consensus reached in the end aimed to provide an architecture in which both parties were meant to find themselves reflected and to a certain extent represented. The second case, Chandigarh, illustrates the challenges the Indian postcolonial elite faced after Independence. Although an entirely national approach to building and planning, drawing exclusively on local South Asian traditions and motives could have been taken at this stage, an even stronger borrowing from the West can be observed. As Western modernism was equated with progress, transcultural flow from Europe to Asia continued with European architects in leading positions on Asian projects. Although, as Hegewald suggests cautiously, it might go too far to call this a reverse

cultural flow, there are references to local stylistic and religious aspects in the architecture of European builders in Asia.

Hegewald's chapter recaptures the issue of uniqueness versus generality of citizenship that has surfaced in several essays in the volume. Are the Indian examples unique or do they reflect more general global approaches and phenomena prevalent at the time of their conception? The chapter suggests that a number of contemporary illustrations from South Africa, Australia, China, Bangladesh, Brazil and Pakistan outline similarities as well as differences. On the whole they yield valuable insights with regards the agency of architecture and urban planning in the area of citizenship making. The conclusion sets the specific material examined in this chapter into a wider context and investigates questions of cultural and conceptual flow in citizenship making, and the case of the "reluctant citizen" in connection with visual tools and of a reverse flow. The latter started with the orientalist style of the Victorian age but continues in different forms to the present day. The mechanics of counterflow are based on power relationships. Flow used to be asymmetric because of the underlying uneven power relationship. With booming economies in the East, cultural flow has started to reverse. A number of recent constructions, public buildings designed by South Asian architects throughout the Western world, illustrate Asian architects as global citizens contributing to a counterflow of ideas and visual images back to the West.

The Global Flow of Citizenship: Europe to Asia, and Back Again?

Thanks to the global flow of ideas and objects, national citizenship, the totem of the European territorial nation states that emerged out of the Treaty of Westphalia (1649), has lost its exclusive, territorially bounded, and static character in the global age. Many today see citizenship as obsolete, or at least as a residue of the era of nation states, that is slipping steadily into oblivion. However, citizenship and its hybrid forms have shown surprising resilience. Though it is no longer a unique bond between the nation state and its exclusive territory, citizenship has metamorphosed into its new avatars. In the place of the classic passport, which proudly carries the symbolic seal of the state, one finds today an assortment of documents to suit the needs of the multinational business traveler, immigrants with multiple identities and loyalties, and the ubiquitous refugees (especially the lucky ones) with stay permits and special papers furnished by specific states. Beyond them are the illegal immigrants, living out their miserable lives in the entrails of large metropolises—hapless men, women and children on the move—who have a history but no specific destination. National frontiers, with the exception of the European Union, remain impervious to the foreigner; and even within Europe, at times of crisis, old memories of nationhood in terms of the flag and national currency edge their way to the forefront of political debate.

In an age when multinational corporations and non-state actors vie with national, sovereign states for influence in the international and national arenas, the salience of reconsidering citizenship in the light of new realities can hardly be overemphasized. Though the concept remains an integral part of the political vocabulary of our times, the sentiments and affinities that citizenship connotes have changed radically compared to the usage typical of modernization in the 1950s. Today, people no longer think of themselves in terms of the *asymmetry* that once described the relationship of citizens of the developed and the developing worlds. Finally, the cognitive content of the term itself has changed radically in terms of its scholarly understanding. This leads to a peculiar situation where a universal concept has hybridized into a myriad local and regional usages; and the usages of this category across time and space no longer connote a merely vernacular translation of a core concept. Citizenship today is a concept and an institution, but its form is not a universal constant.²⁴ These hybrid structures reflect the relative power of the indigenous ideas germane to the society and the imported concepts, their relative power, and their connectivity to the local structure of power and values.²⁵

The core issues that the authors of this volume address analyze the multiple faces of citizenship. The questions they raise have emerged as the main frontiers. How successful has the project of citizenship been in the postcolonial world? More crucially, how has the European provenance of the concept affected its legitimacy in the postcolonial world? Is citizenship an artifact of a cultural flow from the West to the non-Western world, or is it the inherent genius of each civilization, quickened by the stimulus of the contact with the West? Do policies and institutions designed to enhance citizenship work in reality? One of the main policy contributions of the research undertaken here is to show that citizenship gets accelerated when public policies enhance individuals' sense of efficacy, and public norms lead to the convergence of the innate sense of personhood by the constitution. (See Figs. 4.1 and 4.2, Chap. 4). In terms of its construction, the sense of being a citizen gets accentuated when the persons concerned can see a convergence of their deeply held beliefs and the values espoused by those in authority.

At this point, the issue that we had encountered at the outset returns with renewed vigor. Does citizenship make sense both as an analytic and empirical concept? The plethora of meanings that citizenship evokes enriches the field of research but also makes progress in this field even more difficult. The varied ways in which citizenship is understood in diverse national contexts enhances the problem of measurement, and consequently makes the search for a general theory of citizenship beyond the prevailing liberal paradigm considerably complicated. Arguably, each fragment of the citizenship discourse is critically connected to the actual existence of a citizen "out there." But, if all are citizens, and citizenship is all,

²⁴ The forms that it takes—the *polites* of the Greek polis, *civis* of the Roman empire, *cittadino* of the medieval Italian cities, the *buenger* of early modern European cities, the *sujets* of the early modern state, *citoyen* of the Jacobin state, and *citizens* of modern democratic states (Refer to the Maissen table, in Mitra, Chap. 4). – represent historically recognizable points of a continuous conceptual flow that intersects time and space at particular points.

²⁵ See below for the outline of a theory of flow dynamics concerning the migration of ideas.

then citizenship can mean precisely nothing! Is citizenship at all measurable in a manner acceptable both to the state and society, of which the individual is a part?

This conceptual uncertainty that underpins citizenship today joins new states with the old. The asymmetry that once bound them has become problematic in an era when the relationship of countries, as much as people within those countries, is more likely to be perceived as entangled²⁶ rather than hierarchic. Today, transnational citizenship questions the unproblematic view of modern, national citizenship where the political and emotive contents of this concept could be locked into the mold of the nation. The hegemony of imported notions of citizenship is challenged by the revival of premodern, endogenous concepts of citizenship, in the developed world. The pressure emerging from the flow of people, ideas, and objects has brought to the fore the need to stretch the exclusive, ethnic notions of citizenship. This is necessary to fit changed realities in which many races and ethnic groups must share the common living space of the nation on equal footings.²⁷

This is of course not to argue that the global has necessarily subsumed the national, or that flow has replaced the stationary reality of nations, boundaries, territorial space, and border checkpoints. Millions of people still live within their national states and will not know any authority other than that of the state of which they are citizens. In the contemporary world, globalization, which was meant to make citizenship and national boundaries increasingly less salient, has in fact revived their importance. The agenda of contemporary international politics is crowded with competing claims of the state and supra-state agencies on the loyalty of individuals and ethnic groups. In the absence of a global political order with binding character, nation states, acting in their capacity as the collective voice of their citizens, remain the most important agents of accountability and enforcement. Rather than the exclusive scenario of the national versus the global, the scenario that one is much more likely to come up with is one of entanglement, a *demi-monde* where one no longer knows where the nation stops and the wider world starts. The complex process through which subjects and immigrants become citizens thus pitches territoriality and ethnicity as competing norms for the entitlement to citizenship. Caught in this double bind, citizenship has become a contested category—an entangled and flexible relationship more than a fixed linkage—with the potential to become a political problem of global, as well as local importance.

In the final analysis, despite the flow of culture, objects, and people that affects all aspects of life in the contemporary world, most citizens, just like their predecessors, function within closed spaces. In that sense, the city wall was as

²⁶ Please refer to Michael Werner and Benedicte Zimmermann, “Beyond comparison: Histoire croisée and the challenge of reflexivity”, *History and Theory*, 45, Feb 2006.

²⁷ The *Economist* comments: “Striking a balance between personal and religious freedom, and the ideals of common citizenship, is proving to be an enormous test for all European countries with large Muslim populations—especially when some seem determined to assert, or even caricature, the practices of their homelands.” *The Economist* (2010).

important to the citizens of the Greek city state²⁸ as the frontier continues to be for the inhabitants of the post-Westphalian nation states and postcolonial states, late comers to the comity of nations for whom citizenship is a badge of national honor. However, in the contemporary world, the search for identity can take individuals wherever they wish, virtually if not physically, and in that sense, citizenship today cannot be exclusively bounded by territory. It extends beyond the fixed coordinates of time and space, so emblematic of the modern state. The border-crossing, entangled lives that characterize the everyday existence of traders, terrorists, technicians and “travelers”, without the necessary travel documents underscore the reality of transnational citizenship.

Some of the issues relating to multicultural and multiple citizenship are closely connected to the works of Will Kymlicka.²⁹ The main thrust of his approach is to deny the classical liberal notion of citizenship as a uniform bundle of equal individual rights and duties in a closed political community. Instead, he has argued for some form of a differentiated citizenship, which takes into account the different positions, interests, and identities of citizens that emerge from gender, racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination, and which manifest themselves in various kinds of group rights. India may be considered as a prime example of an early incorporation of group-differentiated citizenship rights in the confines of a liberal secular state—way before the discussions about multicultural citizenship brought the idea to the fore. Of course, the reasons for the tilt towards a more particularistic, group identity and entitlement oriented conceptualisation of citizenship in India can be traced back to different histories and traditions of state formation and governance on the subcontinent. The case studies which showcase the extent of India’s achievements in this field might help identify the potential for a cultural and conceptual counterflow in the field of citizenship. A post-liberal, post-national theory of citizenship that can bind together these “new kids on the block” and the older inhabitants, and make them feel comfortable in close proximity to one another within an enclosed space, is still in the making.

References

- Auboyer, Janine. *Daily Life in Ancient India: From 200 BC to 700AD* (London: Phoenix; 2007).
- Camp II, John McK. “Walls and the Polis”, in *Studies in Ancient Greek History*, Presented to Mogens Herman Hansen on his sixtieth birthday, ed. by Pernille Flensted-Jensen, Thomas Heine Nielsen and Lene Rubinstein, Copenhagen 2000, pp. 41–57.
- Dikshit, Sandeep. “Canada expresses regret, says it is reviewing visa policy”, *The Hindu*, <http://www.thehindu.com/2010/05/29/stories/20100529639001600.htm>.
- Edwards, Michael. *Everyday Life in Early India* (London: B.T. Batsford; 1969).
- Friedman, Thomas. *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century* (Picador: New York; 2005).

²⁸ See Camp II, John McK (2000), for a historical analysis of the relationship of space and boundaries in the making of citizenship.

²⁹ See, for example: Kymlicka, Will (1995).

- Jaume, Lucien. "Citizen and State under the French Revolution" in Quentin Skinner and Bo Strath, eds., *State and Citizens: History, Theory, Prospects* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2003).
- Kymlicka, Will. 1995. *Multicultural Citizenship*. Oxford: OUP.
- Mitra, Subrata K. "Citizenship in India: Some Preliminary Results of a National Survey", *Economic and Political Weekly*, February 27, 2010.
- Mitra, Subrata K. "From comparative politics to cultural flow: the hybrid state, and resilience of the political system in India", in Phillip Stockhammer, ed. 2011. *Conceptualising Cultural Hybridization: A Trans-disciplinary Approach*, Vol. 1. *Transcultural Research*. Heidelberg Studies on Asia and Europe in a Global Context (Springer Verlag, Heidelberg).
- Skinner, Quentin and Strath, Bo eds. *States and Citizens: History, Theory, Prospects* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2003).
- The Economist, "Women and veils: Running for cover". 15 May, 2010, p. 62.
- Walzer, Michael. "Citizenship", in Terence Ball, James Farr and Russell Hanson, eds., *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change* (New York: 1989).
- Werner, Michael and Zimmermann, Benedicte. "Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the challenge of Reflexivity", in *History and Theory* 45 (Feb 2006), pp. 30–50.

Section I
Reimagining the Liberal Canon

Chapter 2

From T.H. Marshall to Jawaharlal Nehru: Citizenship as Vision and Strategy

Jivanta Schoettli

Abstract Jivanta Schoettli brings in the dimension of European-Indian entanglement. British sociologist, T. H. Marshall and India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru were contemporaries. Sharing the intellectual lineage of British liberalism both were preoccupied with the same issues of national integration and socioeconomic divisions but within very different contexts. The essay seeks to identify some of the shared conceptual tools and institutional remedies that Marshall and Nehru reflected upon and applied. The chapter goes on to examine specific debates in the Indian Constituent Assembly that showcase the *transcultural* nature of decisions and institutions which later framed the discourse on citizenship within India's postcolonial political development.

The British sociologist, T. H. Marshall and India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru were close contemporaries. What makes the parallel between Nehru and Marshall especially interesting is the fact that they shared an intellectual lineage in the form of British liberalism as it had evolved in the nineteenth century, and the particular variant of Fabian socialism that had emerged out of it by the early twentieth century. Both were preoccupied with the same question of how to foster national integration: while Marshall was formulating a theory about the integrative function of citizenship rights to counter the problem of growing inequalities and class divisions within England, Nehru was debating the principles and articles of India's Draft Constitution. Furthermore, as it will emerge in this chapter, Nehru and Marshall shared a belief in the potential for socioeconomic rights to act as the spur that would overcome divisions and disparities stemming from class, in the case of England, and caste, religion, and ethnicity in the case of India.

J. Schoettli (✉)

Department of Political Science, Heidelberg University, South Asia Institute, Heidelberg, Germany

e-mail: mo6@ix.urz.uni-heidelberg.de

By focusing on Nehru this essay seeks to explore the transcultural sources and nature of debates about citizenship in India. It is contended that these discussions which took place in the 1950s occurred during a crucial phase of political and institutional transition which had long-term impact on the country's political development. The chapter considers what is meant by the term, "transcultural," examining closely two core analytical concepts: the *social imaginaire* and the pervasiveness of *asymmetry* in cultural flows. Both, it is argued, are useful tools when trying to incorporate culture and conceptual flows into an analysis of how institutions emerge and evolve across time and space. In the second part of the paper, citizenship is discussed as an example of institutional change using the two concepts of the social *imaginaire* and asymmetries in cultural flow. This is done on two levels. First, Jawaharlal Nehru himself is portrayed as a carrier, a facilitator of cultural flow par excellence. Secondly, the discourse in the Constituent Assembly Debates (CAD) surrounding questions of religious and minority rights for India's citizens is analysed. Meeting over a period of almost 3 years in 11 parliamentary-style sessions to hammer out the country's constitution, the CAD provide an excellent insight into the terms of debate about fundamental principles of freedoms, rights, and equality.

The topic of religion and minority rights highlights how the transfer of ideas and practices was a two-way process during the colonial period with important ramifications for institution building and policy making after independence. Furthermore, the modernisation package which Jawaharlal Nehru came to personify entailed not only a *vision* of modern India but also brought in its wake *strategies* that complicated and compromised the delineation of citizen rights and the definition of equality. It is argued that both vision and strategy are important components of any institution and are essentially products of a dynamic process involving cultural and conceptual flows. A final section summarises the value added of analysing citizenship in transcultural terms.

Citizenship as Vision and Strategy

Most studies of citizenship tend to adopt a historical perspective, culminating in modern times, implying a cumulative process of citizenship rights. In extreme cases there is a teleological sense of progress implied in the various stages but usually a narrative is presented linking "original" ideas of the Athenian citizen and Roman civitas to the modern phenomena of the nation state and ideas of territorial sovereignty and citizenship. Such descriptions tend to locate the momentum propelling the practice and discourse of citizenship in sites of conflict and struggle. The universalist or unitary model defines citizenship primarily as a legal status through which an identical set of civil, political, and social rights are accorded to all members of the polity. T. H. Marshall's seminal essay "Citizenship and Social Class" is the main reference for this model, which became progressively dominant in post-World War II liberal democracies. Marshall's central thesis was that the twentieth century's

expansion of social rights was crucial to the working class's progressive integration in British society (Marshall and Bottomore 1950:11). Similar stories were told in other Western democracies: the development of welfare policies aimed at softening the impact of unemployment, sickness, and distress it was argued was fundamental to political and social stability. The apparent success of the post-war welfare state in securing social cohesion was a strong argument in favour of a conception of citizenship focused on the securing of equal civil, political, and social rights.

However, more recently scholars have begun to discuss the fact that the emergence of citizenship depends not only on changes in the material distribution of power but also results from the shifting of ideas, beliefs, and values.¹ By taking such variables into account there is greater scope for analysing the variation that occurs across time and space in terms of what Homi Bhabha has described as the "in-between forms which derive from the selective reception of or even resistance to foreign goods, ideas and practices." (Bhabha 1994) Taking this into account it is possible to think of citizenship as being a universal ordering device and norm, as well as one that varies in meaning and contestation according to context.

The chapter draws upon two key conceptual tools: the social *imaginaire* and the notion of asymmetry. In a paper titled "Cultures of Democracy and Citizen Efficacy" Charles Taylor uses the social *imaginaire* to demonstrate how transitions to democracy will be very different from each other because the people concerned are moving from very different pre-democratic repertoires and are often moving to rather different variants of democratic imaginaries (Taylor 2007). The social imaginary for Taylor consists of "an ensemble of practices which they can make sense of" and which in turn depends on (one) the actors having a sense of themselves as forming a collective agent, capable of acting together; and (two) the ensemble of actors knowing what to do, or in other words having agreed practices in its repertory that put the new order into effect. Such an approach provides an alternative perspective to common views of development and acculturation, the former often portrayed as a stage-by-stage process and the latter, usually described as the wholesale adaptation to an emulated culture. Instead, as Taylor concludes, "we should not think of transitions as different routes to the same (at least hoped-for) end point, a stable democracy of a normal kind. In fact, democracies are path dependent; the founding transitions they undergo mark their future." (Taylor 2007: 121) Furthermore, as Homi Bhabha and others have pointed out, the accepted wisdom of acculturation and development disregards the agency of the members of the receiving society and their active role in shaping asymmetrical cultural contacts.

In fact it is precisely the condition and nature of *asymmetry* which the Heidelberg Cluster of Excellence "Asia and Europe in a Global Context: Shifting Asymmetries in Cultural Flows" uses as one of its central heuristic devices to explore the dynamics of cultural flows. A few core aspects are identified:

¹ See the work of the Indian sociologist, Andre Beteille for example.

1. The notion of asymmetry in cultural flows is neither a passive nor a constructed constellation, but itself a factor whose perception releases a broad range of creative and destructive manifestations of human agency.
2. As a result this is an approach that recognises the instability of cultural flows over time and takes issue with the idea of “culture” as a clear entity with social, religious, linguistic or geographical boundaries.
3. In the process history is itself part of the conceptual asymmetry and plays a key role in structuring the social *imaginaire*.
4. Context is given great importance in terms of the diversity it generates in the voices and actions of human agents.

However, since it is argued here that citizenship is essentially about policies and policy-making the chapter makes the added contention that vision and strategy together determine the staying power of a particular policy preference. A mix of value and instrumental rationality,² emerging from the social *imaginaire* and asymmetries generated by cultural flow congeals to produce a particular policy. As a result, rather than conceive of citizenship in terms of being struggle-driven, or a top-down/bottom-up, or an active versus passive development, a transcultural perspective involves an analysis that takes asymmetry to be at the root of change, transformation, innovation, and conflict. Since human agents are involved, the *perception* of this asymmetry unfolds a particular dynamic of its own and becomes one of the driving forces of human agency and interaction. It is argued in this essay, and demonstrated in the following section, that even citizenship, with its tendency towards a uniform and universal understanding of legal rights and the propensity of a rights-based conception of citizenship to increase pressures for mass political participation, is a *transcultural* phenomenon.

Nehru’s Challenge in Marshall’s Terms

Jawaharlal Nehru is an illustrative case of the above statement. As one of the key negotiators with the British and a central shaper of modern India’s institutions, Nehru’s views on citizenship, the state, and national unity act as a crucial prism for understanding his policy, preferences, and choices. Born in 1889 into a wealthy Brahmin family that had settled in Allahabad in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh, though originally hailing from Kashmir, the child Jawaharlal was exposed to both great religiosity from his mother, Swarup Rani, and the highly Westernised habits

²Max Weber, and the distinction he drew between ‘instrumental’ and ‘value’ rationality, is constructive. Rationality in its more traditional sense implied a consequential logic where social action is “determined by expectations as to the behaviour of objects in the environment and of other human beings; these expectations are used as conditions or means for the attainment of the actor’s own rationally pursued and calculated ends.” Weber’s “value” rationality drew attention to outcomes that cannot simply be explained in utilitarian terms, when action is “determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behaviour, independently of its prospects or success”.

and views of his father, Motilal Nehru. From 1901 to 1904 Jawaharlal was educated at home by a European tutor and then sent, at the age of 16, to Harrow, and from there to Trinity College, Cambridge where he graduated with a lower second in the Natural Sciences Tripos in 1910. In accordance with the wishes of his father Motilal Nehru, a highly successful barrister and political figure in his own right, Jawaharlal went on to read law at Gray's Inn, London, the same place where before him Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Muhammad Ali Jinnah among others, had studied. It is during this time that Jawaharlal encountered the movement of Fabian Socialism popular at the time in Britain, through the lectures of Harold Laski at the London School of Economics and began to develop his own political outlook.

Key developments in the political and intellectual climate of turn-of-the-century Britain were to play a crucial role in shaping the policies of both post-war Britain and independent India. Amongst these, the influence of the Fabian society is an important prism through which to observe the change and continuity in ideas and practices from the age of Victorian utilitarianism to the post-war social democracy and welfare politics of the Labour Party. Founded in 1883, the Fabian society attracted a number of intellectuals including among others, George Bernard Shaw, H. G. Wells, Annie Besant, Harold Laski, Beatrice and Sidney Webb. What is interesting is how closely Nehru's thoughts on the state, modernisation, and development reflected the twin sources of ideas popular at the time in Britain: utilitarianism and Fabianism.

Crucial to note is that the utilitarian idea of progress was not only the progress brought about by scientific innovation; so was the reform of the existing social order. Hence, Governor-General Dalhousie saw it as his duty to tackle the problems of infanticide, female education, and the treatment of Hindu widows. Unity of authority, uniformity of management, and legal practices were essential principles within this vision of governance. Codification was to emerge as one central instrument to put these principles into practice. References by Dalhousie to "the good of the community," "the interests of the public," and "the welfare of mankind" were echoes of the central utilitarian, "Greatest happiness of the greatest number precept."

Fabianism, as a current of political thought emerged in response, or rather, in dialogue with the dominant ideas and experiences of industrialisation during the Victorian age. Believing in the possibility of gradual transition and reform, the Fabian Society rejected notions of class struggle and revolutionary change advocated by Marx's followers. Instead, it was argued that evolutionary and constitutional methods, the use of persuasion and permeation, would bring about a gradual process of socialisation. Although Fabianism came to be embraced by the post-war Labour government it was never a doctrinal set of principles. The main goal of its adherents was to tackle the great injustices wrought by the capitalist system and to spread the theory of evolutionary socialism. As a result, democracy was to play a central part in the Fabian outlook given that it provided the opportunity to bring about change peacefully and gradually.

Emerging from the hothouse of Fabianism that was the London School of Economics (LSE), Marshall was also deeply immersed in the liberal socialist tradition of the LSE where he taught from 1925 to 1956. Teaching at the same

time at the LSE were Harold Laski and Lord William Beveridge who was director of the School (1916–1937) and author of the parliamentary Social Insurance and Allied Services Report, more commonly known as the *Beveridge Report* in which he famously proposed a model of citizenship that included a social security system that would be “an attack upon want.” By the 1930s Laski was advocating that only the state could provide for those interests which all citizens did share in common. Laski, too, emphasised the prominence of the economic factor. “Changes in the methods of economic production appear,” he thought “to be the most vital factor in the making of change in all the other social patterns we know. For changes in those methods determine the changes of social relationships; and these, in their turn, are subtly interwoven with all the cultural habits of men.” He claimed that the economic factor is “the bedrock upon which the social superstructure is built,” and that “the way in which it mainly operates is through the struggle of economic classes to possess the state-power.” For all these luminous public figures and scholars, therefore the state represented the key actor that would act in favour of the public good.

Marshall’s core contribution was to argue that the extension of citizenship could act as a political instrument of integration to counterbalance the divisive forces of class inequalities. To add legitimacy to his proposal, Marshall constructed a theory of citizenship based upon the central claim that citizenship had grown incrementally and was expressed progressively, in three different dimensions, namely the civil, the political, and most recently the social. The eighteenth century, according to his schema, had witnessed the development of civil rights, targeting mainly the legal status and civil rights of the individual, rights which were to be defended in a law court. Core rights in this case referred to freedom of speech, the right to a fair trial and equal access to the legal system. Moving into the nineteenth century, Marshall noted the extension of political rights, an outcome of the working-class struggle for political equality, through greater access to the parliamentary process. Improvements under this rubric referred to electoral rights, the invention of the secret ballot box, the creation of new political parties and the expansion of the franchise. Finally, the twentieth century, according to Marshall, engendered “social rights,” which included claims to welfare, entitlements to social security, and unemployment benefits, etc. In addition to this stage-by-stage account of citizenship, Marshall observed the emergence of a “hyphenated society,” a social system where there was perpetual tension between the need for economic profitability, the taxation requirements of the modern state, and the rights of citizens to welfare provisions.

For Nehru, tackling the challenge of national integration in a country of vast socioeconomic disparities, beset by linguistic, ethnic, and religious fault lines, the state also represented a beacon light as the only guarantor of a fundamental equality of status. Having been granted very limited and partial access to civil and political rights under the British, the great hope for the modernists of independent India was that social (and implicitly economic) rights would provide the basis for a more equal and unified society. A prime example of this is the 1931 Congress Party Resolution on Fundamental Rights, which was the brainchild of Jawaharlal Nehru and came to be known as the Karachi programme. It would later be described as the first commitment of the Congress to an economic programme. Hence, while the

Nehru Committee Report of 1928 had recommended among other things free elementary education, the maintenance and improvement of labour and economic conditions, the maintenance of health, etc., the Karachi Resolution went further and provided for the organisation of economic life on the “principle of justice” and “to safeguard the interests of industrial workers.” Later, during the Constituent Assembly Debates, Jawaharlal Nehru, when moving the Objectives Resolution, spoke of the content of “economic democracy” and went on to emphasise the “promise of food and opportunity for all.” (Tiwary 1967: 154)

Given the—perhaps misconceived—shared intellectual milieu, it was not surprising that Nehru spoke in terms and about conditions that were more relevant to industrialised societies, such as that of Britain and the Soviet Union. However, aside from the obvious transfer of ideas, both popular and radical, at the time, the case of Nehru and policy making in 1950s India, encapsulates a far more convoluted and coagulated process of cultural flow, as a close analysis of his views on religion and minorities will reveal.

Nehru on Religion: Instilling a Modern Imaginaire

As has often been quoted, when asked what had been his greatest challenge as prime minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru replied, “Building a secular state in a religious country.” On the topic of religion, Nehru propounded various arguments portraying its negative effects on society and politics. His earliest published volume, *Letters from a Father to his Daughter*, is extremely negative about the role of religion. Describing the origin of religion which, “first came as fear. . . But however, much it may have grown, we see even today that people fight and break each other’s heads in the name of religion. And for many people it is still something to be afraid of. They spend their time in trying to please some imaginary beings by making presents in temples and even sacrifices of animals.” (Nehru 1981: 41)

Another common attack against religion was that it was partly to blame for India’s weaknesses and a reason why the region had succumbed to imperial rule. With independence the country was to wipe the slate clean and start anew by embracing modernity. The radicalism of the early Jawaharlal Nehru shows through particularly in speeches aimed at rousing the young. For example, in his presidential address to the Bombay Presidency Youth Conference in 1928, Nehru proclaimed:

We must aim, therefore, at the destruction of all imperialism and the reconstruction of society on another basis. . . Our national ideal must, therefore, be the establishment of a cooperative socialist commonwealth and our international ideal, a world federation of socialist states. Before we approach our ideal, we have to combat two sets of opponents—political and social. We have to overcome our alien rulers as well as the social reactionaries of India. . . Religion has in the past often been used as an opiate to dull men’s desire for freedom. . . Religion has been the fountain-head of authoritarianism and meek submission. (Gopal 1987a: 206–7)

On numerous occasions Nehru expressed his firm conviction that religion and religious categories would lose their relevance; for example, this crops up during a series of articles written between 1933 and 1934, published in various newspapers.

In response to Muhammad Iqbal who had accused Gandhi of preventing Muslims and the “Harijans” from making common cause at the Round Table Conference, Nehru stated “Personally, I am not interested in religious labels and I am sure that they will soon disappear, or, at any rate, cease to have any political significance.” (Nehru 1934: 62)

Nehru went on to define his outlook which “is not religious and I find it difficult to think of groups in terms of religion. Sir Mohammad evidently does so to the exclusion of other and more modern ways of thinking, and I am afraid he confuses religion with race and culture.” (Nehru 1934: 63)

The unity of India was a central concern for Nehru during this period and almost all his books deal with this theme either from a historical, cultural angle or in terms of the success of a national freedom movement. Though it is not mentioned explicitly, secularism does begin to appear in Nehru’s vision as the glue for holding together a state such as India and providing the basis for a national consciousness, overcoming “numerous superficial differences.” (Nehru 1934: 65) Furthermore, the early Nehru demonstrated awareness for the challenges entailed in establishing a level playing field where the majority community makes compromises and the minority community feels protected and not disadvantaged. However, as Nehru himself pointed out in his retort to Iqbal, “What are these minimum safeguards (for the protection of a minority) and who is to decide them? The minority itself? How are we to know what the minority community really desires? Are we to take the opinion of any small group claiming to represent the community? And when there are several such groups, what are we to do?” (Nehru 1934: 66)

Much later on, Nehru’s writings in prison reflected a deepening faith in modernisation and a “scientific rationalism.” Hence the scientific approach was described by Nehru as “the refusal to accept anything without testing and trial, the capacity to change previous conclusions in the face of new evidence, the reliance on observed fact and not on pre-conceived theory, the hard discipline of the mind—all this is necessary, not merely for the application of science but for life itself and the solution of its many problems.” (Nehru 1985: 512) Whilst in contrast, the methods employed by religion were seen as compounding society’s problems:

Concerned as it is principally with the regions beyond the reach of objective inquiry, it relies on emotion and intuition. And then it applies this method to everything in life, even to those things which are capable of intellectual inquiry and observation. Organised religion, allying itself to theology and often more concerned with vested interests than with things of the spirit, encourages a temper which is the very opposite to that of science. It produces narrowness and intolerance, credulity and superstition, emotionalism and irrationalism. It tends to close and limit the mind of man, and to produce a temper of a dependent, unfree person (Nehru 1985: 513).

Although Nehru had his differences with Gandhi he chose not to publicise them too much. One such occasion when he did articulate his disagreement with Gandhi’s goals and methods occurred in September 1932 when Gandhi began a “fast unto death” on the subject of separate electorates for India’s “depressed classes” which Gandhi considered to be a British attempt to divide and undermine Indians along further cleavages. Nehru, on the other hand, considered this to be a “side issue”, writing in his autobiography that he “felt angry with Bapu at his

religious and sentimental approach to a political question. . . And his frequent references to God—God has made him do this—God even indicated the date of the fast. . . What a terrible example to set!” (Gopal 1987b, Volume 5: 408)

Nehru’s ideas about religion and the “false consciousness” behind the forces of communalism were in sync with the world view of British social reformers and liberal radicals of his time. However, two important ambiguities were to manifest themselves in Nehru’s own writings and ultimately in the articles of the constitution. Despite being adamant about the negative side effects of religion and its inevitable waning significance in the face of modernisation, Nehru adopted a more “understanding” approach towards Islam and India’s Muslim community. This apparent contradiction with his stance towards Hinduism is most obviously manifest in his position on the Hindu Code Bill and the Uniform Civil Code, which will be examined below. Secondly, Nehru’s extensive tirade against religion through most of his political career did not generate a coherent theory or position on what the role of the state should be towards religion. In fact, no clear statement on secularism was to emerge, neither from Nehru’s writings and pronouncements nor out of his policies later on in government.

Nehru on Islam and Minorities: Perceived Asymmetries in Cultural Flow

Nehru’s position on minority rights was pervaded by an exaggerated sense of the asymmetries between Hindus and Muslims that he believed to be historically entrenched and which had become politically institutionalised under colonial rule. Hence, he posited that, “a special responsibility does attach to the Hindus in India both because they are the majority community and because economically and educationally they are more advanced.” (Gopal 1987c Volume 6: 168) However, while Hindus are berated for having fallen behind the rest of the world because of inherently retrograde social customs such as the caste system and mystification, the particular Muslim trauma had to be treated differently given that it suffered from exogenous shocks. The following needs to be quoted at length as it captures this sentiment well:

Moslems have produced few outstanding figures of the modern type. They have produced some remarkable men but, as a rule, these represented the continuation of the old culture and tradition and did not easily fit in with modern developments. This incapacity to march with the changing times and adapts them culturally and otherwise to a new environment was not of course due to any innate failing. It derived from certain historical causes, from the delay in the development of a new industrial middle class, and the excessively feudal background of the Moslems, which blocked up avenues of development and prevented the release of talent. In Bengal the backwardness of the Moslems was most marked, but this was obviously due to two causes: the destruction of their upper classes during the early days of British rule, and the fact that the vast majority were converts from the lowest class of Hindus, who had long been denied opportunities or growth and progress. (Nehru 1985: 390)

As a result, the narratives Nehru constructed to explain the weaknesses of religious communities to cope with modernity rested on very different explanatory

variables. On the one hand Hinduism is portrayed as inherently backward whilst the fate of Islam is to be empathised with because of the negative outcomes resulting from its encounter with British rule. This lopsidedness persists through most of Nehru's writings and into his years of policy making as prime minister. For example, although communalism was condemned by Nehru both in its Hindu and Muslim variants, the harsher criticism was always directed at the Hindu Mahasabha.

Another instance of bias arises in his book, *The Discovery of India*, where Nehru devotes quite a few pages to "secular" thinkers and movements like that of Vivekananda, Rabindranath Tagore and Annie Besant, but hardly acknowledges the important reform movements of the Brahma Swaraj and Arya Samaj³ which were more explicitly based on Hindu philosophy, Hindu practices, and ideals (Nehru 1985: 335–41). On the Muslim front however, Nehru lauds the more religious reform movements such as Sir Syed Ahmad Khan's Aligarh Movement⁴ as well as more secular Muslim leaders like Abdul Kalam Azad. Recognising the psychological dilemmas that Indian Muslims faced over matters of history and allegiance, Nehru wrote with compassion about the challenges they must have faced. For, "to begin with, the new middle classes were almost absent among the Moslems. Their avoidance of Western education, their keeping away from trade and industry, and their adherence to feudal ways, gave a start to the Hindus which they profited by and retained. . . . The Revolt of 1857 was a joint affair, but in its suppression Moslems felt strongly, and to some extent rightly, that they were the greater sufferers. This Revolt also put an end finally to any dreams or fantasies of the revival of the Delhi Empire." (Nehru 1985: 380–83)

The spread of rioting across India in the mid-twenties, that involved sections of the Hindu and Muslim communities, compelled Nehru to take a clearer position on the question of religion in politics. The process of divergence between the religious communities was further aggravated by British official policy, symbolised by the establishment of separate electorates; and as the franchise was broadened periodically on this basis, the communal elements grew correspondingly stronger. From this analysis Nehru drew the conclusion that the communal problem was a wasteful diversion from the main campaign against the British. The communal parties, both Hindu and Muslim, derived their support from the feudal and upper classes and were defensive of vested interests in seeking office and employment from the British. So, to Nehru, these communal parties were giants with feet of clay who would fade into nothingness in the light of reason once the British were pushed out. He, therefore, in accordance with his favourite strategy of indirect approach, ignored the communal problem and concentrated his energies on the national movement against foreign rule and the need to give that movement an economic slant rather than develop a coherent agenda in regards to what form a secular state was to take.

³The *Brahmo Samaj* and *Arya Samaj* movements were both important Hindu reform movements founded in the mid-nineteenth century.

⁴A movement launched in the mid-nineteenth century to educate Muslims of the Indian subcontinent.

These ambiguities on the nature of secularism in the Indian context as well as the special rights to be guaranteed to minorities are also apparent in the articles of the constitution itself. The following section deconstructs some of the debates that occurred within the Constituent Assembly and the implications this had for the making of the Indian citizen.

The Post-Colonial State: Delineating the Indian Citizen

The Constitution of India, with its 395 articles and eight schedules, is the longest constitution in the world. Perhaps what is most interesting about the document is the duality on a number of issues that is enshrined in its provisions. For instance, it is committed to both individual and group rights, and on the subject of religion there is considerable room for interpretation and manoeuvre. A number of articles appear to explicitly support the “wall of separation” position with regards the state and religion. Article 15 (1) states that the state shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth, and Article 16 (1) and (2) of the Indian constitution affirms an equal opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment of any office under the state. It further affirms that no citizen, on grounds of religion or race, can be ruled ineligible for or be discriminated against in respect of any employment or office under the state. Under Article 25 (1), “all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate religion” and Article 29 (2) declares that no citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the state on grounds only of religion, race, and so on. The clause on universal franchise declares a general electoral roll for all constituencies and states that no one shall be ineligible for inclusion in this roll or claim to be included in it on grounds only of religion.

At the same time there are articles which directly enjoin the state to intervene on the behalf of religion. Article 30 (1) recognises the rights of religious minorities. Secondly, Article 30 (2) commits the state to give aid to educational institutions established and administered by religious communities. Also permitted is religious instruction in educational institutions that are partly funded by the state. These are significant departures from the “wall of separation” view of the secular state. Even more significant are Articles 17 and 25 (2) that *require* the state to intervene in religious affairs. Article 25 (2) (b) notes that “nothing in Article 25 (1) prevents the state from making a law providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus.” Article 17 is an uninhibited, robust attack on the caste system, arguably the central feature of Hinduism, and abolishes untouchability and makes the enforcement of any disability arising out of it an offence punishable by law.

For some, the ambiguous nature of secularism in India means that it is no longer secularism in the Western sense of the term. Scholars have argued that secularism in India has to be understood in terms of its particular cultural background and social context. For instance, Rajeev Bhargava identifies four important aspects (Bhargava 2002: 24):

1. First, there exists the mind-boggling diversity of religious communities in India. Such diversity may coexist harmoniously but it invariably generates conflicts, the most intractable of which, I believe, are deep conflicts over values.
2. Within Hinduism in particular and in South Asian religions more generally, a greater emphasis is placed on practice rather than belief. A person's religious identity and affiliation are defined more by what s/he does with and in relation to others, than by the content of beliefs individually held by them. Since practices are intrinsically social, any significance placed on them brings about a concomitant valorization of communities.
3. Many religiously sanctioned social practices are oppressive by virtue of their illiberal and inegalitarian character, and deny a life of dignity and self-respect. Therefore, from a liberal and egalitarian standpoint, they desperately need to be reformed (. . .). It follows that an institution vested with enormous social power is needed to transform their character.
4. In Hinduism, the absence of an organized institution such as the church has meant that the impetus for effective reform cannot come exclusively from within. Reform within Hinduism can hardly be initiated without help from powerful external institutions such as the state.

This chapter proposes that simply listing the particularities of the Indian case certainly stretches the applicability of the term secularism but in the process divests it of the value and instrumental rationality contained within its particular Indian institutional form. Instead, it is argued that the multifaceted nature that secularism has taken on in Indian citizenship has to be understood in light of the country's particular experience of cultural flows and the coping mechanisms that this generated. This means that the tensions and contradictions generated over group rights and individual rights and the provisions that arise for an equal citizenry are different in India and cannot be simply dismissed as deviations or discrepancies.

For example, having experienced the institution of separate electorates introduced by the British, a distinction was drawn in the Constituent Assembly Debates between community-based *civic* rights and religion and caste-based political rights. Hence, separate electorates were considered and vehemently rejected in the CAD. In fact, this became a discussion about equal citizenship rights and it was argued that special political rights were not to be granted because this would lead to permanent divisions and permanent minorities whilst instead as one of the members put it, "the minorities must be dissolved into the majority by justice." (As argued by Hridaya Nath Kunzru in the Constituent Assembly Debates).

Justice was to stem from the granting of community-based social rights. For instance, for Ambedkar, such minority rights had an absolute status. When preparing the interim report on fundamental rights he was asked by Mahavir Tyagi if the grant of cultural and educational rights to minorities in India should not wait until the fate of minorities residing in Pakistan was more clearly known. Ambedkar replied firmly that the rights of minorities are not relative or conditional upon the decision of other states but were absolute: "No matter what others do", he urged, "we ought to do what is right in our own judgement and, therefore, every minority, irrespective of any other consideration, is entitled to the right to use their language, script and culture and the right not to be precluded from establishing any educational

institution that they wish to establish.” As a result, minority rights were firmly entrenched within the Indian political and social *imaginaire* and produced an Indian constitution that was to be committed to citizenship founded on universal principles of equality based on the individual, as well as claims hinging on group difference.

The Post-Colonial State: Coping with Cultural Flow

To fully understand the terms of debate within which even present-day discussions about religion and minority rights take place in India, it is insightful to examine long-run processes of cultural flow. This is useful because it highlights the extent to which issues and ideas are inevitably transcultural. For example, the establishment of formal British rule brought with it a radical break with existing customary relationships between the ruling institutions and the religious institutions. In those relationships, both in the Hindu and Islamic traditions, religion had supported kingship while the kings had protected and maintained religion. Both traditions stress that the ruler should order society according to sacred law, endow places of worship and support religious schools, etc. This understanding was transmitted with great clarity and pragmatism to the British, too. For example, a letter that the priests of the Hindu temple complex at Puri wrote to Lord Wellesley, the Governor-General in 1804, after the British East India Company had extended its control from Bengal to the coast of Orissa, welcomed Wellesley as their new ruler and informed him that he owed his victory to their gods and that he must now support their temples. (Embree 2002)

As the British became rulers in the late eighteenth century, the East India Company's officials continued to be involved with local religious institutions, even going so far as to administer pilgrim taxes and participate in the selection of priests. Coinciding with a rise of evangelicalism in Britain, this produced a backlash that was to have a formative role in the policy of the British government in India toward the religion of its subjects. In the first place, the zeal to spread the Christian faith set in and, secondly, the compulsion that the Christian faith required to attack what was regarded as social evils. At home, the list of such evils was long and disparate, but included, most prominently, the slave trade, child labour, prostitution, drunkenness, and ignorance of Christian truth. In India, the list was longer, but it is of fundamental importance that these social evils were caused, in the evangelical reading of the nature of Indian society, by the Hindu religion itself, not by its racial composition.

Occurring at a time when utilitarianism was also taking root, the justifications for reformist policies were justified on the grounds of good governance. A great test of the colonial compromise, of giving good government while not grossly offending the religious sensitivities of the ruled, came to a head over the demand, largely from groups in England, that the British government in Bengal should ban the practice known as “sati”. In 1829, Governor-General Lord William Bentinck finally declared

the practice illegal throughout the Indian territories under British control. His minute justifying his action is a reasoned statement of how a government, while holding to a principle of neutrality and non-interference in the religious beliefs of the people, can nevertheless use coercion in a specific instance to make drastic revisions to religious practices. The Bentinck minute was a precursor to the escape clause that the makers of the Indian constitution included 120 years later when they sought to guarantee complete freedom of religious belief and practice. This freedom was “subject to public order, morality and health,” and the state had the right to regulate and restrict any “secular activity” associated with religion, if it violated the public good.

With the 1857 mutiny yet another disjuncture can be identified with Queen Victoria’s proclamation to her Indian subjects at the end of the uprisings, which included the most explicit statement yet made about the British government’s attitude toward religion. “While firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity,” the Queen declared, “We disclaim alike the right and the desire to impose our convictions on any of our subjects.” None was to be favoured or molested because of religion, and those in authority were to abstain from “all interference of the religious belief or worship of any of our subjects.”

As a result, the postcolonial state of independent India was inheritor to all these approaches on the subject of religion and minority rights ranging from the position that the state must actively sustain religion, that the state must simply be guided by principles of good governance and the greatest good, to a position of noninterference and neutrality. Each came equipped with a particular vision of the public good, as well as a set of strategic resources drawn from the inheritances of three radically different civilisations of India, the Islamic world, and the West. The cultural flows that occurred entailed a constant flow and counterflow, a reshaping of the rules of the game which generated new forms in the process. This contention is examined below in light of the debates on secularism and the Hindu Civil Code and the ongoing political discourse about the fate of a Uniform Civil Code that would guarantee the provision of equal rights to all citizens of India.

Vision and Strategy in the Making of the Indian Citizen

1. The Debate on Secularism

In the Constituent Assembly on 17 October, 1949, disagreement and acrimonious debate occurred over the incorporation of the principle of secularism. On that day H. V. Kamath began the discussions by moving an amendment to begin the preamble with the phrase, “In the name of god.” Opponents to Kamath’s amendment continued to insist that religion was a matter of individual choice and that on this matter the collective will should not be imposed. Kamath’s amendment was defeated by 68 to 41. However, the Assembly also turned down a suggestion from the opposition, who wanted to include the word “secular” in the preamble.

Brajeshwar Prasad from Bihar moved that the first sentence of the preamble begins as follows: “We the people of India, having resolved to constitute India into

a secular cooperative commonwealth to establish socialist order and to secure to all its citizens (...).” Unfortunately there was no discussion on the inclusion of the term “secular”; most members ridiculed Brajeshwar Prasad’s attempt at making the constitution a socialist instead of liberal democratic document, and his amendment was turned down for that reason.

For this issue we can see three alternative positions in the controversy around the preamble. The first saw a definite line of separation between religion and the state. Given the principles of freedom of expression and religious liberty, it was up to the individual to decide whether or not to be a believer, or to adhere to this or that religion. Therefore the preamble could not contain any references to God, and neither should the constitution establish links between the state and any religion. This argument of religion being an individual’s private affair was extended during the main sessions of the Constituent Assembly to include the more radical claim that religion must be relegated to the private sphere. Many members declared that the need of the hour was to strengthen the identity of Indians as citizens of the Indian state, as opposed to being members of some community or religious group. Radhakrishnan’s speech on the Objectives Resolution on 13 December, 1946, asserted that “nationalism, not religion, is the basis of modern life. . . .the days of religious states are over. These are the days of nationalism.” A month later, G. B. Pant, speaking to the Advisory Committee of the Constituent Assembly proclaimed that the “individual citizen who is really the backbone of the state. . .has been lost here in that indiscriminate body known as the community. We have even forgotten that the citizen exists as such. There is the unwholesome, and to some extent, degrading habit of thinking always in terms of communities and never in terms of citizens.”

Many of these proponents of the so-called, “no-concern secularism” were making the familiar argument that a state wanting to strengthen itself must encourage the philosophy of abstract individualism so as to weaken all associations in society other than itself. It can then replace these associations with itself as the locus of the individual citizen’s identity. Secularism in this view meant the gradual weakening of the bonds of religion and their replacement with nationalism. It meant that the state must not recognise religion as a public institution. It was not just a question of religious liberty but of the establishment of state paramountcy. Religion was to be relegated to as small a sphere as possible so that the state could emerge as a modern leviathan.

The second position on secularism, exactly opposite to the first, was that no links between the state and religion should be permitted, not because this would weaken the state, but because it would demean religion. Religion, a system of absolute truth, could not be made subject to the whims of changing majorities by allowing the democratic state to have a say in religious affairs. Like the first, the third position—which can be called the “equal-respect theory of secularism”—also began with the principle of religious liberty, but held that in a society like India where religion was such an important part of most people’s lives, this principle entailed not that the state stay away from all religions equally, but that it respect all religions alike. In this view, instead of distancing itself from all religions or tolerating them equivalently as sets of superstitions which could be indulged in as long as they remained a

private affair, a secular state based its dealings with religion on an equal respect to all religions. One of the main proponents of this view, K. M. Munshi, proclaimed that the “non-establishment clause (of the US constitution) was inappropriate to Indian conditions and we had to evolve a characteristically Indian secularism”. Munshi said: “We are a people with deeply religious moorings. At the same time, we have a living tradition of religious tolerance—the result of the broad outlook of Hinduism that all religions lead to the same god. . . In view of this situation, our state could not possibly have a state religion, nor could a rigid line be drawn between the state and the church as in the US.”

Both Munshi’s and Ambedkar’s draft articles of March 1947 on justiciable rights contained clauses referring indirectly to a uniform civil code, Munshi’s proposal stated that: “No civil or criminal court shall, in adjudicating any matter or executing any order, recognise any custom or usage imposing any civil disability on any person on the ground of his caste, status, religion, race or language.” Ambedkar wrote that the subjects of the Indian state shall have the right “to claim full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by other subjects regardless of any usage or custom based on religion and be subject to like punishment, pains and penalties and to none other.” By 30 March, however, the Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee had decided to make the uniform civil code a *directive*, non-justiciable principle of state policy. In her letter of 31 March, Rajkumari Amrit Kaur emphasised the importance of the uniform civil code and called it “very vital to social progress”.

2. The Hindu Code Bills

The passing of the Hindu Code Bills⁵ acts as an example of how a particular institution with important implications for the discussion of equality and group versus individual rights, took shape. Having joined the bandwagon in the late 1940s, Nehru took up the subject of reforming and codifying Hindu law and turned it into a clarion call for social reform and secularism. However, as the political risks became apparent in the early 1950s, the initiative was stalled and temporarily dropped. When the Hindu Code Bills were finally passed in the mid-1950s the terms of reference had been altered, transforming what was initially supposed to have been a campaign for legal reform, a process of rationalising the legal system, into a grand project of modernisation where Hindus as the majority community were to set an example in the interest of building a secular society.

While the Hindu Code Bills opened up a healthy debate on social reform and set in motion important steps for the emancipation of Hindu women, the bills fell far short of what they were originally supposed to be, a stepping stone towards the enactment of a uniform civil code applicable to all citizens of India. It is posited that Nehru and the Congress Party realised it was not in their political interest to press for a uniform civil code, hence the matter was allowed to revolve around reforming

⁵ This refers to the Hindu Marriages and Divorce Act, 1955, the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 and the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

retrogressive Hindu practices, and generating enough dissent and discussion to keep the process in a stalemate. If Nehru had truly sought to establish an institution that formally endorsed and upheld secularism, he ought to have thrown his weight fully behind the legislation establishing it as the blueprint for a future uniform civil code. Instead, the Hindu Code Bills came to represent a highly contentious and unfinished project, neither paving the way towards greater equality across communities nor truly facilitating Hindu social reform, given the numerous loopholes that came to be engrained in the legislation.

The long-term debate over the Uniform Civil Code is produced by the tension between two notions of rights in the fundamental rights chapter (Chap. 3) of the Indian constitution. The bearer of rights is both the individual, unmarked abstract citizen of liberal theory, as well as the collectivity—that is, the universal, as well as the particular. The former is the subject of Articles 14–24 which ensure the individual’s rights to equality and freedom and the latter of Articles 25–30 which protect religious freedom and the cultural and educational rights of minorities. It is from the latter that religious communities derive the right to be governed by their own “personal laws.” Since these personal laws cover matters of marriage, inheritance, and guardianship of children, and since all personal laws discriminate against women, the tension in part three of the constitution is on one level a contradiction between the rights of women as individual citizens, and those of religious communities as collective units of the democracy. The state is in fact expected both to be the neutral arbiter between religious communities as well as the agent of social justice within communities.

The Hindu right claims that secularism in practice means the majority community surrendering its interests, while the state protects those of minorities. In other words, the argument is that the state has not delivered on its promise of abstract citizenship—minorities have retained their personal laws, the only Muslim-majority state of Kashmir has a special status within the framework of the constitution, and so on. Secular critiques of Hindu communalism have seen it as threatening the abstract citizen enshrined in the constitution with its assertion of “Hinduness”. In fact, it can be argued that in this context the “secular” discourse and “Hindu communal” discourse occupy the same terrain—that of claiming to be the true protectors of the rights of the abstract citizen.⁶

Conclusion: A Transcultural Study of Citizenship

With the focus on Nehru as a transmitter of cultural flow, a survey of his ideas and understanding of religion and minority rights reveals the strong influence of British modes of thought. For example, in his mediations on Indian history, *The Discovery*

⁶ See Mahajan (2002) and works by Ashish Nandy (1985) and T. N. Madan (1987).

of India, where the Mauryan emperor Ashoka (c. 273–237 B.C.) is portrayed as the great protagonist of Indian unity and secularism, Nehru refers to him as “still beloved in India”, which was true among Indian nationalists when Nehru was writing in the middle of the twentieth century. However, knowledge of Ashoka had almost vanished from Indian memory until the early nineteenth century and his “rediscovery” was mostly thanks to the way Ashoka and Akbar were presented in British textbooks, with the emphasis being on the fact that their policies had failed until they were renewed under the British.⁷

Drawing upon a history and historiography written by colonial rulers and having imbibed the heady atmosphere of socialism and fabianism in England, a young Nehru wrote in 1926 that he hoped the passage of time would “scotch our so-called religion and secularise our own intelligentsia,” and that just as in Europe mass education had weakened the power of religion, so the process was “bound to be repeated in India.”⁸ His enthusiasm did not waver, and long afterward as prime minister he gave unequivocal support for secularism, not just as neutrality, but also as an ideology. Writing to leading congressmen in 1954, he spelled out that secularism was a creative force which, while permitting religious freedom, prevented religion from interfering in the great task of nation building. But secularism meant more than religious freedom. “It conveys,” he insisted, “the idea of social and political equality.”⁹ Like Marshall, Nehru envisioned that an expansion of civil, political, and social rights would lead to progressive integration of the modern Indian citizen.

However, as Nehru was to discover during his political career, and which this chapter has also attempted to highlight, figures like Nehru do not act in a vacuum but are themselves part and parcel of a path-dependent process that to a large extent preselects the range of resources and strategies available. In the case of India, the construction of categories, such as the Hindu and the Muslim, were given political resonance by the colonial state, and the vision of universalist ideals of social justice and equality were inherited as part of Britain’s experience with liberalism, socialism and imperialism. As a result, a policy choice like the Hindu Code Bill, which will forever be a central ingredient in the discussions for a Uniform Civil Code, needs to be analysed in light of (a) the asymmetries perceived and institutionalised by colonial rule, and (b) the particular social *imaginaire* underlying Nehru’s modernisation package. Both these dimensions come to the fore during the early 1950s, a crucial period for transition in India’s political development, and they are manifest in the vision and strategies underlying the political discourse and policy making of the time.

⁷ This is the essential theme in the most influential of all textbooks on Indian history, Vincent Smith’s ‘Oxford History of India’, first published in 1919, but republished and reedited many times.

⁸ Quoted in Mushirul Hasan, ‘Nationalism and Communal Politics in India’ (New Delhi: Manohar, 1991), p. 285.

⁹ Quoted in Granville Austin, ‘Working a Democratic Constitution: The Indian Experience’ (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 55–78.

References

- Austin, Granville. 2000. *Working a Democratic Constitution: The Indian Experience*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Bhabha, Homi K. 1994 *The Location of Culture*, London, Routledge.
- Bhargava, Rajeev. 2002. "What is Indian Secularism and What is it for?" *India Review*, 1 (1): 1–32.
- Embree, Ainslee T. 2002. "Religion in Public Space: Two Centuries of a Problem in Governance in Modern India." *India Review* 1 (1): 52–76.
- Gopal, Sarvepalli, Mushirul Hasan and Mridula Mukherjee, eds. 1987a. *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, 1st ser., vol. 3. New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund.
- Gopal, Sarvepalli, Mushirul Hasan and Mridula Mukherjee, eds. 1987b. *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, 1st ser., vol. 5. New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund.
- Gopal, Sarvepalli, Mushirul Hasan and Mridula Mukherjee, eds. 1987c. *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, 1st ser., vol. 6. New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund.
- Hasan, Mushirul. 1991. *Nationalism and Communal Politics in India*. New Delhi: Manohar.
- Madan, T.N. 1987. Madan, T.N. "Secularism in its Place," *The Journal of Asian Studies* Vol.46, No.4: 747–59.
- Mahajan, Gurpreet. 2002 *Secularism as religious non-discrimination: The universal and the particular in the Indian context*. *India Review* 1 (1), January, 33–51.
- Marshall, Thomas H. and Bottomore, Tom. 1950. *Citizenship and Social Class*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nandy, Ashis 1985 "The Anti-Secularist Manifesto," *Seminar*, Vol.314: 14–24.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal. 1934. *Recent Essays and Writings*. Allahabad: Kitabistan.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal. 1981. *Letters from a Father to his Daughter*. New Delhi: Children's Book Trust.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal. 1985. *The Discovery of India*, 4 ed. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Fund.
- Taylor, Charles. 2007. *Cultures of Democracy and Citizen Efficacy*, *Public Culture* 19 (1): 117–150.
- Tiwary, Uma Kant. 1967. *The Making of the Indian Constitution*. Allahabad: Central Book Depot.

Chapter 3

Reluctant and Excluded Citizens, Differentiated and Multilevel Citizenship: Where the Indian and the European Discourse on Citizenship Meet

Clemens Spiess

Abstract Clemens Spiess examines the overlap of European and the Indian discourses on citizenship. Both discourses share the challenges that growing transnationalism poses to their prevailing citizenship regimes. This brings Spiess to two recent ideas of citizenship, namely *differentiated* and *multilevel* citizenship, and how they have resonated in the Indian and European contexts respectively. The chapter asserts that both the Indian concept of a group-sensitive citizenship regime and the European experiments with multicultural citizenship rights have one thing in common. Both implicitly conceive of citizenship as a multilayered concept that sees citizenship as compromised by various “layers”—local, traditional, and transnational—beyond the national.

The idea of citizenship was introduced into India by the British. It was however, a perverted notion of citizenship as it did not encompass a transfer of equal rights upon the native subjects but served largely administrative purposes. Citizenship was largely an instrument of governance.¹ After independence, however, this

¹ Contrary to the statements in most of the expert interviews conducted as part of the research project “Citizenship as Conceptual Flow. Asia and Europe in Comparative Perspective” citizenship is conceived of here as an inherently Western concept borne out of waves of collective action and grounded in the categories of “membership” and “rights/entitlement.” This view differs from the one encountered in the interviews that sees citizenship largely as a matter of belonging to a political community and claims that citizenship was present in traditional Indian society. T. K. Oommen, for example, states that “[t]he general belief is that the idea of citizenship came to this part of the world from Europe. That is based on a misconception. Because, wherever states existed there was citizenship,” (Interview database, “Citizenship as Conceptual Flow” interview conducted in March 2009, New Delhi). Rajeew Bhargava, however, takes a different view: “The idea of rights as subjective possession of individuals or communities could be seen as an import.

C. Spiess (✉)

Department of Political Science, Heidelberg University, South Asia Institute, Heidelberg, Germany

e-mail: clemensspiess@yahoo.co.in

imported notion of belonging (the legal status of membership as well as its identity dimension), rights and entitlements soon gained a life of its [the notion] own—shedding the “principle of difference-deferral which had informed colonial governmentality” (Roy 2008: 223). Citizenship in post-independent India or in any other post-colonial context was, first of all, an exercise in nation building, in bringing together territoriality and a (still largely evolving) national identity. Initially, it was thought of less as a liberal mechanism for social bonding able to reconcile (legal, in contrast to political) equality and (individual) freedom, nor did it reflect the idea advanced by Marshall and Bottomore (1950) that (social) citizenship acts as an integrative political tool able to counter balance social inequality or, in other words, able to balance formal equality and existing inequality through the provision of equal opportunities. In terms of belonging, too, for obvious reasons the idea of citizenship was originally different from the thick conception of the European experience and much closer to the more inclusive or thin conception of the United States. This comes as no surprise, since multiculturalism, or, for that matter, “unity in diversity” as a value orientation was a *sine qua non* in both the New World of America and Australia, and post-colonial India. In the European nation states, on the other hand, “cultural minorities were desired and/or coerced to abandon their identity *in lieu* of the promised equality through the instrumentality of citizenship” (Oommen 2004: 533).² To sum up, as Hindness (2005: 254) noted accurately, “the attainment of citizenship through political independence involves a radically different trajectory than the successive development of civil, political, and

You get the feeling of an entitlement even from your father when you feel that your father should give you something. . . but it is one thing to say that you should get something from your father and another to say that you have a right for (sic) it. This idea is an import, even if we don't have a great intellectual history to go by here, but as far as I can tell (sic). The difference between ‘thou shall not kill’ and ‘I have a right to life’—within the tradition of Christianity, there is a huge gap between these two statements. There is only a certain period of time in the history of Europe, where one got abandoned in favour of the second. So, I would say that the fact that you have the right as a citizen is something that came through colonial modernity. Not in practice though, but just the thought of it. . . in practice it was not implemented. In a sense, this was introduced by the British colonial state in response to a social reality in India which made it mandatory to have community-specific rights, very different from other countries, such as France, US. . . the notion of ‘differentiated citizenship.’” (Interview database, “Citizenship as Conceptual Flow” interview conducted in December 2008, New Delhi). The belief in an indigenous notion of citizenship or the projection of the idea of citizenship into traditional society/a distant past is reminiscent of the bigger part of the Indian discourse on civil society (most prominently Kothari 1988). However, as Béteille has rightly argued, “citizenship and caste are antithetical principles. It is difficult to see how we can make a case for the presence of citizenship in traditional Indian society, unless we are prepared to argue that caste had little or no significance in that society, that it was indeed a colonial construction” (Béteille 1999: 2589; see also Gupta 2003).

² The distinction between the “ethnic nation states” of Europe and the “immigrant societies” of North America and Australia (Walzer 1997) has of course become obsolete in the era of worldwide immigration, but the difference in (nationhood) tradition still lingers on in the respective citizenship regimes; see also Brubaker 1992.

social rights traced by T. H. Marshall (. . .) and other sociologists for contemporary Western states.”³

With the advent of independence, however, the basic idea of inclusion and exclusion that the concept of citizenship entails had to be implemented in a historical context radically different from the one of the former coloniser. Likewise, ways had to be found to reconcile citizenship with a sociocultural makeup, which is rather unique in its cultural heterogeneity and social differentiation. As a result, a distinct Indian discourse on citizenship unfolded that bore only a slight resemblance to its European counterpart(s) of the time.

The Constituent Assembly Debates are ample witness to this different trajectory that the Indian discourse on citizenship had taken.⁴ After independence, at the commencement of the Republic, India thus embraced a rather inclusivist notion of citizenship grounded in the categorical principle of inclusion.⁵ This did not have much to do with most of the European nation states’ experiences or, for that matter, India’s later embarking on a more ethnic-based citizenship regime, in which descent from parentage of Indian origin became the overriding consideration. Instead, it embraced a group-differentiated notion of citizenship that was linked to the existing cultural pluralism (hence the right of religious communities to preserve their cultural differences and the avoidance of a uniform civil code), as well as the ideal of a just society (hence reservations and quotas) and, consequently, the attainment of not only formal but absolute equality. Again, the idea of a differentiated citizenship regime stands in stark contrast to the European citizenship regimes of the time and has gained prominence in European citizenship discourse only very recently.

However, when processes of globalisation and international migration gained momentum in the twentieth century, the discourse on citizenship in both Europe and India gradually changed direction. In the face of increasingly assertive “politics of difference”⁶ amidst a growing prominence of ideas about multilevel governance

³ The statement is reminiscent of Turner’s (1990) distinction of historically different contexts of the emergence of citizenship and his differentiation between “citizenship from above” (as a means to pacify society) and “citizenship from below” (as a result of a struggle about citizenship rights within society).

⁴ See Mitra and Lall in this volume. See also Rodrigues (2005).

⁵ The distinction between the categorical and the contingent principle of inclusion stems from Robert Dahl’s work (Dahl 1989). According to the categorical principle of inclusion being an adult member of a political community is sufficient qualification for full citizenship, whereas the contingent principle of inclusion grants citizenship only to those who are qualified to rule; qualification can be grounded in property, merit, or existing membership in a religious, ethnic, or cultural community.

⁶ Comaroff and Comaroff (2005: 127) illustrate this ever increasing importance of “difference” under the impact of globalization: “The neoliberal age, especially after 1989, has seen an explosion of identity politics, not just of ethnic politics. Also of the politics of gender, sexuality, age, race, religion, lifestyle, and yes, class. As a result, imagining the nation rarely presumes a ‘deep horizontal fraternity’ anymore . . . Although most human beings still live as citizens *in* nation-states, they tend only to be conditionally, partially and situationally citizens *of* nation-states.

and transnational (political) communities,⁷ one could witness a steady confluence of the two discourses, albeit for different historical reasons. As Oommen (2004: 531), following Gupta (2001), has so brilliantly argued,

the transitional problem of the EU and the IR [Indian Republic] has the same source: the rupture between structure and sentiment. . . . But the rupture arises from opposite directions; in the case of the EU it is between the new structures which are transnational and the old sentiment of the nation-state which is incongruous with the new structures. In the IR, it is between the old structures created at the inception of the Republic and the imagined national sentiment which does not match.

Given the earlier disjunction between the two discourses' ideas about belonging and citizenship's functionality, the *rapprochement* thereby largely revolves around questions of inclusion versus exclusion. And, for that matter, hinges upon questions concerning the principle of inclusion, and revolves around discussions about the need for new forms of citizenship (differentiated, multilevel citizenship) in the face of new challenges (or discussions about the respective other country's experiences with alternative forms of citizenship).

India started from a rather inclusivist citizenship regime and embarked upon a more ethnic citizenship concept in line with the overarching goal of nation building and the state's concomitant attempt to promote a pan-Indian identity (based on ethnic and majoritarian ascriptions). The citizen was demarcated,⁸ thus bringing it closer to the (original) European citizenship regimes⁹ and setting in motion a debate about "who is an Indian?"—echoing Savarkar's Hindutva-agenda of the early twentieth century (Savarkar 1923). This debate, which was always of heightened significance in some regions of India, such as Kashmir or the country's immigration prone Northeast, sharpened, when, from the late 1990s onwards, the question of a bestowment of citizenship rights on Non Resident Indians (NRI) was mooted. The subsequently created categories of Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) and Overseas Citizens of India (OCI) added a transnational dimension to India's citizenship regime. This bears resemblance to the transnational flavour of the debates surrounding a prospective European citizenship regime creating truly EU citizens

Identity struggles. . . . seem immanent almost everywhere as selfhood is immersed—existentially, metonymically—into claims of collective essence, of innate substance and primordial sentiment that nestle within or transect the polity. In short, homogeneity as a 'national fantasy'. . . . is giving way to recognition of the irreducibility of difference."

⁷ Not only ideas, but also a growing realization of transnationality, such as in the case of the European Union.

⁸ A process, which had already begun with the enactment of the Citizenship Act of 1955 but was gaining momentum through the amendments in the wake of the Assam Accord (1986) and, subsequently, through the 2003 amendment (Rodriguez 2005; Roy 2008).

⁹ There is of course variation in the European citizenship regimes, probably best exemplified by the difference between the republican citizenship regime in the political nation of France and the more exclusive citizenship regime in the ethnic nation of Germany (Brubaker 1992). Overall, however, the citizenship regimes in the European tradition, until recently at least, have always been more exclusive and "ethnicised" than, for example, the US citizenship regime.

or introducing at least some form of an EU/member states based multilevel citizenship regime.¹⁰

Europe's experience was a little bit more ambivalent. In the last decades, as a result of an unprecedented increase in immigration, Europe witnessed a gradual erosion of the clearly identifiable boundaries drawn around membership and identity that the traditional notion of citizenship once entailed and which were thought to be set in stone. However, reaction to increasing immigration was played out differently in the European nation states due to different nationhood traditions. Whereas the general trend is towards a liberalisation of access with even former die-hard defenders of ethnic citizenship such as Germany adding *jus soli* components to their citizenship regime, Great Britain—always an outlier in a *jus sanguinis* dominated Europe—“imported the altogether foreign *jus sanguinis* tradition of Continental Europe” (Joppke 1999: 645), thus pursuing a similar strategy of “ethnicising” its citizenship regime as India. With that, a new way of thinking about the principle of inclusion gained momentum, taking increasing notice of the previously neglected categories of excluded and reluctant citizen. At the same time, the ethnic diversification of society—due to increasing immigration and, subsequently, more liberalised citizenship regimes—brought about a gradual departure from the Marshallian logic of a (social/equal) rights-based approach to citizenship. Apart from a new understanding that citizenship is not only a mechanism of social bonding through expanding categories of rights, but also a mechanism of closure, the “politics of difference” that accompanied ethnic diversification implied that “membership in a state no longer connotes a specific identity” (Joppke 2007: 39). This has meant a crucial drifting apart of membership and identity, which has found expression in a shift from the promotion of (universalist) social/equal rights to the acknowledgement of multicultural and anti-discrimination rights. Though short of a true exercise of differentiated citizenship as in the case of India, Europe came closer to the Indian discourse on group rights via various “programmes of multicultural citizenship, which seek to accommodate the distinctive needs of culturally excluded groups”¹¹

¹⁰ At the same time, the introduction of the PIO and OCI categories can also be considered as an example of the growing ethnicisation of the citizenship regime in India. As van der Veer (2005: 285) notes on the categorisation of PIO: “One is of Indian origin if one has held an Indian passport, or if either of the parents or grandparents has held an Indian passport or if either of the parents or grandparents was Indian. The wife of a person of Indian origin is held to be of Indian origin, too. [Neither] Citizenship nor residence are thus the criteria for deciding who belongs to this category, but ‘origin’ is and in that sense it has much in common with the German genealogical definition according to which migrant communities in Eastern Europe belong to the German nation and have the right to return to Germany.”

¹¹ The wording “culturally excluded groups” in the Joppke quote hints at the distinction between the “legal status” and the “identity” dimension of citizenship. Against the background of the ethnic diversification of societies the latter is of crucial importance since the existence of “formal citizens” who do not act and conceive of themselves as members of a (cultural) collectivity is now a commonplace phenomenon (Joppke 2007, 1999 and see also the discussion of the category of reluctant/excluded citizens below).

(not only immigrants) within the universal citizenship framework” (Joppke 1999: 630).¹²

Both discourses on citizenship thus changed track in the second half of the last century as a result of new challenges brought about by globalisation, international migration, and a more assertive “politics of difference”. An additional factor was a historically contingent incongruence of (transnational) structure and (national) sentiment.¹³ The idea of citizenship that once travelled from Europe to India—against the background of a culturally asymmetric context—got indigenised, but is confronted with similar challenges to the principle of inclusion/exclusion and of “reluctant citizens” that characterise(d) the European experience. At the same time, Europe faces similar challenges accruing from growing cultural diversity (and, some would say, social inequality), as did India at the time of independence, and it has to rearrange its citizenship regimes accordingly. Both share the challenges that growing transnationalism poses to their prevailing citizenship regimes.

In order to determine the interface of the European and Indian discourses on citizenship, however, there is a need for some conceptual clarifications. The following shall provide a conceptual approach to the categories of reluctant and excluded citizens, and to the ideas of differentiated and multilevel citizenship as the main areas where the Indian and the European discourse on citizenship meet, while simultaneously looking into some of the Indian and European debates on these issues.¹⁴

“Reluctant” and Excluded Citizens: Why Doesn’t Citizenship Always Work?

The traditional concept of citizenship—devised as a mechanism for social bonding able to reconcile (formal) equality and (individual) freedom, but also devised as a mechanism of (social) closure—is tied to several basic tensions. There is the one

¹² As Bhargava notes on the incorporation of the Indian citizenship practice into theoretical discourse: “So, yes, we got this early on and the practice of ‘differentiated citizenship’ was being applied in India long before the theory coined the term. . . the bearers of citizenship rights are both individuals and communities. The balancing of that is being left, in large cases, to democratic negotiation rather than fiat. The ambiguity should not be seen as a weakness but as strength.” And he goes on to argue for the integrative capacity of differentiated citizenship in India: “It [the differentiated citizenship] is a non-assimilationist strategy, very important for the sense of all being together, solidarity, and recognition of difference.” (Interview database, “Citizenship as Conceptual Flow”, interview conducted in December 2008, New Delhi)

¹³ Both entities have of course devised coping strategies, which could loosely be labeled as conceptualisations of ‘unity *in* diversity’ (as the result of the straightjacketing of a multi-ethnic civilisational society into a single territorial state in the case of India) vs. ‘unity *and* diversity’ (as a result of the coming together of sovereign states in the case of Europe; Oommen 2004: 533).

¹⁴ There are of course other issues that determine the current debate on citizenship and resonate in both discourses, European and Indian, such as, for example, the role of civic duties as a core element constitutive of citizenship, but these shall not be dealt with here.

between formal equality and existing inequality or, for that matter, between rights and entitlements; the one between status and praxis/process¹⁵; the one between civic universalism and cultural particularism, or between the universalist claim of citizenship and its particularist implementation (in the name of the nation state) and finally, and closely related to the latter, the one between inclusion and exclusion—either on ethnic, religious, or on social grounds. As a result of these tensions a proper functioning of the citizenship paradigm and prevalence of a societal perception of citizenship as the prime and legitimate ordering mechanism of modern political community seems to be closely tied to the capacity to strike a balance between the respective poles of the continuum. Problems arise when the pendulum swings too far. This can be brought about by new processes triggering social change and/or a spatial restructuring of politics and governance (such as migration, globalisation, the creation of new transnational/supranational political communities, or the need for a new division of labour); by a mismatch of a *de jure* and *de facto* ability to exercise one's citizenship rights; or brought about by a (cultural) clash of differing visions of what citizenship entails. This can be a clash between the (modern) state's idea and imposition of a certain notion of belonging, rights, and entitlements and a differing (traditional) societal perception thereof, or a clash of differing citizenship ideals among social groups within the same political community.

To illustrate this dynamic nature of the citizenship concept and the potential consequences of a swing too far towards one of the poles of the continuum, it might be useful to give an example. If there is a tilt towards the entitlement dimension of citizenship and a concomitant (morally or normatively most often justified) demand to achieve absolute equality at the expense of the rights dimension of citizenship, with its emphasis on the principle of equal opportunities and acceptance of existing hierarchies and social stratification, then there is the danger of abandoning the principle of equal opportunities altogether. Inevitably, this would undermine the very basis of the citizenship concept and its rootedness in the idea of (formal) equality and (individual) freedom. One should not forget that the (liberal) idea of modern citizenship implies a justification and legitimation of social hierarchies and stratification through its granting of formal equality (Marshall 1950). The controversies surrounding the pros and cons of the welfare state (e.g. conflicts between tax payers and recipients of welfare services arising out of redistributive measures), or the heated debates on the advantages and disadvantages of a merit-based educational system versus one that emphasises affirmative action, are two of the most obvious manifestations of such a swing of the pendulum.

¹⁵ Or between the liberal tradition of a more or less passive and private ideal of the citizen as *bourgeois*, which has—by virtue of legal status and protection within a given political community—the right to act out his/her individual freedom as long as he/she does not interfere in the individual freedom of his/her fellow citizens, and the republican tradition of the active citizen as *citoyen*, who has the obligation (and opportunity) to participate in public affairs as part of his/her belonging to a certain political community.

Similarly, if there is a tilt towards the particularistic dimension of citizenship, very often in the name of “difference” or “identity”, an endless and continuously progressing compartmentalisation of the citizenship status (most often on the basis of ascriptive criteria) could be the consequence, whereas a too universalist conceptualisation of citizenship (e.g. in the name of a global market or the human rights regime) could make the nation state obsolete as a reference point of the citizenship status.¹⁶ The rationale of citizenship as a mechanism of social bonding (as well as social closure) therefore hinges upon the ability to find equilibrium amidst the above-mentioned basic tensions that are constitutive of the traditional idea of citizenship. For a long time this had probably been the only way, beyond the use of coercion, to regulate membership through the inevitable interplay of inclusion and exclusion.

Against this background of the dynamic nature of citizenship, there are various reasons why citizenship does not always work and does not work everywhere. Some of them are epitomised in the image of the “reluctant” citizen, others are more obviously tied to the simple fact of “exclusion” or perception thereof. The “reluctant” citizen image would signify those (citizens) who already “belong” to a political community, but have a different, i.e. more particularistic, more status-oriented, more exclusive, etc., idea of citizenship than the official notion of citizenship of the community they are a part of. For example, reluctant citizens could be Kashmiris, citizens belonging to one of the states in India’s Northeast, Sri Lankan Tamils, Spanish Catalans/Basques, or Irish in Northern Ireland who all share the perception that their citizenship status, as part of the greater political community that they are embedded in, implies an abandonment of their original (cultural) identity or “difference.” Alternatively, it could refer to those citizens who value their citizenship status in terms of the right to act out one’s individual freedom higher than the more republican citizenship ethos of the political community they belong to, e.g. those Americans who refuse to pay taxes in the name of individual

¹⁶ In a way, of course, these “swings of the pendulum” could, in some cases at least, already be labelled “transformations” of the idea of citizenship: the ethnic diversification of society has undermined the basis for social rights in favour of anti-discrimination rights and multicultural recognition, because it constrains creating and retaining “the ethnic homogeneity and solidarities that are required for the redistribution of wealth” (Joppke 2007: 38); regarding the membership dimension of citizenship, an erosion of the once steadfast association of membership/status and identity is clearly visible in many of the (former) ethnic nation states of Europe whereas transnational forms of belonging and, some would say, a concomitant decoupling of citizenship and the nation state are gaining momentum. The following, however, is concerned with existing malfunctions of citizenship arising out of the enduring validity of the traditional concept of citizenship and still acknowledges social rights and the membership-identity nexus as constitutive elements of the idea of citizenship (especially the latter is seen here as a decisive “tool” of citizen making in a postcolonial context, see Mitra 2008 and Mitra in this volume). In addition, many a (scholarly) swan song of the nation state as a reference point of citizenship involves conceptual stretching, since both membership and rights, as two core constituents of the citizenship status, still relate almost exclusively to the national context. For a discussion of the empirical tenability of the now prominent category of the “transnational citizen”, for example, see Fox (2008).

freedom,¹⁷ and those Europeans who do not send their children to school and instead teach them at home in spite of compulsory schooling. Or it could apply to those “righteous” citizens with a more exclusive citizenship agenda than the one officially declared by the political community to which they belong and, who, out of their reluctance to accept the official position, are willing to fight for their agenda. Very often, these reluctant citizens with a more exclusive idea of citizenship than the official discourse base their notion of citizenship on ascriptive ties and/or cultural traits, such as some Hindu nationalist groups in India.¹⁸ In many cases, reluctant citizens act out their reluctance, vis-à-vis the official notion of citizenship, in an act of purposeful exclusion or dissociation from what the national citizenship regime entails/demands. Either violent means are applied (for example, the ETA or the IRA bombing public buildings) or less articulate expressions of alienation from the prevailing idea of national belonging (for example, Kashmiris who, as Indian citizens, purposefully refuse to vote in elections in the state of Jammu and Kashmir).

The more obvious characterisation of “excluded citizens” denotes those who have been denizens of the country for several years and are awaiting formal citizenship. This includes migrants (in this regard the imperative of “external exclusion,” which is constitutive of the citizenship paradigm insofar as there has always been an imperative for inward-bound inclusion and outward-bound exclusion inherent in the idea of citizenship, has been broadened to encompass a new dimension of “internal exclusion,” the long-term exclusion of migrants from the citizenship rights of their host societies), but also those who have been granted legal citizenship and remain disappointed with its inability to afford them access to basic needs and rights, to meaningful ways of participation¹⁹ which would help to alter their plight, or to gain cultural acceptance. Whereas the former refers to the formal exclusion of legally unacknowledged residents in a given political community or,

¹⁷ A similar case could be made for the Amish or Hutterite communities in the United States who make use of their “exit option” from the national citizenship regime. Another mismatch of an individual’s and the political community’s perception of what citizenship entails, which is prominent in discussions about citizenship in Western countries, is illustrated by the dichotomy of active versus passive citizen (or *bourgeois* versus *citoyen*), which has been brought up as a result of electoral/political apathy (“Politikverdrossenheit”) and passivity due to long-term welfare dependency.

¹⁸ Very often, too, reluctant citizens are, to some extent at least, “produced” by changes in a citizenship regime elsewhere or, for that matter, by transcultural flows (of citizenship practices). In that regard, Rodrigues (2005: 222) notes that “the closure of citizenship in other societies, such as in the UK following the agitation launched by Enoch Powell against Asian migrants, had immediate repercussions in India in not only reinforcing the ethnic slide in considerations of citizenship, but also in fuelling the ethnic divide, particularly between Hindus and Muslims.”

¹⁹ For example, think of a person who has all the (active) citizenship rights and entitlements that his/her belonging to a political community implies, but whose mother tongue is different from the official language of the political community he/she belongs to, so that the language in which citizens debate or negotiate with one another (as a basis for meaningful participation) is not identical to his/her mother tongue (Bhargava 2005; Kymlicka and Norman 2000).

for that matter, “stateless citizens,” a category that is of relevance especially in the West/Europe, the latter refers to the informal (and very often also illegal) exclusion of proper citizens on social and sociocultural grounds and is the much more prominent category of exclusion in India.

As Painter (2002) and Kofman (1995) have pointed out with reference to the latter:

the ability to exercise one’s *de jure* citizenship rights depends in part on being recognised as a citizen in daily life by other members of society, which often in practice seems to mean sharing some of the same cultural values or identity. Those, whose faces do not fit with the major collective perception of the “imagined community,” may find that they are excluded *de facto* from full participation in social life. Institutionalised racism in the welfare state, for example, means that members of minority cultural and ethnic groups have worse access to health care, education and welfare benefits than others despite equal citizenship status in law. (Painter 2002: 95).²⁰

Thus, while the migrant or immigrant, such as the Tibetan in Himachal Pradesh, the Bangladeshi in Assam, the Turkish in Germany, or the Pakistani in the United Kingdom, is the most obvious manifestation of an “excluded” citizen, the category potentially also encompasses Northeasterners in “mainland” India, *dalits* and *adivasi*, Sinti and Romanies in Europe, naturalised citizens or the homeless—all of them enjoying full citizenship rights in theory. The status of “excluded citizens” thereby not only reflects intrastate cultural asymmetries, but can be “generated” by asymmetries prevailing in the international social order as well. As Yuval-Davies (1999: 127) notes on the status of what she calls “committed diasporas”²¹:

When examining issues of citizenship of those migrants. . .one needs to take into consideration not only their formal and informal status in the countries where they live, but also that of their countries of origin as well. Probably most important in determining it would be the relationships between the two countries and their relative position of power in the international social order. A comparison between the situation of, for example, an American student and a Somali refugee living in London, could illustrate this most forcefully.

And indeed, the same could be said about a *basti*-based Bangladeshi migrant and an expat living in Delhi.

As one can see from the above, the manifestations of excluded or “reluctant” citizens are manifold and all of them are tied to basic tensions inherent in the traditional (liberal) citizenship paradigm. In both cases, the “reluctant” and the excluded citizen, the efforts of the political community to mediate its notion of belonging, rights, and entitlements or, for that matter, the efforts in “citizen making” have failed, or rather no adequate way/form has been found as yet to reconcile the differing perceptions of what citizenship entails.

²⁰ Exclusion sometimes comes across in an institutionalised form, for example through definitions of criminality (“terrorism” in the West) or health (“leprosy” in India). I am thankful to Barbara Hariss-White for this comment.

²¹ “[I]mmigrant communities which are culturally and politically committed to continue to ‘belong’ to their ‘mother country’—or more specifically to the national collectivity from where they, their parents, or their grandparents, have come” (Yuval-Davis 1999: 127).

Differentiated and Multilevel Citizenship: New Ways for New Nations?

Transnational political communities and supranational polities as well as a growing assertion of intrastate social groups in the name of difference and identity, especially in divided societies and immigrant nations, have brought up two new conceptualisations of citizenship. These largely fall under the particularistic thread of the citizenship debate and are the ideas of (group) differentiated and of multilevel citizenship.

The former is a result of the 1990s theorising about multicultural citizenship and is closely connected to the works of Will Kymlicka and Iris Marion Young.²² Differentiated citizenship denies the classical liberal notion of citizenship that is understood as a uniform bundle of equal individual rights and duties in a closed political community. Instead it argues for some form of a differentiated citizenship which takes into account the different positions, interests, and identities of citizens that emerge from gender, racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination manifesting itself in various kinds of group rights.

Though formulated from a liberal perspective insofar as it aimed to reconcile standard liberal ideas about equality and justice with the multicultural/multinational character of most contemporary nation states,²³ differentiated citizenship broke with the traditional liberal conceptualisation of citizenship, requiring or assuming that societies are nationally and culturally homogeneous and that liberal citizenship is, or can be, genuinely neutral. Designed as an integrative device or “tool” with the goal of bringing about cultural membership for minorities or, for that matter, integrating “excluded” citizens (immigrants or those who are *de jure* citizens but are excluded *de facto* from full participation in social life) into the political community toward fuller citizenship, differentiated citizenship can also be conceived of as a model of democratic governance responsive to social and cultural diversity combining liberal notions of equality with the specifics of diverse societies.²⁴ Consequently, it is an “offspring” of the theoretical discussion of

²² See, for example, Kymlicka (1995) and Young (1990).

²³ In a sense, differentiated citizenship also aims at the reconciliation of the status and the identity aspect of citizenship’s membership dimension insofar as it acknowledges the membership-identity nexus. It thus bears resemblance to Mitra’s statement that legitimate citizenship needs to be co-authored by the state and society: “Just as the legal right to citizenship is accorded by the state, identity, and following from it, the moral right to belong, is what people give to their claims to citizenship. When both converge in the same group, the result is a sense of legitimate citizenship where the individual feels both legally entitled and morally engaged. If not, the consequences are either legal citizenship devoid of a sense of identification with the soil, or a primordial identification with the land but no legal sanction of this” (Mitra 2008: 4). In fact, the main motivation for the original conceptualisation of differentiated citizenship is the failure of liberal conceptions of justice and equality to account for the importance of identity or cultural membership.

²⁴ Differentiated citizenship is thus not altogether different from Lijpharts’s conceptualisation of consociationalism (see, for example, Lijphart 1971) as an institutional device to facilitate democracy in culturally segmented societies, except for the assumption that consociationalism is largely a matter of elite collaboration and does not necessarily involve the citizenry.

citizenship in immigrant or postcolonial societies and, initially at least, was only of slight relevance for European conceptualisations of citizenship historically grounded in the prerequisites of cultural homogeneity and the congruence of identity and nationality.

However, with the ethnic diversification of European nation states and the ambivalence created by the juxtaposition of a national identity discourse and the supranational construction of a European state, the idea of differentiated citizenship has at least entered the European discourse on citizenship. Short of explicit group rights to guarantee the group access to particular goods that might be jeopardised without legal protection, such as language rights, special rights to representation, reservations, and quotas (for access to public sector employments or to institutions of higher education), or even limited forms of self-government, Europe has witnessed in the past decades a proliferation of provisions recognising multiculturalism. These include, for example, policies that provide training in the official language, civic education, programs to help minorities retain their language and culture (and other forms of cultural autonomy), official recognition of the contributions of the cultural minorities in the national repertoire of symbols and stories, antidiscrimination legislation, or policies that promote employment equity.²⁵ A closer look at the emerging (and officially endorsed) concept of European citizenship also reveals how the idea of a differentiation of citizenship gradually gains momentum in Europe.

In contrast, India may be considered a prime example of an early incorporation of group differentiated citizenship rights into the confines of a liberal secular state—way before the theoretical discussions about multicultural citizenship brought the idea to the fore.²⁶ Of course, the reasons for the tilt towards a more particularistic, group identity- and entitlement oriented conceptualisation of citizenship in India can be traced back to different histories and traditions of state formation and governance on the subcontinent. As the Rudolphs (2008: 56) have

²⁵ The distinction between explicit group rights and the rights-based manifestations of multiculturalism in European nation states roughly corresponds to Kymlicka's distinction between measures that facilitate the integration of "polyethnic minorities" and measures that are directed at "national minorities." Polyethnic minorities include groups that, at some time, have voluntarily immigrated to the state (e.g. Sikhs in Canada or Turks in Germany), in contrast to those groups that are considered national minorities within the state, such as the Nagas in India's Northeast or the Flemish in Belgium.

²⁶ Even though some of the group rights, such as reservations and quotas that made up India's at least partially differentiated citizenship regime were initially designed as time-bound measures to be abandoned when the social inequalities that they were supposed to overcome had been levelled. The fact that a kind of differentiated citizenship has been practiced in India since independence and has entered the European citizenship discourse only recently (in the shape of "multiculturalism") is an indication, but no evidence for, a conceptual counter flow from 'Asia to Europe'. In a similar vein, the debate on multiculturalism and "Britishness" in the wake of the Rushdie affair has shown how conflicting ideas about cultural identity—in this case those of South Asian immigrants and of the "properly British"—result from the flow (and confrontation) of ideas (in the minds of people) and produce a rethinking, or at least a debate on what it means to be a citizen (beyond legal technicalities), fuelled by the confrontation of different perceptions thereof; see Asad (1990).

pointed out “in contrast with European nation-states, whose strength rested on the extinction of regional cultures and identities, subcontinental empires in India have made accommodations.” Consequently, when independent India embraced the liberal model of the state, “claims on state sovereignty and monopoly over public and national interest were constrained by the traditional obligation of the ruler to recognize and uphold the jurisdiction of prior social groups” (ibid. 56).

The Constituent Assembly Debates, imbued with the colonial heritage of group representation and the liberal idea of an individualistic, universal citizenship regime that prevailed in the European role models of the time, dealt extensively with the question of “how can democratic governance and social cohesion be attained in a culturally and nationally pluralistic context” (for a discussion of the Constituent Assembly Debates on this issue see, for example, Acharya 2001 and Schoetli in this volume). At the end of the deliberation process was a compromise that included both the classical, individual-based liberal notion of equidistance towards a citizenry of equals, and a group-sensitive citizenship model based on cultural recognition and the need for resource distribution.²⁷ The imported concept of citizenship was thus modified in order to turn it into a mode of governance appropriate to the Indian context. In a sense, the Indian citizenship regime borrowed the objective of the traditional citizenship paradigm from liberal (nationalist) imaginings prevalent in nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe but transformed this objective into one not requiring the Indian state to rest upon the cultural homogeneity of its citizen-constituents (Acharya 2001: 19). In other words, the Indian constitution makes “simultaneous commitment to communities and to equal citizenship” (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987: 38–39).²⁸

²⁷ As Acharya (2001: 82) notes: “in any case, a complete liberal individualist approach was a non-option given both the procedural and pragmatic compulsions to devise an inclusive political community. A quasi-liberal spirit, one that precariously balances rights of individuals with those of communities, permeates and informs the Indian constitutional experiment. Indian constitutionalism, it will be safe to concur, is deeply embedded in a ‘thickly’ constituted multicultural society.” Given the influence of the colonial model and, at the same time, the need for a thorough departure from India’s constitutional/colonial predecessor, the Indian constitution is also, paradoxically, a derivation and a deviation from the colonial model: it retains some aspects of the principle of group representation exercised during the colonial period (alongside a common citizenship model), but treats different groups differently. It gives exemptions from laws (e.g. for Sikhs, Article 25), exercises positive discrimination (for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes), concedes self-government (in Kashmir or the autonomous district councils of the North-east, Sixth Schedule), recognises traditional legal codes (various personal laws), provides special representations (Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Anglo-Indians), acknowledges symbolically the status of various groups (e.g. through national holidays character) etc. (Acharya 2001: 80). For a discussion of the indigenisation or strategic “re-use” of Western party politics and Westminster parliamentarianism in postcolonial India see also Spiess (forthcoming).

²⁸ That this original citizenship regime or, for that matter, its group-sensitive components became heavily contested later on is ample evidence of the awkward positioning of group rights in a majoritarian democracy. In contrast to the multiculturalism espoused by the Indian constitution, “Hindu nationalism and other ethno-national exclusivist ideologies are trying today to re-imagine and re-appropriate the conventional (European) requirement that the nation-state display a

The Indian acceptance of a group sensitive citizenship regime as well as the European experiments with multicultural citizenship rights have in common that they implicitly conceive of citizenship as a multilayered concept that sees citizenship as compromised by various “layers” (local, traditional, transnational) beyond the national. The postcolonial context only highlights the juxtaposition of the different layers vis-à-vis the state-bound national framework. This perspective on citizenship conforms with Yuval-Davis now well-known formulation that

citizenship needs to be understood as a multi-layered construct, in which one’s citizenship in collectivities in the different layers—local, ethnic, national, state, cross- or trans-state and supra-state—is affected and often at least partly constructed by the relationships and positionings of each layer in specific historical context. This is of particular importance if we want to examine citizenship in a non-westocentric way. The constraints on the state in many of the post-colonial states, by local and traditional communities on the one hand and multinationals and international agencies on the other hand, would be even more noticeable than in the West. Recent technological, economic and political developments have enhanced the need for such an analytical perspective. (Yuval-Davis 1999: 122, see also Mitra in this volume)

The notion of citizenship as a multilayered concept bears significance not only for the discussion of differentiated citizenship as a tool to provide democratic governance in diverse societies, but also resonates strongly with recent suggestions to think beyond the mere nation-state principle of citizenship, which is based on the amalgamation of nationality and citizenship. Multilevel citizenship seeks “to break with the assumption that citizenship, national identity and the national state territory are, or should be, congruent” (Painter 2002: 102) and, in a way, advances the idea of differentiated citizenship insofar as it suggests, eventually, to “give the right to define the rules of inclusion and exclusion to territorially defined political communities or territorially defined levels of governance within the broader political community” (Baruah 2008: 18) (in contrast to state-monitored group rights). It is basically a result of the perceived withering of the nation state in an era of polycentric, multilevel governance and increasing cultural pluralism and of a concomitant creation of transnational political communities, above all the European Union. It has, however, also been applied to artificially created postcolonial political communities encompassing a diverse (and very often also divided) society such as India.²⁹ In a sense, the European Union now has to tackle the same problem that was so visible in the Constituent Assembly Debates in India at the time of independence, namely, that the “quality of citizenship. . . is the result of a complex and variable geometry of rights, entitlements, obligations and responsibilities emanating from the membership of superposed political—social and cultural—‘communities’” (Kofman 1995: 122).

particular ethnic character and unleash a corresponding homogenizing political project” (Acharya 2001: 20).

²⁹ In the words of Bhargava (2005: 52), “the story of nation-building in India is a process of the straightjacketing by the British colonialists of a multi-ethnic civilisational society into a single territorial state.”

So far, multilevel citizenship is little more than an idea, an abstract concept rather than a description of an emerging political reality or practical political project. This is the case even though, by now, the frequent existence of dual citizenship and/or the growing acceptance thereof could be considered a special form of multilevel citizenship going beyond the scope of a mere one-nation (state) conception of citizenship (but remaining limited to the level of the nation state).³⁰ Furthermore, the specific local and regional cultural, language, or even self-government rights that *differentiate* between, (or are limited to) certain parts of a nation state (especially in the case of federal systems; examples include the official support for the Welsh language in Wales but not England or the “autonomous district councils” in India’s Northeast) could be considered as constituting the rudiments of a multilevel citizenship regime. Multilevel citizenship, however, in a fully developed form, and in contrast to the mere exercise of (territorially defined) differentiated citizenship, would comprise “a variable geometry with citizens in some regions and at some levels—having different sets of rights than those in others” (Painter 2002: 13), reflecting individual’s simultaneous and clearly bounded membership(s) of political communities “at a variety of spatial scales” (local, regional, national, transnational, supranational; *ibid.* 103) and, ultimately, granting these territorially defined political communities/levels of governance the right to determine the terms of membership.

What probably comes closest to an emerging multilevel citizenship regime is the gradually evolving idea of a European citizenship as a manifestation of further political integration of the most developed set of transnational political institutions anywhere in the world.³¹ One could argue that membership in the European citizenry is derived from national citizenship and therefore only a supplement to citizenship at the national level or citizenship of a member state (EU citizenship attaches to those with the nationality of a member state and—*prima facie*—it is the member states that determine who are their nationals and, consequently, European citizens; Painter 2002:97). In addition, what rights do European citizens really get beyond what their states already provide? At the same time, however, considering that EU constitutional development is an open-ended process and that European citizenship is likely to evolve further, possibly even to the point of a future

³⁰ Take, for example, the above mentioned PIO and OCI categories in the Indian context.

³¹ Since recently the idea of a more substantial European citizenship is also officially endorsed. This is clearly visible from various pronouncements following the formal establishment of EU citizenship through the Maastricht Treaty, which expressed a notion of European citizenship wider than the Maastricht Treaty rights. In 2004 the European Commission declared “giving full content to European citizenship” as one of three priorities for the enlarged European Union and in 2006 the decision to launch a second phase of an EU programme to promote active European citizenship (Europe for Citizens) reflects a notion of European citizenship going beyond the Maastricht Treaty rights, “incorporating shared values, active participation in public life, a sense of belonging, the promotion of ‘European awareness’, engagement with civil society and the role of ‘intermediaries between Europe and its citizens’” (Painter 2008: 7).

European citizenship on the basis of (mere) residence in Europe,³² EU citizenship already involves (enforceable) rights, which are not negligible, namely the right to vote and stand for election at the municipal/local and European levels; the right to avail of the protection of the embassy or consulate of any EU member state when outside the European Union where the citizen's own state is not represented; the right to petition the European Parliament and refer matters to the European Ombudsman; and, above all, the right to move (and work) freely across national borders, "a right that most migrants can only dream of" (Fox 2005: 195).³³ The rationale for establishing a pan-European citizenship regime alongside the various national regimes (and labelling it as such) is thereby clearly linked to the promotion of a common, transnational identity going beyond the nation state and a purely juridical concept based on legal membership only.³⁴

India too has some rudimentary experiences in the exercise of multilevel citizenship albeit not in its full form that includes granting the right to define citizenship to the individual levels of governance, but as a result of (nation) state-initiated special citizenship rights for territorially defined regional communities. These include, of course, the special citizenship rights of citizens of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in addition to their national citizenship rights—as laid down in Article 370 of the Indian constitution.³⁵ Or the special citizenship rights in Nagaland and other states of India's Northeast in matters of religious or social practices, customary law, and procedure; administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to Naga customary law and ownership and transfer of land and its resources (Article 371, additional rights for tribal communities concerning, for example, limited rights of self-government and special representation, are laid down in the Fifth and Sixth Schedule of the Indian constitution).³⁶

Against the background of these examples of infant multilevel citizenship regimes, most of which refer to what Kymlicka would call "national minorities" (territorially

³² In this regard, the yet to be passed Lisbon Treaty, while sticking to the criterion of national citizenship as a qualifier for European citizenship, shows a change of wording in the relevant Article (9) referring to European citizenship from "Citizenship of the Union shall be complementary to national citizenship" to "Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to national citizenship." While this is unlikely to change the trajectory of EU citizenship, it reinforces the duality between national and EU citizenship and "makes the point that the development of different layers of citizenship entitlements is not a zero sum game, in which rights given at one level must necessarily detract from those given at another level" (Shaw 2008).

³³ The formal introduction of European citizenship came with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 through an amendment of the Treaty of Rome (Article 8 of the Maastricht Treaty). The rights catalogue referring to European citizenship laid down in Article 8 was complemented by the right to bring cases in the European Court of Justice against EU institutions, as per the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997.

³⁴ For more discussion on this see Pfetsch's paper in this volume

³⁵ For example, the provision that only citizens of Jammu and Kashmir can buy property in that State as well as anywhere else in India.

³⁶ In the case of Nagaland, Article 371 extends these special rights even further, from the State to the district level (limited to the Hill district of Tuensang).

concentrated cultures that have been historically incorporated into a larger nation state, usually of an ethnic kind), the discourse on a potential introduction of multilevel citizenship in India, however, follows a rationale that is partly different from its European counterpart. As Baruah (2008) has recently suggested,³⁷ introducing multilevel citizenship to India's Northeast by granting State governments in the region the right to craft their own citizenship laws could help to "make a decisive break from the notion of ethnic homelands that owes so much to the colonial propensity of fixing tribes to their supposedly natural habitats." This could be so because "the obvious advantages of introducing state-level citizenship in this frontier region would be that it could define political communities in civic terms. It would also introduce a dynamic element of incorporating new members" (ibid. 19) based on the fact that modern citizenship is founded on the principle of negotiating (and renegotiating) the rules of inclusion/exclusion and not on the principle of ethnic ascription. The kind of ethnically determined exclusion prevailing in the region would be broken up and an "internal immigrant" could thus become, in theory at least, a full-fledged member of the polity to which he or she has shown commitment by taking residence therein. There is of course a lot of wishful thinking involved in such a kind of proposition, since there is a great deal of resentment and hatred against migrants prevailing in India's Northeast and the introduction of multilevel citizenship, as suggested by Baruah, opens up avenues for political instrumentalisation/manipulation and even more exclusionary politics.³⁸

Conclusion

Both new ideas of citizenship, differentiated as well as multilevel citizenship, problematise the relationship between citizenship and national identity and question whether the traditional linkage between citizenship and national identity is a fruitful combination.³⁹ But even though they seek to "break with the assumption

³⁷ See also Sonntag (2004) for a similar argument regarding the exclusionary effects of granting self-government to the Northeast's national minorities on the basis of their cultural identity; see also Baruah 2009.

³⁸ Hönig (2009) highlights additional problems related to the idea of state-level citizenship and its potential implementation in India's Northeast: "First, it is not clear how politics would play out in the regional arena if competences relating to citizenship were to be transferred to the state level. It cannot be ruled out that the pendulum will swing back and compound discriminatory practices. Second, the areas of 'citizenship, naturalization and aliens' are inscribed in the Union List of the Constitution, giving the centre exclusive jurisdiction over these subject-matters. As a result, the explosive issue of cross-border ('illegal') immigration would remain outside the reach of the states, diminishing the appeal of multi-citizenship. Third, the issue of a 'border within' throws up questions of how to square the goal of affording equal opportunities for all with strategies of positive discrimination and affirmative action for disadvantaged segments of society. To sum up, multi-level citizenship may serve to fill the Indian polity with the federal spirit that is central to the idea of power-sharing, but it is a contested notion for its potential of being exploited by nationalist groups using the notion of citizenship as a ruse for their exclusionist agendas."

³⁹ See also Oommen (1997).

that citizenship, national identity, and the national state territory are, or should be, congruent,” eventually they also struggle with the preeminent question of how to keep a large number of different (or multiple) cultural entities/identities under one political roof. Multilevel citizenship also wants to rescue the nation state or national identity by propagating a coexistence of the national with other levels of citizenship. The prominence or salience of this question depends of course on whether one looks at political or ethnic nations, nation states or nation-building states, or, more generally, on the nationally different ways that the community is imagined, and consequently, is the question has to be dealt with or answered differently. The linkage between citizenship and national identity and the question of how to reconcile (growing) cultural pluralism (or a growing assertion thereof) with the idea of the nation state therefore lies at the heart of any current engagement with the citizenship paradigm. A feasible way out of the dilemma with which transnational political institutions, growing cultural pluralism, and assertion of identities, international migration and globalisation have confronted the nation state—either by delinking citizenship and national identity or by creating differentiated or multi-level citizenship—is yet to be found.

References

- Asad, Talal. 1990. “Multiculturalism and British Identity in the Wake of the Rushdie Affair”. *Politics and Society* 18 (4): 455–480.
- Acharya, Ashok. 2001. “Equality, Difference and Group Rights: The Case of India.” Doctoral Thesis, University of Toronto, available at: www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp05/NQ63760.pdf
- Baruah, Sanjib. 2008. “Territoriality, Indigeneity and Rights in the North-East India.” *Economic and Political Weekly*. 43 (12): 15–19.
- Baruah, Sanjib. 2009. “The Partition’s long shadow: the Ambiguities of Citizenship in Assam, India.” *Citizenship Studies*. 13 (6): 593–606.
- Bhargava, Rajeev. 2005a. “Introduction” In *Civil Society, Public Sphere and Citizenship*, edited by Rajeev Bhargava and Helmut Reifeld. New Delhi: Sage.
- Bhargava, Rajeev and Helmut Reifeld, eds. 2005b, *Civil Society, Public Sphere and Citizenship: Dialogues and Perceptions*. New Delhi: Sage.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Béteille, André. 1999. “Citizenship, State and Civil Society”. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 34 (36): 2588–2591.
- Comaroff, Jean and John L. Comaroff. 2005. “Naturing the Nation: Aliens, Apocalypse, and the Postcolonial State.” In *Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants and States in the Postcolonial World*, edited by Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dahl, Robert Alan. 1989. *Democracy and its Critics*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Fox, Jonathan. 2005. “Unpacking ‘Transnational Citizenship.’” *Annual Review of Political Science* 8 (1): 171–201.
- Gupta, Dipankar. 2003. “Civil Society or the State. What Happened to Citizenship?” In *Civil Society and Democracy. A Reader*, edited by Carolyn M. Elliot. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

- Hindness, Barry. 2005. "Citizenship and Empire." In *Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants and States in the Postcolonial World*, edited by Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hönig, Patrick. 2009. "India between Scylla and Charybdis: Negotiating the Cliff of Federalism." *Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics* (50) October. <http://hpsacp.uni-hd.de>.
- Oommen, T.K., ed. 2004. "Socio-Political Transition in the Indian Republic and the European Union." *European Journal of Social Theory* 7 (4): 519–37.
- Joppke, Christian. 1999. "How Immigration is Changing Citizenship: A Comparative View." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22 (4): 629–52.
- Joppke, Christian. 2007. "Transformation of Citizenship: Status, Rights, Identity." *Citizenship Studies* 11 (1): 37–48.
- Kofman, Eleonore. 1995. "Citizenship for Some, but not for Others: Spaces of Citizenship in Contemporary Europe." *Political Geography* 14: 121–37.
- Kothari, Rajni. 1988. *State Against Democracy: In Search of Humane Governance*. New Delhi: Ajanta.
- Kymlicka, Will. 1995. *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kymlicka, Will and Wayne Norman. eds. 2000. *Citizenship in Diverse Societies*. Oxford: University Press.
- Lall, Marie. 2005. "Indian Education Policy Under the NDA Government." In *Coalition Politics and Hindu Nationalism*, edited by Katherine Adeney and Lawrence Saez., London: Routledge.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1971. "Cultural Diversity and Political Integration." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 4 (1): 1–14.
- Marshall, Thomas H. and Bottomore, Tom. 1950. *Citizenship and Social Class*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Memorandum by Professor Jo Shaw. 2008. Salvesen Chair of European Institutions, University of Edinburgh <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldconst/84/84we08.htm>
- Mitra, Subrata K. 2008. "Level Playing Fields: The Post-Colonial State, Democracy, Courts and Citizenship in India." *German Law Journal* 9 (3): 343–366.
- Oommen, T.K., ed. 1997. *Citizenship and National Identity: From Colonialism to Globalism*. New Delhi: Sage.
- Painter, Joe. 2002. "Multi-Level Citizenship, Identity and Regions in Contemporary Europe." In *Transnational Democracy: Political Spaces and Border Crossings*, edited by James Anderson. London: Routledge.
- Painter, Joe. 2008. "European Citizenship and the Regions." *European Urban and Regional Studies* 15 (5): 5–19.
- Rodriguez, Valerian. 2005. "Citizenship and the Indian Constitution." In *Civil Society, Public Sphere and Citizenship: Dialogues and Perceptions*, edited by Rajeev Bhargava and Reifeld, Helmut. New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- Roy, Anupama. 2008. "Between Encompassment and Closure: The 'Migrant' and the Citizen in India." *Contributions to Indian Sociology* 42 (2): 219–48.
- Rudolph Lloyd I. and Susanne Hoerber Rudolph. 1987. *In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rudolph Lloyd I. and Susanne Hoerber Rudolph. 2008. *Explaining Indian Democracy. A Fifty-Year Perspective, 1956–2006. Volume II. The Realm of Institutions. State Formation and Institutional Change*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar. (1923). 1949 *Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?* 4th ed. Poona: Gokhale.
- Sonntag, Selma K. 2004. "National Minority Rights in the Himalayas." *Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics* (21) June. <http://hpsacp.uni-hd.de/>.
- Spieß, Clemens. 2012. "Another Form of Re-Use? Institutional Continuity and Indigenisation' of Westminster Parliamentary and Western Party Politics in Post-Colonial India". In *Re-use: the art of politics of integration and anxiety*, edited by Julia A.B. Hegewald, Subrata K. Mitra. New Delhi: SAGE.

- Turner, Bryan S. 1990. "Outline of a Theory of Citizenship." *Sociology* 24 (2): 189–217.
- Veer, Peter van der. 2005. "Virtual India: Indian IT Labor and the Nation-State." In *Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants and States in the Postcolonial World*, edited by Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Walzer, Michael. 1997. *On Toleration*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Young, Iris Marion. 1990. *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Yuval-Davis, Nira. 1999. "The 'Multi-layered Citizen': Citizenship in the Age of 'Glocalization'." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 1 (1): 119–136.

Chapter 4

Turning Aliens Into Citizens: A “Toolkit” for a Trans-Disciplinary Policy Analysis

Subrata K. Mitra

Abstract Subrata Mitra analyses the debate on the flow of liberal ideas of citizenship to non-Western societies through an inquiry into its philosophical and social construction. A flow diagram is developed to capture the dynamic process of *citizen making* in terms of its underlying parameters, some of which go beyond the realm of everyday politics. Towards this objective, the chapter undertakes a brief survey of the evolution of the formal category of citizens from antiquity to present day, and the inner differentiation of liberal theory of citizenship, in order to cater to its complex empirical nuances and finally, to unite the various strands of citizen making in the form of a *tool kit*. This neo-institutional model provides the basis for a *transdisciplinary* analysis of policy making with regard to citizenship.

Citizenship is a cutting-edge issue of our times. In its various shapes and guises, it underpins debates about the modern state, nation, identity, personhood, marginality, and empowerment. These debates take place as much in the mainstream media as within political parties, interest groups acting on the welfare of immigrants and displaced people, and in committees and bureaucratic circles that are under pressure to generate appropriate and effective policy to turn aliens into citizens. This political challenge is to be found not only in the politics of transitional societies where millions of colonial subjects and homeless people moving across national boundaries find themselves within the territory of new states, but in the interstices of complex, liberal democratic, post-industrial societies where foreign immigrants live out their precarious lives, as well. More often than not, as we have seen in the previous chapters, in critical situations as these, the concepts and institutions of citizenship drawn from the liberal theory of citizenship are not adequate to explain the challenges that reluctant and excluded citizens face in their everyday lives.

S.K. Mitra (✉)
Department of Political Science, Heidelberg University, South Asia Institute,
69120 Heidelberg, Germany
e-mail: Mitra@uni-heidelberg.de

**The Modern 'Post-colonial' State, Traditional Society and Citizenship:
Overlapping Legal and Moral Categories**




Fig. 4.1 Overlapping circles of state and society

These gaps between theory and facts lives are the product of a different history and ontology from that of Marshall, not mediated by the European experience that molded Marshall's *Weltanschauung*. The urgency for action in such cases often makes the distinction between the concept and reality of citizenship untenable, thus putting into question the very feasibility of effective policy.

The chapter responds to this hiatus of theory and experience of citizenship with a tool kit that is particularly adept at meeting the contingencies where those who feel alienated are not able to connect themselves with the institutions of the state. The path to such a heuristic device, the chapter argues, lies through the specification of a working definition of citizenship in terms of a "third space," consisting of the overlap between the state and society (see Fig. 4.1 above). Towards this objective, the chapter briefly delves into the evolution of the concept of citizenship in the context of European society and history, and its awkward encounter with the non-European world. The cognitive hiatus that results from the attempt to map the non-Western life-world into Western concepts is expressed in terms of the phenomenology of citizenship, captured in interviews conducted in Orissa and in the North East of India.

The resonance of these split images is plentiful. One finds them in the awkward, reluctant, and excluded citizens who one encounters in the media in terms of their dual identities, and in the exploits of terrorists who think of themselves as *azadis*—political actors who see themselves as freedom fighters—striving for an ideal world beyond the pale of the world as we know it. The discourse of displaced and enraged tribals some of whom are depicted as Naxalites or minority cultural communities marginalized by the steady incursion of majoritarian norms who are profiled as fundamentalists, are best understood in terms of innovative concepts such as entangled or transnational citizenships. The chapter pulls these insights are pulled together in terms of a flow diagram of aliens-into-citizens which could act as

Culture, Context and Strategy in Turning Subjects into Citizens: A Rational Choice, Dynamic Neo-Institutional Model




Fig. 4.2 Towards a post-liberal and transnational theory of citizenship

heuristic tool kit for policy makers in search of concrete measurements that can enhance citizenship (Fig. 4.2 above).

The State of Play: Citizenship as Ubiquitous and Conceptually Puzzling

“Citizenship for all”—aliens, immigrants, transients, subjects, minorities, and the stateless refugees of all descriptions—is a slogan that marks political discourse in long-established democracies as much as the politics of transitional societies. Spread out across the globe, the presence of citizenship and citizen rights on national and international agendas is a testimony to both the global reach of the discourse on citizenship as well as its inner complexity. Who is a citizen, who defines who a citizen is, what distinguishes a citizen from one who is not, and which minimal rights and duties constitute citizenship are issues of great emotional appeal. Existing theory, as we have seen in the previous chapters, is not necessarily helpful for clarity on these issues. Depending on where one stands in the national and international nexus of power, the status of individuals in terms of their claims to citizenship can be both confirmed and contested, depending on which strand of liberal theory of citizenship or its derivatives one draws on.¹

¹ Contrast, for example, the status of the Kashmiri or Chechen insurgents from the point of view of the multicultural and liberal approach of Marshall. Is the act of rebellion an assertion of one’s identity evidence of empowerment or an infringement of one’s required loyalty to the state? Neither multiculturalism nor liberal democratic theory can easily accommodate these contradictory aspects of the rebel’s persona and political repertoire.

In the face of such theoretical disarray and conceptual complexity, how can one map the state of play regarding the status of citizenship in a given political context, or for that matter, devise policies to spread this much sought after status widely across a given population? Towards these objectives, this section undertakes a brief survey of the social constructions of citizenship and the evolution of the formal category of citizens from antiquity to present day. It considers the limitations of the liberal theory of citizenship to cater to the complex empirical nuances of citizenship. Finally, it attempts to unite the various strands of citizen-making policies in the form of a tool kit. This is done through an analysis of the conceptual basis of citizenship through an inquiry into its philosophical and social foundations. This section of the volume thus sets the stage for the construction of a flow diagram that seeks to unite the dynamic process of citizen-making in terms of its underlying parameters, some of which go beyond the realm of everyday politics.

The application of liberal citizenship theory for an exegesis of the discourse on citizenship in transitional societies, or with regard to the politics of immigration within established democracies reveals its lack of conceptual precision and empirical correlates. Under its broad banner one finds people chafing under the tutelage of the almighty state or all-demanding nations; immigrants on the move across national borders, and those who feel squeezed out of their traditional living space because of the new arrivals; minorities bearing the brunt of nation-building majorities; and workers, peasants, and ordinary folks squeezed out of their own economic, political, and cultural spaces by the grand march of the market and state. Citizenship as a public concern cuts through the barriers of race, gender, culture, and nationality. Though often isolated in their corners, and yet sharing a sense of world-wide community, these individuals and groups find a political ally in the concept of citizenship which they believe promises to make good their losses. The methodological problem is rendered even more complicated because of the diversity of meanings attached to this label which many bear proudly, and some feel just as politically self-righteous to reject.

Why does this motley crowd of people with grievances nail their complaints onto citizenship which they see as a new platform from which to conduct their search for dignity, justice, freedom, identity and space? The answer lies in the fact that the problems of citizenship in transitional societies and transitional parts of established societies, which it typically addresses, cannot be easily solved within existing theory; and it is evocative of the kind of problem where theory becomes enmeshed with action. Being is becoming, for citizenship, as one finds it on the world stage from the Arab Spring to civil libertarian groups in liberal democracies, unites both theory and action.²

²“The concept of citizenship”, Bhargava comments, “once out of fashion among political thinkers, has now re-emerged as a crucial political idea.” Rajeev Bhargava, “Introduction” in Rajeev Bhargava and Helmut Reifeld, eds., *Civil Society, Public Sphere and Citizenship*, 2005, p. 48. After all, social theory, ever on the lookout for causes to defend, has valiantly risen to the defense of the *petit gens*, as we see in the works of Tilly, Moore, Hobsbawm, Rawls and Pitkin, to name but

The new, world-wide interest in citizenship emerges primarily from two complementary factors. First, the rise of new issues such as the arrival of non-Christian and non-white immigrants in stable Western democracies has brought a great paradox that underpins liberal democracies to the surface. How can one accommodate the “different”—groups whose core values, religions, rituals, political culture, and memories do not form part of the national myths of European democracies—within the structure of interests and concepts of long established social groups? Or, to put it simply, seen from the point of view of national majorities, how to tolerate the “intolerant” (which is how many within Western societies perceive resurgent Islam)? In the second place, in changing societies where the state was founded on the tenet of Western modernity—either in its liberal or Marxist variant of the public sphere as independent of the religious—the basic rights to freedom of religion are being eroded by the rise of intolerant national majorities. The emergence of ethnicity and identity, often as part of democratic self-assertion of erstwhile colonial subjects threatens the very basis of citizenship, namely, individual rights and freedoms.³ In postcolonial societies where the transition to democracy entails the assertion of both individual and group rights, how to reconcile both has become deeply problematic. Finally, in older established democracies, decline in electoral participation and interest in public affairs have sent a warning signal to the theorists of democracy about the urgent need to re-conceptualize citizenship. In consequence, democratic discourse, in the West as well as in postcolonial and post-revolutionary societies, has become entangled with new theoretical issues such as the distinction between active and passive citizenship, “layered” and “differentiated” citizenship.⁴

From the European Past to the Global Present: Citizenship as Linear Flow

Citizenship has been a key feature in the development of the state from classical antiquity to present day. In an apparently seamless “flow,” the core concepts of the Greek city state and the Roman Empire, representing, respectively, the salience of descent and law, became the foundation stones of the European idea of citizenship. It evolved from Greece and Rome, and subsequently, through the turbulent centuries of medieval Europe, passing through the early modern state, finally acquiring the institutional status of the citizen of liberal democratic Europe. One of the most significant results to emerge out of a symposium on “The Development

a few of the scholars who have responded to the social dislocation caused by the industrial revolution and inroads of the modern state into traditional society.

³ This, Bhargava asserts, “has eventually served to highlight both the significance of citizenship and the limitations of how it had been earlier formulated. Once it was realized that community identities could be conceived in ways that threatened citizenship, democratic theorists began to earnestly re-conceptualize it in order to accommodate rather than exclude community identities.” *Ibid.*

⁴ See Spiess (Chap. 3) for the definition and social construction of these categories.

of Citizenship in a Transcultural Context” produced an overview of the flow of citizenship in the European context, connecting the Greek polis and the modern democratic state.⁵ Presented by Thomas Maissen, the scheme delineated the evolution of the concept up to but not beyond the modern liberal democratic nation state.

The grand narrative one finds in Table 4.1 treats the modern nation state as the main site for the location of the citizen and does not take into account those who have dropped out of history in course of the evolution of the modern state. The “losers” in the story of the making of the modern European citizen have not, of course, vanished into complete oblivion. Their memories have been locked away into the myth of their nationhood and memories of lost battles. Such people, located at the margins of modern nation states—the Scots and the Chechens, for example—are the subjects of transcultural history, which is engaged in putting together these lost pieces of global history in order to reconstitute narratives that have gone out of focus but are not, for that reason, irretrievably lost. Focused on the “winners” in the game of state formation, the scheme presented in Table 4.1 does not take into account discontinuities, war, and breakdown of established orders. However, those who lost the battle for supremacy did not necessarily disappear. As we learn from the losers’ strategies—nationalist myths that are written into memory as the history of lost glory—and the reuse of sacred sites (the Acropolis has been successively a Greek temple, Christian church, and Ottoman mosque). One gets a more detailed picture of the story of the loss and recovery of European nationalisms.⁶ The Greco-Roman tradition did not disappear with the onset of the European medieval period which introduced the concept of trans-European citizenship into the conceptual pool. The original Republican tradition was revived by the early modern states, as the Jacobins of revolutionary France set off to liberate their own people and others in the name of restoring republican values. Eventually, the modern democratic state, as we shall see below in the formulation of Marshall, strove to extend citizenship rights to the whole population, riding on the buoyant welfare state.

The Phenomenology of Citizenship in a Post-Colonial Context

The historical background of the evolution of citizenship within Western democracies helps explain how the concept had dropped out of political science in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, and why contemporary political discourse on citizenship exhibits such a rich diversity of approaches. The

⁵ A symposium on “The Development of Citizenship in a Transcultural Context,” which brought together the doctoral fellows and research groups which constitute Area A (Governance and Administration) of the Cluster of Excellence, generated very helpful insights for the work of the citizenship research group. The symposium, held in Athens, 7–11 December, 2009, was organized by Professor Thomas Maissen, Director, Project A11 of the cluster.

⁶ The architectural technique of leaving empty spaces in the memorial building, proudly displaying fragments of the Athenian antiquity, anticipating the return of the “Elgin” marbles is an attempt to draw attention to what I have described as discontinuity above.

Table 4.1 Thomas Maissen, concepts of citizenship in Europe

Name	Greek polis	Rome	Italian medieval cities	Northern early modern cities	Early modern states	Liberal state	Modern democratic state
Precondition	Polites (astus) Descent, autarchy, virtue	Civis Descent, residence, emancipation (slave), treaty of alliance, virtue	Cittadino Descent, virtue	Bürger, bourgeois, burgher Privilege, <i>coniuratio</i> (oath)	Sujet Residence	Citoyen Property, commerce, adherence	Citizen Birth, descent
Status	Landowner, oikia (rule in the oikos)	Legal person within tribus	Member of the popolo	Craftsman in guild	Subject	Sovereign member of the nation	Sovereign member of the nation
Residence	“Suburban”	Cities (civitas)	Urban, villa in the countryside	Urban (within the walls)	Territory	Territory	Territory
Legal community	Polis and surroundings	Individual cities	City and contado	City	Territory	Territory	Territory
Quality	Participation (self-rule, offices, honour)	Soldier, participation, protection	Ruler, merchant	(Economically) privileged and free	Protected	Producer, equal in rights	Protected, equal in rights and participation, taxes, military service
Access to offices	Census, military service	Patrician status, cursus honorum	Patricians, wealth (or foreigner: podestà)	Distinct families (Regimentsfähigkeit)	Nobility, bourgeois specialists	Meritocratic	Functional elites, university graduates
Distinction/ categories of non-citizens	Versus foreigners, Metoikoi, women, adults, slaves	Liber versus slaves (and plebs), Romanus versus foreigners	Versus rural nobility, peasants, signoria	Versus rural nobility, peasants, princely rule	Versus foreign powers	Non-productive and poor people (nobility, labours)	Versus non-nationals (foreigner, immigrants)
Theory	Aristotle	Cicero	Machiavelli	(Calvin)	Hobbes	Sieyès	(Rousseau, Tocqueville)

problematic nature of citizenship one encounters today is in part linked to the demise of the concept of the state in the twentieth century, the very time when the powers of the Imperial state were growing inordinately. That demise was related to a sequence of factors that were of great consequence for citizenship. In the first place, within the ethos of the twenty-first century, both the state and the nation stand not as exclusive repositories of exclusive sovereignty. Instead, the individual, as citizen, is the ultimate arbitrator. The “State” was further stigmatized by linkage with a superannuated idealism of the nation’s corporate will, which passed into the equally mystical notion of “society”, sometimes an idealized world order. Marxist theory, increasingly influential, tended to reduce the state to an epiphenomenon of economic domination and class struggle. Liberal theory, which had traditionally preached a minimal and consensual state with formal-legal anchorage, tended increasingly to identify the state with the coercive power of regimes and to confuse it with the denial of freedom.

In the United States, whose new modes of political science would achieve world-wide hegemony by the mid-century, the national experience had stressed a diffused notion of political community overweighed by the activity of voluntary associations and private profit-making corporations. Political science, as it abandoned institutional analysis for behavioural analysis in the presumed interest of greater realism and empirical specificity, strove to eliminate the notion of state altogether, substituting such concepts as “group,” “political system,” and “political process,” and allying its manner of analysis with parallel developments in psychology and sociology. That same political science also tended to see the functions and jurisdictions of the state (or whatever other term was used) as the arena of countervailing social and economic forces—at most, as a regulator of competing interests without independent majesty; at the minimum, as a “black box” where competing social forces resolved their periodically shifting claims (Kelly, 1979).⁷

The relative absence of political science from the playing field explains why there should be increasing calls for a “theory of citizenship” that focuses on the identity and conduct of individual citizens, and includes their responsibilities, loyalties, and roles. There are, however, at least two general hazards in this quest. First, the scope of a “theory of citizenship” is potentially limitless—almost every problem in political philosophy involves relations among citizens or between citizens and the state.⁸ In their survey, Kymlicka and Norman (1994) try to avoid this danger by concentrating on two general issues that have been neglected due to the overemphasis in recent political philosophy on structures and institutions—namely, civic virtues and citizenship identity. The second danger for a theory of citizenship arises from the proximity of two different concepts which are sometimes conflated in these discussions. The

⁷ Kelly, George Armstrong “Who needs a Theory of Citizenship?” *Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* Vol. 108/4 (Fall 1979).

⁸ Kymlicka, Will and Wayne Norman. “Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory”. *Ethics*, Vol. 104, No. 2 (Jan., 1994), pp. 352–381.

first is the specification of citizenship entirely as a legal status, which alone can extend full membership in a particular political community. The second is the equating of citizenship with participation in the public life of the community. An acceptable compromise between the two positions would locate it at a point where legal status and behavior balance one another. This distinction is vital for the construction of a scale that measures citizenship in countries where people not only belong to separate political communities but also belong in different ways—that is, some are incorporated as individuals and others through membership of a group. The great variance in historical, cultural, and political situations of individuals in postcolonial contexts where nation building follows state formation rather than preceding it, as in the liberal democratic states of Europe, is a crucial parameter in determining their status as citizens, as opposed to being aliens.

The landscape of citizenship which underpins the general and comparative concepts discussed above helps understand the phenomenology of citizenship as one gathers from conversations with specialists and ordinary men and women. It also helps formulate an answer to the key question: Is citizenship a universal category that takes different forms, depending on the context, or is it innately and uniquely “Western”? In his answer to this basic question, “First and foremost”, as Rajeev Bhargava (2010) puts it, “citizenship is a sense of comfort in the public domain with one another.”⁹ Starting with this all important “sense of comfort” as a point of departure, Bhargava introduces other attributes of citizenship, both in terms of what it is not, as well as what it is. He does not, for example, make it mandatory for a citizen to be a member of any existing nation state. “First of all, the author doesn’t associate it with membership in a nation-state. The idea of citizenship is much older. . . You can be a citizen outside the boundaries of a polity. Being part of a nation-state is a contingent feature, not a necessary condition of what citizenship is.”¹⁰ However, while citizenship is an integral part of the self-perception of the individual, it cannot be entirely self-referential. One is, necessarily, a citizen of a larger collectivity. Bhargava adds: “citizenship is, first and foremost, an issue of belonging. If you are a citizen, you are a citizen of something and normally of a polity (or of a political community) and that brings the question of what the boundaries are.” The issue of belonging introduces a series of further considerations of who is in and who is out, and what rights those

⁹ Interview, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi, Feb 23, 2010. Bhargava adds, “[You get a sense of comfort] if . . . there is no misrecognition, if you are not negatively portrayed in public, if there are no negative stereotypes, if there’s no hate speech, if you are not looked at in a certain way, if you don’t have to face any aggressive posture. I mean. . . these are bodily compartments, which are extremely important. So, it’s not just enough to live in your neighbourhood and enjoy your rights. In moving around, in conversation, in public life of any kind, you should have a comfort level. . . I think if you feel estranged then your identification with the entire political, [system], the entire state and community, political community will fall.”

¹⁰ Interview, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, December 6, 2008.

who are in are entitled to, and what duties they must fulfill to maintain their status as citizens.”¹¹

If citizenship is universal, then why does it take different forms in different contexts? This question entails two further issues that underpin it. The first refers to the indigenous term in which it existed prior to the cultural and conceptual flow that connected the local with the global. The second refers to the specific form that the flow of the concept across geographic frontiers in course of its historic migration and evolution. The flow of the concept riding on the back of trade and pilgrimage has a different form of interaction and hybridization when compared to transmission through invasion and colonial rule.

Two on-site investigations into the indigenous roots of citizenship—one about the tribes of western Orissa, and the other about the tribes of India’s northeast, have yielded rich dividends. Talking about the social and political lives of the tribes of western Orissa, Nayak holds that:

there always was a concept of citizenship. But they had the very basic idea of citizenship, without which, even, I think they could not have thought about living in society. . . .every moment they are feeling like citizens of a particular state or area or village . . .that they are not just ordinary persons, but that they have rights and responsibilities towards the state. And they wanted to be under the control of the village headman, next the territorial lord, then next the king. They wanted to have a king, to be ruled by a king, and have the rights of the land and other properties like that. So, the rights of full citizens, they are very proud of that—[are based on the fact] that they belong to this area. . .that they are under the rule of this and that king. So that kind of feeling was there, that without the King their life was of no use, or the social living was not really functional. They had a hierarchy: King—Head—Citizen.¹²

Nayak describes this indigenous concept of citizenship specific to the tribals studied as “*khunt-katidar*”—a person who will have the right within a specific area to engage in slash and burn agriculture. And he will be given this right by the head or the king. They could easily slash the trees; cultivate the land and become its owners under the patronage of the king. They were not only occupying the land on their own, but they have been given permission. So, *khunt-katidars* were not only cultivators, but they had rights over the land cleared by them. So they used to express the idea of citizenship as *khunt-katidars*, meaning the rightful citizens.

Our fieldwork in Tripura led to findings that were similar to Orissa in tone and content but vastly dissimilar in intensity. In size and population, the State of Tripura is much smaller than Orissa. Tucked away in the northeastern corner of India, tenuously connected to the Indian mainland by air and in a circuitous way, by road

¹¹ Interview, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, December 6, 2008.

“It brings up questions of exclusion and inclusion. Everybody cannot be citizens of the same community. We just have to ensure that exclusion and inclusion are just and that nobody is included or excluded on grounds that are irrelevant. So if there is a place where a number of people have lived for centuries, we need to devise a criterion that included everyone as opposed to choosing one feature which has been selected because it is contingently or temporarily salient. Once you settle the question of who is a citizen. . .there is the whole question of rights that is so important in modern politics.”

¹² Interview, Prasanna Nayak, Utkal University, Bhubaneswar, February 22, 2010.

and rail, the tribal population was reduced because of the massive immigration of Hindus from Bangladesh. Being a minority in their own, traditional homeland, the inhabitants of this State exhibit a strong but fragmented sense of identity. They rely more on language and memory than the sense of citizenship, which is understood as the shared comfort of a common public sphere. Language itself does not contribute to the common bond. Among the 19 tribes of Tripura, Kok-Borok is the lingua franca in the hills, but in towns the elite groups among the tribes (known as Thakurs), Kok-Borok is not. According to Mr Kumud Chaudhury, a linguist with many years’ experience of fieldwork in Tripura, it is a “speech community”, i.e. a community tied together more by a common linguistic link than common ethnic origin. Chaudhury also stresses that for Tripuri urban elites, the use of Kok-Borok is less frequent.¹³ Etymologically, Kok-Borok means “the language of the people.” Borog is how the “sons of the soil” refer to themselves—in many ways similar to the *khunt katidar* of western Orissa. But unlike western Orissa, the Borog are actively engaged in a debate on whether to write their language in the Roman or Bengali script. They have developed a concept of the noncitizen, referred to as “wanjei,” and a term of distancing—“wansa”—from those who make them feel uncomfortable and provoke worry. Yet another similarity with Orissa is the conversion to Christianity which has generated intertribal conflicts.¹⁴ Bengalis, who form the vast majority of the population, while united under the broad rubric of a common language, are nevertheless deeply divided in terms of their specific identities which remain rooted in the localities from which they migrated to Tripura.¹⁵ This makes Tripura an unusual state where few feel as if they are on their home ground as one might expect citizens

¹³ Interview, Kumud Chaudhury, Agartala, Feb 20, 2010. Kai Peng, Wrangkhral, Kukichi are the communities where the focus on their own language and insurgency are at the most intense.

¹⁴ Interview with Mr Kumud Chaudhury, linguist, Agartala, Feb 19, 2010. He also informs that India’s Independence Day is not spontaneously celebrated in Tripura among the tribes because Tripura was an ‘independent kingdom’ before 1947!

¹⁵ Mr Subhas Talapatra: Senior Advocate Guwahati High Court (Agartala bench) 19. 2. 10 at Agartala. Although he thinks of himself as an Indian citizen, he stresses the ethnic dimension of citizens among the residents of Tripura. First, a section of tribals do not consider themselves to be citizens of India. Second, for the erstwhile East Pakistan/Bengal refugees (his parents’ generation), 80 % of their memories lies in their former place of birth/or residence. ‘Desh kothai’ (where is your country?) is very common in daily interaction and social interaction, marriage making etc. He stresses that ‘our past’ is almost impossible to erase! In northern Tripura, Shylet dialect is well maintained. There are others such as ‘Brahmanberia, Comilla and so on. Ancestry thus is a great hindrance to the development of a common Indian citizenship. Third, the 1980 inter-ethnic riots made the refugees more vulnerable, threatened to cling to their old identity. The Bangladesh War of Liberation (1971) was taken by the refugees as their war. The tribals under the leadership of the TUJS gave the slogan that ‘we are tribals, neither left nor green’. Fourth, regarding ADC-State government rift, he comments that there is very little tribal voice since things are decided by the ‘party’. This is resented by the nascent tribal youths who are educated and Christians and who find little space available for them. Their self-consciousness is targeted against the Bengalis.

to do. “In Tripura, both the tribal elites and the *wanjei* groups do not consider Tripura as their homeland/motherland. And yet, the *wanjei* groups control everything!”¹⁶

Citizenship as a “Third Space”: Entangled and Transnational Citizenship

Citizenship is a liminal category with a political edge and a moral depth. The political cutting edge entitles the citizen—as opposed to the alien and the subject—to certain rights, to be shared in common with others. The moral depth binds the citizen in empathy and solidarity with others like himself. Citizenship has to be understood as *both* signifier and signified of the cultural flow. It is both product and process, a window that provides a glimpse into the global flow of ideas, and is itself a product of the same conceptual flow. This common space is depicted in terms of the interface of state and society below, in Fig. 4.1.

In the contemporary world, globalization, which was meant to make citizenship and national boundaries increasingly less salient, has in fact revived their importance. The agenda of contemporary international politics is crowded with competing claims of the state and supra-stage agencies on the loyalty of individuals and ethnic groups. In the absence of a global political order with binding character, nation states, acting in their capacity as the collective voice of their citizens, remain the most important agents of accountability and enforcement. The complex process through which subjects and immigrants become citizens thus pitches territoriality and ethnicity as competing norms for the entitlement to citizenship. Caught in this double bind, citizenship has become a contested category and a political problem of global importance.

In the era of globalization, we are faced with a new context and a new challenge. Ours is a world of nation states, states without nations, nations without states, and, as often as not, people with histories but without nations or states to to which they could nail their identities. This is a world where citizenship—equal membership of moral and political communities—has steadily emerged as an entitlement. To understand these aspirations and capabilities, one needs to move beyond the frames of references and categories that are specific to the history of the European nation state.¹⁷ The method of “*histoire croisée*”, which has found favor with many projects within the cluster, “breaks with a one-dimensional perspective that simplifies and

¹⁶ Interview with Mr N. C. Devbarma (20. 2.10 at Agartala) A retired (2002) director of All-India Radio, Agartala, Feb 20, 2010., a graduate and having a degree in IRPM. He asserts his mother tongue is Kok-Borok, and he is in favor of using the Roman script. Stressing the social and cultural identity aspects of citizenship in Tripura, he stresses the distinction between “*Borok*” (human beings) and “*Wanjei*” (outsiders). The Kok-Borok speaking Tripuris had rights (common) over shifting cultivation while the Wanjei did not have those rights. He was at pains to note that the original residents of Tripura have to secure ST certificates from the officials, mostly Bengali who are refugees in Tripura! He stated that citizenship was imposed on the tribals in Tripura.

¹⁷ Michael Warner and Benedicte Zimmermann, “Beyond comparison: *Histoire Croisée* and the challenge of reflexivity”, *History and Theory* 45 (February 2006), p. 36.

homogenizes, in favour of a multidimensional approach that acknowledges plurality and the complex configurations that result from it.”¹⁸ To meet the challenge of citizenship in the contemporary world, entangled history—has emerged as a new paradigm and an alternative to national history and comparative politics. Werner and Zimmermann (2006) present the manifesto of this new paradigm in the following words.

To investigate relational configurations that are active and asymmetrical, as well as the labile and evolving nature of things and situations, to scrutinize not only novelty but also change, is one of the aims of *histoire croisée*. Instead of an analytical model—which would result in a statist view of things—our aim is on the contrary to articulate various dimensions and place them into movement; this requires a toolbox that, while integrating the well-tested methodological contributions of the comparative approach and transfer studies, makes it possible to apprehend in a more satisfactory way the complexity of a composite and plural world in motion, and thereby the fundamental question of change. The failure to achieve this is a weak if not blind spot within comparative and to some extent transfer, approaches.¹⁹

The liberal response to these problems as we have already seen in Chaps. 2 and 3 can be considered in terms of the mutation of the ideals of Marshall. Written during the period of post-war reconstruction in Britain, T. H. Marshall’s work on citizenship has to be seen in context of the wider debate over the welfare state and the arguments that were being promulgated at the time for an extension of state provisions. Marshall’s core contribution to the theory was to argue that the extension of citizenship could act as a political instrument of integration to counterbalance the divisive forces of class inequalities. To justify his position, Marshall constructed a theory of citizenship based upon the central claim that citizenship had grown incrementally and was expressed progressively, in three different dimensions, namely the civil, the political and the social. The eighteenth century, according to his schema, had witnessed the development of civil rights which mainly targeted the legal status and civil rights of the individual, rights which were to be defended in a law court. Core rights in this case referred to freedom of speech, the right to a fair trial and equal access to the legal system. Moving into the nineteenth century, Marshall noted the extension of political rights, an outcome of the working-class struggle for political equality, through greater access to the parliamentary process. Improvements under this rubric referred to electoral rights, the invention of the secret ballot box, the creation of new political parties and the expansion of the franchise. Finally, the twentieth century, according to Marshall, engendered “social rights” which included claims to welfare, entitlements to social security, unemployment benefits, etc. In addition to this stage-by-stage account of citizenship, Marshall observed the emergence of a “hyphenated society,” a social system where there was perpetual tension between the need for economic profitability, the taxation requirements of the modern state and the rights of citizens to welfare provisions.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 38–39.

An influential figure in the sociology of citizenship, Marshall has spawned a number of critics. Anthony Giddens (2002) for instance has criticized Marshall for developing an evolutionary perspective on the historical emergence of citizenship which begins to seem teleological. Giddens also pointed out that citizenship rights are not a unified, homogenous set of social arrangements and that these themselves can become the basis of conflict and contestation. It can be further added that the Marshallian explanation fails to take into account the case of postcolonial states and societies where political rights came *before* civil and social rights as one can see in the case of India to which we turn in the next section.

The Indian Discourse on Citizenship: Hybridizing or Reinventing Liberalism?

Citizenship in India, T. K. Oommen argues, has been “moulded by a long and tortuous history of 5,000 years.”²⁰ Oommen problematizes the relationship between citizenship and national identities from the vantage point of competing constructions of national identities in contemporary India. The three salient foundations of these constructions are religion, language, and tribe, which are in a relationship of continuous tension with the statist conception of national identity which purports to promote harmony among all the people of India transcending religious, linguistic, and regional or sectional diversities, as hoped by the founding fathers of the Indian constitution.

When a religion is invoked as the basis of national identity, those who do not belong to that religion are subjected to a process of “ethnification.” This means even those who are nationals (i.e. those who identify with one or another national territory as their homeland and speak the language of that nation) can be made to appear as “outsiders”. This tendency, according to Oomen, which undercuts the very foundations of the Indian polity is prevalent among the Hindu, Sikh, and Muslim “nationalists” in contemporary India. While the Hindu militants see the whole of India as their exclusive homeland, Sikh and Muslim militants view only part of India thus.

Although language and tribe are not accorded any legitimacy by the Indian state for defining national identity, they are accepted as the bases for politico-administrative units. This results in two basic contradictions. First, it militates against the notion of single citizenship as domiciliary requirements, which are often prescribed by these units for availing some of the civil and social citizenship entitlements. Second, such prescriptions often render those who do not share the

²⁰ T.K. Oommen, “Introduction: Conceptualizing the Linkage between Citizenship and National Identity” in Oommen ed., *Citizenship and National Identity: From Colonialism to Globalism* (New Delhi: Sage; 1997), p. 41. Some of the nodal points in this long march of classical India to the contemporary will be discussed in detail in my essay on the case of India later in this volume. Also see my *Politics in India: Structure, Process, Policy* (London: Routledge; 2011).

relevant linguistic and tribal identities as outsiders to these units. Thus, a second category of ethnies emerge—those who are nationals in their respective homeland (e.g. Maharashtrians in Maharashtra and Nagas in Nagaland)—but aliens elsewhere in the territory of the Indian state. Full citizenship entitlements to all members of the polity irrespective of their spatial locations can partly moderate the tensions and conflicts between ethnies and those who are denied the same rights.

The Indian constitution has taken this onboard through the concept of “differentiated citizenship.”²¹ Rajeev Bhargava, in his response to a question about the “amalgamation of this imported or modern idea of citizenship” says:

Yes, it was an important requirement for proper integration. It is a non-assimilationist strategy, very important for the sense of all being together, solidarity, and recognition of difference. And of course, the caste, as you mentioned, was also important. Reservations for Dalits, that was a community-specific right. . . a special right. In effect, one could argue that the formation of federal states in India is grounded on the moral ground to self-government by different linguistic communities—thus, illustrating differentiated citizenship. Article 370 is an extreme version of the same thing. And, Article 371 which applies to the North East, is also something that makes government unable to alter some of the customary practices of the North East.

So, yes, we got this early on and the practice of “differentiated citizenship” was being applied in India long before the theory coined the term. Both community rights and minority rights existing in a way that permits the state to legislate on a case-by-case basis, etc. The Constitution thus tries to balance individual and collective rights. In the case of the right to set up an educational institution, it is given to a religious and/or linguistic community, but everybody can apply to the state for funds, which has major repercussions (. . .) if all the funds taken are coming from the state, then no religious instruction can take place there. But that is very rare, as it makes a mockery of the right. One of the reasons for this right to exist is because you want to set up something to instruct a pupil in religion, not just about all religions. But it is interesting that if it is partially funded by the state, you cannot have a policy that is exclusionary, you cannot disallow people from other religions from applying to the school.²²

The Toolkit: Turning Aliens and Subjects Into Citizens

The core idea behind the toolkit of citizenship is to identify institutions and policies that can transform rebels or the alienated into citizens. With this intention, the toolkit seeks the room to maneuver within the structure of the state. The Indian record of successfully turning subjects into citizens (discussed in detail in Chap. 7) has cross-national significance because, rather than being a unique attribute of Indian culture, it is based on an institutional arrangement containing several important parameters. The first of these are the legal sources of citizenship as formulated in the Indian Constitution (Articles 5–11), the Constituent Assembly Debates (which provide insights into the controversy surrounding specific articles),

²¹ See Spiess, Chap. 3.

²² Bhargava, Interview, by Clemens Spiess CSDS, Delhi 20 Dec, 2008.

and legislation undertaken by the national parliament to enable and amend, depending on the case, the original provisions of the constitution.

“Judicialization” of citizenship is yet another method of synchronizing the provisions of the law and the new demands emerging from society. The assertion of identity and linkage to India has emerged as a supplementary basis of Indian citizenship, in addition to birth and residence. Property and citizenship have constantly been interwoven: the questions of who can own property, and how much, have received different answers across India’s regions. In the case of Kashmir, the laws have always had a slightly different tinge due to the special agreement that the Indian acts would not be normally applicable in Kashmir. In the last decade, case law has tended towards a more flexible and all-encompassing understanding of Indian stipulations with relation to property and, of course, the onset of economic liberalization has given wings to even further judicial liberalization of these concepts. Similarly, recent laws allowing NRIs (Non-Resident Indians) to own property have already been registered in case law.

Governance, as I have argued in a previous work (Mitra 2005), is possible if the state pays close attention to law and order management, strategic reform, and the constitutional incorporation of society’s core values.²³ Working out of a similar model, one can assert that India’s relative success on the issue of citizenship can be attributed to the fact that these tools of citizen-making are used with unusual vigor and imagination by the political decision makers in India. The typical strategy makes a three pronged attack on conflict issuing out of the hiatus between general legal norms of the state and the assertion of political identity contesting the state. India makes stakeholders out of rebels by adroitly combining reform, repression, and selective recruitment of rebels into the privileged circle of new elites (see Fig. 4.2 below).

The model weaves together several insights that we gain from the Indian attempt to turn subjects into citizens in a form that can be used as the basis of comparison across countries. The first and foremost of these is the fact that in the Indian discourse and public policy, citizenship is conceptualized both as a “product” and a “process”—which is tantamount to saying that citizen-making is a primary objective of the constitution, modern institutions, and public policy of the state. The three processes, on the other hand, are reinforced by the momentum generated from below, as people assert their citizen rights and articulate them through a complex repertoire that effectively combines political participation with strategic protest. Both the state and the janata—India’s generic category for politically conscious and articulate participants in everyday politics—draw on categories that are indigenous as well as imported, and the process stretches out into memory of selfhood and rights of empowerment through a chain of associations that links people in one part of the country to another. One consequence is the emergence of the hybrid citizen—a liminal category that joins the protester and the participant,

²³ See Subrata K. Mitra, *The Puzzle of India’s Governance: Culture, Context and Comparative Theory*. 2005. London: Routledge.

stretching the accommodating capacity of the political system and blunting the edges of anti-system behavior.

The model of “citizen-making” below highlights the role of elites and strategies of reform. It also explains India’s attempts to generate differentiated and multilevel citizenship—new conceptual tools with relevance for policy making—as categories germane to her politics. That makes citizenship a significant case study of conceptual flow where practices, notions, institutions of citizenship have been transferred, imported, emulated and adapted to successfully, and unsuccessfully, meet local needs and constraints.

The putative universality of the liberal view of citizenship masks a particular historical and cultural context. The theorist Rajeev Bhargava asserts:

Well, the ‘universalist’ outlook was not universal in the first place. It was very particularistic. Once you sort the community issue, settle the issue of belonging then the basis of that citizenship becomes irrelevant. Just to take an example: if I have a school where I will only admit Catholics, then the Catholics will go to the chapel but then it will lose its religious appeal after a while since everybody shares and believes in the same thing. And then, in this context, you can say that religion doesn’t really matter since everybody has the same faith.²⁴

Considerations of citizenship of whatever kind demand an idea of citizenship. There cannot be an idea of citizenship without an account of the subject of citizenship. Yeatman (2007) argues that the subject of citizenship is “the individual” considered as an integrated unit of organic and subjective life. It is this idea of the individual that is the referent for the idea of self-preservation in early modern civil philosophy. It is difficult to appreciate the significance of self-preservation without using the vantage point of post-Freudian accounts of the self to open it up. Citizenship concerns the status of the human being considered as a person (a self).²⁵ Yeatman suggest that contemporary social movements assert a positivity and pride in group specificity against ideals of assimilation. Political actors who form part of such movements have also questioned whether justice always means that law and policy should enforce equal treatment for all groups. Embryonic in these challenges is a concept of differentiated citizenship that can be considered the best way to realize the inclusion and participation of everyone in full citizenship.

With regard to this point, Young (1989) argues that far from implying one another, the universality of citizenship in the sense of the inclusion and participation of everyone stands in tension with the other two meanings of universality embedded in modern political ideas: universality as generality, and universality as equal treatment.²⁶ First, the ideal that the activities of citizenship express or create a general will that transcends the particular differences of group affiliation, situation, and interest,

²⁴ Interview with Rajeev Bhargava by Clemens Spiess, Delhi CSDS 20.12.2008.

²⁵ Yeatman, Anna. ‘The Subject of Citizenship’. *Citizenship Studies* 11 (1) 2007 February, pp. 105–115.

²⁶ Young, Iris Marion. “Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship”. *Ethics*, Vol. 99, No. 2 (Jan., 1989), pp. 250–274.

has in practice excluded groups judged not capable of adopting that general point of view. The idea of citizenship as expressing a general will has tended to enforce homogeneity on citizens. To the degree that contemporary proponents of revitalized citizenship retain the idea of a general will and common life, they implicitly support the same exclusions and homogeneity. Young argues that the inclusion and participation of everyone in public discussion and decision making requires mechanisms for group representation. Secondly, where differences in capacities, culture, values, and behavioral styles exist among groups, and some of these groups are privileged, strict adherence to a principle of equal treatment tends to perpetuate oppression or disadvantage. The inclusion and participation of everyone in social and political institutions therefore sometimes requires the articulation of special rights that attend to group differences in order to undermine oppression and structural disadvantages.

Conclusion

I have argued in this chapter that progress in the field of citizenship in the direction of building a cross-cultural explanatory model of citizenship with policy relevance is contingent on a rigorous exegesis of its empirical content. This needs to be complemented with an analysis of the process of its transmission and the understanding of its complex genealogy which connects the imported liberal concept of citizenship to the indigenous meanings attributed to it in the lived-in categories that we get in anthropological studies, as well as from in-depth interviews with specialists.²⁷

The conceptual boundary of a specific phenomenon is of great interest to the research on citizenship. Is citizenship a logically bounded entity defined by a simple set of features in which all instances possessing the criteria attributes have a full and equal degree of membership? (See Rosch And Mervis, 1975 & Andersen, 2000)²⁸ In response to this question, I have formulated citizenship as an interface between state and society—a “third space”—whose inhabitants unite the rights germane to their membership of the political community and the sense of identity, identification, and obligation that membership of the society entails. As such, while we achieve some form of generality with regard to the category of the citizen, its empirical references remain bound to the context. The first approximation of the category thus

²⁷ Those who are in pursuit of a transdisciplinary “theory” of citizenship will do well to heed the advice of the Indian sociologist T. K. Oommen. “Creation of clear concepts is a pre-requisite for theory building. And if concepts and theories are rooted in and isomorphic to the life-world of the people, their potentiality to avoid human misery will also be substantial. I consider this combination as the real task and promise of social science.” Oommen (1997), pp. 49–50.

²⁸ See Eleanor Rosch and Carolyn Mervis, “Family Resemblances: Studies in the Internal Structure of Categories” *Cognitive Psychology* 7, 573 (1975). The counterargument against too tight a boundary comes from the apprehension that without clear boundaries a concept will be susceptible to “stretching” as, in that case, “there will be no limit to a concept’s extension.” Hanne Andersen, “Kuhn’s account of family resemblances: A solution to the problem of wide-open textures” in *Erkenntnis* 52: 313 (2000).

opens the issue to the larger vista of the “flow” of citizenship, which is a complex theoretical problem in its own right. The commonsensical, everyday reference to the flow of objects suggests a movement from one place to another in a steady unbroken stream, and a “continuous mass,” in a manner that would be interpersonally visible, rather as one would think about the flow of blood in veins and arteries, of water flowing downstream, or electricity moving across a conductive medium. Can one attribute these characteristics to the flow of citizenship from one context to the other?

One of the main arguments of this chapter is that indeed it is both imperative and feasible for the state in the times of globalization to conceptualize and construct citizenship as a seamless flow across time and space and innovate appropriate institutions and policies to achieve this objective. Citizen-making is a prime function of the modern state and a sensible strategy for governance and administration in any society. Tracking the core concept of citizenship as it traveled from Europe to Asia, this chapter has explored the phenomenology of citizenship and the translingual and transcultural facets of its evolution.²⁹ The insights gathered in course of the research that we have undertaken makes it possible to look at citizenship in terms of a very broad spectrum of concepts, which can be a formal part of the culture, linguistically articulate, or existing in the inner world of the actor, but have not yet been articulated in terms of science, language, society, culture, or theory. The book as a whole explores the institutions, political processes, and symbols used to profile a model citizen. The complex process of acculturation, through which the imported becomes indigenized and hybridized, involves agency and strategy, innovatively producing an asymmetry reflecting the uneven nature of such flows, the cultural context, and balance of power.

The critical evaluations of Marshall’s foundational writings carry an important lesson for contemporary analyses of citizenship. Too “English” and too closely tied to the specific context of an expanding postwar economy, a stable cultural foundation and the solid framework of the welfare state, Marshall had held the elimination of social exclusion as a worthy and feasible goal of social policy. The quantitative implications of Marshall’s liberal citizenship had the attainment of full citizenship coverage where everybody will achieve his civic, political, and social rights as a goal. Even in England, as Marshall’s critics point out, the emergence of gender, race, immigration, and region as salient cleavages questioned the simple cultural premises of his basic assumptions (Bulmer and Rees, 1996).³⁰ The decline of the

²⁹ By translingual we mean phenomena that exist but have not yet been transferred into any specific language system. Similarly, transcultural would mean phenomena that exist on the part of the existential world but have not been acknowledged in high culture as part of the custom, manner, or ritual.

³⁰ “‘Marshall’s ‘Englishness’ had its time and place, but that has passed.’” Martin Bulmer and Anthony Rees, “Citizenship in the twentieth century”, in Martin Bulmer and Anthony Rees, eds., *Citizenship today: the contemporary relevance of T. H. Marshall* (London: UCL Press; 1996), p. 279. Based on Mann’s contribution to the volume, they argue that a comparative analysis of citizenship, even within the relatively homogeneous European cultural context, requires the reformulation of Marshall’s concept.

welfare state made the rights-driven citizenship idea even more contested. As we move from Marshall's postwar England to the contemporary scene, the new frontiers of research on citizenship shows wide vistas of interesting empirical and theoretical problems that are in urgent need of attention.

The chapter has explored the meanings of citizenship in the inner world of the actor and the observer on the basis of conversations with experts and actors; identified the gap in the conceptual landscape of citizenship that the book seeks to meet; and sketched out a preliminary model and research design for a quantitative analysis of citizenship, which can, as I have argued in my case study of citizenship in India (Chap. 7), at best be a still picture of a dynamic reality. It is comparative and cross national in perspective. The chapter has developed a model of citizen-making. The model is both comparative and cross-national in perspective. The components of the model, which are, strategic reform, incorporation of core social values into the constitutional norms that underpin the institutional arrangement of the state, and firm, fair, transparent management of law and order have deep implications for policies intended to transform aliens into citizens. By making these unstated parameters of citizen-making explicit, this chapter has set the stage for a comprehensive discussion of citizenship in its transnational and post-liberal context. This theme will be explored further in the analytic narratives that follow.

References

- Andersen, Hanne. 2000. "Kuhn's Account of Family Resemblances: A Solution to the Problem of Wide-Open Textures." *Erkenntnis* 52 (3): 313–337.
- Bhargava, Rajeev. "Introduction" *Civil Society, Public Sphere and Citizenship*, edited by Rajeev Bhargava and Helmut Reifeld. New Delhi: Sage.
- Bulmer, Martin and Anthony Rees, eds. 1996a. *Citizenship Today: The Contemporary Relevance of T.H. Marshall*. London: UCL Press.
- Giddens, Anthony 2002. *Runaway World: How Globalisation is Reshaping our Lives*, Profile Books Limited, London.
- Kelly, George Armstrong. 1979. "Who Needs a Theory of Citizenship?" *Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* 108 (4): 21–36.
- Kymlicka, Will and Wayne Norman. 1994. "Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory." *Ethics* 104 (2): 352–381.
- Mitra, Subrata K. 2005. *The Puzzle of India's Governance: Culture, Context and Comparative Theory*. London: Routledge.
- Mitra, Subrata K. 2011. *Politics in India: Structure, Process, Policy*. London: Routledge.
- Oommen, T.K., ed. 1997. *Citizenship and National Identity: From Colonialism to Globalism*. New Delhi: Sage.
- Rosch, Eleanor and Carolyn Mervis. 1975. "Family Resemblances: Studies in the Internal Structure of Categories." *Cognitive Psychology* 7 (4): 573–605.
- Yeatman, Anna. 2007. "The Subject of Citizenship." *Citizenship Studies* 11 (1): 105–115.
- Young, Iris Marion. 1989. "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship." *Ethics* 99 (2): 250–274.
- Zimmermann, Benedict and Warner, Michael. 2006. "Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisee and the challenge of relexivity" *History and Theory* 45

Section II
Citizenship in National and Transnational
Contexts: The European Union, Sri Lanka,
and India

Chapter 5

European Citizenship: A Concept of Interrelatedness and Conditionality

Frank R. Pfetsch

Abstract Frank Pfetsch argues that the idea of citizenship in the European Union is different from citizenships known in customary communities or in traditional nation states. It is transnational and dual in the sense that it is linked and additional to citizenship of the member states of the European Union. Every citizen of a member state is automatically a citizen of the Union. His essay explores the various types of relationships between citizenship and political frameworks, the different dimensions of citizenship, as well as the different categories of migration with respective national and European Union regulations. The political role within the institutional settings of the European Union is examined together with the most relevant treaty regulations concerning citizenship.

Citizenship is the exercise of rights and obligations by citizens within communities, possibly on various levels of the polity. It implies the legal right and duty to participate in public life on the territory on which people live and implies a moral commitment. It also has a territorial dimension which can be exercised on a local or communal level, on a sub-national (Länder, province, etc.), national (Staatsbürger in Germany, citoyenneté in France, etc.), regional, or European (Europa der Bürger, citizenship of the European Union), and global (cosmopolitan, Weltbürger) level. A person can be a citizen of a local community, a state, or an integrated regional political entity, whereas cosmopolitanism is more of an idealistic individual conception.

Historically, the concept of a citizen was invented in Greek antiquity when a citizen (polités) was someone who lived in a small community and had the right to participate in public affairs. This however, was restricted to free, wealthy, educated adult males. Citizenship required social status and economic independence as well as time to exercise civic duties. The civic virtues of independently thinking individuals were later on defended by Cicero and others in the Roman tradition. Citizenship was a legal

F.R. Pfetsch (✉)

Institute of Political Science, University of Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany
e-mail: Frank.Pfetsch@urz.uni-heidelberg.de

and civil status in the world of civic life (e.g. the right to marry: *ius connubii*), in business (*ius commercium*), and in political and military matters (*ius suffragium*). Later on, in medieval times, a citizen was someone who lived in the city as a protected entity (borough, Burg, Bürger) who enjoyed the rights given by the community. Not until later, with the Westphalian state system, did the national level become the most common political entity and the final authority to render citizenship. Historically, therefore, citizenship developed before nationhood. Since 1648 nationality and citizenship have been linked to the Western world and have spread with colonial rule over the globe. The nation state and its citizenship have become a universal institution, but with the old and new forms of government this connection differentiated and gave citizenship different meanings. This is especially true in the context of the European Union.

There are various concepts of the different dimensions and aspects of European citizenship. I will concentrate on four dimensions involved in citizenship which are in some way interlinked: there is a *legal dimension* which refers to the formal rights and duties of citizens and stands in the tradition of liberal thought. The *psychological dimension* refers to the sense of belonging, a person's identification with the community. It is the affective aspect and is closely linked to tradition, culture, religion, ethnicity, etc. Third, there is the *political dimension* of citizenship which refers to the participatory rights of the citizens, foremost the right to vote and present as a candidate; it is an aspect of political philosophy. Finally, there is a *social and economic dimension* of citizenship that refers to social or welfare rights for support in situations of need.

The Legal Dimension

In modern times the legal status of citizenship has been provided by the state. Citizenship is the legal expression of being part of a given community or nation, and to enjoy legal protection of citizen and human rights. It is state related and requires also the fulfillment of the obligations laid down in the constitution. As a legal system the constitution regulates and distributes the powers ingrained in the various organs of a state. In addition, a constitution also sets the values of a polity. It seems that the notion of constitutional patriotism has become an accepted concept which tries to link legal terms to emotional feelings. In the opinion of the author, the attachment towards abstract legal terms such as freedom, equality, solidarity, etc. is, however, a more rational than emotional act. Legal systems of selected European states will be discussed below.

The Psychological Dimension: Citizenship and Identity

Besides legal status, citizenship contains an element of affection and emotion towards a community, which means to feel comfortable with other citizens. The state has become the most important frame for identification. The state provides the legal status and society through culture, language, beliefs, religion, customs etc., gives the feeling

of togetherness. Identification with a given community requires devotion, attachment, and loyalty to a nation. Considerations of identity include the question of who is in and who is out, touching upon basic principles of social life: who belongs to the in-group and who belongs to the out-group. All opinion polls in European countries show that the identification with the nation state is by far more developed than with other communities such as regions or the European Union.

Two different conceptions of identity or nationality exist, and, consequently, of citizenship: the one can be defined by objective criteria, the other by subjective.

According to *objective criteria* based on language, customs, race, religion, ethnicity, etc. citizenship is given, among other laws, by the law of blood (*ius sanguinis*) and/or by the law of the land or territory (*ius soli*). The former concentrates more on homogenous settings, the latter on multiple cultures. One can become a citizen of a given nation state either by family ties, by birth on the territory of a nation state, or by naturalization. It is the latter which is central to migration policy (see below). The distinction between *ius soli* and *ius sanguinis* is, however, more analytical than empirical. Even in France both conceptions have coexisted since the nineteenth century (Wieder 2009). *Ius soli* and *ius sanguinis* are both important criteria to obtain citizenship of a state within the European Union. As a tendency European constitutional law emphasizes the overarching concept of constitutional patriotism. In such a way the Treaty on European Union (TEU, Maastricht Treaty) decouples European citizenship from ethnos.

Besides these more or less objective criteria of becoming a citizen of a state, there exists a *subjective criteria* that is the will of the individual (*demos*) to live together. Citizenship is also based on a psychological aspect which expresses an emotional attachment towards a community—local, regional, national or European. It is the latter which is transnational, incorporating various national and sub-national entities. There are presumably collective feelings of one nation—altogether 27 countries—toward the others. Without the knowledge of others a shared feeling can hardly develop. This leads us away from the individual emotional perception to either a collective sentiment and/or the perception of shared basic values, common history, collective memories, etc. In his *Essay on Representative Government* (1861) John Stuart Mill defines national identity: “This feeling of nationality may have been generated by various causes. Sometimes it is the effect of identity of race and descent. Community of language and community of religion, greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of its causes. But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents; the possession of a national history, and the consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past. None of these circumstances, however, are either indispensable or necessarily sufficient by themselves” (Mill 1977: 229). Thus, identity has an individual and a collective dimension (see Fig. 5.1), it can change over time and is historically determined as an imagined construction (Anderson 1983, 1991). As far as European identity is concerned it is supposed to be transnational, i.e. members of one community are supposed to develop togetherness also with members of the other communities. The links could be a shared heritage, complementary national cultures, common values and institutions, a Common Foreign and Security Policy (Pfetsch 2001). Hence,




Fig. 5.1 Model of individual and collective identity

legal elements also come in, for example, constitutional principles referring to liberty, security, equality, etc. European identity can thus evolve from a transnational composite of various national identities. With the intensification of transnational communication, regions have been drawn closer together and this can, in addition, contribute to a European identity as suggested by Deutsch (1957) with his transactional approach and the European *demos* project of the discourse model proposed by Jürgen Habermas (1992/1996).

The Political Dimension; Approaches in the History of Ideas

Two democratic traditions as to the nature of citizenship can be distinguished: an individual liberal and a civic republican. In the *liberal tradition* the protection of the individual stands against the state and is linked primarily to a market society. The legal dimension captures this tradition: “All are equal, autonomous beings, so that there is no sense that the state has any organic existence, bonding the citizens to it

and to each other” (Heater 1999: 6). The *republican view* refers to a communitarian concept of collective identity. Citizenship connects the individual to the state but also connects individuals to each other. Heater states that “Citizenship is shared activity in the spirit of mutual goodwill” (Heater 1999: 56). It is more of a moral concept; citizens are seen as part of a community, as part of an organic society, not merely a collection of individuals. This tradition touches upon many aspects of the psychological dimension.

The *republican tradition* originates in Greek antiquity and was later followed by Rousseau with a narrow and exclusive definition of citizenship, since belonging to a defined small community is the preferred polity. In his constitutional proposal for Corsica, Rousseau requires an extreme form of life for its inhabitants: to be simple in customs, equal in wealth and social ranking, homogeneous in knowledge.¹

The other *liberal tradition* has a much broader and inclusive meaning of citizenship and is linked to the philosophies of Locke, Kant, or Popper. It is the idea of an open society with free trade, movement, hospitality, and the “space of freedom, security, and law” according to the EU treaty. It implies rights and obligations: The right to move, to vote, the right of residence, but also the obligations to pay taxes, to exercise military service, etc. It is a more inclusive definition of citizenship attributing higher values to constitutional principles that regulate a political community.

Both traditions do not necessarily exclude each other. They can complement one another through *republican liberalism*. Dagger argues that citizenship incorporates three elements, namely autonomy, virtue, and rights, which should be regarded as complementary and may “strengthen the appeal of duty, community, and the common good while preserving the appeal of rights” (Dagger 1997: 5). Thus, the individual can enjoy the civil rights and civil duties at the same time.

There is yet another aspect which concerns the value system of a polity. Each society has more or less explicitly developed *core values* (Leitkultur) as an identifiable set of basic values. Together with such core values *constitutional principles* also consist of formal regulations for the polity as a whole. They organize the political process, its institutions, and the legal status of a citizen. The former values are traditional and hardly negotiable; the latter are more flexible and can more easily be negotiated. It is a kind of constitutional patriotism that was described by Michels (2008) in his essay “*On some causes and consequences of English constitutional patriotism*” (1926), and later on by Dolf Sternberger (1982/1990) and Jürgen Habermas (1992)—as the attachment towards a constitution with all its opportunities and limitations (Fig. 5.2).

¹Rousseau even went so far as to demand that a citizen should be male, married, have two children, a home, and land sufficient for living; a citizen must be born on the island; a foreigner cannot become a citizen; an unmarried male over 40 will be excluded. He goes on to say that there should be no money, no trade, and very little mobility; changing location results in the loss of citizenship for 3 years. The economy is closed; trade with foreign countries does not exist; autarchy and subsistence and real exchange of goods are the economic foundations of the ideal Corsican state (Rousseau 1915). This is reminiscent of former real socialist settings.




Fig. 5.2 Relationship culture, identity, politics

The Treaty on European Union (1992/1993) introduced the concept of *citizenship of the European Union*, and the Treaty of Nice (2000/2003) facilitated the legislative process on related subjects by introducing qualified majority voting. These decisions are more in line with the liberal tradition that gives citizens minimal rights (universal suffrage), no full parliamentarization, indirect participation and, however rudimentary developed, a transnational party system; the right to vote in municipality and European elections, or otherwise through national representative organs.

In some of the EU countries, referenda on European matters are required and parliaments must be heard. European citizenship, even though it is linked to the nation state, consists of overlapping categories. Any citizen of any member state is automatically a European citizen. The sum of all member state citizenships constitutes European citizenship (Fig. 5.3).

Citizenship has to do with culturally and historically determined identification with territorially fixed entities, foremost the nation state. Identification with a given political entity is easier if the respective population possesses a homogenous common cultural and historical background. Identity is more difficult to achieve if the constituency is composed of different ethnic, religious, linguistic, etc. attributes. Heterogeneous constituencies are more common around the globe. This is also the case among and within the various countries of the European Union. Thus the European politics of citizenship has to refer to multicultural entities in a multilayered system of states and regions. Federal systems in particular show different levels of identification: communal, regional, national state, and finally European. Opinion polls show that identities are attached differently to different layers. Stronger are attachments to national and/or regional or local entities; according to the Eurobarometer 94 % of the population in the 27 European countries feel attached to their own nation; 74 % of the citizens feel “European” (Eurobarometer 71, spring 2009).




Fig. 5.3 The constitution of European citizenship

The Social and Economic Dimension of Citizenship

Industrialization processes in Western societies were accompanied by social demands towards the state in order to protect the poor and disabled. As a result the fight for social protection encompasses the market economy with its free mobility within the borders of the society. Since the European Union has no uniform social policy, this dimension is taken care of by the member states and, as a future project, is enshrined in the Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 2000. The constitutional requirements do not insist on the equality of the conditions of life as is the case, i.e. in the Federal Republic of Germany. However, the regional (Article 130c), structural, and cohesion (Article 130d) funds, as well as the social fund (Article 123), aim at adjusting the economic and social conditions among the member states. In the chapter ‘Solidarity’ of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union the following rights are mentioned:

- Workers' right to information and consultation (Article II-27)
- Right of collective bargaining and action (Article II-28)
- Right of access to free placement services (Article II-29)
- Protection of workers in the event of unjustified dismissal (Article II-30)
- Fair and just working conditions (Article II-31)
- Prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work (Article II-32)

These rights, however, express intentions rather than realized practice.

Migration

Citizenship touches upon various categories of migration. Besides being born on the soil of a member state or linked through family ties, the interesting question concerns the way a person coming from outside can obtain citizenship of a European state. Europe has been the continent of colonial and postcolonial mobility within and to the outside world. Whereas in the eighteenth and nineteenth century Europeans emigrated to colonial territories foremost in North America, Africa, Asia and Australia/ New Zealand),² after World War II with the "economic miracle": millions of foreign workers from Italy, former Yugoslavia, Spain, Portugal, and Turkey came to Germany and other western European countries to work and eventually settled down permanently. Great Britain received peoples from former colonies (Caribbean, India, Pakistan, etc.); France from Maghreb countries such as Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and East Asia, etc.). Altogether the share of immigrants of the total population amounts in these countries to around 7–8 %.

The reasons for migration are manifold: political, religious, economic, wars, ethnic cleansing, natural catastrophes, overpopulation, poverty, etc. At present about 50 million people are refugees according to UNHCR, a substantial part of them knocking on the doors of the rich countries. As a consequence, the dominant rich countries on the whole pursue a more restricted policy of opening their frontiers to foreign migration, especially from poorer countries (Thranhardt 2003: 8). The industrialized world stands for free trade (though there are exceptions for example, in the field of agriculture) and free flow of capital and services to be fixed in international agreements, but human mobility from the exterior is limited. The development of the national immigration regulations show that it is to a great

² As much as 20 % of the European population immigrated to North America. Altogether and worldwide up to the end of the twentieth century about 100 million people left their homes according to World Bank estimates. Exact figures are not available; reliable figures are given by the UN High Commissar for Refugees (UNHCR); persons falling under the Geneva Convention of 1951 amount to 7.4 million in 1980, and 17.2 million in 1990. The labour movement had already taken place in the nineteenth century; intra-European migration can be observed, for example, from Poland to Germany.

extent determined by economic cycles and labor surplus or shortage. Liberalization of immigration and naturalization laws is linked to the needs of the labor market.

The enlargement of the European Union with 12 new member states in the first decade of the twenty-first century posed new challenges of migration and security since it has become increasingly difficult for national governments to control the movement of people across its borders. However, various national laws show a growing understanding of the need to accept migrants in Europe because of demographic ageing and the economic need for labor, i.e. since 2000, German laws have facilitated naturalization of foreigners and accepted, in certain cases, dual nationality of people from third countries and even multiple nationalities for people from EU countries.

Migration consists of a variety of population flows:

- Labor migration (seasonal labor, au pair, guest labor (Gastarbeiter))
- Asylum seekers
- Refugees (civil war refugees, expelled people (Vertriebene))³
- Foreign experts, green card, blue card
- Ethnic mobility (Aussiedler, Übersiedler, Spätaussiedler, etc.)
- Immigration⁴
- Illegal migration, organized crime, drug trafficking.

How to Become a Citizen of an EU Country?

The main question as to immigration, concerns the legal and moral conditions of how to become a citizen of a European state. Immigration politics is the regulation by the host state of incoming people from third countries, but also their integration into society by way of legal measures. Some of them are excluded from the beginning and cannot and/or will not apply for citizenship rights, such as labor, foreign experts or illegal immigrants. Others can receive citizenship as approved asylum seekers, refugees, or similar ethnic groups. The member states of the European Union are still the main actors in the field of migration policy, although coordination among them has led to the harmonization of EU law especially in the fields of refugees, border control, immigration, and asylum and visa policies. With Directive 2004/38/EC the European Union has followed the general trend of further harmonization and coordination and has moved towards supranationality (Faist and Ette 2007; Bommers and Schiffauer 2006; Hansen 2003). The most important new features of the directive are:

³ According to the Geneva Convention of 1951 refugees are persons who have to leave their home country because of persecution because of political, religious, ethnic and other reasons. Refugee politics, then, is the fight for the causes, regulations, and integration.

⁴ Immigration is state regulation of immigrants from third states, as well as the politics of integration (assimilation, acculturation) into a polity.

- Integration of previously piecemeal legislation; categories allow to deal with different groups and simplify administrative formalities;
- Flexible conditions for freedom of movement and possibility of acquiring the right of permanent residence for EU citizens after 5 years of continuous residence;
- Extension of the right to move of family members irrespective of whether they are EU national or not;
- The right of movement can be restricted on grounds of public policy, public security, or public health.

These new features have to be seen together with the *European Convention on Human Rights* of the Council of Europe (1949). Nationals of participating countries, as well as nationals from third countries can complain at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. EU nationals can complain at the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg to address their rights. The decisions of both courts have to be seen independently; some have to be adopted by national and subnational lawmakers.

Since European citizenship is based on the citizenship of the individual member states it is important to consider the citizenship regulations in some of the European states. A comparative view shows similarities but also differences. Common to all migration flows are the dependence on regulations on economic needs and business fluctuations; demographic needs; colonial heritage; and human rights commitments. Common to all, especially at present, is also an extensive debate about national identity (deutsche Leitkultur, Britishness, identité nationale) and the will to coordinate control of borders and regulate immigration flows. There is a tendency towards differentiation and harmonization of immigration, of visa and asylum policies among European states. Differences among European countries are due to economic conditions, cultural and political legacies, as well as to party politics and events such as the 9/11 attacks.

Citizenship in Germany

Germany is one of the countries with the highest flows of migration compared to other countries; the flows are regulated foremost according to economy and demographic needs, or humanitarian commitments. Following EU Directive 2004/38/EC the German nationality law (Staatsangehörigkeitgesetz) was ratified on 28 August, 2007. This new immigration law (30.03.2007) regulates the reuniting of family members, facilitates naturalization of foreigners who have lived in Germany for some years, allows, in specific cases, dual citizenship also for people from countries outside the European Union, one nationality, however, being the rule. Furthermore, it requires language knowledge and the knowledge and acceptance of the principles of the constitution of the Federal Republic (Grundgesetz) (www.einbuengerung.de).

Since the 80s there has been a debate about the Leitkultur (core values) and, as a consequence, about acceptance of cultural and religious symbols: one being the wearing of scarves in schools and the other the displaying of Christian symbols,

such as the crucifix, in public institutions. In both cases the states (Länder), as sub-levels of the central state, are responsible for cultural affairs, hence the decision to accept or refuse religious symbols. In 1995 the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the display of crucifixes in public schools is against constitutional law, leaving the implementation to the Länder, which, as a consequence, legislated according to their law: i.e. in Bavaria Christian symbols are allowed to be displayed in public institutions, whereas in Berlin they are not. In Baden-Württemberg the wearing of scarves by school teachers is not allowed, however pupils can. Also, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg ruled that the displaying of crucifixes in public schools is against the law and hence should be forbidden. So far this court decision was not implemented in Italy. In Switzerland a referendum decided that further construction of Minarets is against the Swiss *Leitkultur* and should not be pursued. Hence, in a multilayered political system different levels can decide differently when responding to questions of culture and identity.

Citizenship in France

The image of France is that of a multicultural, republican, secular country which in its immigration policy follows the strategy of assimilation rather than the British way of integration. For a quarter of a century the flow of immigration growth has followed the relatively continuous flow of natural growth in the population (Chemin 2009). As in other European countries, immigration laws of France are very complex, complicated, and change over time (Rey 1997). Whereas after the war immigration was rather easy especially with Algerian refugees; the immigration laws of 24 July, 2006 (Décret no. 2006–1626 du 19 décembre 2006) and of 20 November, 2007 (Loi relative à la maîtrise de l’immigration, à l’intégration et à l’asile) are more restrictive because of illegal immigration and economic recession. Linguistic and cultural preconditions have to be fulfilled in order to become a French citizen. The *Code de la Nationalité Française*, which is the French law on citizenship, based both on *ius soli* and *ius sanguinis*, was amended several times (Loi Bonnet 1980; Loi Pasqua 1986; Loi Joxe 1989) and puts more restrictive barriers on immigration.

In France, a secular country since revolutionary times, questions of religion have not become topics of greater debate even though President Sarkozy recently stated that the wearing of the Bourkha is not in the French tradition, initiating a contemporary debate on French identity within the media. In the meantime the wearing of the Bourkha is forbidden by law.

Citizenship in Spain

For the last two decades Spain has been among the countries most affected by legal and illegal immigration from African but also from former colonial countries.

Spanish migration politics show a dynamic development since Spain has become an EU country (Kreienbrink 2004). The organic law of 1985 on the rights and obligations of foreigners (“Ley Orgánica 7/1985 sobre los derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España”) constituted the basic law and various amendments have since been made. The general tendency from 1985 to 2007 is that of liberalization, meaning facilitating immigration especially during the period of accelerated economic expansion and demographic decrease of natural population growth. The continuous deficitgap in population growth was substituted by remarkable immigration flows, especially after 1995. For the abovementioned categories of persons, specific regulations have been introduced, some more and less restrictive.

Citizenship in the United Kingdom

British immigration law used to be—besides the Netherlands and Sweden—the most liberal in Europe and stood for integration, religious tolerance, and openness to ethnic heterogeneity, antidiscrimination, pragmatism, and cultural diversity. Immigrants from former Empire regions such as the Caribbean, India, Pakistan, Africa, and the Far East continued to flow into Britain. As with the other countries, a wave of acts (British Nationality Act, 1948, Commonwealth Immigration Act 1962 and 1968, Immigration Act 1971, Nationality Act 1981, Human Rights Act 1998, Race Relation Act 2000) defined and altered the criteria of citizenship in the United Kingdom. Open and restrictive tendencies of integration and assimilation followed (BirsI 2003). However, though the “Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Bill” of 2009, is not yet in force, it is in some ways more restrictive concerning the provisions for citizenship. On one hand the bill facilitates British citizenship for children of the armed forces, and on the other hand it allows control checks on journeys between the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland; it additionally imposes restrictions on migrants’ entitlement to study in the United Kingdom; allows fingerprints to be taken from certain foreign national prisoners; extends detention at ports to Scotland, and finally gives power to allow the high court to transfer judicial review applications to the tribunals.

Summing up the different legal modalities to become a citizen of a member state of the European Union, there are some states that are more open to welcoming foreigners; others are more restrictive depending on time, economic or demographic needs, historical legacies, and a country’s value system. In all of the countries considered, changes of laws have occurred over time. No regulation is fixed for all time in the matter of becoming a citizen. A tendency towards coordination and harmonization of immigration policies of the EU countries can be observed (see below).

The Dual Citizenship of the European Union

European citizenship is dual: it is in addition to the national citizenship of member states and does not replace national citizenship. There is no exclusive European citizenship, only a citizen of a European member state can become a European citizen and not vice versa. The borderline between in and out is clear: only citizens of a member state acquire European citizenship. The question of identity is left to individual legal arrangements.

Historically, European integration policy started as a paternalistic approach of the European elite without the broader participation of ordinary citizens. Later on, with the development of the common market, citizens were categorized according to their functions as economic and political individuals. In a third wave with the Maastricht treaty, a “utopian dialogue” (Neunreither 1995: 13) between the Union and its citizens was established, implementing citizens’ rights in the treaties and in the charter of human rights.

What is the position of the European Union concerning religious matters as core values? During the debate about a European constitution the question came up if the Union has to be seen as a secular or as a Christian polity. Some countries wanted to emphasize the Christian background as the main traditional characteristic of Europe, others favored a secular understanding of the relationship between state and church in the tradition of enlightenment and tolerance. The final text of the Preamble of the Lisbon Treaty states that Europe stands in the tradition of its “cultural, religious, and humanitarian” heritage. Hence, the European Union is supposed to be secular and neutral towards religious convictions.

The decision making process for questions concerning citizenship and migration is determined by the *institutional settings*. Where is the politics of citizenship located in the framework of the institutional system of the European Union? As a political system the European Union can be characterized as a hybrid type of political order between intergovernmental and communitarian policy, through multilayered governance. The so called three pillars of the European Union were originally:

The Community pillar: EC, EURATOM, ECSC (until 2002) (first pillar),
Common Foreign and Security Policy (second pillar),
Justice and Home Affairs (third pillar).

The community pillar consists of the common market with free movement of goods, people, services, and capital. The other pillars are organized intergovernmentally, which means that each country could have a veto position through the vote of unanimity. Citizenship is primarily with the third pillar; each country has its own laws but there is the tendency that issues common to all member states are coordinated and even harmonized. Issues that are connected with national specifics, i.e. of Germany, France, Spain, Great Britain, etc. remain under national jurisdiction.

Treaties regulating European migration policy started with the “Treaty establishing the European Economic Community” (**Treaty of Rome**) constructing the common market in 1957/1958 where the abolishment of obstacles to freedom of

movement of goods, persons, services, and capital was the principle intention. Later on the **Schengen** (Luxembourg) agreement in 1985 and 1990 (in force since 1993) provided free movement within the borders of the member countries, i.e. all EU member states except Great Britain and Ireland, including Island, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. The EU citizenship was then formally established by the **Treaty on European Union** (TEU) in 1992 (see appendix) exactly 40 years after the first European Community Treaty. The TEU gives its citizens the right of free movement, the right to vote, and stand as a candidate in municipal and European elections; provides diplomatic and consular protection to citizens of the member states in third countries; gives the right to petition to the European Parliament and the right to apply to the Ombudsman. With the **Amsterdam Treaty** (1997/1999) integrating Schengen into EU law, asylum, immigration, and visa policy have become communitarian by being transferred to the EC Treaty as the first pillar. Unanimity existed until the **Nice Treaty** allowed in some cases of migration policy majority voting together with the European Parliament. The **Lisbon Treaty** in 2009 (see appendix) finally confirms previous provisions together with democratic principles (equality of its citizens, representation, participation, initiation of proposals), non-discrimination and provisions of border checks, asylum, and immigration. The treaty states intentions to “develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all stages, the efficient management of migration flows,” conditions of entry and residence, and standards on the issue by member states of long-term visas and residents permits (Article 63a). “The Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection” (Article 63, 1).

In the case of applications from a third country EU law obliges each member state to decide according to common criteria. If approved, the candidate can then move freely within Schengen Europe. In order to implement these legal arrangements, the European Union has established a databank (EURODAC), an agency (FRONTEX), and information exchange within the European Police Office (Europol).

In addition, human rights were proclaimed as part of the founding principles of the European Union. Later on, the **EU Charter of Fundamental Rights** was adopted by the Intergovernmental Conference of the European Union in 2000. Under Title V CITIZENS’ RIGHTS, provisions are mentioned on the right to vote and stand as a candidate in municipal and European Parliament elections; the right to good administration; right of access to documents; right to refer to the European Ombudsman; right of petition, freedom of movement, of residence, and diplomatic and consular protection.

The reference to the Charter in the Treaty of Lisbon makes it legally binding (except for the United Kingdom and Poland) which means that the citizens of the Union are entitled to the rights with seven attributions for: dignity, freedom, equality, solidarity, citizen’s rights, justice, and general provisions. Since the provisions of the Charter go beyond the treaty the citizens are given more extended rights than EU treaties or national constitutions can provide. With the Treaty of Lisbon, third country nationals come to resemble citizens of the Union through their inclusion as beneficiaries of the Charter.

With these provisions the Charter reveals a fundamental transformation of the Weberian state, which is defined by national territory, people, and government. These elements no longer form a coherent single framework because rights emanate from multiple sources, most importantly with respect to citizens' rights from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Sassen 2006).

Summing up the politics of citizenship and migration, there is a tendency to extend the rights of individuals from the economic to the political domain. Also, the European Union has gained competences especially in the fields of asylum, border control, refugees, immigration policy, combating terrorism, drug trafficking, and visas, which in the future should—as a consequence of the Schengen agreement—become common European law (asylum and refugees is already in the first pillar). Other fields such as labor migration, foreign expertise, or ethnic mobility belong, because of nationally different situations, to national jurisdiction and are mainly dictated by the economic cycle or demographic developments. On the whole, European citizenship gives its citizens more rights than obligations. According to the principle of subsidiarity, and as a rule, those policy fields that show national specifics should belong to national jurisdiction, whereas issues that concern the common “space of freedom, security, and law” should become community law.

European citizenship is thus derived from national citizenship and is coordinated or intermingled transnationally. Since the European Union is not a state, it cannot have the same quality in passing citizenship to individual members of the European Union. European citizenship is additional to national citizenship and does not replace it. It depends on the political will of the member states to implement the far-reaching rights proposed by laws and constitutional principles.

Can the EU Model of Citizenship Become Universal?

Could the concept of dual or multiple citizenship that exists in the European Union also become models for non-European countries or postcolonial societies? It should be mentioned that European dual citizenship has to be distinguished from multiple citizenship, which refers to the citizenship of two or more states. For European citizens within the European Union it is possible to have two or more citizenships of European states. Since such multiple citizenships may undermine the loyalty towards a given polity; it is, however, the exception rather than the norm in European states.

Political systems outside of Europe can differ from the European pattern and may, therefore, give citizenship a different meaning. Older traditional patterns of communal life may exist or coexist with new state centric patterns. According to Kevin P. Clements et al. the political order of some postcolonial societies (i.e. South Pacific cultures) consist of three ideal types of political order and governance: there is the ideal type of the Weberian state on the one hand, and the ideal type of non-state customary order on the other hand, with the hybrid political order in between the two. “The co-existence of state and customary institutions can be non-cooperative,

incompatible, or even confrontational, and hence lead to frictions that cause fragility, failure, and collapse” (Clements et al. 2007: 53) In cases such as these a commonality can exist; however, a feeling of togetherness is difficult to achieve when people come from different national territories. The same holds for the so-called failed states that do not allow a consistent regulation and implementation of citizenship within a given territory. The attachment to the traditional customary pattern may be the more dominant culture. Here, the Greek or medieval conceptions of citizenship come into life. If only judicial requirements (rights and obligations) are to be respected, a polity in the sense of belonging together will evaporate. Thus, citizenship has a different meaning in more traditional and more state-centric societies, for example in the Moslem world where religion determines all public life. But for multicultural, multilayered regional, or national polities the European Union as a dual transnational arrangement can become a model for other regions as well.

Appendix

In order to implement a common market the *Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EC Treaty)* of 1957 states in

Article (3)

“the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons, services and capital” i.e. the abolishment of customs, duties, and quantitative restrictions.

The *Treaty on European Union* (Maastricht Treaty, TEU) of 1992, in force 1993, says:

CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNION

Article (8)

1. Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.
2. Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty and shall be subject to the duties imposed thereby.

Article (8a)

1. Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.

Article (8b)

1. Every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national shall have the right to vote and stand as a candidate at municipal election in the Member State he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State.
2. The same right holds for elections of the European Parliament and also the right to petition to the European Parliament and may apply to the Ombudsman.

Article (8c)

Every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which he is a national is not represented, be entitled to protection

by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State, on the same conditions as the nationals of that State.

Article (8d)

Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to petition the European Parliament in accordance with Article 138d.

Every citizen of the Union may apply to the Ombudsman established in accordance with Article 138e.

Article 63 on asylum, refugees and immigration measures; these issues are being decided by the Council according to rules laid down in article 67 which means that these policy fields are intergovernmental and the member states have their say.

Article B

The Union shall set itself the following objectives (related to citizenship):

- to strengthen the protection of rights and interests of the nationals of its Member States through the introduction of citizenship of the Union;
- to develop close cooperation on justice and home affairs;

Provisions on Cooperation in the Field of Justice and Home Affairs

Article F

1. The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States, whose system of governance are founded on the principles of democracy.
2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from constitutional traditions common to the Member State, as general principles of Community law.

Article K.1.

For the purpose of achieving the objectives of the Union, in particular the free movement of persons and without prejudice to the powers of the European Community, Member States shall regard the following areas as matters of common interest:

- (1) asylum policy;
- (2) rules governing the crossing by persons of the external borders of the Member States and the exercise of controls thereon;
- (3) immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third countries:
 - (a) conditions of entry and movement by nationals of third countries on the territory of Member States;
 - (b) conditions of residence by nationals of third countries on the territory of Member States, including family reunion and access to employment;
 - (c) combating unauthorized immigration, residence and work by nationals of third countries on the territory of Member States.
- (4) combating drug addiction in so far as this is not covered by (7) to (9);
- (5) combating fraud on an international scale in so far as this is not covered by (7) to (9)
- (6) judicial cooperation in civil matters;
- (7) judicial cooperation in criminal matters,
- (8) customs operation;
- (9) Policy cooperation for the purposes of preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug-trafficking and other serious forms of international crime, including if necessary certain aspects of customs cooperation, in connection

with the organization of Union-wide system for exchanging information within a European Police Office (Europol).

Article 20c

Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, shall have the right to address, individually or in association with other citizens or persons, a petition to the European Parliament on a matter which comes within the Community's fields of activity and which affects him, her or it directly.

Article 20d

1. The European Parliament shall appoint an Ombudsman empowered to receive complaints from any citizen of the Union or any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State concerning instances of maladministration in the activities of the Community institutions or bodies, with the exception of the Court of justice and the Court of First Instance acting in their judicial role. (...)

Finally, the *Treaty of Lisbon* in its consolidated version of 2007 in force 2009 mentions in its Preamble:

Resolved to establish a citizenship common to nationals of their countries.

General Provisions

Article 2

2. The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.

Provisions on Democratic Principles

Article 8

In all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle of equality of its citizens, who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies. Every national of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to national citizenship and shall not replace it.

Article 8a

2. Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament. Member States are represented in the European Council by their Heads of State or Government and in the Council by their governments, themselves democratically accountable either to their national Parliaments, or to their citizens.
3. Every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union. Decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen.

4. Political parties at European level contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union.

Article 8b

4. Not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of Member States may take the initiative of inviting the European Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties.

Non-discrimination and Citizenship on the Union

Article 17 shall be amended as follows:

2. Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties provided for in the Treaties. They shall have, *inter alia*:
 - (a) the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States;
 - (b) the right to vote and to stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament and in municipal elections in their Member State of residence, under the same conditions as nationals of that State;
 - (c) the right to enjoy, in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which they are nationals is not represented, the protection of the diplomatic and consular authorities of any Member State on the same conditions as the nationals of that State;
 - (d) the right to petition the European Parliament, to apply to the European Ombudsman, and to address the institutions and advisory bodies of the Union in any of the Treaty languages and to obtain a reply in the same language.

Policies on Border Checks, Asylum and Immigration

Article 62 under the Chapter 2

states that the Union shall develop a policy concerning “a common policy on visas and other short-stay residence permits.” This has to be decided by the European Parliament and the Council, “acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure.”

Article 63

1. The Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection, and temporary protection with view to offering appropriate status to any third-country national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the principle of non-refoulement. This policy must be in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees, and other relevant treaties.

References

- Anderson, Benedict. (1983) 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Bommes, Michael and Werner Schiffauer, eds. 2006. *Migrationsreport 2006: Fakten, Analysen, Perspektiven*. Frankfurt a. Main: Campus.
- Birsl, Ursula. 2003. *Migration und Interkulturalität in Großbritannien, Deutschland und Spanien: Fallstudien aus der Arbeitswelt* (Opladen: Leske und Budrich).
- Chemin, Anne. 2009. "Le nouveau visage de la France, terre d'immigration." *Le Monde*, December: 22–23.
- Clements, Kevin P., Volker Boege, Anne Brown, Wendy Foley, and Anna Nolan. 2007. "State Building Reconsidered: The Role of Hybridity in the Formation of Political Order." *Political Science*, 59 (1): 45–56.
- Dagger, Richard. 1997. *Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship and Republican Liberalism*. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Deutsch, Karl, W. Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Jr. Maurice Lee. 1957. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Faist, Thomas and Andreas Ette, eds. 2007. *The Europeanization of National Policies and Politics of Immigration*. Houndsmill: Palgrave.
- Hansen, Randall. 2003. "Citizenship and Integration in Europe." In *Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States*, edited by Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska., Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Heater, Derek Benjamin. 1999. *What is Citizenship?* Oxford: Polity Press.
- Kreienbrink, Axel. 2004. *Einwanderungsland Spanien: Migrationspolitik zwischen Europäisierung und Nationalen Interessen*. Frankfurt am Main: IKO.
- Michels, Robert. 2008. "Über einige Ursachen und Wirkungen des englischen Verfassungs- und Freiheitspatriotismus." In *Soziale Bewegungen zwischen Dynamik und Erstarrung*, edited in Timm Genett. Berlin: Akademieverlag.
- Mill, John Stuart. (1861) 1977. *Considerations on Representative Government*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Mill, John Stuart (1977): *Considerations on Representative Government* (1861). London.
- Neunreither, Karlheinz. 1995. "Citizens and the Exercise of Power in the European Union: Towards a New Social Contract?" In *A Citizens' Europe: In Search of a New Order*, edited by Allan Rosas and Esko Antola. London: Sage.
- Pfetsch, Frank R. 2001. *Die Europäische Union*. Paderborn: Fink/UTB.
- Rey, Annette. 1997. *Einwanderung in Frankreich 1981 bis 1995: Ausgangsposition und Handlungsspielraum im Hinblick auf eine gemeinsame europäische Einwanderungspolitik*. Opladen: Leske & Budrich.
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1915. *The Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*. Cambridge: C.E. Vaughan.
- Sternberger, Dolf. (1982) 1990. "Verfassungspatriotismus." In *Werke* Bd. 10. Frankfurt a. Main: Insel.
- Thranhardt, Dietrich, ed. 2003. *Migration im Spannungsfeld von Globalisierung und Nationalstaat*. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Wieder, Thomas. 2009. Aux racines de l'identité nationale. *Le Monde* 7. Novembre.

Chapter 6

Who Is a Citizen? A Multidimensional Question

James Manor

Abstract Jim Manor identifies four interrelated ways to understand the term “citizen. These are (one) who qualifies for official recognition by a particular state or government as a full member of its national community? (Two) Upon whom does a particular state or government bestow certain rights which are associated with citizenship—and what are those rights? (Three) Who affirms a set of values which are associated with citizenship: beliefs in democracy, accountability and tolerance? Finally, (four), who possesses sufficient political capacity—consisting of political awareness, confidence, skills and connections—to be able to operate effectively enough in the public sphere? The response to these questions, Manor suggests, is important for *divided societies* and *immigrant nations*. The solution to these complex problems lies in the development of the notions of group (differentiated) and of multilevel citizenship.

Certain concepts used by social scientists have multiple meanings. “Citizenship” is one of these. If we ask “who is a citizen?”, we are asking not one question but four:

- A. Who qualifies for official recognition by a particular state or government as a full member of its national community?
- B. Who is a bearer of certain rights commonly associated with citizenship?
- C. Who affirms a set of values which are associated with citizenship: beliefs in democracy, accountability, and tolerance?
- D. Who possesses sufficient “political capacity”—a term that implies political awareness, confidence, skills, and connections—to be able to operate effectively enough in the public sphere to qualify as a citizen rather than a mere resident or subject?

The multidimensional nature of this concept might be seen as a reason for social scientists *not* to use it, since its four facets create analytical complications. But we

J. Manor (✉)

University of London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London, UK
e-mail: james.manor@sas.ac.uk

might also take the opposite view. We might embrace it precisely because it has multiple meanings, so that it enables us to draw together analyses of several different themes which may resonate with one another.

In deciding whether to make use of it, we need to consider (1) whether the multiple dimensions are related to one another closely enough to warrant a discussion of all of its varied meanings in one analysis, and (2) whether the multiple issues raised by the concept are important. There can be little doubt about the importance of each of the four dimensions of citizenship. But do the four relate closely enough to one another?

The first thing to say about these four questions is that the first two mainly ask about the postures and actions of governments, while the last two mainly ask about the thinking and actions of ordinary people.

Answers to question A are provided by governments since they determine the criteria according to which various people are (or are not) formally recognised as full members of the national community. Answers to question B are again mainly provided by governments since their actions permit/guarantee or deny the exercise certain rights. And insofar as abuses of rights originate not from within governments but from within society—a common occurrence in some less developed countries—the actions (or inaction) of governments also determine the degree to which vulnerable groups and individuals are protected from this.

Answers to question C can be extracted from studies of the beliefs of ordinary people, and from their affirmations of those beliefs. Answers to question D again emerge from the thinking and actions of ordinary people, since it asks about their “political capacity”: a term which for this author implies their political awareness and confidence (thinking), and their political skills and connections to people like them, or to allies who are unlike them (which become apparent from their actions).

Do these differences—between questions A and B on the one hand, and C and D on the other—imply that our four questions do not relate closely enough to each other to enable us to consider all four dimensions of citizenship in a single analysis? Or do other differences between the various questions imply this?

Questions C and D in the list above are clearly very closely connected. That is apparent from the tendency of some social scientists to address both questions at once, even when they do not distinguish very clearly between them.¹ Question B, which asks about rights, is also closely connected to questions C and D. People are more likely to affirm beliefs in democracy, accountability, and tolerance (question C) if they are able to exercise rights and if they are protected by their government from abuses committed by other members of society. People are more likely to possess “political capacity” (question D) if they have been permitted to exercise some rights. But is question A connected closely enough to the other three questions? My answer is a cautious “yes.”

¹ For a good example, see M. Bratton, “Poor People and Democratic Citizenship in Africa” in A. Krishna (ed.) *Poverty, Participation and Democracy: A Global Perspective* (Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 28–64.

Connecting the Four Types of Citizenship

To examine the link between question A and the other three, let us consider a particular case which raises political and moral issues that are so compelling that it justifies an attempt to integrate analyses of all four dimensions of “citizenship.” The case in question is that of the so-called “Indian Tamils” of Sri Lanka. After 1815 when the British took control of the whole of Ceylon (renamed Sri Lanka in 1972), they needed cheap labour to work on the plantations, which were springing up in the island’s central highlands—growing first coffee and then, after a failure of that crop, tea. They recruited these labourers from the Tamil speaking region of nearby South India, which they also ruled. In time, a huge number of these Tamils took up residence in Ceylon, living separately from the wider society in workers’ colonies on the plantations. Unlike Tamil (and other Indian) migrants who first went as labourers to places like Malaya and South Africa, few of these people branched out into other occupations and dispersed into the wider population of the island. Most of them continued to live separately, in low-paid employment, on the tea estates. Indeed, most still do today.

When the British granted Ceylon independence in 1948, they made very substantial concessions to the political elite which was to succeed them in power, since that elite was strongly (even extravagantly) inclined to serve British commercial and geostrategic interests after the transfer of power. Those elite were dominated by leaders of the majority Sinhalese community. The “nationalism” which they espoused had less to do with asserting Ceylon’s national interests in relation to Britain and other foreign powers than with pursuing the interests of the majority Sinhalese in relation to the minorities on the island. They were not so much Ceylonese nationalists as *Sinhalese* nationalists.

This was vividly apparent from their approach to the minority Tamils who inhabited the island. These Tamils consisted of two main groups: the Tamil labourers living largely separately on the tea plantations in the central highlands, and other Tamils who had predated the labourers as residents of the island by centuries, and were concentrated in the northern and eastern regions of Ceylon—although significant numbers lived in the Sinhalese majority areas. There was only very limited interaction between the Tamils on the plantations and the Tamils living elsewhere, and each group had its own political leaders who again had little interaction. In official documents (such as censuses from the British period) and in public discourse, the distance between the two groups of Tamils was again evident. The plantation workers were described as “estate Tamils” or “Indian Tamils.” The other Tamils were described as “Ceylon Tamils.” The island’s post-independence leaders from the Sinhalese side were strongly determined to maintain this political separation between the two groups in order to maximize the dominance of their majority group.

This might appear surprising since the Sinhalese constituted roughly 70 % of the population, so even if all Tamils on the island united, Sinhalese dominance would still have been assured. But Sinhalese nationalists, then as now, were decidedly

insensitive (and far worse) in their approach to Tamils. The most striking illustration of that in the early post-independence era was the determination of Sinhalese political leaders to deny the so-called “Indian Tamils” citizenship, and the privileges and rights (such as the right to vote) which that term implied. Ceylon had had elections on the basis of universal suffrage since 1931, and “Indian Tamils” had the right to vote. But the new leaders were determined to disenfranchise them. Soon after independence they passed legislation to that effect—and they had the power to do so because the British had not insisted on safeguards for this minority when the new constitution was being drafted. They also denied plantation Tamils passports and other indications that they were citizens. Even though Tamils on the plantations and their forebears had lived in Ceylon for many generations, the new leaders regarded them as foreigners—Indians. But India’s leaders found it impossible to grant citizenship to people with only a distant historical connection to mainland India. As a result, this very large group of people was rendered stateless and politically impotent.

This painful situation persisted over several decades and was the subject of tortuous negotiations between various governments in the two countries. Eventually, a substantial proportion of the Tamils on the plantations were given Ceylonese (or, rather, Sri Lankan) citizenship. But they have remained politically distant from other Tamils on the island, not least because this had largely spared them from successive anti-Tamil riots by the Sinhalese (in 1956, 1958, 1977, 1981, and 1983), acts of state terrorism against unarmed Tamil civilians after 1983, and from ghastly intrusions by the other terrorist force at work after the 1970s, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

This narrative is necessary in order to illustrate the clear connections in this case between the four dimensions of “citizenship” set out in the questions posed above. (A) Official recognition for the plantation Tamils as “citizens,” by one country or the other, remained an unresolved issue for decades. Because they were denied such recognition by Sinhalese nationalists after independence, it is hardly surprising that many of these Tamils (B) were denied many rights and (C) failed to develop firm beliefs in a democracy which excluded them, in accountability when the island’s government refused to be accountable to them, and in tolerance within a society where poisonous intolerance has defaced politics and led to a grotesque civil war. And since they were long shut out of the democratic process—which was grossly abused in 1972 and then left in suspended animation between 1982 and 1994—they were also substantially denied the opportunity (D) to develop their political capacity, and thus full citizenship.

So the four dimensions of “citizenship” have enough to do with one another to justify the use of that term by social scientists. Because it is multidimensional, it enables analysts to draw together diverse issues which inform one another, and which would be less interesting if they were examined in isolation. We need to keep all four dimensions of “citizenship” in mind when we discuss the topic.

Fostering Citizenship: Recent Findings

Further insights into this theme may emerge if we come at it from a different direction. Let us consider a set of surprisingly similar patterns which were discovered when three analysts studied a common thread in the politics of three very different places: Brazil, Uganda, and the central Indian state of Madhya Pradesh. They examined the machinations undertaken by three senior politicians in their efforts to reduce poverty in order to improve both development outcomes and to cultivate political support from poor people. In other words, this was a neo-Machiavellian analysis in which poverty reduction held centre stage.

The three leaders were President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda (who has been in power since 1986), former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil (1995–2002), and former Chief Minister Digvijay Singh of Madhya Pradesh (1993–2003). The three had scarcely heard of each other and never communicated, and yet there were striking commonalities in their approaches to politics and poverty reduction. All three emphasised democratic decentralisation in their efforts to tackle poverty, although they did so in rather different ways, and in markedly different circumstances. Let us consider the three cases in turn.²

In Brazil, Cardoso inherited a well-elaborated system of democratic local government, but changed the rules which governed it in ways that gave new advantages to the poor. Two examples will illustrate the point. His social democratic party competed with the Workers Party of Lula da Silva (which stood further left) in introducing participatory experiments in various municipalities which were intended to—and did—create new opportunities for poor people. He also made the release of his national government's abundant education funds to municipalities conditional upon the enrolment of very high percentages of children in schools. This compelled local officials to comb through the poorer sections of their communities, beating the bushes for potential pupils, to ensure that more poor children received some education.

In India, Digvijay Singh inherited a moribund system of elected councils at lower levels and breathed new life into them. He need not have done so. Chief ministers in most other states in India's federal system responded mainly with tokenism to two amendments to the constitution in 1993 which were intended to strengthen democratic decentralisation. But Singh believed that by pursuing this vigorously, he would enhance developmental outcomes, draw more people into local democratic processes that counted for something, and create structures onto which he could attach poverty initiatives.

That last idea became especially important when he introduced his most successful poverty programme, the Education Guarantee Scheme. It gave any village which lacked a school within a short distance the right to demand and receive a

² Much more detail is presented in M. Melo, N. Ng'ethe and J. Manor, *Against the Odds: Politicians, Institutions and the Struggle against Poverty* (Hurst/Columbia University Press, London/New York, [forthcoming](#)).

new, basic school at the state government's expense. The teachers in these schools were recruited from among residents in each village who had themselves received enough education to teach local children and who would be given brief but fairly effective training for their new tasks. Crucially, the new teachers would be paid by the village council (*panchayat*) which was empowered to withhold salaries if the teachers did not do their jobs properly. This was intended to overcome the epidemic of absenteeism which bedevilled conventional government schools—and it worked. Examination scores in the new schools were slightly higher than the better equipped conventional schools. This eased worries about the quality of education in the new schools. And remarkably, fully one-half of the villages in the state (26,000) demanded and received new schools. 1.6 million students attended them and many of those children would otherwise have had no education at all.

Yoweri Museveni inherited a political wasteland when he emerged from the bush at the head of an insurgent force in 1986. Uganda had been laid waste by Idi Amin's harebrained military dictatorship and then by a predatory and brutish successor government under Milton Obote. Museveni distrusted national-level elites. So to counter them he constructed his new state by building it up from the grass roots—empowering five tiers of elected councils between the village and the district levels. He then kept these councils strong, using them to implement development programmes, some of which had a significant impact upon poor people (amid the rubble left by previous regimes, the vast majorities were poor).

One important example was his aggressive campaign to acquaint people with the danger of HIV/AIDS, which brought that scourge under control—a rarity in Africa. Another was his programme to promote Universal Primary Education (UPE). When he proposed it, international development agencies (donors), upon which his government was heavily dependent, reacted negatively because the initiative would be far too expensive. Museveni—a forceful, formidable man—confronted them. He would go ahead with UPE, even though it might bankrupt his government. The donors would have to support him or watch their main development icon in Africa crash and burn. In this high stakes game of chicken, the donors gave way, and UPE became a reality. Its results were so impressive that donors then incorporated the idea into their recipes for other countries. Museveni delivered primary education to Ugandans and changed the agenda of the donor community.

Readers will have noted that basic education loomed large in all three of these cases. This clearly relates to “citizenship.” Teaching people to read is one means of equipping them as citizens. It enhances their political capacity and their ability to understand and demand their rights. But that is not the whole story here. At a deeper level, there are further parallels among these three politicians which speak directly to our main theme. Quite apart from their instrumental use in furthering poverty programmes, democratic decentralisation, and other initiatives taken by these leaders were in all three cases intended to achieve three further goals. These may seem rather tame, even a little boring to some readers, but they are anything but.

First, the leaders believed that creating opportunities for ordinary people to engage in a democratic process at the local level would enable them to develop a rough but realistic understanding of what politics and government could and could

not achieve. Many people would exert at least a little influence, often for the first time, over decisions that tangibly affected their lives. But they would also learn that government had clear limitations. This realism would enrich their political awareness—one element of political capacity required for people to become citizens. It would also make people less susceptible to what Indians call “tall promises”—glittering but wildly improbable ideas of what might change if they responded either to fire-breathing extremists, or to what Museveni calls purveyors of “superstition” who offer magical transformations of a quasi-religious type. If such leaders gain power, they tend to treat people as subjects rather than citizens.

Second, the three leaders wanted people to learn, from their own experiences with local democracy, that deals and compromises were often necessary. Political bargaining would thus become normal, customary practice in the conduct of society’s business. By accepting this as the norm, ordinary people would again have their political awareness enriched. And if they played even a minor part in forging such accommodations, they would develop their political skills, confidence, and connections to other actors. These are the other three elements of political capacity which people need to qualify as “citizens.” If the politics of bargaining and accommodation won acceptance, then the winner-takes-all attitudes which can do serious damage (not least to the rights of ordinary folk)—and which had long and repeatedly devastated Uganda in particular—would lose their grip on the minds of local political actors and ordinary folk.

Finally, these three leaders believed that once this second set of ideas sank in, local leaders and ordinary people would see that local democratic politics was something from which almost everyone could gain at least something, and that this might lead more people to affirm beliefs in democracy, accountability, and tolerance. They might gain only part of what they sought, but the system was potentially open to at least modest influence by all residents of a locality—which in many cases was a “first”—and everyone gained from the moderate, non-brutish character of the process. In other words, it was no zero-sum game. If some local decisions were disappointing, others soon thereafter might more adequately reflect the preferences of particular individuals and groups. “Government,” which now in part meant local democratic proceedings, would become more open and responsive. Digvijay Singh has said that he sought to initiate a transition from *rajniti* to *lokniti*—from politics dominated by unseen and unaccountable actors at higher levels of government to politics in which ordinary people, even perhaps those at the margins of society, had some rights, some voice, and experienced increasing inclusion. If people began to experience this, and to see that it was not a zero-sum game, they would become less politically cynical, less alienated, and less likely to exit the system—or again, to swallow “tall promises” and “superstitions.” They would remain engaged with the local political process, even when some decisions were unsatisfactory to them. Such engagement (and the willingness to maintain it) is another element of “citizenship” and it further strengthens people’s “political capacity.”

The three aims described in the paragraphs above do not only affect political capacity, which is associated with people’s potential for *action* in the public sphere, but also in part to pursue the fulfilment of rights. They also affect thought—their

perceptions, values, and norms. They help to encourage a popular belief in democracy, accountability, and tolerance—which, as we saw at the beginning of this paper, is also an attribute of “citizenship.”

Citizenship and Political Integration: Integration of two Types

Readers may see only tenuous connections between the two preceding sections of this paper, between the depressing story from Sri Lanka and the more encouraging evidence from Brazil, Uganda, and central India. In fact, the two discussions—and thus the four types of citizenship listed atop this chapter—are linked. To explain that, let us consider another element of Sri Lanka’s recent history. This author first made this argument 30 years ago.³ He would love to report that constructive political action since then had rendered it anachronistic, but unfortunately it remains depressingly relevant today. It is worth noting here because it helps to bridge the gap between the discussions in the two preceding sections.

The term “political integration” refers to the knitting together (by various means) of people within political systems, and to giving people some sense of belonging. We need to distinguish, however, between two types of political integration. On the one hand, there is elite-mass integration; that is, a process that forges vertical connections between political actors at higher levels and others at lower levels, including ordinary people at the grass roots. On the other hand, there is horizontal integration; that is, a process that creates links, or at least some tolerance and understanding, between different groups in society.

It might appear that there is little connection between the two types of integration, but this is not so. Sri Lanka is well-known to have suffered over many decades from a severe lack of horizontal integration, the latter type. But that problem is substantially the result of a severe lack of the first type, elite-mass integration. This takes some explaining.

The first thing to say is that tension and conflict between the Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka and the Tamil minority is a very recent, post-independence phenomenon. This comment refers to the “Sri Lanka Tamils” who had resided in all parts of the island (mainly the north and east) for centuries, long before British planters imported the so-called “Indian Tamils” from southern India to work on their estates. In roughly a century and a half of British rule in Ceylon, not a single incident of collective violence occurred between Sinhalese and Tamils. Sinhalese and the British occasionally engaged in violent conflict, as did Buddhists and Christians, but Sinhalese and Tamils never did.

So there was nothing inevitable about such conflict erupting between these groups after independence in 1948. Sinhalese rioting against Tamils, which has occurred on

³J. Manor, “The Failure of Political Integration in Sri Lanka”, *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* (March, 1979) pp. 21–46.

five occasions, began in 1956 and then in 1958 as the result of naive, inept, and wildly incautious actions and words from senior politicians, most notably Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, who held power between 1956 and 1959. He was astonished and horrified by the riots, but he and his successors were too maladroit and preoccupied with the political utility of Sinhalese chauvinism to put things right.⁴ Thus this conflict was set in motion by the bungling and vile machinations of senior politicians. Elite manipulation rather than a deep-seated, time-honoured ethnic animus explains this tragedy.

It is important that readers gain some sense of how bizarre and poisonous popular misperceptions became in Sri Lanka. Consider one example from the fifth round of rioting by Sinhalese against Tamils, in 1983—the worst of the five outbreaks, and the one that so thoroughly alienated Tamils that civil war ensued. When the killing started, an anthropologist was doing field research in a remote Sinhalese village in central Sri Lanka. It was located far away from the nearest Tamil settlement, and the villagers had scarcely (or never) seen a Tamil. When media reports informed them that rioting had broken out in major urban centres, the villagers raged against the Tamils. They had long been told by political leaders and reports in the largely government-controlled media that Tamils were naturally violent people, so they concluded that Tamils must be doing the rioting. In reality, all of the violence—in 1983 and on the previous four occasions referred to above—was the work of Sinhalese against Tamils.⁵ This same misperception, that Tamils were inherently violent, triggered another incident after the rioting ended. A man was walking through the central market in Colombo when a thief tried to pull his wristwatch from his arm. He resisted in an animated manner, striking out at his attacker. Sinhalese onlookers who saw this concluded that since the man was behaving violently, he must be a Tamil, so they beat him to death. When he was identified, it turned out that he was a Sinhalese. (It is impossible to tell the two groups apart from their physical appearance.)

How do we explain these insane misperceptions? The place to start is with the failure of elite-mass political integration in Sri Lanka. Major political parties there have always been dominated by tiny elites—at various times by individuals, families, and cliques—who have consistently concentrated huge powers in their own hands. Party members at lower- and even at upper-middle levels have had very little influence over the policies or the actions of their supreme leaders. Those leaders have worked systematically to prevent their party organisations from gaining substance and strength because that would limit their room for manoeuvre.

This is a familiar story across much of South Asia, but it has often reached unusual extremes in Sri Lanka. For example, long before independence, the British sent a

⁴ This story is told in great detail in J. Manor, *The Expedient Utopian: Bandaranaike and Ceylon* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989).

⁵ J. Spencer, “Popular Perceptions of the Violence: A Provincial View” in J. Manor (ed.) *Sri Lanka in Change and Crisis* (Croom Helm, London, 1984) pp. 187–95. See also, in the same book, G. Obeyesekere, “The Origins and Institutionalisation of Political Violence”, pp. 153–74.

commission to Sri Lanka to collect evidence that would assist them in devising a new constitution for the island. During that visit, it became apparent that the commission was considering a step unprecedented in the British Empire—the introduction of universal suffrage for elections to a legislature that would possess significant powers. The leaders of the only potent political organisation on the island, the highly centralised Ceylon National Congress, were all for the generous empowerment of the new legislature, which they expected to dominate (and eventually did). But they came mainly from the high caste and moneyed Sinhalese elite, and there were limits to their faith in the masses. They therefore opposed the proposal to base elections on universal suffrage. The commission disagreed and introduced it anyway. We therefore see, early on, the extraordinary spectacle of the British imperial authorities adopting a position that was more progressive than that of the main nationalist party.

There was more to follow. After independence the Ceylon National Congress transformed itself into the United National Party, or UNP, which was dominated by the same elitist Sinhalese operating in the same overweening manner. It became known as the “Uncle Nephew Party” after its first prime minister (D. S. Senanayake) was succeeded upon his death first by his son (Dudley Senanayake), and then (after the son had an emotional breakdown) by his nephew (Sir John Kotelawala). The hyper-elite which utterly dominated the party exhibited the same fear of the masses that had been evident before 1931—especially the urban masses. The delimitation of parliamentary constituencies was manipulated to make rural votes count for far more than those cast in urban areas. Polling occurred in rural constituencies where the UNP was strong in a first round, the results of which were announced before votes were cast in urban centres, to create momentum for the ruling party. The number of polling stations, especially in dubious urban and periurban areas, was kept severely limited. This forced voters to traverse considerable distances to cast ballots, and enabled thugs—employees of the private bus companies, Sir John’s plumbago mines, etc.—to prevent voters from areas of oppositional strength from reaching the polling stations.

This travesty ended in 1956. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike had quit the UNP to form his own party (the Sri Lanka Freedom Party or SLFP) after seeing that, as a nonmember of the Senanayake clan, he had no hope of becoming prime minister. Sir John’s all-too-visible stupidity⁶ and breathtaking insensitivity to the views of ordinary Sinhalese had made the UNP vastly unpopular. Bandaranaike’s party won the election and once in power, he increased the number of polling stations, nationalised the bus companies, and announced the dawning of the “Age of the Common Man”. But he ran his party in the same grossly overcentralised manner as his counterparts in the UNP, and when he was murdered in 1959⁷ his widow, who took the leadership of the party after a few months, controlled it even more aggressively for a generation. Unlike her late husband, she filled many key posts

⁶ He was one of the least intelligent political leaders I interviewed in South Asia, and I interviewed hundreds.

⁷ The narrative up to this point is covered in far more detail in Manor, *The Expedient Utopian*.

with relatives. In more recent times, leaders from outside the two families have led these parties, but power within them has remained concentrated at the top where new families loom large. At the time of writing, President Mahinda Rajapaksa and his brothers occupy many of the key posts in the government.

This tradition of extravagant overcentralisation has had an impact on popular habits of mind when it comes to politics. The bizarre anti-Tamil misperceptions mentioned above have been matched by others among the Sinhalese majority that have little to do with the minority. When governments have become deeply unpopular (a common occurrence in the island's history) and when fair elections have been permitted (which did not occur between 1977 and 1994), ordinary people, who are deeply politicised along party lines, even though parties have remained grossly overcentralised, become intensely preoccupied with partisan divisions. Supporters of each of the two main parties went to the extent of refusing social contact with supporters of the other, even at weddings and funerals. Excitement and expectations about the supposedly transformative changes that the election of a new government will bring have often risen to fever pitch. As a result, as elections approach,

spirit mediums who enable people to have ecstatic encounters with saints, gods, and demons find that the demand for their services declines as people who came to them in normal times turn instead to heady visions of political transformation.⁸

And yet, only a few weeks after an election, the public mood reverts

to profound frustration when the new heaven and new earth fail to materialise...Such severe disappointment leads to a resurgence of ecstatic religious activity, but it also seems less than accidental that elections in Sri Lanka have tended to bring in their train communal, criminal and insurrectionary violence.⁹

How do we explain these radical mood swings? The answer lies in the refusal of centralising political elites to devolve substantial powers onto elected bodies at the local level, as the author explained in detail elsewhere.¹⁰ This has made it impossible for ordinary people in Sri Lanka to develop the kind of rough but realistic understanding of what is and is not possible from politics that the leaders in Uganda, Brazil, and central India, who were discussed above, facilitated through democratic decentralisation. By failing to integrate people at the grass roots into the political system (that is, to promote elite-mass integration), the island's overweening political elites have allowed habits of mind to develop which make it impossible to achieve the other kind of political integration—horizontal integration between different linguistic groups.

This brings us back to the question of interconnections between the three types of citizenship listed at the beginning of this paper. Elite-mass integration is

⁸ Manor, "The Failure of Political", pp. 37–38.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 38 where more detail is provided. These comments are based on field observations by R. L. Stirrat, Sharon Mayne and this writer. See also, G. Obeyesekere, "Social Change and the Dieties: Rise of the Kataragama Cult in Modern Sri Lanka", *Man* (1977) pp. 377–96.

¹⁰ Manor, *ibid.*, pp. 24–29.

obviously bound up with Types B, C, and D. If (as in Sri Lanka) elites and the masses are poorly knit together; if elites exercise too much power over decisions, then ordinary people are less likely to enjoy rights, and do not have enough opportunities to develop the political capacity or the values that are associated with citizenship.

But the discussion just above is also intended to show that the failure of elite-mass integration also undermines horizontal integration between groups within any given country. The excessive power of Sinhalese nationalist elites freed them from the pressures from below normally associated with healthy democratic systems, and enabled them to become enchanted with the notion that they could treat minorities in a cavalier and, eventually, brutish manner without suffering any consequences. They came to believe that they could get away with anything; a dangerous idea that has been painfully apparent in the attitudes of the island's governing elite during 2009 and 2010. The armed forces subjected unarmed Tamils to extensive, indiscriminate artillery barrages, and prolonged incarceration in detention camps. The government treated international humanitarian agencies with paranoid contempt, and did nothing to rein in the shadowy death squads that were gunning down independent Sinhalese journalists in great numbers. And then when the chief of the army staff criticised President Rajapaksa after being courted as a possible opposition candidate in a presidential election, the latter called him a "traitor."¹¹ After Rajapaksa defeated him in that election, he promptly arrested his opponent and prosecuted him before a court martial.

The belief that they could get away with anything first led members of the ruling elite to disenfranchise and to deny citizenship to the so-called "Indian Tamils". It later inspired gross abuses against the "Sri Lanka Tamils," which included long spells of state terrorism. Those outrages led to a grotesque civil war which so alienated "Sri Lanka Tamils" that their rights and their formal status as citizens of that country (see questions B and A above) seemed to them to have little substance. It also persuaded many of them—those who joined the vast exodus to safer countries where they sought alternative citizenship—that for minorities, citizenship in Sri Lanka implied not reassurance and inclusion but grave peril. This analysis plainly indicates that there is enough to connect the four types of citizenship to justify studies which encompass all three.

The Crucial Role of Political Action in Promoting Citizenship

Finally, let us consider one other issue that arises when we mainly consider the last two types of citizenship (although the comments below have some relevance even to questions A and B). Question C focuses upon certain *ideas* (the

¹¹ *The Hindu*, 17 November 2009.

affirmation of beliefs in democracy, accountability, and tolerance), while question D fixes upon things that equip people for *action* in the public sphere (their political capacity).

We might therefore ask: are ideas or actions more important in fostering citizenship? Both have some importance, but the arguments presented in this chapter strongly suggest that political action is more important. Consider the discussion of the three leaders from Brazil, Uganda, and central India. All three propagated ideas which were intended to encourage a popular belief in democracy, accountability, and tolerance. But those same ideas are often loudly proclaimed by leaders in other places who, in practice, ignore or even abuse them, and abuse rights in the process. That has almost always¹² been true of politicians in Sri Lanka who led the country into a vile civil war. The thing that makes Cardoso, Museveni, and Digvijay Singh different is that they followed up on their expressions of these inspiring ideas with actions—institution building, policy formulation, and political machinations—which made those ideas tangible realities in the everyday lives of ordinary people.

We must then ask how these ideas became tangible to ordinary folk. The actions of leaders at higher levels were important not so much in their own right, but because they created opportunities for people at the grass roots to *take action themselves* within democratic structures which the leaders had created or revived. By participating in democratic processes leading to local decisions which materially affected their lives, ordinary people began to perceive democracy as concrete, proximate reality. By lobbying elected local leaders, questioning them, and publicly expressing support or opposition—and of course, by voting for or against them at successive elections—ordinary people began to demand and sometimes achieve accountability, and their rights become real to them. By coming to understand that political accommodations (bargains and deals) were inevitable and even desirable aspects of local democracy, they became more tolerant of outcomes that provided benefits to others as well as to themselves, and thus more tolerant of those “others.” It was also through their own actions that people at the grass roots developed attachments to the values associated with citizenship and strengthened their political capacity—their awareness, confidence, skills, and connections—another key attribute of citizenship.

Actions loom larger than ideas in enabling the emergence of these types of “citizenship”, even the type that has to do with values and ideas, with a belief in democracy, accountability, and tolerance.

¹² The presidency of Chandrika Kumaratunga between 1994 and 2005 was an exception to this pattern, but she was unable to overcome the enormous problems which she inherited from less imaginative leaders.

References

- Bratton, Michael. 2008. "Poor People and Democratic Citizenship in Africa". In *Poverty, Participation and Democracy: A Global Perspective*, edited by Anirudh Krishna. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Manor, James. 1979. "The Failure of Political Integration in Sri Lanka." *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* March 17: 21–46
- Manor, James. 1989. *The Expedient Utopian: Bandaranaike and Ceylon*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Melo, Marcus., Njuguna. Ng'ethe and James Manor. (Forthcoming). *Against the Odds: Politicians, Institutions and the Struggle against Poverty*. London: Hurst & Co.
- Spencer, Jonathan. 1984. "Popular Perceptions of the Violence: A Provincial View." In *Sri Lanka in Change and Crisis*, edited by James Manor. London: Croom Helm

Chapter 7

Citizenship in India: Evolution, Involution, and Rational Construction

Subrata K. Mitra

Abstract Subrata Mitra focuses on the concept and measurement of citizenship in India. He delineates the Indian discourse on citizenship from which the current concept has evolved, in three ways. The *evolutionists* see a seamless web that connects citizens of classical India with *nagariks*—the vernacular term that the Constitution employs to denote citizens—of contemporary India. *Hindutva*, the *Khalsa*, the *pan-Islamic identity*, or more regionally focused identities such as the *Naga*, *Mizo*, *Kashmiri* are examples of *involution* where the citizenship bonds point inwards in search of the deeper recesses of the collective self, beyond the mere rituals of food, dress, or social networks, or articles on individual rights enshrined in the Constitution. The third approach conceptualizes citizen making as a deliberate, “rationally” designed process.

From a brief glance at India’s daily papers, at learned discourses, parliamentary rhetoric, or the sharp bargaining in committees and bureaucratic agencies, one can see how citizenship has emerged as a key issue in the contemporary politics of the world’s “largest democracy.” In this respect, India is not very different from other *changing* societies where the issues of identity, space, and citizenship are at the very forefront of political debate.¹ The deepening of the federal process and creation of ever smaller political unit have the extension of citizenship rights as a

¹The concept of “changing societies” was typical to the field of political development in the aftermath of the Second World War when it was generally assumed that the changing societies of the Third World, emerging out of colonial rule, could reach the levels of economic development and democracy enjoyed by Western societies by adapting themselves to the paradigm of modernization. Such confidence in the hegemony of Western concepts of development is no longer the case. Today, one finds “changing societies” in the midst of post-industrial, liberal democratic

S.K. Mitra (✉)
Department of Political Science, Heidelberg University, South Asia Institute,
69120 Heidelberg, Germany
e-mail: js3@ix.urz.uni-heidelberg.de

major objective.² At the international level, the worldwide resurgence of ethnicity and identity, and the new technology of rapid global communication have given a new impetus to the implicit question “who is an Indian?”, which was held in abeyance during the decades of Nehru’s leadership with its emphasis on modernization. However, citizenship had already emerged as a broad concept during and in the aftermath of the “Emergency” rule of Indira Gandhi (1975–1977) which had united the political left, center, and right under the label of “citizen rights” and had been championed by civil liberties movements. The polarization of opinion in the 1980s, once the *Khalsa* and subsequently, *hindutva* emerged as the militant faces of Sikh and Hindu nationalism, added a further twist to the concept. Today, in the face of the threat of terrorism, insurgency in Kashmir and the north east and allegations of violation of human rights of tribals, citizenship has emerged as a label for a whole range of underlying issues.³

The meanings attributed to citizenship in India’s political discourse today are radically diverse. The ideologies underpinning the discourse which are derived from deeply embedded values with regard to nation, man, and destiny as the brief perusal of India’s political ideas later in this essay will show are different from those prevalent at the time of the founding of the Republic as well. The diversity of meaning and usage leads to uncertainty in comparative analysis and in the making of public policy.⁴ The violent inter-community conflicts and militant rhetoric that are part of the citizenship discourse,—imported notions of self and indigenous values of selfhood—hold the potential for transforming the concept of citizenship into an “essentially contested category.”⁵ The political consequences of this cognitive gap between the official concept of citizenship and its social constructions are seen in the heady, irresponsible rhetoric of “who is a citizen and entitled to live in India”, and platitudes of “inclusive development,” aimed mostly at the ballot box.

A comprehensive account of citizenship in India which can pull together the ideological differences that that sometimes render scholarly debate almost

systems where immigrants and natives are locked in a battle over the core concepts of the state, and where hybridization rather than purity dominates the public sphere.

²The continuing debate over the creation of the Telengana State is a pointer in this direction. See Vinay Kumar, “Telengana Movement a desire for greater democracy, empowerment,” in the *Hindu*, URL: <http://www.thehindu.com/2011/01/07/stories/2011010758431600.htm>

³The diverse meanings attributed to it can be seen from a brief perusal of India’s print media, government reports and learned essays. News reports from Kashmir are replete with accounts of “protesters” who have gone on a rampage about the “rights of citizens” but there is no basic debate about who citizens are and what this status entails.

⁴The very question of how to secure citizenship for the inhabitants of Kashmir, as the current inconclusive debates in India readily testify, can reduce a body of experienced lawmakers into sheer pandemonium.

⁵Two contributions by Sudhir Kakar, *The Inner World: A Psycho-analytic Study of Childhood and Society in India* (Delhi: OUP; 1978) and Kakar ed. *Identity and Adulthood* (Delhi: OUP; 1979) provide an introduction to the debate on identity and selfhood in India. See W. B. Gallie, “Essentially contested concepts”, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. 56 (1955–6), pp. 170–1, for a definition of essentially contested concepts.

impossible, is beyond the remit of this essay. Also ruled out, because of the limitation of space, is a comprehensive analysis of the interaction of indigenous categories and imported notions. Instead, my intention here is to focus on three analytical strands that underpin the evolution of citizenship in India. The first two—evolution and involution—conceptualize citizenship in terms that are indigenous and uniquely accessible to India's society and history. The first approach holds citizenship to be a seamless flow, connecting the pre-modern past with the present. Essential to this approach is the continuous existence of *Bharat*, a -hmythico-historical space terred a traditional name for India.⁶ Unlike evolution, involution puts the onus of citizenship on ethnicity, rather than territory, and accounts for the development of different strands of citizenships in terms of the moral communities that inhabit this space. The third approach of “‘ratioal construction’” hold the creation of *nagariks*—thernacular Hindi term used in the Constitution for the citizen—as the matask of the state, and goes on to devise the legislative methods for the purpose of fulfilling this goal. Rather than delving into these approaches in depth, the chapter focuses on some selected, salient aspects of the problem of citizenship in India. These are, the institutional basis of citizenship, the interaction of colonial rule and Indian society, the delineation of the salient features of citizenship in India's Constitution once colonial rule came to an end through the Transfer transfer of er in 1947, bsequent interaction of traditional society and the modern post-colonial state and finally, an empirical measurement of citizenship in India.

Multiple meanings attributed to citizenship in theory and practice hold the danger of conceptual stretching which render empirical measurement problematic. The chapter responds to the methodological problem by devising a method of measuring citizenship and implementing it in the Indian context, building on the concept of the “‘citizenship toolkit’” presented in Chap. 4. The criteria of measurement are drawn from the critical parameters laid down in the constitution, namely, self perception, empowerment, the attitude towards the “‘non-citizen,’” and finally, citizen duties. However, instead of applying the tools of survey analysis of public opinion—themselves an example of cultural flow⁷—the essay seeks, first, to establish the congruence of the epistemology of measurement with its ontology within the framework of Indian culture and history. This is done through a brief analysis of the philosophical roots of citizenship in India, the diversity of its contemporary social constructions, based on insights gathered from elite interviews, and constitutional provisions and policies aimed at their implementation. The core argument of this section suggests that the evolution of citizenship in India has led to a fortuitous entanglement of the imported norm of citizenship and the endogenous concept of

⁶The first article of the Constitution of India: “‘India, that is *bharat*, shall be a Union of States” (emphasis added) captures the essence of this approach.

⁷Commenting on the inappropriate use of methodological individualism in cross-cultural and comparative analysis, Susanne Rudolph says, “‘as we address the state in Asia (as indeed the state per se) we must treat the symbolic as a phenomenon. We must try to create theoretical frameworks that combine a demystified, rationalist worldview with an understanding of the phenomenology in societies where the gods have not yet died.” Susanne Rudolph (1987) “‘State formation in Asia—prolegomenon to a comparative study.” *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 46(4) p. 742.

selfhood, leading to a hybrid category that is both socially meaningful, and politically acceptable to the individual. The hybrid categories of citizens, aliens, and rebels (presented in Fig. 4.1, Chap. 4), are consistent with the assumptions that go into the liberal political theory of citizenship. Once the legitimacy of measurement of social constructions through individual opinions is established, the chapter presents the results of a statistical measurement of citizenship through a cross-section survey of the Indian population.

The findings from the analysis undertaken in this chapter are used to validate the theoretical basis of citizenship discussed in the earlier chapters of this volume, and to transform citizenship from a dichotomous variable (i.e., citizens as distinguished from noncitizens) to one which is more nuanced, reflecting the relative weight of the factors that contribute to citizenship. Since social measurements sometimes lead to skepticism among non-statisticians, the following section briefly discusses the context of measurement, preparing the reader for the introduction of the actual tools of measurement of citizenship in the last section of the essay.

Concept and Method in the Measurement of Citizenship

By the standards of social science in its positivist mode, for every phenomenon that exists, there are measurements, direct or indirect, with which one can quantify it. However, when the concept and method of measurement are artifacts of the cultural flow from Europe to Asia, to apply them in a non-European context without first grounding them in the social reality would be tantamount to measuring one life by the standard of another. As such, instead of proceeding directly to measurement⁸ we need to examine the process that links the instruments of measurement with the body of experience that the actors associate with citizenship. The attempt to bring together the epistemology of measurement with the cultural associations of citizenship has significant implications for the validity of attitudinal survey to the measurement of citizenship in India.

The movement from description of the attributes of citizenship to its measurement involves several analytical steps. The most important of these is to juxtapose two images of citizenship in India, namely, that of the observer (the state, the constitution, the government, the immigration authorities), and the actor (society, voters, communities, rebels and insurgents). The insights into the actor's perception

⁸ The risk of "loss in translation" when applying instruments of measurement plucked out of one cultural context to another is enormous, particularly when it concerns an attitudinal survey, the technique that I have chosen to measure citizenship in India. Michael Werner and Benedicte Zimmermann, "Beyond comparison: Histoire croisee and the challenge of reflexivity", *History and Theory*, 45, Feb 2006, p. 37 mention this as the problem of "reciprocity and reversibility" when it comes to the application of cross-cultural analysis. "While the project relating to transfers did not lay down a rule on this point right from the start, empirical surveys have generally involved simple linear processes, from one culture or one discipline to another, following a logic of introduction, transmission. and reception." *Ibid.*

are derived from open-ended conversations with political thinkers, social elites, experts, and people in the context of their everyday lives, whereas statute books, government white papers, legislation, and court judgments are a source for the observer's view. The dialectical interaction of these views as seen in public opinion, events, memories, legislation, institutions, and policies account for the complex landscape of citizenship in India. The main hypothesis here is that the overlap of the two views—that of the actor and the observer—generates the empirical space for citizenship (Chap. 4).

The theoretical basis for the concepts of state and society within the empirical context is the second important consideration. Thus, in the Indian case, one need to understand the ways in which the concepts of the ideal citizen have been formulated by delving into the diversity of political theories of the state and the citizen. Institutions are the link between political theory and society. As such, the next important step is to understand the historical evolution, social construction, and legislative specification of citizenship in India.

India: The Context of Research

As a site for an analysis of the discourse on citizenship, India offers a magnificent window to the comparative, transcultural, and transnational analysis of citizenship. The diversity of India's culture and history resemble that of Europe where citizenship evolved from below. The momentum of economic, political, cultural, and social change acted as the motor of the growth of citizenship in Europe. By contrast, in India, citizenship in its present form was introduced from above, first, incrementally, by British colonial rule, and then, in one gigantic step, by the constitution of 1950 which changed the status of the entire population, resident within the boundary of the new state to citizens of the new republic.

The three general approaches—evolution, involution, and rational construction—mark the discourse of citizenship in India and have been already mentioned earlier in this essay.⁹ The *evolutionists* see citizenship as an essential part of Indian civilization and heritage, which seamlessly connects India's past and present. For this school, Indian citizenship and Indian territory are overlapping categories in a manner comparable to the *ius solis* of the European discourse on citizenship. One finds the opposite argument in the ethnic construction of citizenship—an approach that resembles the *ius sanguinis*, a strand of European thinking. According to this approach, involution—entanglement of the indigenous moral communities and the imported concept of cultural, economic, and political rights—is a more appropriate

⁹These approaches are identifiable in the writings of India's political thinkers, and in the elite interviews conducted as part of the fieldwork on citizenship in India. See below.

description of the state of citizenship in India.¹⁰ Straddling both schools is the *rational construction* of citizenship. One finds this strategy of citizen making in the vision that underpinned the efforts of the constitution of India, adopted in 1950 and still largely intact, to transform a heterogeneous population into the new, hybrid category of the *nagarik*—citizens of the Indian republic.

The contrast between Europe (particularly Great Britain) and India has several significant implications for comparative research on citizenship. In the first place, European citizens, drawing on the Greco-Roman legacies, have fought for their rights and lived up to their duties through the centuries of struggles for nation building, religious wars, border conflicts, social movements and pogroms (Table 4.1, Chap. 4). The rise of the citizen has been greatly influenced by large-scale historical processes such as the Industrial Revolution, religious wars, and violent conflicts over issues of language, ethnicity, and state formation. The state has been both promoter and victim of the rise of the citizen; just as society has sometimes taken the leadership in cleansing the body politic of any impurity that might have crept in from the corrupting intimacy of the noncitizen. The citizen has been the interface of the state and society, the fulcrum around which battles for nation building and nation wrecking have raged. In India, by comparison, the game has been lopsided. With decolonization, the national state as the main agency for nation building, colonial subjects have been catapulted from feudal slumber to hyperactivity in a state wanting to be modern, democratic, and secular. The imperative for action has come from above in the form of juridical empowerment, and from below as a consequence of constitutional empowerment, enfranchisement, and entitlement in the shape of struggle for living space, dignity, livelihood, and equality. In contrast to Europe, in India, the process of citizen-making has thus been marked by a distinctive rhetoric and political culture where rights have taken priority over duties, and expressed themselves in the imported, European concept of citizenship.¹¹

The genealogy of citizenship in modern India takes us back to the arrival of British colonial rule, which carried the seeds of utilitarian solicitude for the greatest good of the greatest number¹² as the basis of the legitimacy for foreign occupation, for the missionaries and their commitment to the dignity of man, and particularly

¹⁰ See Table 7.1 below for an illustration of the debate between involution and evolution on the nature of the relationship between the past and present in India. While both evolutionists and involutionists derive the legitimacy of their concept of the future from their understanding of the past, the former see the present as part of the *evolution* of an unproblematic past to an equally unproblematic future. In contrast, the involutionists see the present (inclusive of colonial modernity) as a corruption which needs to be expunged in order to produce an authentic, *Indian* future.

¹¹ See, for example, Partha Chatterjee's concept of the "political society." The main challenges to the state today, namely, Naxalite violence, communalism, terrorism, and regionalism, are routinely seen by their protagonists and sympathetic intellectuals as nothing short of the assertion of citizenship. Interestingly, the citizen duties (Article 51a) were introduced into the constitution of India by an amendment in 1976 at the height of the national emergency, an authoritarian interlude that has left deep scars in the democratic record of India.

¹² See Eric Stokes, *The English Utilitarians and India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1959) for a magisterial analysis of the conflation of utilitarian norms and colonial realities.

Table 7.1 Values and institutional arrangements in the making of citizens: a typology of Indian thinkers

	Institutional arrangement		
		Status quo	Radical change of institutions
Salient values	Modern	Nehru	Subhas Bose (and Ambedkar)
	Traditional	Tagore	Gandhi (and Savarkar)

for women,¹³ and the early stirrings of the spirit of nationalism. But the real floodgates were opened at independence. Following decolonization, leaders of postcolonial states who saw citizenship as the epitome of the modern state very much wished to enshrine it as the cornerstone of their own political edifices. This was also true of India. Six decades ago, as colonial rule came to an end, citizenship was, for Jawaharlal Nehru, the foundation of the Indian state and the nation, and the substance of the new political culture and institutions (Chap. 4). In their long, boisterous, acrimonious, and reverential speeches, the fathers of the constitution debated the articles clause by clause with intense pride and passion. They coveted the sense of citizenship which they saw as the pride of Athenian democracy, and as the icon of the emerging European states of the seventeenth century, the *cri de coeur* of the *citoyens* and *citoyennes* of revolutionary France, ferreting out the noncitizens from their midst, fighting against the enemies of the republic to defend their nascent, independent state. The constitutions of the new Republic of India registered these “universal principles” as part of its own creed.¹⁴ But, did these concepts and values have any basis in India’s past? We turn next to Indian political theory to delve into the historical and cultural roots of citizenship in India.

Uncongealed Memories: Identity and Citizenship Discourse in Indian Political Theory

Political theories are a rich source of insights into collective memories,. The writings of major thinkers and founding fathers of independent India are a source of the normative core of citizenship. This is particularly insightful with regard to the salience people attach to the moral dimension of citizenship and the forms of institutional arrangement for the implementation of the normative goals. A typology can be constructed on the lines indicated in Table 7.1 to show the diversity that underpins Indian thinking on citizenship.

Indian political theory is itself a source of diverse discourse on citizenship. The four ideal types presented in Table 7.1 help establish the ontological and institutional variations built into the concept of citizenship as one finds it in Indian

¹³ See Robert Hardgrave “The Breast-Cloth Controversy”, *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, vol. 2 (June 1968), pp. 171–187.

¹⁴ The Directive Principles of State Policy, built into the constitution, make copious references to the citizen.

political theory. There is no neat overlap here with the three approaches mentioned above. Instead, one finds traces of all three in each of them. However, the emphasis varies from one type to another. Nehru's views (see Chap. 2) are typical of rational construction, though his thoughts draw their legitimacy from the continuity of Indian civilization from the pre-modern to the modern. A thinker might consider collective, public morality as a fixed point of reference (Gandhi, Savarkar) while another might proceed from the assumption that morality is a matter of individual taste (Nehru, Subhas) and that the state should strive towards removing the constraints that inhibit the individuals quest for their private ideals. Tagore, the quintessential evolutionist, straddles between types, because his ideas are deeply evocative of India's past but he stands, nevertheless by Nehru the liberal humanist than the nationalism of Gandhi and Bose.

Nehru's vision and his chosen path towards a modern India are redolent of his commitment to the norms of liberal citizenship. In his *Unity of India* he considered the impact language has on citizen identity formation (Nehru 1942).¹⁵ The polar opposite to Nehru's liberal citizenship is the Gandhian ideal of communitarianism and the dissolution of the state as a means of achieving it. Gandhi's political vision, which he expresses in *Hind Swaraj* (Gandhi 1999), is indicative of what he sees as the ideal state. He writes that there will be "ever-widening, never-ascending circles. Life will not be a pyramid with the apex sustained by the bottom. But it will be an oceanic circle whose centre will be the individual always ready to perish for the village, the latter ready to perish for the circle of villages, till at last the whole becomes one life composed of individuals, never aggressive in their arrogance but ever humble, sharing the majesty of the oceanic circle of which they are the integral units (Savakar 1923)."¹⁶

Gandhi's reference to the centrality of the individual as a building bloc of the whole edifice of the future state is significant for citizenship. Equally significant is Savarkar's vision regarding the sublimation of religious differences, leading to the creation of a common bond among all people living in India, based on a common citizenship.

A radical shade of communitarianism—more exclusive and more controversial—is found in the ideas of V. D. Savarkar. His conceptualization of the citizen is closely linked to ethnicity and religion.¹⁷ With regard to Muslims he says that "It may be that

¹⁵ "I am only dealing with the language side of [education]. When we consider the whole subject of education we have to think in terms of the State and the society we are aiming at; we have to train our people to that end; we have to decide what our citizens should be like and what their occupations should be; we have to fit in this education to their life and occupations; we have to produce harmony and equilibrium in their private and social and public life. We shall have to lay far greater stress on technical and scientific training if we are to take our place in the modern world. All this and more we shall have to do, and in doing so we shall have to upset the present incompetent and inefficient and top-heavy system of education and build anew on securer foundations." *The Unity of India*, p. 258 (Nehru 1942).

¹⁶ *Hind Swaraj and other writings*, p. 188 f.

¹⁷ "A Hindu is primarily a citizen either in himself or through his forefathers of 'Hindusthan' and claims the land as his motherland. In America as well as in France the word Hindu is generally understood thus exactly in the sense of an Indian without any religious or cultural implication. And

in some future time the word Hindu may come to indicate a citizen of Hindusthan and nothing else; that day can only rise when all cultural and religious bigotry has disbanded its forces pledged to aggressive egoism, and religions cease to be “isms” and become merely the common fund of eternal principles that lie at the root of all, that are a common foundation on which the Human State majestically and firmly rests.”¹⁸

Tagore, like Gandhi, attached great salience to the moral dimension, but unlike Gandhi the single-minded quest for the ideal state is replaced by an abstract yearning for an international community. Implicit in his design is the status quo of existing institutions which frame his lofty ideals. He pursued the question of what a nation is. In *Nationalism* he writes: “I am not against one nation in particular but against the general idea of all nations. What is the Nation?” He continues: “It is the aspect of a whole people as an organized power. This organization incessantly keeps up the insistence of the population on becoming strong and efficient. But this strenuous effort after strength and efficiency drains man’s energy from his higher nature where he is self sacrificing and creative. For thereby *man’s power of sacrifice is diverted from his ultimate object, which is moral, to the maintenance of this organization, which is mechanical*”¹⁹ (emphasis added).

B. R. Ambedkar, who, as the father of the constitution, shared the design of the institutions of the Nehruvian state, and gave vent to a sharper degree of commitment to the sectional interests of the former untouchables. Being a representative of the Dalit community, B. R. Ambedkar in his writings naturally put specific emphasis on that particular group. He writes: “The right of representation and the right to hold office under the state are the two most important rights that make up citizenship. But the untouchability of the untouchables puts these rights far beyond their reach. . . they [the untouchables] can be represented by the untouchables alone”.²⁰ (1920). His skepticism towards members of the higher castes as political representatives is also evident: “. . . a legislature composed of high caste men will not pass a law removing untouchability, sanctioning intermarriages, removing the ban on the use of public streets, public temples, public schools. . . this is not because they cannot but chiefly because they will not.”²¹

Finally, we get once again a further insight into the conflation of individual rights and a shared identity within the political structure of a future Indian state in the writings of Subhas Bose. He held Samyabada—the doctrine of synthesis or equality—as the core of his political vision. He summed up his scheme for the realization of this vision in seven succinct principles. These are: “(one) Complete national independence and uncompromising anti-imperialist struggle for attaining

had the word Hindu been left to convey this primary significance only, which it had in common with all the words derived from Sindhu then it would really have meant an Indian, a citizen of Hindusthan as the word Hindi does.” Savarkar, 1923. *Hindutva: Who is a Hindu*, p. 51.

¹⁸ *Who is a Hindu?* p. 67.

¹⁹ *Nationalism*, p. 110.

²⁰ Cited in Partha Chatterjee, p. 81.

²¹ *Ibid.*

it; (two) a thoroughly modern socialist state; (three) Scientific large-scale production for the economic regeneration of the country; (four) social ownership and control of both production and distribution; (five) freedom for the individual in the matter of religious worship; (six) equal rights for every individual; (seven) linguistic and cultural autonomy for all sections of the Indian community; (eight) application of the principle of equality and social justice in building up the New Order in Free India (Verma 1995).”²²

The typology in Table 7.1 indicates the plurality built into Indian political thinking. Precise classification of specific thinkers is difficult as there is considerable movement over time, and slippage because in their engagement with one another, there is considerable flow of ideas in all directions²³; nor is it simple to neatly pack Indian political thinkers into the three broad style of flow. The best one might say is that Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Bose represent two broad strands of rational construction, while Tagore tends towards evolution and Gandhi and Savarkar are par excellence, purveyors of involution.

As we shall see in the section below, the ideas of modern Indian thinkers have trickled down, via the debates on the floor of the constituent assembly, into two broad strands. One of these chooses territory and the accident of birth; and the other, ethnic identity, as the moral basis of citizenship. India’s liberal political institutions and processes facilitate the articulation of the normative and procedural plurality that underpins the discourse on citizenship. While it is conceivable for individuals to distinguish the roles of the state and society in their political persona, and peg their sense of citizenship according to the interface of the two, there is no such automatic collective scheme at the collective level. As such, one cannot legally enforce a collective moral code of citizenship for the whole of Indian society, as is the case in France or Iran.

Chance, Choice, and Path Dependency: History in the Making of Policy

The diversity of political thinking with regard to the interplay of the moral and the political in the making of the citizen constitutes an important legacy for citizenship in contemporary India. In a cross-national comparison, one cannot find in the Indian case a seminal event such as the American or French revolutions, or even the less violent “Glorious Revolution” of England. These great ordering mechanisms could, at least for a time, wipe clean the slate and write on it the clear message of a

²² The Indian Struggle (1935–42), pp. 100–01. Cited in V. P. Verma, *Modern Indian Political Thought* (Agra: Lakshmi Narain Agarwal Educational Publishers; 1995), pp. 593–594.

²³ The difficulty of classification is also indicative of the conviviality that underpins public rivalry among these forerunners of modern India. The colors run, as they engage with one another. “Nehru was also wearing a Gandhi cap!” Clemens Spiess, personal communication, Dec 2009.

particular way of being a citizen. These landmark events that could serve as the point of origin of citizenship are not so explicitly present in the case of India. This is of course not to say that there are no such seminal events at the *regional* or *local* arenas. In any case, the complex historical chronology of the evolution of citizenship in India is marked by various acts of the colonial government, political events such as peasant uprisings in British ruled areas and *praja andolans* (peasant movements) in princely states during colonial rule that have contributed to the evolution of the concept of citizenship in India.

A brief glance at this uncharted territory reveals some references to the cultural flow from Europe that affected the indigenous development of the concept.²⁴ The most lasting impact of course was that of British colonial rule. The first modern political institutions introduced by the British, such as the telegraph, railways, and the police were part of an elaborate system that sustained colonial rule. Those that came later—such as the civil service, elections under restricted franchise, the media, the judiciary and the legal profession, the universities and modern educational system—soon became the social base of the Indian middle classes. Each of these institutions had a pyramidal structure with British elites at the top. However, the lower levels of these institutions were almost exclusively staffed with native Indians. Suspended uneasily between the ruler and the ruled, the new, vernacular educated Indians—scribes, journalists, teachers, petty officials—were recruited from those sections of Indian society that the British Raj considered loyal to it. After independence, under the pressure of competitive politics, vote-hungry politicians inducted the excluded groups—the Hindu right wing, backward classes, some sections of the former untouchables and subjects of the former princely states that were not directly affected by colonial rule—into the political mainstream. These newly mobilized groups started questioning not only the policies of the generation of leaders who came to power immediately after independence, but, in some cases, also the institutions that were closely tied to their power and prominence in society. Though, during the eventful six decades following independence, the deepening of democracy has led to the questioning of some aspects of the British legacy, the basic structure of the secular democratic state has held.

The edifice of the post-independence institutional arrangement that provided the framework to Nehru's citizenship toolkit was not entirely an Indian invention but a hybridization of the conceptual flow from Britain to India in the light of growing Indian resistance to foreign rule. The inflow from Britain to India was incremental.

²⁴ As a remarkable example of conceptual flow, one can see the reverberations of European history in the far flung battles between European colonial powers, down to the use of the word "citizen"—the battle cry of the nascent French Republic and its successors. Tipu sultan of Mysore, while trying to secure the alliance of France against the English in India "enlisted himself as a member of the Jacobin Club and permitted nine Frenchmen in his service to elect 'citizen Ripaud' a Lieutenant in the French navy, as their President, to hoist the flag of the recently established French Republic and to plant a Tree of Liberty at Seringapatam." Cited in Majumdar, RC: Raychaudhuri, H C: Datta K. K *An Advanced History of India*, Part III. Modern India (second ed. 1951), pp. 711–712.

It started with the 1861 Indian Councils Act which created the office of the Secretary of State for India, and made the Governor General of India the Viceroy—the representative of the Crown in India. There were a series of such critical moments under British rule that affected the making of the citizen in India. The other points were, respectively, the 1909 Morley-Minto Reforms that expanded central and provincial legislatures. This made it possible for non-official majorities in provincial legislatures to wield governmental power, and provide for separate electorates to give minorities an additional weight. The 1919 Montagu-Chelmsford Act introduced the constitutional principle of Dyarchy which separated “reserved” subjects controlled by British officials from “transferred” subjects, to be controlled by non-officials.

The devolution of power was shown as a commitment by the colonial power to the training of Indians in the art of self rule. Only a handful of propertied and educated voters were empowered to pronounce their opinion on minor matters involving municipal government in the beginning. However, they were, despite their small numbers and limited powers, a marker for the future. However, there was also a second, less explicitly stated purpose for providing representation to assertive minorities and checking the power and ambition of the Indian National Congress, which the British saw mainly as the spokesman for upper caste, Hindu, India. The founding of the Indian National Congress in 1885 had been followed, in 1906, by the founding of the Muslim League to protect the interests of India’s Muslims,. Islamic assertion and separatism finally found its voice in the passage of the Pakistan resolution by the Muslim League in 1940 in Lahore, which led to the partition of India and the continued problem of Islamic citizenship in India for the millions of Muslims who stayed, rather than migrating to Pakistan.

Looking back, it can be argued that the years between the landing of Mohammad-bin-Kasim in Sind in 711 A.D., which marked the first Islamic invasion of India and the 1940 resolution for the formation of Pakistan by the League mentioned above, were crucial for the citizenship discourse in India after Independence. During these years, Islam, a foreign religion, not only found a foothold in India but actually rose to power and prominence, contributing to the culture, language, art, architecture, and religiosity. But for some Hindus the memory of great achievements of pre-Muslim India, redolent of the famous Guptas, Mauryas, and Chalukyas, and, prior to that, the great classics, such as the Ramayana and Mahabharata, remained as a symbol of the lost glory of India which the recovery of political power could resuscitate. This self assertion, first visible in the formation of the Arya Samaj, has surfaced in contemporary politics under the broad rubric of *Hindutva*.

With the transfer of power by the British in 1947, independent India entered an era of rediscovery and resurrection, in which groups of society that had never wielded power directly were represented. These reforms, in turn, were possible because of the strategic reuse of pre-British institutions and practices—of India’s Muslim and their predecessors, the Hindu kings—by the colonial powers. The process of institutional evolution accounts for the continuities of Indian politics, and as part of the same process, the practice of past conflicts and collaboration has

continued in the form of the rituals, customs, and traditions. These are an integral part of the present institutional structure and political process.

The Post-Independence Citizenship Regime

We have seen from the previous section how at independence, India launched her political career on the basis of a cohesive core of ideas and institutions that were the legacy of cultural and conceptual hybridization during British rule. Within the broad rubric of this core, the competition among the protagonists of evolution, involution, and rational construction continued to influence events. The Partition of India on the basis of religion was a victory for involution. However, the Congress Party, which assumed succession of power in India, never made ethnic citizenship part of its creed. Consequently, in a truncated but more cohesive India after independence, the leaders of the congress, under Jawaharlal Nehru, had a comparatively better start to the process of state and nation building, and citizen-making compared to Pakistan.

The constitution of India and the network of institutions and political practices it has spawned have deeply affected the evolution of citizenship in India. The direct contributions of the constitution are to be seen in the conflation of the republican, liberal, and communitarian traditions of citizenship in the Preamble,²⁵ the articulation of rights and duties of citizenship in key sections of the constitution; the interplay of individual and group rights, and finally, the specification of cultural and ethnic arenas within which citizenship is expected to flourish.

Independent India, which emerged from within the British Empire, was schooled in the British tradition of territorial citizenship. But the British themselves, and subsequently the Muslim League, had seen the primordial identity—caste, religion, kin, tribe, family, and the all-encompassing term of ethnicity—as the basis of identity in India. The Congress Party had, however, aspired to the same norms of territoriality as the basis of the state and citizenship, rather in the tradition of the modern European liberal democracies where these rules are governed by the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). Just as the Muslim League, which claims to represent all the Muslims of South Asia, had campaigned for the Partition of India, and carried out a territory as a homeland for Muslims, the Congress Party had resisted this on the

²⁵ The Preamble to the Constitution of India announces this intention with boldness and clarity.

WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and to secure to all its citizens:

JUSTICE, social, economic and political;

LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship;

EQUALITY of status and of opportunity;

and to promote among them all

FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation;

IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY this twenty-sixth day of November, 1949, do HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION.

grounds that India was one nation and should remain united. Independence, from this point of view, came as a pyrrhic victory for the Congress, West and East Pakistan were carved out of British India and were made into the state of Pakistan. This historical outcome was already in the offing.

The Constituent Assembly Debates reflect the dilemma of devising a formula of citizenship that would do justice to the moral will to be a citizen of India regardless of where one was born and at the same time address territoriality where the decision of those speaking in the name of a territory – state, province or native kingdom – would be binding on all those who lived on it.

The Constitution that resulted from these deliberations adopted a fuzzy solution to the contentious issue of citizenship. Like most constitutions in the world of liberal democracies, it avoids the terminology of nation and nationality. Citizenship is the constitutional key word for dividing the world between “us and them.”²⁶ Expressed in terms of rights, the constitution includes citizens’ rights which aim to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by state authority. However, these rights are not limited only to the state’s own nationals. What is exclusive for an Indian citizen’s status are positive rights (especially social rights) and political rights (primarily the right to vote and to stand for election). In historical comparison and in political theory they constitute the criterion of exclusion which distinguishes the fully effective status of a citizen from other forms of membership, especially from that of mere subjects.

Article 5, the first of the section on constitutional provisions for citizenship, clearly reflects Dr. Ambedkar’s reiteration regarding the territorial as opposed to the ethnic basis of citizenship in India. Birth, to be domiciled on Indian territory or being born to Indian parents are sufficient for a person to get Indian citizenship. The logical sequence is maintained by Article 6, the second Article dealing with citizenship, which deals with migrants from the territory of the undivided India and denotes an almost unlimited “right to return” to those who were born into Indian territory, as defined in the Government of India Act, 1935. The problem of re-migration was tackled in Article 7, which, while stating that no person who migrated to Pakistan was a citizen of India, nevertheless made provisions to include those who had re-migrated to India from these territories. These people were required to have a permit of resettlement or permanent return issued by the proper authorities. It is interesting to note that the root of the idea of PIO (Persons of Indian Origin, a recent innovation that gives some citizen rights to Indians who have acquired the citizenship of another country and in consequence, have lost their Indian citizenship) can be glimpsed in Article eight, which deals with people residing outside India at the time of independence. It gives them the right to apply for citizenship based on origin—again, subject to the provision that the person has registered with an India

²⁶ “The question of citizenship became particularly important at the time of the making of our Constitution because the Constitution sought to confer certain rights and privilege upon those who were entitled to Indian citizenship while they were to be denied to ‘aliens’. The latter were even placed under certain disabilities.” Durga Das Basu, *Introduction to the Constitution of India* 74 (2001).

consulate in the country of residence. The necessity to demarcate between the citizens of the newly partitioned territories is captured in Article 9, which states that those who have voluntarily acquired citizenship of any foreign state lose Indian citizenship claims. The inclusive character of citizenship in India can be seen in Article 10. This article makes every effort to include everyone; the constituent assembly did not expressly disallow being or remaining citizens of this country. Questions raised in recent years from stateless citizens in India would probably have to find answers in this article, since refugees with no proof of identity who are expressly disowned by neighboring countries often find themselves in the unenviable position of being stateless. Finally, underlining the republican strain of citizenship in India, the constitution authorizes the parliament to regulate the right of citizenship by law under Article 11.

Religion, as a marker of citizenship, was explicitly rejected by the Constituent Assembly Debates, although there were members like P. S. Deshmukh who wished to include provisions that consolidated the rights of Hindus and Sikhs. The emphasis was more on territorial loyalty than religion. This included the important financial aspect of evacuee property. One of the most forceful arguments was based on the fact that re-migrants were to be granted Indian citizenship. All the questions left unanswered by the Constituent Assembly were to be decided by India's parliament and the courts, which responded to the challenges in a similar structure, but with the courts displaying a slightly more flexible approach at times.

The constitution confers a full set of individual rights, including the freedom of speech, belief, practice, movement, occupation, and property, and provides for limitations on them, carefully monitored by the Supreme Court in the public interest. These individual rights are supplemented by group rights to identity, by the way of constitutional provision for primary education in the mother tongue, and protection for personal law, which governs marriage, divorce, adoption, and succession. A set of fundamental duties to abide by the constitution, to respect the National flag and the national anthem, to defend the country when called upon to do so, to protect harmony and to "preserve the rich heritage of our composite culture," to safeguard public property—, are provided for under Article 51A.²⁷

Finally, comparable to Article 370 which was meant to protect the cultural and ethnic identity of Jammu and Kashmir as a condition of the state's accession to the Indian Union, several articles provide for the perpetual protection of separate cultural, religious, ethnic, and linguistic character of political units of the Indian Union. Thus, Article 371A categorically states that "No act of Parliament in respect of religious or social practice of the Nagas, Naga customary law and procedure, administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to Naga customary law and ownership and transfer of land and its resources shall apply to the State of Nagaland unless the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland by a resolution so decides". Similar provisions apply for other states (Assam, Andhra Pradesh,

²⁷ Inserted to the constitution under the forty-second amendment Act 1976 at the height of the emergency, the legitimacy of the fundamental duties remains contested.

Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh) or parts of states. The Governor of Nagaland carries personal responsibility for the observation of the equitable distribution of resources that would guarantee a fair share to the Tuensang district, Article 371A 2 (b). These provisions that balance the principles of self-rule and shared rule set the precedents for similar demands, most recently in the case of the attempt to create the separate state of Telengana.

A perusal of the laws, institutions, and public policies pursued by the government of India and the state governments since independence provides a glimpse into citizen-making in independent India. The social construction of the individual as a being, ensconced in a network of relations composed of the various occupations and affinities, freely associating and dissociating, is owed with the attendant rights and duties of citizenship in India.²⁸ The Citizenship Act, 1955 is the core legal instrument that gives the institutional basis to citizenship in India. This has been followed by others such as the Citizenship Rules of 1956, the Dadra and Nagar Haveli (citizenship order) of 1962, the Goa, Daman, and Diu (Citizenship) Order of 1962, the Citizenship (Pondicherry) Order of 1962, the 2003 Assam Accord, and so on.

Measuring Citizenship: Results of a National Survey

Citizenship, following the discussion in the previous sections, is a political concept that conflates the inner world of the individuals with their social construction of the self. It is a valued asset and should, in principle, be measurable like other value assets such as education, wealth, and social status. However, while the legal entitlement is undoubtedly an important constituent of citizenship, the burden of proof of citizenship lies with the individual herself. One may be legally entitled to citizenship but not be aware of it; be aware of it but not feel in possession of the rights and capacities that make citizenship meaningful; or one might be disaffected and reject the legal rights of citizenship, driven by some innate force—loyalty to a different authority than the national state, or by another sentiment. Speaking in the abstract, one can thus differentiate between many different sections of the population. There may be citizens whose right to citizenship is complemented by a corresponding sense of capacity, duty, moral obligation, and sentiment. These intuitive notions, widely shared in the literature on citizenship, form the basis of the survey questions about “who is a citizen of India?”, the sense of empowerment, the perception of who “noncitizens” are, and the evaluation of a normative basis of citizenship. Four criteria, namely, self perception, sense of empowerment,

²⁸ This official norm finds its resonance in school textbooks. See Sudipto Kaviraj. *Citizen and Government: A textbook for Classes IX and X*. New Delhi: National Council of Educational Research and Training, 1985.

identification of the noncitizen, and the sense of citizen duty as enshrined in the constitution are of critical importance to the making of the citizen.²⁹

First of all, at the core of the survey measurement of citizenship is the self perception of the individual. The respondents are asked this question in as neutral a manner as possible in the survey context, and in the mother tongue of the respondent: (Question 13) “Some people think of themselves as Indian citizens, while some others do not think of themselves as citizens of India. Talking about yourself, do you consider yourself a citizen of India?” The results show 89 %—an immense majority of the respondents—assert their claim to the citizenship of India. The rest are distributed over those who do not regard themselves as citizens and those who either do not respond or are undecided.

Who, then, are these 89 % who claim the status of citizens and who are the noncitizens? The socio-demographic profiles of these two categories of India’s population help establish the following profile. In terms of their self perception, citizens as well as noncitizens do not have any distinct social profile. The higher educated tend to have a slightly greater tendency to see themselves as citizens (the gap between the nonliterate and the college educated is 7 %); the oldest age cohort feels its status as citizens a little less keenly than those younger than them (those 56 % or above, at 85 % are 4 % points below the national average) and the very poor, at 83 %, are 6 % below the national average. Interestingly, with regard to the social categories, nearly all except Muslims are within 1 % of the national average. As for Muslims, at 85 %, they are barely 4 % points below the national average with regard to self-definition as Indian citizens.

If, in terms of social characteristics, there is not a clear social profile that would radically distinguish the self perception as citizens from that of noncitizens, then one should look at the state averages in order to see how important the role of context is. Clearly, context matters, for in Jammu and Kashmir, at 19.6 %, the average of noncitizens is almost three times that of the national average. In Tripura it climbs even higher, reaching an astounding 27 %.

We turn next to the issue of capacities and empowerment. Here, we follow the conventional measures such as the perception of equality (equal rights), the right to free expression, sense of political efficacy (the right to change a government that one does not like), and the fulfillment of basic necessities like food, clothing, and shelter. The question is worded in such a way that the individual does not need to have a precise notion of the society at large, and instead takes a position on people such as themselves. By adding up these individual perceptions one gets a sense of the collective. The question asked for this purpose has four specific themes to it (Table 7.2). (Question 12)

²⁹ The four questions on citizenship form part of the National Election Study (NES) conducted by Lokniti (CSDS) during July-August 2009. A representative sample of about 8,000 men and women were interviewed in their own languages by specially trained investigators. See Subrata Mitra, “Citizenship in India: Preliminary Analysis of a National Survey,” in the *Economic and Political Weekly of India*, Feb 27, 2010, for full details of the survey.

Table 7.2 Perception of empowerment, and social, and material capacity

Statements	Fully agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Fully disagree	No opinion
Everyone enjoys equal rights	45	21	11	11	12
People are free to speak their minds without fear	39	24	15	9	13
People have the power to change the government they do not like	46	19	10	8	17
Most people have basic necessities like food, clothing, and shelter	33	21	16	16	13

Table 7.3 The “un-citizens,” as perceived by the respondents

Category	Statements	%
1	Those who do not take part in elections and other affairs of the country	9
2	Those not born in India, or to Indian parents, including illegal immigrants	29
3	Terrorists/separatists or those who help them	25
4	Those with loyalties other than towards India	11
5	Those who do not have respect for the flag, or unity of India	12
6	NRIs, PIO card holders	4
7	Others	7
8	Don't know	3

“Now [a] few statements will be read out, about the state of things in India for common people. Please tell whether you agree or disagree with each one of them.”

This is followed by a question on a category of people who Simon Schama, in his celebrated book “Citizen”, based on the aftermath of the French Revolution of 1789, described as “un-citizens.” The category is important in the sense that definition of the other sometimes helps define oneself more sharply. (Question 14) “And who in your opinion are not citizens of India? (Read out answer categories 0–5)”

Instead of asking the respondent to evaluate each alternative, the intention in this case is to arrive at a social rank ordering of the given alternatives. The alternatives are read out from top to bottom and bottom to top alternately in order to make sure that no particular response is privileged in any way. Looking at the responses (Table 7.3) one can see that the constitutionally stipulated criterion of exclusion, namely those not born in India or to Indian citizens, get 29 % support, which is higher than the others. But it is important to note here that the large majority of respondents have chosen criteria of exclusion from Indian citizenship those items that do not have a basis in law, but in entirely “constructed” categories that reflect the current state of affairs and sentiments in the country. Thus, terrorism as a criterion of exclusion, at 25 % is a big draw. Together, the two items that measure loyalty and sentiments, get around 23 % support. Finally, a small percentage—of 3.4—show their abiding concern for the rights of the sons of the soil and reject the claim of NRIs and PIO card holders, despite their legal right to some form of layered citizenship.

Table 7.4 Citizen duties and their evaluation by respondents

Statements (citizens of India should. . .)	Fully agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Fully disagree	No opinion
Vote regularly	80	10	2	1	7
Respect national symbols like the flag, the national anthem, and the integrity of the Indian territory.	77	10	2	1	10
Send children to school	81	9	2	1	7
Promote harmonious relationship between all religions	73	12	3	2	10
Safeguard public property like roads, trains, buses, government buildings	73	12	2	2	11

Finally, we ask the respondents to record their positions on some issues that have been considered to be essential to citizenship, namely citizen duties, a variation of which is incorporated in the Constitution of India. (Article 51) The following question was asked: (Question 16) “Now some few statements will be read out. Please tell whether you agree or disagree with each of them. (Probe further whether “fully” or “somewhat agrees or disagrees”).” The responses (Table 7.4) show a substantial amount of support for the Indian variations on the classic themes of citizen duties, such as regular voting and participation in public activities, respect for the national flag, and other core symbols, such as the national anthem and the territory of India.

A Cumulative Index of Citizenship: Diversity in Unity

While individual questions are interesting in their own rights, they can provide only a partial understanding of reality. However, one can enhance the credibility of measurement by combining measurements of the same phenomenon from different angles. On the basis of the convergence of the three attributes of citizenship, namely self definition, a sense of empowerment, and positive evaluation of citizen duties that we have witnessed above, a cumulative scale was created, first merging individual items within questions 12 and 16 to produce composite indices, and then combining both with self definition. For the sake of simplicity, all three components of citizenship were given equal weight. The sum of the three specific scales produced a general index of citizenship which was then divided into three levels: low citizenship (21.3 %), medium citizenship (35.1 %) and high citizenship (43.6 %).

The profile of those at different levels of the general index and the strength of the correlation of each with the sociodemographic variables is presented in Figs. 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6. One finds here enough evidence of a large core of “strong citizens” in every possible social group. But this main finding must be tempered with the observation that “citizen-ness” is also affected by the routes to social power such as status, education, gender, and wealth. Men and urban dwellers are




Fig. 7.1 The construction of citizenship (index) and its socio-demographic correlates (Gender)




Fig. 7.2 The construction of citizenship (index) and its socio-demographic correlates (Residence)

more likely to be strong citizens than women and rural residents respectively. Economic class is a stronger predictor of citizenship. Equally significant is the gap between the upper castes on the one hand and scheduled tribes and Muslims on the other. Another interesting feature cumulating the routes to citizenship is the surprises at the State level. Jammu and Kashmir still remains low, with 20.2 % strong citizens and 39 % weak citizens compared to 43 % strong and 21 % weak for the country as a whole. However, a surprise companion to Jammu and Kashmir in




Fig. 7.3 The construction of citizenship (index) and its socio-demographic correlates (Education)




Fig. 7.4 The construction of citizenship (index) and its socio-demographic correlates (Caste)

this context is Gujarat with a its less than national level of strong citizenship and more than national level of weak citizenship. At the top end are two further surprises: Himachal Pradesh and Karnataka grace the highest level in the national ranking of states in terms of the cumulative index.




Fig. 7.5 The construction of citizenship (index) and its socio-demographic correlates (Class)




Fig. 7.6 The construction of citizenship (index) and its socio-demographic correlates (States)

Conclusion: An Indian Counterflow?

The chapter has argued that citizenship in India is a function of territory, ethnicity, and political resources.³⁰ The survey findings reported here—a *still picture of a moving reality*—help locate Indian reality in a comparative perspective, and to

³⁰ The statistical overview of citizenship is culled out of a survey of social attitudes, in which a representative sample of the Indian population has been queried about their self perception, and other attributes such as empowerment and loyalty to the symbols of India's nationhood.

connect general theory with the Indian case. The analysis of citizenship in India in this chapter has yielded a large core of *nagariks*—citizens who are conscious of this status, in possession of the capacities that give meaning to their constitutional status as citizens. The term itself is a hybrid product of the conceptual and cultural flow from Europe in the course of colonial rule, and, as we have seen in our analysis of the ideas of some representative Indian thinkers, its conflation with indigenous moral and political categories. There are three distinct but entangled approaches to citizenship. Rational construction is the dominant form, but in their articulation, many cultural nationalists still see Indian citizenship more as part of the heritage—a seamless evolution that connects the past with the present—than the outcome of a painstaking process of policy making, legislation, administrative measures, and occasionally, a stroke of luck. In post-Partition India, involution was thought to have become a part of the past; but thanks to occasional outbursts of inter-community violence, one has become aware of the potential power of involution, which continues to haunt the policy-maker. Continued reference to evocative terms, such as *hindutva*, *khalsa*, or Islam—categories that are exclusive to their citizens and demand an exclusive territorial base—is the subliminal message of the continuous clash of imported and indigenous political categories.

The citizenship discourse in India today reflects a conflation of the two classic routes that have historically defined the trajectory of this concept. The path of “citizenship from below” has consisted of irate men and women contesting the power and legitimacy of the *ancient regime* as in the French Revolution, under the banner of their common identity as citizens—free and equal agents of their destiny. Secondly, new states have sought to design their nation, consisting of citizens whose political and moral persona is defined, and policed, centrally. The Indian landscape is marked by crosscurrents of identity, national power, and territoriality, leavened by the countervailing forces of community, collective memory, and ethnicity. The conceptual flow of European norms of personhood, and rights of citizens over the course of centuries of interaction between Europe and Asia left a residue in the form of Indian movements for basic rights³¹ and identity. These have continued to operate as autonomous, independent purveyors of visions of citizenship and the means for their attainment, comparable in many ways to their European predecessors of “citizenship from below,” of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The resultant elements constitute a unique constellation, specific to the Indian context and culture, but share some common parameters with similar discourses in other postcolonial societies with a long history of collective and contested existence.

The results of the empirical measurement of citizenship in India show that citizenship “works” for those whose ontological-historical categories constitute the core of the measurement of citizenship. This explains why citizenship is stronger in India’s geographic core as compared to the periphery (Kashmir, the North-East); among the higher educated and higher social groups who were

³¹ The emphasis on rights as an essential ingredient of citizenship occurs frequently in our elite interviews. See Prasanna Nayak.

mobilized politically before the lower social groups, and the sons of the soil, as opposed to the immigrants or recent arrivals. (See diagrams 1–6 above). The remarkable fact is that differences are one of degree and not kind; and even in areas that are considered to be “closed to India” (such as Kashmir), one is always surprised to find a good presence of ‘Indian’ citizens.

The “million mutinies” that the introduction of fundamental rights induced have surfaced in the form of the conflict of individuals against groups, groups against one another and the state, insurgencies, separatist movements, and outright war against the state.³² While these challenges to the state and public order are common knowledge, the idioms of identity, retrieval of memory and new, hybrid forms of collective action are of particular interest for research on citizenship. The meeting of the traditional and the modern forms of politics have taken different shapes. In some cases, the indigenous form of citizenship has reacted violently against the imposition of the alien. Even when the acceptance of the alien has remained passive, sullen resignation of earlier generations has resurfaced in subsequent generations in unexpected forms of resistance. But this is not the story of an out-and-out failure. The secret of India’s success has consisted of hybrid forms of identity where the indigenous and the alien have interpenetrated and provided a firm ground under the feet of the new institutional arrangement of the Indian state.

An excess of patriotic fervor leads some to deny the flow of ideas that gave the initial push to citizenship in India. This occurred over a period of nearly three decades, from the passing of the Government of India Act 1919 that incrementally transferred powers to Indians under colonial rule until 1947 when the Independence of India Act made India into a dominion. The Indian freedom movement revolved around a broad consensus on the concept of citizenship, based on tolerant pluralism, the expansion of rights in quantum and coverage of the population, and a united struggle against colonial rule. The attempts by more extreme forms of exclusive identity—synonymous with the Hindu revival or Islam, famously articulated in Jinnah’s “two nation” theory—did not have an adequate popular base or elite support to sabotage it. The violence associated with the Partition of India, was a key point of departure. Just as it generated a fortuitous space for the deeper articulation of the pre-independence formulation of citizenship by the Indian National Congress, it also produced the opposite for the newly constituted state of Pakistan. A narrow view of citizenship—dominated by a particular brand of Islam and with Urdu as the hegemonic language—was thrust upon the unsuspecting population of the new state, which was divided between the West and East Pakistan by a thousand miles of Indian Territory.

The Transfer of Power by parting British colonial rulers to the Congress Party, which had inculcated and institutionalized the Indian variant of tolerant pluralism, was able to continue the process of nation-building under the leadership of Nehru,

³² V. S. Naipaul, *India: A Million Mutinies Now* (London: William Heinemann; 1990) p. 517. Today’s Naxalites elicit much more popular sympathy than one would expect from a society in the throes of accelerated entry into the international market economy where each outbreak of insurgency has a direct impact on the much needed Foreign Direct Investment, indispensable to rapid growth.

and his brand of fuzzy nationalism. It served India for over two decades until Indira Gandhi introduced a more divisive, “‘us-again-them’” politic, based narrowly on personal loyalty. The narrow partisanship of the culture represented by Indira Gandhi and the decline of the Congress Party in the wake of its split in 1969 opened up the space for a re-definition of the issue of India’s collective identity. For a while, the Hindu nationalists, under the leadership of the Bharatiya Janata Party held the initiative, and enjoyed the political success that went with it. The most recent evidence in the form of the electoral success of the Congress Party perhaps points towards the re-emergence of the old congress consensus of inclusive nationalism and layered citizenship, though it might be too soon to tell if this will hold for the next decades. The fact that a sense of common citizenship has evolved—which has penetrated every region and section of the population of India—shows how rational construction has kept the pre-independence consensus together, more successfully than India’s neighbours. This is not to argue that the anchors of involution in ethnic identity have no appeal, or that common citizenship is strong enough to stop inter-community violence. Instead, the co-existence of both common citizenship and inter-community violence only goes to show how and why citizenship is a dynamic process where events at each turn are affected by both general factors and local conditions.

I have argued in this chapter that citizenship is a specific form of political identity.³³ It is a political variable and not merely a legal concept. Nationality is a necessary but not sufficient condition for citizenship. In terms of the full force of this concept, citizenship derives from a set of core considerations of rights to which the citizen feels entitled, and some moral obligations that the citizen considers fundamental to it. The citizen considers himself the agent of his political destiny, and that of the political collectivity of which he is a part.³⁴ In this vein, citizenship belongs to a “third space” (Bhabha 1994)³⁵ which constitutes the interface of the

³³ Citizenship is an integral part of political identity and in this sense follows the definition of identity by Sudhir Kakar. Kakar describes a person as having an identity when s/he has “a sense of self ‘that makes it possible to perceive oneself’ as a consistent and continuous being with a past, a present and a future.” Sudhir Kakar, ed., *Identity and Adulthood* (Delhi: Oxford University Press; 1979), preface, p. IX.

³⁴ Kakar’s illustration of the concept of personhood in Vivekananda as the conflation of assertion and sublimation comes close to my usage of citizenship. “Vivekananda was passionately convinced that the regeneration of religious vitality required a massive effort in raising cultural consciousness so that the Hindu world-image would come to pervade every form of individual and social endeavour, which in turn called for elementary measures of economic and sheer physical emancipation. Religion cannot be preached to empty bellies, he asserted.” Sudhir Kakar, *The Inner World: A Psycho-analytic Study of Childhood and Society in India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press; 1978), p. 163.

³⁵ Homi Bhaba’s conceptualization of the “third space” captures the spirit of the concept of citizenship, seen as a thread that strings together the past and the future into a coherent design of which the present is the most immediate and accessible evidence. “The enunciation of cultural difference problematizes the binary division of past and present, tradition, and modernity, at the level of cultural representation and its authoritative address. It is the problem of how, in signifying the present, something comes to be repeated, relocated and translated in the name of tradition, in the guise of a pastness that is not necessarily a faithful sign of historical memory but a strategy of

legal specification of individual citizenship in the constitution on the one hand, and the primordial concept of personhood germane to Indian society on the other.

These diverse usages of citizenship raise questions about its cognitive content. What might be the common factor that runs through such diverse usage? Is citizenship a legal constant or a political variable like power or poverty, open to measurement and stratification at different levels of intensity? Finally, is citizenship an attribute of individuals or ethnic groups?³⁶ There is enough unexplored terrain to justify further investigation. What one can say with some certitude is that India's package of policies and institutional arrangements—turning *rebels into stakeholders*—has served her well.³⁷ They have tamed the extreme arguments of cultural nationalism and provided the basis for a form of citizenship which combines the security that comes from territoriality with identity, ensconced in the institutional arrangement represented by the combination of federalism and consociationalism. That might have some lessons for strife-torn countries like Sri Lanka. It may even be relevant to the challenges facing Europe where old, hard notions of a national core are being contested by the new arrivals who carry with them concepts of religious orthodoxy that cannot be easily accommodated into the old definitions of the nation and the citizen.

Citizenship in India carries the conflicting legacies of colonial rule and the anti-colonial movement; the continuous induction of exogenous concepts adapted to local needs; and the strategic *reuse* of indigenous pasts. Here, citizenship is made and unmade in the high politics of the state and the politics of the street and the bazaar, in constituent assemblies and courtrooms, but also in *mandirs*, mosques and *gurdwaras*, and deep in the jungle where the state battles the forces of class, caste, ethnicity, religion, and region. This is a world of deeply embedded local concepts of citizenship, and a sense of national citizenship that evolved in course of the Freedom Movement. There is, in addition, a sense of “transnational”³⁸ citizenship, a “multi-layered construct in which one's citizenship in collectivities—local, ethnic, national, state, cross or trans-state, and supra-state—is affected and often at least partly constructed by the relationships and positioning of each layer.”³⁹ The discourse on citizenship, and the world that underpins it, is an arena of two-track actors—flexible citizens—who optimize their political and cultural resources by

representing authority in terms of the artifice of the archaic.” Homi Bhaba, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge; 1994), p. 35.

³⁶ The Indian constitution, which recognizes individual, as well as group rights, seems to point towards both the individual and the group as building blocks of politics. Article one: “India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States”, draws on the political, legal, entity of the state and its individuals on the one hand, and Bharat—redolent of the myth of traditional India, bound by the laws of Manu, on the other—points in both directions, simultaneously.

³⁷ See Subrata Mitra and V. B. Singh, *When Rebels become Stakeholders* (Delhi: Sage; 2009).

³⁸ See Jonathan Fox, “Unpacking ‘transnational citizenship’,” *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2005: 8 pp. 171–201.

³⁹ Nira Yuval-Davis, “The multi-layered citizen: citizenship in the age of globalization” in *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 1 (1) pp. 119–36.

drawing on multiple means and modes of action. Their citizenship consists in the use of multi-prong strategies that draw as much on the legitimate means provided by the state as on the recourse to violence. They cut into the political world of modern institutions, as into the traditional means of putting pressure on the decision-maker. These border-crossing entrepreneurs are constantly engaged in innovation, hybridization, and the creation of new norms out of the conflation of the state, society, and the market. This heightened sense of efficacy has brought into play not only the interests that were long suppressed by dominant groups. The liberal democratic institutions of India and the freedoms they jealously safeguard have helped bring the past back in again into the framework of present politics in the shape of the articulation of vengeance, anxiety, and desire to effectuate an “imagined” past.

Postcolonial and in some cases, post-communist states, in their solicitude to join the “modern world,” take on what they consider to be its indispensable appurtenances, such as the institutional facades of the modern state and the concepts that underpin them. All the while they remain oblivious to the vast differences in the historical trajectories that led the modern Western states. The hiatus between the political context of their origins and the concepts that dominate their present politics can be fatal to the long-term survival of the nascent state. This is all the more the case because fragile political entities are often caught at the crossroads between the norms of territoriality and ethnicity, without knowing on which of these two bedrocks they should build their institutional arrangements of citizenship. Perhaps, institutionalization of the equivalents of the hybrid Indian *naagarik*, whose moral and political profile and historical origin we have analyzed in this chapter, might be a possible solution to avoid the tragic consequences of the emergence of ethnic identity within the framework of territorial states in changing societies.

References

- Basu, Durga Das. 1991. *Introduction to the Constitution of India*. New Delhi: Prentice-Hall.
- Bhabha, Homi K. 1994. *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge.
- Fox, Jonathan. 2005. “Unpacking ‘Transnational Citizenship’.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 8 (1): 171–201.
- Gallie, Walter Bruce. 1955–6. “Essentially Contested Concepts.” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 56: 167–198.
- Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand. 1999. *Hind Swaraj and Other Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kakar, Sudhir. ed. 1979. Preface, *Identity and Adulthood*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Kaviraj, Sudipta. 1985. *Citizen and Government: A Textbook for Classes IX and X*. New Delhi: National Council of Educational Research and Training.
- Majumdar, Ramesh Chandra, Hem Chandra Raychaudhuri and Kalikinkar Datta. 1961. *An Advanced History of India*. 2nd ed. London: Macmillan.
- Mitra, Subrata K. and V. B. Singh. 2009. *When Rebels Become Stakeholders: Democracy, Agency and Social Change in India*. New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- Naipaul, V.S. 1990. *India: A Million Mutinies Now*. London: William Heinemann.

- Nehru, Jawaharlal. 1942. *The Unity of India: Collected Writings 1937–1940*. 2nd ed. London: Drummond.
- Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar. (1923). 1949 *Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?* 4th ed. Poona: Gokhale.
- Stokes, Eric. 1959. *The English Utilitarians and India*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Verma, V.P. 1995. *Modern Indian Political Thought*. Agra: Lakshmi Narain Agarwal Educational Publishers.
- Werner, Michael and Bénédicte Zimmermann. 2006. "Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity." *History and Theory* 45 (1): 30–50.
- Yuval-Davis, Nira. 1999. "The 'Multi-layered Citizen': Citizenship in the Age of 'Glocalization'." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 1(1): 119–136.

Section III
Flow Differentiated: Belief, Education,
Class, Tribe, and Space

Chapter 8

The Effects of Globalisation on Citizenship in India: The Changing Role of Education

Marie Lall

Abstract Marie Lall focuses on the Western concept of citizenship as it has lodged itself in Indian thinking and in the political space that is linked to the changing nature of the nation state. She suggests that the concept has been adapted by India to fit the local context of a postcolonial multicultural and multi-religious society. Education has been the prime political tool to cement citizenship values and India's classrooms are the laboratories where both the linked concepts of citizenship and national identity are forged. Just as globalization is changing the nature of the state it is also altering the nature of the social contract between state and citizens.

At its most basic the definition of citizenship is “a secular system of contributory rights, involving entitlements and duties, binding people to the nation state.” (Turner 2006: 608) and focuses on the relationship between the individual and the state. However any definition of citizenship also has to encompass three different aspects of citizenship:

Citizenship as status, which denotes formal state membership and the rules of access to it; citizenship as rights, which is about the formal capacities and immunities connected with such a status; and in addition citizenship as identity, which refers to the behavioural aspects of individuals acting and conceiving of themselves as members of a collectivity, classically the nation or the normative conceptions of such behaviour imputed by the state. (Joppke 2007: 38)

With regard to education, the prime facet of citizenship is the issue of identity, although education also is part of a wider state mechanism to inform citizens of their rights and duties. A large part of identity creation happens through the formal education process at school. Education is seen as one of the central tools in modern society to shape national identity (Lall 2009). Governments have the ability to control and impose curricula in schools and with it help to define the identity

M. Lall (✉)

Department of Educational Foundations and Policy Studies, University of London, Institute of Education, London, United Kingdom
e-mail: m.lall@ioe.ac.uk

discourse of the day. Education is also one of the most important ways of establishing citizenship values. For the modern nation state the classroom has become an important place where the relationship between the state and the individual gets cemented—both in terms of the rights and duties as citizens, as well as the different conceptions of national identity.

But in India today Gramsci's hegemony goes beyond simply fostering a unifying national identity through education, as globalisation has fundamentally altered the relationship between education and the state. The state today plays a central role in education, both facilitating the process of marketisation, as well as addressing educational disadvantage through specific policies and programmes in the context of the aspirations and demands from different social groups. Consequently, we are witnessing seemingly contradictory trends whereby the new hegemony is that of the withdrawal of the state from public services at a certain level, yet with increased state involvement at other levels. This is linked to the rise of increasingly affluent middle classes which are able to buy those services originally supplied by the state in an open market. Consequently, the question of rights and responsibilities is being eroded as state responsibility for providing public services is changing. The increased importance and involvement of private and non-state actors in the public domain is altering the relationship between the individual and the state. This also alters the role and purpose of education.

In India the concept of citizenship has been affected in two separate yet important ways by globalisation. This chapter will argue that as globalisation alters the role of the state, the concept of citizenship changes as well. In India in particular, the changed nature of state responsibilities in the education sector, which has in certain instances resulted in reduced state involvement, also changes the concept of citizenship. This is the case when the middle classes opt for alternative private provision, and the result being a two tier society where rights and duties are not the same for all citizens across the board.

Beyond this, globalisation has also led to the rise of other (religious and regional) identities led by new elites challenging the traditional concepts of an all encompassing national identity, resulting in a parting of ways between the concepts of citizenship and national identity. This is most pertinently reflected in curriculum and textbooks changes, which took place the BJP led NDA. Whilst the concept of Indian national identity has been radically changed, the citizenship laws have remained the same.

The Development of the Concept of Citizenship as a Cultural Flow

“Citizenship establishes the boundaries of the political community. It establishes that which is public and that which is private. It also tells us who is in and who is outside of the political community” (Kivisto and Faist 2007: 13). Citizenship therefore denotes the membership to a polity—in this case a particular state, and the

membership involves a reciprocal set of rights and duties. Politically motivated classes have helped decide who can access these rights, working in tandem with the state, which has the monopoly on dictating who is in and out. So, in Western democracies, over time there has been a move from white, male property owners as citizens towards a more inclusive definition. This relationship between the individual and the state is therefore linked to the particular form the nation state takes, which changes with time and throughout history, and is often related to social revolutions.

The concept of citizenship as discussed at the start of this volume is a Western concept and is linked to modernity through its relationship with the nation state. As a concept it has travelled across the world; first as a cultural flow in the colonial project, and later it was adopted by postcolonial societies as they turned themselves into nation states and faced the challenge to turn anti-state independence movements into stakeholders and citizens of the newly created states. In this process the concept of citizenship itself changed. Postcolonial societies did not in any way resemble their European counterparts and their citizenship had to adapt to the realities of multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-linguistic societies, most of which had as first priorities, internal stability and economic development.¹

The Case of India: The Local Adaptation of Citizenship and Its Link to National Identity

Prior to the British Empire the concepts of nation state and citizenship were alien to India. It was through colonisation that the Indian middle classes adopted what was in effect a Western way of organising the public sphere. The concept of the Indian nation state and, with it Indian citizenship, is one which developed slowly over the nineteenth century, a cultural flow brought in by the colonial masters from Britain. Sudhir Chandra maintains that “rights were not a matter of bestowal. They had to be desired and conceived. With the awareness of subjections came the sense of one’s rights and respect for one’s independence” (Chandra 2005: 109). The realisation of the difference between national and imperial interests and the British education of the Indian elites who wanted to enter the government service or turn to legal professions (read - enter the bar), led to increasing discontent amongst the educated upper middle classes. Chandra explains that the creation of the Indian National Congress in 1885 was “the institutional manifestation of a new political phenomenon [...] and demonstrated the possibility of ‘cementing’ the Indian people ‘into a national organisation’” (Chandra 2005: 113–114). The INC was the organisation which led to a unified fight across India for independence, creating the public and political space in which the Indian concept of citizenship would ultimately be developed.

¹ With regard of how this played itself out in postcolonial architecture, see Julia Hegewald’s contribution in this volume.

Moving out of colonialism meant moving from being subjects to being citizens and a new concept of Indian citizenship had to be created. It was the Nehruvian doctrine of shared history which was at the base of both Indian national identity and Indian citizenship (Lall 2001). Given India's diversity, neither ethnicity, nor language or religion could provide the postcolonial unifier for India's national identity. The Indian constitution and the Indian citizenship act were the legal frameworks which have defined Indian citizenship since 1947. Although the debates on who should be in or out and who the "we the people of India" have abounded, the inclusive vision espoused was more advanced than many European citizenship laws of the time. Nehru wanted to construct a new unified Indian state based on shared history, religious tolerance, and democracy. The pillars would be the new political elite (the Congress Party) and the new infrastructure services (the IAS) which transcended civil society and its divisions.

Basing both citizenship and national identity on the civic conceptions of territory also meant that the Indian Diaspora was excluded from Indian citizenship (Lall 2001). At the time of independence Indian citizens were persons "who at the time of the commencement of the Constitution had their domicile in India and (a) were born in the territory of India, or (b) either of whose parents were born in the territory of India, or (c) who have been ordinarily resident in the territory of India for no less than five years immediately preceding the commencement of the Constitution." (Rodriguez 2005: 212) Consequently, citizenship was not confined to ethnic Indians, and also extended to those who were of Indian origin and who wanted to return home. However, the Diaspora abroad was encouraged to take up local citizenship and was therefore excluded from Indian citizenship unless they returned. "It was a grand vision of the nation rooted but open to the world and towards the future" (Rodriguez 2005: 214).²

This secular conception was not uncontested at independence. There was a Hindutva conception of citizenship as well, which had supporters wanting to privilege Hindus and Sikhs, even abroad (Rodriguez 2005: 224). However, it was only in 1998 when the BJP came to power that the issue of Indian citizenship for Non Resident Indians (NRIs) and debates around potential dual citizenship were raised again. The BJP initiated the Person of Indian Origin (PIO) card (in effect a twenty year visa with certain economic privileges). Later, based on BJP policies, but under a Congress led government, an overseas citizenship (OIC) was instituted. In neither case did the bearer get any political rights and in neither case was the basic premise underlying Indian citizenship altered. What was interesting is that both the OIC and the PIO status were open for the newer and largely Hindu diaspora which had the economic power to invest in India's economy, neglecting the pre-1947 diaspora (Adeney and Lall 2005). The logic for both the PIO card and the OIC was to promote diasporic investments into India. However, whilst not altering citizenship right and duties, they did affect the concept of Indian national identity as foreign passport bearing Indians who could now claim a formal relationship with the country of their ancestors.

² See the discussion around religion and the Indian Diaspora in John Zavos' contribution in this volume.

The Role of Education in India's State Building Project

The legacies of the Nehruvian approach to citizenship, national identity, and education are considerable, perhaps the most notable of which was the entrenchment of the pluralist/secularist perspective in the minds of the Indian people. Following independence, school curricula were imbued with the twin themes of inclusiveness and national pride, placing emphasis on the fact that India's different communities could live peacefully side-by-side as one nation. Drawing from Nehru's vision, and articulating most of his key themes, the Kothari Commission (1964–66) was set up to formulate a coherent education policy for India. According to the commission, education was intended to increase productivity, develop social and national unity, consolidate democracy, modernise the country and develop social, moral and spiritual values. To achieve this, the main pillar of Indian education policy was to be free and compulsory education for all children up to the age of fourteen. Other features included the development of languages (Hindi, Sanskrit, regional languages, and the three language formula³), equality of educational opportunities (regional, tribal, and gender imbalances to be addressed), and the development and prioritisation of scientific education and research. India's curriculum has historically prioritised the study of mathematics and science rather than social sciences or arts. This has been actively promoted since the Kothari Commission which argued that India's developmental needs were better met by engineers and scientists than historians.

Since Independence, Indian governments have regarded education policy as a crucial part of its development agenda. Emphasis has traditionally been placed on universality, pluralism and secularism, while excellence has become a major focus increasingly. In reaching these goals, the issue of funding has become problematic with this government increased state-spending whilst also relying on the economic potential of the private sector for financial support and expansion of the system.

The Effects of Globalisation on Citizenship

According to Held et al. (1999), globalisation should be discussed in relation to three other concepts—localisation, nationalisation, and regionalisation. The global processes are not only making society increasingly multicultural and ever more intercultural as interactions among cultural groups intensify; they also force shifts in educational and development priorities as people assume multiple cultural identities. Globalisation brings with it a mix of opportunities and threats for every nation, culture, and educational system. On the one hand, the removal of barriers and new technologies create new possibilities for intercultural dialogue; on the other, there is the danger that new structures of global hegemony will emerge in which one political, economic, and communication culture or elite is unilaterally favoured over all others.

³ By which all children learn Hindi, their state language, and English.

Despite its many and varying definitions, globalisation is widely understood to have started to change the nature of the state through the increasing importance of transnational and supranational bodies:

Although globalization has been imagined in a variety of competing ways, there is general consensus that the cornerstones of modern governance, especially the symmetries forged largely in the past two centuries between national states, national territory, and national citizenship rights, have been progressively fractured by transnational networks, flows and identities. (Brodie 2004: 323)

In its most basic form globalisation has also led to the withdrawal of the state, shifting its responsibilities from provider to regulator of public services. This is underpinned by neoliberal globalism that prioritises economic growth and market logic. The erosion of the public sector (including education) has been one of the notable changes in the relationship between the individual and the state. Such fundamental changes in the relationship between the individual and the state mean in turn that the concept of citizenship is changing (Kuisma 2008).

The concept of globality presents citizenship studies with what is in effect an ontological challenge, suggesting that the world has changed. (...) Globality thus invites contemplation of inclusive transnational public spaces and transnational citizen-subjects. (Brodie 2004: 325)

According to Kivisto and Faist, the changes the concept of citizenship is undergoing can be grouped under four themes: inclusion, erosion, withdrawal, and expansion (cf. pp. 6–13). Inclusion refers to multicultural aspects of citizenship as espoused by Kymlicka, which included religious, linguistic, and ethnic rights. The erosion of the notion of citizenship is linked to the decline of the welfare state due to the effects of neoliberalism as well as the view that citizens have become passive recipients of the welfare state with less involvement in public life, as discussed by Habermas and Giddens. At the same time we are witnessing an expansion of citizenship to include previously marginalised/excluded groups (gender/race).

In order to understand these changes it helps to look at where citizenship has been historically located. The pre-modern locus of citizenship was the city state (Greece/Rome). With the advent of the nation state the modern locus of citizenship shifted there. The postmodern locus of citizenship could go beyond nation state (Hoffman 2007 in Kivisto and Faist) as concepts such as world citizenship and supranational organisations, such as the United Nations, became more important (Heater 2002 in Kivisto and Faist). Consequently, contemporary citizenship has an expansive character expressed with terms such as transnational, global, world, and cosmopolitan citizenship. This is evident in today's European Union which has developed a concept of "nested citizenship" (Faist 2000 in Kivisto and Faist)—where individual European nation states are also members of the European Union. The locus of European citizenship therefore co-exists with a supranational institution European Union.⁴ There are also increasing cases of dual and multiple citizenships, something many nation states were uncomfortable with even a couple of decades ago.

⁴One could argue that Nehru's vision of an Afro-Asian voice and voting block in the United Nations is also an early version of such nesting.

...the contemporary lament for the erosion of national citizenship often loses sight of the historical evolution of this political institution, its strong association with western liberal political economies and its uneven application both within and across national states. (Brodie 2004: 327)

For this discussion one needs to remember that both in the West and in the East the concept of citizenship has evolved in parallel with the nation state and adapted to the times and the local context. In light of the challenges and changes coming through globalisation, it is important to reevaluate what citizenship means today.

How Globalisation Is Affecting India: The Withdrawal of the State from Education and Effect on Citizenship

The academic and political debate in India with regard to citizenship has traditionally been located around participatory citizenship and the status of minorities (see, for example, work by Oommen on caste and how SCs and STs have been deprived of citizenship). Oommen also argues that in the elite conception of citizenship there are different visions of India and that the Hindu Nationalists focus on religion whilst the Cultural Pluralists, which crystallised in the anticolonial movements, focus on secularism. In both cases citizenship would be differently defined (Oommen 2005: 76–77). Bhargava links the reasoning of what Indian secularism is for, to the argument that all Indians, no matter their religion, must have the right to equal (passive) citizenship in that they are to be equally protected and have “a minimum of material wellbeing and a sphere of one’s own in which others ought not to interfere” (Bhargava 2002: 9). Active citizenship according to him is when all citizens are equal participants in the public domain, which secularism aims to protect with regard to minorities (Bhargava 2002: 10). As such, citizenships, rights, and duties have been very much part of the wider social justice debate. Yet the concept of social justice and in particular India’s view of equal opportunities for all has changed since the opening up of the economy in the early 1990s and the ongoing economic reforms (Lall and Nambissan 2011).

In India the 1991 economic reforms and opening up of the market has meant increased disparities between the wealthy and the poor.⁵ According to Kumar:

‘Economic inequalities increased during the last quarter of a century as the income gap between rich and poor countries, between rich and poor people within countries, as also between the rich and the poor in the world’s population widened. And income distribution widened.’ (Nayyar 2006) In the case of India, the changing character of economy has resulted in the informalisation and the casualisation of the workforce on a mass scale. The government is disinvesting in the public sector enterprises and the state institutions, handing them over to private companies. (Kumar 2009: 144)

⁵ See also chapter by Barbara Harris White on economic citizenship in this volume.

Whilst the Western media focuses on outsourcing and the large Indian middle class, the rural population which still makes up over 70 % have not benefited in the same way as those based in urban settings. The effects of globalisation on the ground are seen to have led to Westernisation through the increased consumption of imported Western branded goods, affordable for only a small fraction of society. The disparities between the haves and the have-nots have widened. This has had an effect on the relationship between the state and its citizens as now a whole section of society was no longer dependent on the state for the provision of public services, but could buy out of the social contract.

As mentioned above, globalisation is also associated with the increasing adoption of market forms for the delivery of services which were once organised by the state and financed through taxation (for example, education, health, and other welfare provisions). Many writers point to the increasing “commodification” of these services and their penetration by a private sector ethos, either in provision or in sponsorship, or through the organisation of services according to market principles by the introduction of consumer choice. Governments attempt to justify opening up education to corporate capital on the grounds that private sector management methods are best, and that business people are needed to “modernise” education for a “knowledge economy” based on information technologies. In this light India has experienced increased market logic in its education system, where results have to be measured and efficiency and effectiveness are the buzzwords of the day.

This has had a direct effect on equity and social justice. Many scholars have pointed out that globalisation has led to greater economic and social inequality (UNDP report 1999, Rikowski 2002; Kuisma 2008). Though educational access has expanded, it has become unequal in quality (Carnoy 2000). Since the 1990s, there has been an indiscriminate expansion of private schools across India, which has expanded the opportunities for the burgeoning middle classes. Though school education in India is free and universal, access to quality private schooling is denied or restricted to the economically weaker as the policy of reservations is not applied to school education. The state system of public provision has moved away from a social democracy ideal with equal provision for all.

In the social democratic era, education was constructed as a public good and a collective form of welfare provision, a key element of Marshall’s social citizenship (Marshall 1950). In the current neo-liberal era, by contrast, policy discourses construct education as a positional good for individuals, and as the site for human capital formation for the globalised economy. What has not changed is the importance ascribed to education. (Gamarnikow 2009: 13)

Yet education is one of the most important ways of establishing citizenship values. The civic virtues required for a “flourishing democracy”, according to Galston, are: *General virtues* such as courage, law-abidingness and loyalty; *social virtues* such as independence and open-mindedness; *economic virtues* such as work ethics and adaptability; and *political virtues* such as the capacity to respect the rights of others and to engage in public discourse (Galston 1991: 221–224 cited in Kymlicka and Norman 1994). For the modern nation state the classroom has become an important place where the relationship between the state and the

individual gets cemented—both in terms of the rights and duties as citizens, as well as the different conceptions of national identity. So what does it mean for citizenship when the state partly withdraws and the middle classes flee the system?

In India today the common basis of citizenship for the middle classes is built around choice and the market—the old values of social justice are no longer policy priorities. The state plays a central role, both facilitating the process of marketisation, and, at the same time, addressing educational disadvantage through specific policies and programmes in the context of the aspirations and demands from poorer social groups. Consequently we are witnessing seemingly contradictory trends whereby the new hegemony is that of the withdrawal of the state from public services at a certain level, letting the middle classes fend for themselves, yet with increased state involvement at other levels, creating a sensation of a “layered” state with no clearly demarcated boundaries. This is linked to the rise of increasingly affluent middle classes who have benefitted from India’s economic reforms and who are able to buy those services originally supplied by the state, in an open market. Whilst still only representing 30 % of India’s population, the middle classes no longer require the state to provide them with public education and health, resulting in a part withdrawal of the state from these services. Consequently the question of rights and responsibilities is being eroded as state responsibility for providing public services is changing. The increase importance and involvement of private and non-state actor in the public domain is altering the relationship between the individual and the state. The discourse of choice and the dominance of the markets by the middle classes results in newly excluded groups (see Lall and Nambissan 2011). This also alters the role and purpose of education.

Whilst the middle classes build their separate private schools, there have been demands from civil society groups for a provision of access for deprived groups to these elite schools on the pretext that the state has provided free land. However, once the land is provided, schools ignore their commitment to the government to provide schooling for the poorer families in return. This has led to judicial intervention in certain states like Delhi and the state is now asked to implement a 20 % quota of seats in the private schools to provide quality schooling and infrastructure to underprivileged castes and social classes. The experience shows that, in actual practice, such a vision of egalitarianism is not accepted by the private schools or the parents of privileged backgrounds who send their children to those schools. The schooling delivered for those admitted on quota and for those from the privileged home backgrounds is entirely different. The timings of schools and teachers teaching these two groups of children are different, with the less qualified teaching poor children and the better qualified teaching privileged children of the same school.

Even in the rural areas there is a demand for private English medium schooling because English is perceived as an emancipatory global language that can increase economic and social mobility and the private schooling is perceived as of better quality in comparison to the government schooling (Sarangapani 2003). At the national level, the National Knowledge Commission envisaged the introduction of English Medium education in Class I, which encouraged some state governments, such as Andhra Pradesh, to formulate policies to make learning English mandatory at Class I.

Nambissan puts it rightly:

poor infrastructure, lack of basic amenities, and facilities, as well as adequate number of teachers is a feature of schools that dalit children encounter as they enter government (local body managed schools). In addition, curriculum is dominated by conventional pedagogy based on the textbook, chalk and talk and absence of relevant teaching aids. . . This provides an unattractive learning environment for dalit children (the majority of whom enter government schools) and contrasts with the quality of schooling in 'public-private' institutions enjoyed by the more privileged strata. (Nambissan 2006: 243)

In fact, it is paradoxical that, in India, the government on the one hand made elementary education a fundamental right to be protected by the constitution,⁶ on the other, it falls in line with the demands of the market forces such as the Confederation of Indian Industry and the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, which campaign for the withdrawal of the state. One important development is that India's Planning Commission has released a policy document suggesting a more limited role of the government in educating its masses through Public Private Partnerships. The document focuses not only on education, but also on women and child development, health, family welfare, agriculture, the environment, rural development and social justice, and empowerment amongst other headings (Government of India 2004). The report explains that the sums spent by the state fall short of the requirements and therefore "Public-private partnership is an alternative to the traditional approach of providing services." (Government of India 2004:15). This suggests clearly the withdrawal of the state in the context of neoliberal reforms.

So, today, the Indian state is facing a two tier society that is emerging out of the reform process of the last twenty years. As the middle classes, who originally had the highest stake in the rights guaranteed through citizenship, withdraw from the equation, the state's relationship is reduced to the second tier of largely poorer urban and rural Indians. As the state has become richer (since 2003 government revenues have increased at the rate of 31 % per annum, see James Manor, forthcoming: 4), a huge array of redistributive and anti poverty programmes have been rolled out.⁷ Yet despite the National Rural Employment Programme and the Midday Meals Scheme, the quality of government school education has fallen to such a degree that the middle classes have largely opted out. Even poorer sections of society opt where possible for a private alternative, with profit schooling for the poor being advocated as a credible alternative to public schooling. (See work by James Tooley and Srivatsava, as well as Namissan and Ball, in Lall and Nambissan 2011). These contradictory trends are altering the relationship between the individual and the state. Citizenship in terms of rights and responsibilities is changing as society becomes increasingly fragmented

⁶ Only in July 2009 (Lok Sabha) and September 2009 Rajah Sabha.

⁷ The money spent on these programmes is around USD 50 billion since 2004, i.e., over 6 years. In comparative perspective the military budget in 2003/4 has been \$14.74 per annum rising to \$17.38 in 2004/5 pa. The recent 2008/09 budget proposes a raise from INR 960 billion in 2007/08 to INR 1056 billion in 2008/09 (a 10 % hike, from about USD 24 billion to about USD 26.6 billion at one USD 1 to INR 46). That's hike of about 10 %; compare to India's 2007 consumer price inflation index of 5.51 % in 2007. So, in the same period that state expenditure has gone up on poverty programmes, the government has also increased the annual defence budget by more than 60 %.

and the middle classes make their own destiny away from the masses which have no other option but to accept whatever the state is still willing to give them.

How Globalisation Is Affecting India: The Delinking of Citizenship and National Identity

The relationship between national identity and citizenship is a complex one and differs from country to country. Originally the nation state was the foundation for cultural and ethnic homogeneity (Habermas 1992b: 2) and became the basis for democratic citizenship in Europe in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Yet, as Habermas observes when looking at the reunification of Germany and the closer integration of the European Union in the course of the twentieth century, the relationship between citizenship and national identity has changed and evolved. Citizenship, as developed out of Rousseau's notion of self determination (Habermas 1992a: 4), has become linked to civil rights and today much of the literature links the concept of citizenship more to democracy and political choice than it does to a common identity. In Europe it is therefore the process of being able to choose representation that forms the basis of the relationship between the individual and the state.

In India, although rights, responsibilities and duties underpin citizenship, an important part of the discussion focuses on another tenet of citizenship—identity. As various groups within one state might have differing identities, they still relate to an overarching or umbrellas concept of citizenship. Kymlicka and Norman have discussed the concepts of citizenship in diverse societies and have found that, depending on the system, minorities sometimes are awarded special rights and sometimes have to play by the rules of the majority (Kymlicka and Norman 2000: 1–2). This, however, is insufficient to address the issues faced by postcolonial societies who are made up of various ethnic and linguistic groups and whose state has the challenge of defining not only an overarching national identity, but also fostering a concept of citizenship shared across the various groups.

India did adopt a form of multicultural citizenship with group differentiated rights within the inclusive and egalitarian nature of citizenship propagated by the constitution. Group identities and differences are recognised in order to protect minorities from the majority:

...there are different identities in India, and if these are not recognised and measures not adopted to protect their distinct interest, then equality of rights and equality of treatment would effectively reinforce the dominance of the majority. (Rodriguez: 229)

Different treatment was extended to disadvantaged groups, groups, and communities which had different languages, ethnicities, and religions, and also according to the federal arrangement of India. Consequently, Scheduled Castes and Tribes (SC/ST) have had reservations in higher education and public employment, Muslims are governed by their own private laws, and states were ultimately

reorganised according to language. To this day the relationship between the centre and the states is not “uniform” (Rodriguez: 234).

With regard to religion Nehru promoted a multicultural strategy—that of polyethnic rights (Adeney and Lall 2005: 7)—based on the state’s neutrality (equidistance) to all religion (India’s definition of secularism). It also meant the protection of the personal laws for Christian and Muslim minorities. This has been controversial as the religious personal laws of the Hindu majority are not protected. With regard to language, a multicultural strategy was adopted allowing individual states to use their languages for official business. Nehru was, however, opposed to the reorganisation of states on a linguistic basis for fear of any state wanting to secede. The reorganisation of states on a linguistic basis and, with this, the giving self-governing rights to linguistic communities, took place only after 1953 following prolonged agitation.

In effect, the unifying and inclusive conception of citizenship also had multicultural aspects that allowed for differentiation of rights and multiple identities on the basis of religion and language across the Indian state. Yet, despite legally giving space to these multiple identities, the concepts of citizenship and national identity were originally very much linked with each other, neither being based on ethnicity, religion or language. As discussed above, Nehru had chosen a civic conception over an ethnic conception with regard to both. Indian citizenship defined the Indian’s legal relationship to the state and was reflected in the state’s desire to forge an inclusive national identity, allowing for different private linguistic and religious identities to be subsumed. This Nehruvian vision was propagated through education and was largely uncontested at the national level till the late 1980s.

Aside from increased inequalities between and within countries (UNDP 1999) another effect of globalisation has been to prompt a drive in some countries for stronger identification with indigenous cultural roots. In India this took the form of a re-emergence of Hindu nationalism with perceptions of economic Westernisation leading Hindu nationalist groups to warn against the corrosion of traditional Hindu society.

The issue of a religious national identity—in this case a Hindu identity—has been propagated by Hindu nationalists who maintained that if Pakistan had been created as a home for the subcontinent’s Muslims, India was in effect a Hindu nation and Indian national identity should reflect a Hindu ethos. This argument based on the pre 1947 “two nation theory,” only gained political weight after the 1991 economic reforms. The opening up of India’s economy and the advent of the effects of globalisation on Indian soil had two effects: First, a political and economic decentralisation to the state level which in turn led to the increase importance of local grievances at national level (clear effect of glocalisation as a part of the seventy-third amendment and the introduction of Panchayati Raj politics). Second, the reaction by India’s urban middle classes, who were quickly getting rich, to review their identity and wanting to protect it from what was seen as the negative Western impact coming in through the opening up of India’s economy. In both cases sub-identities (ethnic/regional as well as religious) started to play an increasingly important political role, leading to coalition governments and later the election of a Hindu Nationalist led NDA government in 1998.

The BJP came to power fighting against the Indian economic reforms—advocating more limitations on the operations of multinational corporations in India, and pushing for a greater involvement of the Non Resident Indians (NRIs). Under the slogan “Microchips yes, potato chips, no” the BJP promised that the already stark economic divisions in Indian society would not be exacerbated by the opening up of the Indian market. On the ground, however, after winning the elections, the economic reforms continued unabated and with the gradual opening of the Indian market to foreign trade and investment, and financial devolution to the Indian states, a slow rift started to open up between the poor north and the increasingly rich southern states. Between 2000 and 2004 India witnessed the contradictory developments of opening up through increased participation in the world economy as well as, a “return to its roots” through the rise of a Hindu-inspired nationalistic movement.

At this juncture the concepts of citizenship and national identity parted ways as India’s citizenship laws did not change—yet the understanding of who was Indian and who was not, and on what basis, started to be debated. Abroad, Indians of the diaspora who had to date been excluded were re-integrated into a new Indian national identity which was clearly linked to ethnic and religious lines. It was now possible to have a foreign passport and still espouse an Indian national identity. Domestically this debate took place in the realm of education where the Nehruvian understanding of inclusiveness was challenged and new textbooks propagated religion as a way of distinguishing self from other.

Education for National Identity as a Political Football in India

The classroom has time and time again been used as a facilitator of conceptual flows. Nehru took an essentially Western concept and adapted it to India’s needs and situation at independence. The classroom was the vehicle for propagating an inclusive national identity through India’s history and social science curriculum, locating both citizenship and national identity in Indian territory and shared history. This secular vision of identity dominated India’s education system more through what is understood as a “hidden” curriculum as opposed to overt indoctrination. It was only with the economic changes after 1991 and the increasing importance of regional and religious identities (and with it the rise of regional parties into coalition governments) that this vision of an inclusive secular India started to be challenged from the religious right. Again, the classroom was identified as the location where the battle of ideas would be won.

The BJP, which led India between 1998 and 2004, recognised that education policy was an effective means to promote and spread its Hindu nationalist ideology and alter the basic definition of Indian national identity. After assuming power, the BJP leaders took steps to replace key officials in the education department and initiated reforms of the curriculum and textbooks (Taneja 2003). The aim was to inculcate future generations of Indian citizens with the ideology of “Hindutva.” Hindutva is based on the premise that India is fundamentally a Hindu nation, and

that therefore any non-Hindus in the country should either accept the majority's domination or leave. This "Hindu nationalist" view means that all non-Hindu communities in India, but especially the Muslim community, are seen as separate, second-class citizens, often portrayed as politically suspect since their loyalties may lie outside of India (either to the Islamic world in general, or Pakistan in particular) (See Lall, in Lall and Vickers: 2009). If one returns to the arguments made by Oommen and Bhargava discussed in the previous section, it is clear that any differentiation on the basis of religion would in the end lead to a differential concept of citizenship (Oommen 2005 and Bhargava 2002).

In 2000/01, the National Council for Education Research and Training (NCERT)⁸ issued a National Curriculum Framework for school education under the slogan of "Indianise, nationalise and spiritualise." The framework called for the purging of all foreign elements from the curriculum in state schools. These included the British legacy as well as aspects of Indian culture which were seen as having been introduced by the Mogul invaders. The changes introduced by the nationalists were an attempt to increase pride in being Indian, but concerns were raised that Indian culture was presented as a solely Hindu culture, ignoring India's pluralistic roots.

In effect, the advent of the BJP meant an end to the separation of religion and education in state schools.⁹ Under the BJP's logic of majoritarianism, the Indian nation was reconceptualised as Hindu. The main argument behind this, espoused by the government, was that, previously, the Hindu majority had suffered as the role of minorities had been unduly emphasised. The BJP hoped to "rectify" the situation by giving the Hindu population their rightful place, starting with the school textbooks. The education system was adapted to legitimise the new notion based on a religious interpretation of the past, which establishes the Hindus as the rightful Indians. Indian history was changed to show continuous strife between Hindus and non-Hindus, and non-Hindu communities were identified as foreigners and often as enemies of the nation. There have been attempts to prove the indigenous origins of the Aryans in order to establish historical legitimacy for a Hindu nationhood. This not only ignores the pluralistic roots and the contributions of the Muslim and other minorities to the Indian heritage, but has also resulted in a total reversal of the inclusive, secular Nehruvian roots that underpinned Indian education for over 50 years (Lall in Adeney 2009 and Saez 2005).

Since 2004, Congress has again led the national government. A political war was fought at the centre to reverse the education changes the BJP had made. New textbooks have been printed and the national Council for Education Research and Training (NCERT) was at the heart of the re-secularisation drive. However, since education is subject both to the central and the state governments, the changes were, in effect, not reversed. Individual state governments can decide on the curriculum and textbooks used in the state schools. Some states such as Gujarat have never

⁸The NCERT provides the main textbooks for Indian state schools which serve as models across all Indian states.

⁹Although the Indian government has funded schools of all major denominations, it was nevertheless the constitution that forbids religious teaching in state funded schools.

abandoned the controversial books and a change in regional government can (and has led) to a change in textbooks, making a political football out of education and the concept of Indian national identity.

The interesting thing is that the laws and premises surrounding Indian citizenship have not changed, but that citizenship is now, in educational terms, totally divorced from national identity.

Conclusion

The economic reforms brought the effects of globalisation to India. This had two repercussions on the middle classes: they were able to opt out of state provision and enjoy the benefits of choice that the market provided. Simultaneously they started to ask questions about how the market would corrupt Indian traditions and identity and voted in the BJP. Both phenomena have had effects on education, which has now become a political minefield at two levels.

First of all the middle classes are rapidly opting out of what they perceive as a worsening public education sector, resulting in a two tier society with richer sections of society at much greater advantage than those who have no other options. Choice has replaced India's traditional social justice model, and despite heavy state intervention with pro-poor programmes, equality of opportunity has been eroded.

At another level, the same middle classes voted in the BJP in an effort to mitigate the Westernisation effects of globalisation. This led to a debate around Indian identity resulting in textbooks that went from fostering an inclusive identity to fostering an exclusive one. The issue of Hindu pride and the "retrieval" of history were themes which resonated well with the middle classes that were most affected by India's economic reforms and rapid growth rates.

Globalisation is at the root of both phenomena, leading to the rise of regional and religious identities as different states, and sections of society have become more affluent. It is also the increasingly rich middle classes who can buy the services that used to be the responsibility of the state, as they are seeking a comparative advantage over the wider masses. Both phenomena also point to a changing relationship between the individual and the state and, consequently, an altered concept of citizenship.

References

- Adeney, Kathrine and Marie Lall. 2005. "Institutional Attempts to Build a 'National' Identity in India: Internal and External Dimensions." *India Review* 4 (3): 258–286.
- Brodie, Janine. 2004. "Introduction: Globalisation and Citizenship Beyond the National State". *Citizenship Studies*, 8 (4): 323–332.
- Bhargava, Rajeev. 2002. "What is Indian Secularism and What is it for?" *India Review*, 1 (1): 1–32.
- Carnoy, Martin. 2000. *Globalisation and Educational Restructuring*. Paris: International Institute of Educational Planning.

- Chandra, Sudhir. 2005. "Subjects' Citizenship Dream: Notes on the Nineteenth Century." In *Civil Society, Public Sphere and Citizenship: Dialogues and Perceptions*, edited by Rajeev Bhargava and Helmut Reifeld. New Delhi: Sage.
- Gamarnikow, Eva. 2009. "Education in Network Society.", In *International Handbook of Comparative Education*. Vol. 1, edited by R. Cowen and A. M. Kazamias. (London: Springer).
- Government of India Planning Commission. 2004. *Public Private Partnership, Report of the PPP Subgroup on Social Sector*. November. New Delhi. http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/rep_ppp.pdf
- Habermas, Jürgen. 1992a. Faktizität und Geltung: Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats. Frankfurt a. Main: Suhrkamp.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 1992b. "Citizenship and National Identity: Some reflections on the Future of Europe." *Praxis international* 12 (1): 1–19.
- Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perrato. 1999. *Global Transformations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Joppke, Christian. 2007. "Transformation of Citizenship: Status, Rights, Identity." *Citizenship Studies* 11 (1): 37–48.
- Kivisto, Peter and Thomas Faist. 2007. *Citizenship – Discourse, Theory and Transnational Prospects*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Kuisma, Mikko. 2008. "Rights or Privileges? The Challenge of Globalisation to the Values of Citizenship." *Citizenship Studies*, 12 (6): 613–627.
- Kumar, Ravi. 2009. "State, Inequality, and Politics of Capital: The Neoliberal Scourge in Education." In *The Developing World and State Education – Neoliberal Depredation and Egalitarian Alternatives*, edited by David Hill and Ellen Roskam. New York: Routledge.
- Kymlicka, Will and Wayne Norman. 1994. "Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory." *Ethics* 104 (2) : 352–381.
- Kymlicka, Will and Wayne Norman eds. 2000. *Citizenship in Diverse Societies*. Oxford: University Press.
- Lall, Marie. 2009. "Globalisation and the Fundamentalisation of Curricula - Lessons from India." In *Education as a Political Tool in Asia*, edited by Marie Lall and Edward Vickers London: Routledge.
- Lall, Marie. 2001. *India's Missed Opportunity*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Lall, Marie and G. Nambissan, eds. 2011. *Education and Social Justice in the Era of Globalisation*. New Delhi: Routledge.
- Nambissan, Geetha B. 2006. "Terms of Inclusion: Dalits and the Right to Education." In *The Crisis of Elementary Education in India*, edited by Ravi Kumar. New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- Oommen, T.K. 2005. *Crisis and Contention in Indian Society*. New Delhi: Sage.
- Rikowski, Glenn. 2002. "Globalisation and Education." Paper prepared for the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs, London.
- Rodriguez, Valerian. 2005. "Citizenship and the Indian Constitution." In *Civil Society, Public Sphere and Citizenship: Dialogues and Perceptions*, edited by Rajeev Bhargava and Reifeld, Helmut. New Delhi: SagePublications.
- Sarangapani, Padma M. 2003. *Constructing School Knowledge: Ethnography of Learning in an Indian Village*. New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- Turner, B.S. (2006) Citizenship and the Crisis of Multiculturalism, *Citizenship Studies*, Vol. 10, Number 5, pp. 607–618.
- Taneja, N. (2003). BJP Assault on Education and Educational Institutions. http://www.cpiml.org/liberation/year_2001/september/saffronimp.htm.
- United Nations Development Programme. 1999. *Human Development Report*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 9

Transnational Religious Organisation and Flexible Citizenship in Britain and India

John Zavos

Abstract John Zavos extends the idea of the political-cultural entanglement of Asian-European citizenships. He argues that religious organizations have the potential to be significant actors as dynamic new ideas of citizenship are fashioned in the challenging contexts of global transnationalism. The chapter focuses on one particular religious organization, the Bochasanwasi Shri Akshar Purushottam Swaminarayan Sanstha (or BAPS), examining its location in two different but related arenas of citizenship development, Britain and India. The chapter explores ways in which religion can operate as an ordering discourse in this context. Religious organizations, Zavos suggests, can navigate the public discourses opened up by these trends in order to enhance their sense of belonging, their status, and their access to rights in relation to national, social, and political arenas.

This chapter will explore the ways in which religion has become associated with and affected developing notions of citizenship in and between two related sites: Britain and India. The colonial domination of India by Britain means that the connections between these two nations have a long and tortuous history. This historical relationship is relevant but the most compelling context to this concern is the recognition that citizenship has become an increasingly dynamic idea in the late modern era. As Mitra states, in postcolonial states citizenship needs to be understood as “layered” and “shifting” (2008: 345, 347), and as Aihwa Ong argues, “in the era of globalization, individuals as well as governments develop a flexible notion of citizenship and sovereignty” (1999: 6).

This flexibility develops as a response to the challenges posed by global flows of capital, ideas, goods, and of course people. Ong’s first concern is to map out the mobility of postcolonial elites as they negotiate an adaptable sense of belonging between different sites in which they have a stake, be it economic, social, or

J. Zavos (✉)

School of Arts, Histories and Cultures, University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom
e-mail: john.zavos@manchester.ac.uk

cultural.¹ In addition, however, she explores the role of postcolonial states in responding flexibly to the mobility of transnational populations. There is, she says, sometimes a tendency to locate the issue of transnationalism as contiguously postnational: globalisation is seen as undermining the role of the nation state in securing or fixing the status of the subject, as people form identities and allegiances which cut across the constraints of established political, economic, and social formations. Flexible citizenship is partly a retort to such positions, as it indicates the enduring capacity of the nation state to adapt to rapidly developing conditions. There are, Ong says, “diverse forms of interdependencies and entanglements between transnational phenomena and the nation states—relations that link displaced persons with citizens, integrate the unstructured into the structured, and bring some kind of order to the disorderliness of transnationalism” (1999: 15–16). As this suggests, the action of states in this way is often governed by a conservative impulse, as they seek both to mediate the threat and exploit the (primarily economic) potential of transnationalism. It is a tendency also noted by others who encourage a refocusing of scholarly attention “away from abstract third spaces and on to the social networks and fields whose creation and maintenance locks states and (transnational) populations into recursive and mutually constitutive relations” (Dickinson and Bailey 2007: 759). Much of this work has focused on the relationship between migrant communities and their countries of origin. Dickinson and Bailey, for example, explore the idea of “transnational governance,” whereby the Indian state seeks to “give shape to and manage (its) overseas population” (ibid: 761) by developing forms of mediated citizenship. This kind of relationship is certainly significant, but here it will be seen as part of a web of culturally contingent “conceptual flows” (see Mitra this volume) associated with notions of citizenship, through which the “disorderliness” of transnationalism is negotiated. As Ong notes, the relationship between states and transnational communities is characterised by “diverse forms of interdependence and entanglements.” This chapter seeks to demonstrate how such interdependence and entanglement plays out as it explores the flow of citizenship-related ideas between states, organisations, and communities.

Citizenship may be understood in terms of a set of three interrelated and mutually implicated dimensions: status, rights, and identity (Joppke 2007: 38; see also the introduction and Lall in this volume). Citizenship as culturally contingent, conceptual flow is configured by the operation of different, sometimes contested notions of belonging associated with each of these dimensions. For example, Mitra locates citizenship as connoting a *status* oscillating “between territorially defined national communities within state borders and non-territorial (frequently transnational)

¹ Although Ong is not exclusively focused on elites in her work on flexible citizenship, it is to this group, as I say, that she first turns. My concern in this chapter is to pursue this lead by focusing on the relationship between nation states and a mobile flexible citizenry with the capital (variously social, cultural, and financial) to negotiate diverse institutional forms and national spaces. This focus does not preclude the existence of other forms of flexible citizenship, and indeed a whole range of comparatively “rigid” citizens, unable or unwilling to engage with the possibilities opened up by Ong’s “era of globalisation.”

communities defined in ethnic and functional terms” (2008: 347). Parekh highlights the dynamic impact that cultural and ethnic identity can have on the ability of groups to access *rights* and benefits associated with citizenship (2002). In the field of *identity* different notions of belonging are implicit. Here, what Joppke describes as “the behavioural aspects of individuals acting and conceiving of themselves as members of a collectivity” (Joppke 2007: 38) are performed as a means of demonstrating, asserting, or affirming citizenship as belongingness. Painter emphasises that full citizenship comes partly through “identification with an imagined community” of fellow citizens (2002: 95), and as we shall see later in the chapter, Ong speaks of the significance of a “civilisational discourse” deployed by Southeast Asian states as a means of staking out the values of citizenship, the identity markers, as it were, of full belonging. This field of identity, then, is an area where concepts of imagination, culture, and ethnicity inform and contest notions of citizenship, and in particular those notions of flexible citizenship which are fashioned in the context of transnationalism.

The focus on religion in this chapter is framed by this concern. Of course, religion can and does operate in relation to status and rights as aspects of citizenship as well, and we should remain cognisant of the mutuality of Joppke’s dimensions. This chapter, however, is most concerned with identity, as this field offers the most scope for the operation of citizenship as conceptual flow; that is, the exchange and translation of ideas and attitudes associated with citizenship in the context of transnationalism. A central contention in the chapter is that religion can operate here as an ordering discourse, part of the multivocal negotiation of transnational disorderliness, in the manner noted above as a conservative impulse associated with nation states.² However, this is not just a function of nation states (although these are certainly apparent), but also of transnational religious organisations, which carefully navigate a range of public spaces or social fields (Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004)³ in a manner which increases their ability to perform citizenship identities, and so enhances their sense of belonging (and, hence, their status and access to rights) in relation to national social and political arenas.

This argument is predicated on the understanding that religion, like citizenship, is a concept on the move. The idea of religion as a stable cross-cultural and trans-historical phenomenon has been subverted by the deconstruction of the world religions paradigm (for example, see Asad 1993; Fitzgerald 2000; Flood 1999; Hirst and Zavos 2005). Theorists such as Kim Knott argue that religion rather needs to be conceptualised as “a dynamic and engaged part of a complex social environment or habitat, which is itself criss-crossed with wider communications and power relations”

² Although I am noting here the operation of religion as a conservative force, it does not follow that this is the only way in which religion operates in social and political arenas in relation to transnationalism (see below). Indeed, there is plenty of literature to demonstrate the operation of religion as a progressive and even subversive force in this environment (see, for example, Hefner 1998; Maduro 2004, and the works of Robert Beckford, such as Beckford 2001).

³ Levitt and Glick Schiller define a social field as “a set of multiple interlocking networks of social relationships through which ideas, practices, and resources are unequally exchanged, organized, and transformed” (2004: 1009).

(2005: 119). Implicit here is the idea that particular manifestations of religion are always already intertwined with a variety of discourses constituted in different social fields. This study then is not so much based on the premise that religious organisations may or may not operate in particular ways in relation to state formations and notions of citizenship. Such a premise would demand comparative work between different religious organisations, and perhaps even between different “religions.” Rather, the work rests on examining possible ways in which religion as a discourse may be deployed by different agents in order to mediate the development of notions of belonging associated with citizenship in the dynamic, shifting context of late modern state-subject relations. Although it rejects the idea of religion as a stable universal phenomenon, however, such an approach does not preclude the operation of dominant discourses of religion. Indeed, the world religions paradigm noted above is just such a dominant discourse, although there have, in recent years, been some significant developments in this discursive formation. In certain national and transnational arenas, we see a subtle shift towards the identification and articulation of common religious values underpinning the normative plurality of the world religions—values such as peace, environmental responsibility, respect for human (and religious) diversity, which are commonly projected as “spiritual” or “faith” values—in a manner which frequently marginalises the subversive potential of religious worldviews.⁴ In this chapter we will note the presence of this discursive development, as different agents seek to fashion orderly notions of belonging in the context of transnationalism.

In order to pursue this objective, the chapter focuses on one transnational religious organisation, the Bochasanwasi Shri Akshar Purushottam Swaminarayan Sanstha (or BAPS), and its role in these processes in the context of India and, first of all, Britain. Examining BAPS in these interrelated contexts will provide a significant example of what Ong refers to as the “diverse forms of interdependencies and entanglements between transnational phenomena and the nation-states,” which produce different models of flexible citizenship. In each case the focus is first on the state’s development of new forms of citizenship-as-identity in response to the “disorderliness” of transnationalism, before exploring the ways in which BAPS works with these developments in its efforts to establish a sense of belonging premised on the centrality of “religion.” As we shall see, the transnational character of BAPS enables it to perform citizenship as conceptual flow in a manner which reverberates both in Britain and India, as these states continue to develop new ways of addressing the challenges, opportunities, and threats associated with transnationalism.

Citizenship, Ethnicity, and Religion in the United Kingdom

British citizenship is in many ways intensely layered and contestable, and these qualities derive largely, and ironically, from a condition of postcoloniality. For much of the colonial period the single category of “British subject” theoretically

⁴ For an elaboration of this argument, see Zavos 2008.

encompassed all those who nominally came under the jurisdiction of the British monarchy including, of course, colonial subjects. As the Empire unravelled, however, the category of British subject was increasingly unable to capture the complex relationships developing through the emergence of independent states which were nevertheless still constitutionally tied to Britain through the institution of the Commonwealth. The British Nationality Act of 1948 for the first time established the idea of a British citizen of the United Kingdom and colonies; other former subjects of the British Empire were henceforth known as commonwealth citizens in addition to being citizens of their own independent states. Fears about so-called “New Commonwealth” immigration have since led to a progressive complication of the idea of British citizenship. Perhaps most significant in the current context has been the introduction of the notion of patriality as a qualifier for the status of British citizen under the 1968 and 1971 Commonwealth Immigration Acts. The idea of patriality brings the notion of ethnic identity quite clearly into the arena of British citizenship, as it makes a distinction between British subjects on the basis of their descent, with full citizenship rights being available to those subjects who could prove that their parents or grandparents had been born in the United Kingdom (Carter 2000: 134).

A kind of “ethnic citizen,” then, appears as part of the legal structure of the UK’s approach to citizenship, reinforcing dominant understandings of Britain as a nation of white islanders in the context of the inward flow of non-white migrants in the second half of the twentieth century. As it developed these defensive strategies against non-white immigration however, the British state was concerned with mediating the presence of those migrant populations who were already here, and in doing so, a new and different kind of “ethnic citizen” begins to emerge. In the nineteen seventies and eighties, the British state gradually developed inclusionary policies loosely termed “multiculturalist” as a means of mediating pluralism. Multiculturalism, in as much as it was a coherent policy strategy, was predicated on the principle of equal respect for difference, and an attempt to embrace cultural diversity as a valid factor in the imagining of British identity; what Kymlicka and Norman identify as an acceptance that “ethnocultural identities matter to citizens, will endure over time, and must be recognized and accommodated within... common institutions” (Kymlicka and Norman 2000: 14).

A range of factors during the 1990s and beyond have destabilised the multiculturalist approach as it has developed in Britain. The year 2001 in particular witnessed scenes of violent unrest in northern English towns with large South Asian Muslim populations, closely followed by the events of 11 September. In the wake of these events, the government moved to embrace the idea of community cohesion, an approach to pluralism which criticised previously pursued policies of multiculturalism for encouraging segregation and differentiated values. In a move which owed a good deal to the theorisation of social capital in the United States (Putnam 2000, 2007), community cohesion advocated a new approach to pluralism in which respect for difference was predicated on the recognition of common core values. The then Home Secretary David Blunkett signalled the new focus by explaining that “citizenship means finding a common place for diverse cultures and beliefs, consistent with our core values” (*The Guardian* 14 December 2001). As illustrated here, the ideological shift to community cohesion is often expressed

explicitly in terms of citizenship. This link was only emphasised by the introduction of citizenship tests in 2004 through which new migrants are required to answer questions designed to demonstrate their knowledge and understanding of aspects of British life, culture, institutions, and governance.

The role of religion in this ideological shift is explained by Tony Blair in a speech to the Christian Socialist Movement in 2001: “Our major faith traditions—all of them more historic and deeply rooted than any political party or ideology—play a fundamental role in supporting and propagating values which bind us together as a nation” (see Furbey and Macey 2005: 97). Here the role of religion or more specifically “faith” is identified as a key means of identifying those core values at the heart of community cohesion. In fact, the state had for some time been cultivating connections with religious organisations as a means of managing diversity. From the early 1990s, for example, the Inner Cities Religious Council looked to represent the views of different religious communities in the context first of inner city regeneration, and increasingly in relation to the government’s overall approach to the mediation of pluralism. Critically, the council was to operate on the basis of what its first Chair Robin Squire MP called “some of the common values which people of faith share—the intrinsic value of people; the importance of nurturing communities; respect for the environment; the importance of love and justice in society” (see Taylor 2002: 217). In invoking this commonality, Squire was drawing on that increasingly prominent understanding of the location of religion in global terms, referred to in the introduction, through which a common “discourse of faith” is identified as informing the plurality of religious traditions (Zavos 2008). This kind of approach dovetailed neatly with the trajectory of community cohesion in the early twenty-first century to produce what some commentators have termed a “faith relations industry” in Britain (McLoughlin 2005: 58); that is, a set of emerging state institutions that implicitly read ethnic difference in terms of religious identity. This development is matched by a strong desire amongst some South Asian communities in particular to articulate their identity in Britain in religious terms, rather than in terms of the catch-all “Asian” identity which had for so long distinguished South Asians from Afro-Caribbean migrants. “Don’t call me Asian” has become a familiar refrain, particularly amongst groups representing Hindus and Sikhs in Britain in a post 9/11 context. The idea of religious identity as ethnic identity, then, is becoming increasingly significant in the politics of ethnicity in Britain, and a variety of religious organisations and those claiming to represent religious communities have become prominent collaborators with the government (Zavos 2009).

To summarise the argument so far, in the twenty-first century a new kind of “ethnic citizenship” is being projected through shifts in the British state’s approach to the plurality of society. In effect, this is an example of “flexible citizenship” as state strategy, as the earlier move to secure a racialised ethnic British citizenship through patriality is now supplemented – or “layered” over – by the imagining of ethnically defined minority communities as citizens. Religion provides a key language for the expression of this new notion of ethnic citizenship, in that “faith identities” both chime with the principle of community cohesion and represent an opportunity to promote particular types of ethnicity as legitimate.

Religious Organisation and Ethnic Citizenship in Britain

The new visibility of religion in the British politics of ethnicity is reflected in the performance of religious identity as a kind of model minority identity by an increasing number of representative groups. Some of these groups, such as the Muslim Council of Britain and the Hindu Forum of Britain, are clearly in the political field; they seek to represent an ethnic community defined first and foremost in terms of religious identity, and they have responded eagerly to the community cohesion agenda. As the President of the Hindu Forum stated at the launch event of the organisation in 2004, “it is incumbent upon us all, that we strive as a collective, rejoice in our diversity and work towards community cohesion” (*Asian Voice* 27/3/04). Others are less overtly political, yet nevertheless strongly project the idea of the ethnic citizen, as marked out by the community cohesion agenda, through social action and the arrangement of social space. By practicing what Kymlicka and Norman describe as “civic virtue” (2000: 6), these organisations acquire valuable social capital not just for their own institutions but for the ethnic/religious identities they have come to represent.

BAPS is an example of this type of organisation. It represents one specific grouping of the Swaminarayan *sampradaya*, a devotional Hindu movement which developed initially in Gujarat in the nineteenth century. It is now a global movement with a formidable organisation of temples, centres, and devotional groups, as well as development and educational programmes. It is primarily popular amongst Gujarati communities, and it has a particularly powerful presence in the United States and in Britain, as well as Gujarat itself and some other areas of India. BAPS is, then, an organisation with a strong transnational profile. Steven Vertovec has described it as a form of “cosmopolitan Hinduism,” reflecting a capacity to mould its practice to multiple environments and acknowledge the play of multiple identities amongst its modern devotees (Vertovec 2000: 164). In fact, in offering this model, Vertovec draws on the work of Peter van der Veer, who has argued that contemporary theories of cosmopolitanism need to take more account of the historical development of this idea in contexts of colonialism (van der Veer 2002). Acknowledging such “historical entanglements” (ibid: 178) enables a clearer understanding of “alternative cosmopolitanisms” to those framed by a post-Enlightenment vision of secular engagement⁵ in which, for example, transnational Hindu and Muslim organisations may be “creatively developing new religious understandings of their predicament, entailing an encounter with the multiplicity of Others and with global conditions on their own terms” (van der Veer 2004: 16). Van der Veer argues that these terms may well be articulated in a framework of traditionalism, but “this traditionalism requires immense ideological work that transforms previous discursive practices substantially” (ibid: 12).

It is in this sense of “creative traditionalism,” then, that we may speak of BAPS as a transnational organisation articulating a kind of “cosmopolitan Hinduism.” In fact, van der Veer’s work on the colonial genealogies of cosmopolitanism are again

⁵ Such as those “cosmopolitan norms” explored, for example, in Benhabib 2007.

pertinent, as he identifies the emergence of a discourse of Indian spirituality in the nineteenth century as a kind of anti-colonialist cosmopolitan project, fashioned through the flow of ideas between Euro-American theosophists and emerging representations of Hinduism in colonial civil society. “Western discourse on ‘Eastern spirituality,’” he argues,

is reappropriated by the Indian religious movements of this period... Spirituality is a comparative, polemical term used against Christian colonialism. As in Britain itself, it contests the very colonial domination of scientific knowledge by showing that there are either earlier or alternative forms of science available in Hinduism (2002: 176).

It is this kind of “comparative, polemical” Indian spirituality which was taken by Swami Vivekananda to the World Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893. Here, he contested the space of modern religion with other parliamentarians, arguing that what he presented as the spiritual essence of Hinduism⁶ provided a model of tolerant, rational, and universal religion which neatly encompassed the other, “less ancient” religious traditions (Brekke 2002: 25). Although normally in somewhat less combative forms, this model has been very influential in the development of modern notions of cosmopolitan Hinduism, such as that propagated by BAPS; it also resonates strongly with the emerging global discourse of faith we have noted as congruent with the idea of community cohesion in the United Kingdom.

It is no coincidence that Vivekananda was also very influential in developing a modern notion of *seva* as a feature of his spiritual approach. *Seva* in its broadest sense means any kind of devotional service. It is often related to *bhakti* devotionism in Hindu traditions, framing forms of worship and modelling the guru-disciple relationship. In establishing the Ramakrishna Math and Mission, however, Vivekananda fashioned *seva* more particularly as the obligatory delivery of social service or service to humanity (see Beckerlegge 2006). Vivekananda’s notion of *seva* as social service articulates it as a selfless act—indeed, its selflessness is an indicator of its legitimacy as a form of devotion (see also Warriar 2005: 59). The idea of *seva* has become a central feature of virtually all modern Hindu organisations as they have developed during the twentieth century (see, for example, McKean 1996 on the Divine Life Society). As a guiding philosophy for full-time disciples in modern Hindu movements, *seva* provides the motivation for the full range of management and practical activities associated with particular movements (Warriar 2005: 59–60; Williams 1998: 853–4). For devotees, it provides similar motivation for a range of voluntary activities. As will be demonstrated, in multiple social contexts it also provides a critical religious framing in the performance of civic virtue. For the Swaminarayan Sanstha, this is enacted on multiple levels, including that configured by the British state’s articulation of community cohesion.

Since 1995 the focal point of the Sanstha in Britain has been its temple complex in Neasden, North London. As its website proudly states, this *mandir* is recognised

⁶ An interpretation of Vedantic philosophy developed through a variety of nineteenth century thinkers and sometimes known as “neo-Vedanta” (see Halbfass), combined with the promotion of “yoga as the Indian science of supraconsciousness” (van der Veer 2002: 177).

by Guinness World Records as the largest Hindu stone built *mandir* outside India. Opposite the temple is a private school run by the Sanstha, which caters for children from the age of 2 up to 18. These institutions create a powerful presence for the Sanstha in London. The *mandir* is recognised as a major tourist site (again as the website tells us, *Time Out* magazine listed it in 2007 as one of the “seven wonders of London”). But the complex is also a deeply civic site, in which the civic virtue of BAPS – and by extension the Hindu community – is reiterated in a number of ways. Firstly, the spatial arrangement of the *mandir* expresses a powerful sense of order. It is a spectacular site, a white marble, intricately carved building standing heterotopically in the suburban sprawl of North West London, close to the North Circular, a major road route in the city, and to large retail outlets such as the Swedish furniture manufacturer IKEA.⁷ Entering the *mandir* grounds means leaving these concerns behind, as the carefully manicured lawns and immaculately clean spaces both inside and outside reflect the care and attention of the volunteers who are always in attendance. The orderly nature of the site extends to physical movement, as visitors are encouraged to follow set routes from area to area (in this sense, providing a strong sense of heterotopia, as this managed movement seems to echo the forms of movement encouraged in the nearby IKEA store⁸). These features seek to configure Hindu sacred space as calm and serene, drawing deeply on the dominant discourse of religion as faith, and the associated notion of cosmopolitan Hinduism.⁹ The main managed route at the *mandir* leads the visitor to the entrance of a permanent exhibition called “Understanding Hinduism,” in which the “glory and greatness of Hinduism and the significant contributions by India in all fields” is represented (<http://www.mandir.org/exhibition/index.htm>). The exhibition provides further strong indications of the values underpinning Hinduism as a globally significant religion (and, at the heart of Hinduism in this representation, the importance of Bhagwan Swaminarayan in propagating these values).

A proportion of the exhibition including a film is given over to explaining the building of the *mandir* itself. The key thrust of this part of the exhibition is to demonstrate the devotion and sacrifice of *satsangis* who contributed to the project. The *mandir* was built entirely through private donations and the community also offered voluntary labour as a form of *seva*. The idea captured here of an organised, selfless community working together for a common goal is highly influential in

⁷ See Johnson 2006 on different uses of the term “heterotopia.” My particular interest lies in heterotopia as a sense of difference or “specialness” associated with a space, without it being entirely removed from the parameters of quotidian reality. This sense of familiar difference provides an appropriate kind of context for paradigmatic values which are nevertheless applicable in everyday life, throwing them, as it were, into sharper relief.

⁸ I am grateful to Dr Rohit Barot for drawing this similarity to my attention some years ago.

⁹ The link to van der Veer’s anti-colonial cosmopolitan Hinduism is again evident here, as this representation of Hinduism in a serene, spiritualist key is developed in contradistinction to the classic colonialist stereotype of this religion as a kind of riot of disorderly divinities, beliefs, and practices. See, for example, the commentary of ICS officer Alfred Lyall in the 1880s, as explored in Metcalf, 1995. Lyall describes contemporary devotional Hinduism as “a mere troubled sea, without shore or visible horizon, driven to and fro by the winds of boundless credulity and grotesque invention” (Metcalf 1995: 136).

projections of the Sanstha in wider community environments, It is reproduced through elements of the *mandir* website, and through activities of the Sanstha and the School in the local community. As the school's website comments:

in line with the Hindu ethos with which The Swaminarayan School operates, the School sees its role not only as a participator within the local community but also as a contributor. Hence the School has been involved in several charity drives in recent years. As a result, the children are taught with important character-building values such as giving, sharing, treating each other as equals, and helping those less fortunate than themselves.

(<http://www.swaminarayan.brent.sch.uk/charity-work.html>)

The school, then, contributes to the community both through charitable work and by developing the civic virtue of its students. The combination of this attitude of selfless service with the representations of orderly Hinduism at the temple site produces a kind of moral tableau which acts as a metaphor for the model status of Hindus as “ethnic citizens” in Britain. The Neasden complex projects core values as Hindu values (including *seva*) which clearly resonates with the idea of community cohesion and the associated notion of ethnic citizenship.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the site has emerged as iconic in terms of Britain's multicultural profile, and is frequently visited by prominent politicians and other figures of the state. The *mandir's* website features comment from such figures as Tony Blair, the Prince of Wales, the late Diana Spencer, and the MP William Hague. The tone of this comment is remarkably consistent, focusing on one or both of the two issues explored here: first, the peace and tranquility of the space, and second, the selfless commitment of the community which its building represents. This latter point is emphasised by the Prime Minister Gordon Brown in a message sent to the Sanstha at the time of its centenary celebration in 2007. Mr. Brown states that the devotees “espouse ideals of community and voluntary service which are an example to us all,” hence locating BAPS as exemplary in the performance of community cohesion.

During 2009, both the temple and the school featured prominently on the personal website of the Prince of Wales, as he and his wife visited to celebrate the Holi festival. The video recording this visit is instructive. It features a highly choreographed and orderly representation of the normally rather chaotic practice of Holi. There is also a visit to a classroom, where young children are making chains of daffodils in celebration of another festival that falls in the spring, St David's Day. This scene clearly invokes the commitment of the Swaminarayan movement to community cohesion, as the diversity of Welsh and Hindu festivals is brought together in the context of the royal visit to the school, as is represented by the image in Fig. 9.1 of the Prince with a tilaka and a traditional Hindu welcome garland only made of Welsh daffodils. The hybrid is fashioned in the context of the religion as faith discourse, which recognises the underlying commonality of these diversely framed festivals, hence reinforcing the idea that BAPS is ideally positioned to operate within the context of the UK's strategy of community cohesion.

In this way, then, the activities, statements and even the spaces fashioned by BAPS exemplify the role of the Hindu citizen as a model minority with a great deal to offer to the civic life of the United Kingdom from a specifically religious point of view.

Fig. 9.1 Prince Charles at the Swaminarayan School, Neasden, North London, March 2009 (Courtesy Press Association Archives)



This point is again reiterated by the Sanstha's Annual Review, which highlights BAPS initiatives in a range of social arenas. The 2007–2008 Review touches, for example, on the Sanstha's work in organising health campaigns and regional family seminars, anti-bullying workshops and summer camps for children, and a range of welfare related work in local communities. As the review states, "whether observing international days of significance or reaching out to those often left neglected on the fringes of society, we have sought to make a positive, lasting impact on as many lives as possible" (BAPS, n.d.: 8). One particularly interesting feature of the review is the "Global Highlights" page (see Fig. 9.2).

This page highlights the worldwide reach of the organisation and its ability to deliver the same kind of community centred activities outlined above on a global scale. The page brings together religious activities such as the Holi festival, as celebrated in Sydney with education-related activities such as a parents evening in Johannesburg, and development activities such as disaster relief. The arenas, then, in which the Sanstha can deploy strategies of civic virtue, are radically expanded, reflecting the mobility of this transnational organisation. One interesting feature of development activity is the representation of relief work as occurring in two sites: Texas and Bihar. As sites for such work, these two are of course at opposite ends of the index of human development; the Sanstha brings them together in a way which seems to accentuate its global reach. It is an organisation with the power and the aspiration to provide support throughout the world. Its concept of citizenship in this sense is intensely flexible.

Flexible citizenship is almost consciously produced in some BAPS materials. For example, a webpage focusing on the Sanstha's family building initiative comments that "a strong family produces strong, productive citizens of the future" (<http://www.bapscharities.org/services/community/family.htm>). This statement may resonate as much in Altrincham as it does in Ahmedabad, and in fact there is no indication on this




Fig. 9.2 The “Global Highlights” page of the BAPS Annual Review 2007–2008 (Courtesy BAPS Swaminarayan Sanstha)

page about whether this activity is focused on any particular location. Citizenship is invoked as a general mode of responsibility, a general feature of global society, which the Sanstha is ideally placed to deliver precisely because of its transnational character. My interest now is to see how this plays out in the context of India. Before looking more specifically at BAPS, the next section explores the way in which notions of Indian citizenship have developed in recent years. Interestingly, some of the same migrant communities perceived as so influential in developing different notions of citizenship in Britain are also critically important here.

From PIO to OCI: Flexible Citizenship and the Indian Diaspora

As a young kid in Britain people would look at me and ask me where I was from. I'd say, 'Scotland', and they'd say, 'yes, but where are you really from?' Somewhere at the back of your mind you're wondering about this country that your parents came from and wondering if maybe you belong there.

(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/5290494.stm)

This statement features in a BBC news report posted in 2006, entitled “Indians head home in brain gain.” Attributed to a young South Asian woman born in Glasgow who was by that time living in Mumbai, the statement expresses reasons for her

migration to India. Although she was partly driven by new opportunities fashioned in the context of India's booming twenty-first century economy, this informant, as with others in the article, expressed an emotional attachment to the land of her parents, a sense of belonging, as a key factor in her decision to migrate. The persistence of this affective relationship between the Indian diaspora and the "homeland," even amongst the second and third generation, is also something which is recognised by the Indian government.

In 2000 the Indian Ministry of External Affairs appointed a High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora. Although the committee saw its brief primarily in terms of the potential for inward investment, the significance of the diaspora was also recognised in social and cultural terms. For example, the committee's website explains that

The Diaspora is very special to India. Residing in distant lands, its members have . . . retained their emotional, cultural and spiritual links with the country of their origin. This strikes a reciprocal chord in the hearts of people of India.

(<http://www.indiandiaspora.nic.in/>)

The committee envisaged an opportunity to build on these attachments in terms of India's development and geopolitical status, and as a result, a range of initiatives designed to strengthen the relationship between the Indian state and the diaspora were recommended by the committee in its report submitted in December 2001.

One key area of recommendation was in relation to citizenship. The committee concluded that "the grant of dual citizenship to certain members of the Indian Diaspora *with appropriate safeguards* would facilitate the contribution of the Diaspora to India's social, economic and technological transformation and national development" (High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora 2001: xxxvi, emphasis in original). A mode of citizenship did emerge from this recommendation, although not necessarily in the manner anticipated by many eager members of the diaspora. In 2005 the Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) scheme was introduced.¹⁰ This scheme allowed people with a descent connection to India¹¹ to gain unrestricted rights of entry, residence, and work in India, plus certain restricted investment rights. It did not allow any political rights (such as the right to vote or hold political office), nor the right to hold an Indian passport.¹² In this sense, despite the use of the term "citizen,"

¹⁰ The OCI scheme followed on from the introduction of the Person of Indian Origin (PIO) card scheme in 1999 (and modified in 2002). Both schemes worked on the basis of allowing special rights to people who could claim a descent connection to India.

¹¹ To be eligible for OCI status, an individual should be "a foreign national, who was eligible to become citizen of India on 26.01.1950 or was a citizen of India on or at anytime after 26.01.1950 or belonged to a territory that became part of India after 15.08.1947 and his/her children and grand children" (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, Overseas Citizen of India Brochure, see <http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/oci-brochure.pdf>, last access: 9 June 2010)—interestingly, the idea that one could qualify for this status on the strength of prior status of your parents or grandparents seems proximate to the idea of patriality noted earlier in relation to British citizenship.

¹² It is worth noting that by the initial definition of citizenship offered in the introduction of this volume, drawn from the work of Michael Walzer—that is, membership of a political community—the OCI scheme is already on shaky ground as a form of citizenship.

the OCI scheme falls short of granting citizenship rights, something which has led to a degree of confusion amongst diaspora Indians, and a welter of clarificatory statements on consular websites around the world. As the Delhi US embassy notes, “a person who holds an OCI Card in reality is granted an Indian visa, not Indian citizenship” (<http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/acsdualnation.html>, last access: 27 April 2009). In effect, the OCI scheme is little more than an extension of a measure introduced in 1999 called the Person of Indian Origin (PIO) card scheme which granted similar entitlements to OCI, but for the more limited period of 15 years and with a requirement for registration for stays beyond 180 days.¹³

Deploying the language of citizenship is significant, however, because of the way in which it invokes the idea of flexible citizenship, particularly as this relates to culture and ethnicity. This is represented by the transition from PIO to OCI.¹⁴ In the earlier formalisation of the relationship between India and its diaspora, the emphasis is, in a sense, on the detachedness of diaspora Indians from the land of India. They are persons of Indian origin—that is, they originated from India and so have a connection, but are nevertheless contemporaneously “other.” Time and space conspire to demonstrate their separation. The Overseas Citizen of India is, on the other hand, a kind of extension of the idea of India itself, outwards towards its diaspora. Belonging is not indexed by space and time in the same way; it is indexed primarily by the power of ethnicity, which seems to confirm a close association regardless of geographical distance or even attachment to another state. The symbolic nature of OCI status only enhances this point, as it does not complicate citizenship status for diaspora Indians striving for security in their place of settlement.¹⁵ The OCI scheme in this way invokes citizenship on a different kind of level; the legal connotations of citizenship seem almost to be secondary to the image of citizenship as a symbol of an ethnically imagined community. The symbolic nature of this connection is represented by the appearance of the OCI registration card, which self-consciously echoes the form of an Indian passport, whilst, as the US embassy site indicates, it is “in reality” an Indian visa.¹⁶

¹³ See Achal Mehra’s article on the website “Little India,” entitled “fool’s gold”: “As presently formulated, overseas Indian citizenship is nothing but a glorified PIO Card scheme, which was introduced to a resounding thud a few years earlier. In one important respect, overseas Indian Citizenship offers less than even the PIO Card, which was modeled after the U.S. Green Card. The Indian Embassy explains the distinction, ‘The essential difference between PIO Card and Registration Certificate is that while a PIO Card can also be used as a travel document, the Registration Certificate cannot be so used.’” (<http://www.littleindia.com/december2004/FoolsGold.htm>, last access: 27 April 2009)

¹⁴ It is worth noting here that although both the High Level Committee and the PIO scheme were initiatives taken by the BJP dominated National Democratic Alliance Government, which held power between 1998 and 2004, the OCI scheme was sanctioned by the Congress dominated United Progressive Alliance government which came into power after 2004 (see also Lall, this volume).

¹⁵ But note the problem with UK citizenship as indicated on <http://www.emediawire.com/releases/2005/8/prweb270791.htm> (last access: 7 June 2010).

¹⁶ The PIO card is also marked by a similarity to the Indian passport, although its resemblance is mediated by a markedly different colour (light grey), whereas the OCI card’s dark blue brings it closer to the black of the full passport.

In keeping with this emphasis on ethnicity and identity, the committee envisages overseas citizenship in terms of a profound cultural connection. The report notes that “deep commitment to their cultural identity has manifested itself in every component of the Indian Diaspora. The members of the Diaspora are, together with Indians, equally the inheritors of the traditions of the world’s oldest continuous civilization” (*Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspor, Executive summary*, p. xxvii). Indeed, the report goes on to imply that it is this deep commitment and the “value systems” it engenders which has enabled Indian diaspora communities to be successful and live harmoniously in their multiple diasporic contexts. The maintenance of this connection and the values it enshrines is perceived as a key element in the continued success of the diaspora and in the strengthening of the relationship with the homeland. As an arena in which symbolism and representation reside, then, culture emerges as a fertile ground through which to express the kind of ethnically configured symbolic citizenship that is projected by the OCI scheme.

As part of its projection of the diaspora as a repository of Indian culture, the committee’s report makes reference to the role of religious organisations. In particular, the report identifies organisations like the Chinmaya Mission and the Ramakrishna Mission as carriers of Indian culture in diasporic contexts, and as such they should be “provided assistance” by the Indian government (*Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspor, Executive summary*, p. xxviii). There is no detail as to what form such assistance should take, but clearly there is a role recognised by the government for religious organisations in preserving and transmitting the values which have enabled the success of the Indian diaspora.¹⁷ Although the report does not mention the BAPS Swaminarayan Sanstha explicitly, we have already noted the ways in which the Sanstha reflects citizenship values in London, and other more expansively imagined community contexts. The next section focuses on the ways in which these values are reproduced in the context of the Indian capital, Delhi.

Transnational Sanstha in the Nation: The Delhi Akshardham and the Values of Indian Citizenship

One feature of the “Global Highlights” page of the UK Sanstha’s Annual Review discussed above was a reference to a meal provision project in New Delhi. This project, known as Aap ki Rasoi, was initiated not by BAPS but by the Delhi government. Seeking cooperation from a range of corporate and NGO partners, such as the Taj Hotel group and the Akshaya Patra Foundation, as well as religious organisations such as ISKCON and BAPS, the programme was initiated to provide free midday meals to homeless people in Delhi. BAPS’ involvement in the scheme is coordinated from its massive base in Delhi on the east bank of the Yamuna at Nizamuddin Bridge, the New Delhi Akshardham monument. This enormous complex houses a Shikharbaddha *mandir* like the one in Neasden, as well as a range of

¹⁷ Dickinson and Bailey note that through the OCI scheme the Indian state is “imagining and constructing a diaspora around three poles of membership: professional success, ecumenical Hinduism and multiculturalism” (2007: 765).

exhibitions and other attractions associated with Hinduism and the movement, a management complex and large accommodation block, ornate gardens, and the enormous monument which forms the centrepiece of the site. This site was opened in 2005 amid some controversy, as it is sited in an ecologically sensitive area next to the river.

The Akshardham site is, much like the Neasden *mandir*, a deeply ordered site. Security is tight, but beyond this, the space is marked by its cleanliness and the efficiency with which large numbers of visitors are directed from one to another sector by impeccably dressed volunteers. This sense of order and cleanliness is, it goes without saying, in marked contrast to the general bustle of the busy city beyond the walls of the complex. A sense of heterotopia, similar to that mentioned earlier in relation to the Neasden *mandir*, is evident at the Akshardham. Entering the complex, one is entering a space which is different, although recognisably familiar. This sense of familiar difference provides the context for the articulation of civic values which again is reminiscent of Neasden. At the Delhi site, however, there is a stronger emphasis on the nation in this transmission of values. The exhibits include a boat ride which travels through “10,000 years of India’s heritage;” the Hall of Values in which the “timeless messages of Indian culture” are delivered through an animatronic telling of the life of Bhagwan Swaminarayan; the Garden of India is populated by “exquisite bronze statues of India’s child gems, valorous warriors, national figures and great women personalities” which “inspire visitors with values and national pride.” There is, then, in these extensive exhibits, a very strong sense of the values of Indianness which is delivered in spectacular style by this transnational organisation.

As in Neasden, *seva* is again a key part of this space, and of the narratives associated with the presence of BAPS in the capital and beyond. It appears not only in the exhibits and through the presence of the volunteers, but also on the website where local, national, and global activities are highlighted. Aap ki Rasoi is part of this portfolio. It is particularly significant because it is also part of the local politics of Delhi. Launched in 2008 by the Chief Minister of Delhi, Sheila Dikshit, it is self-consciously a feature of the Congress administration’s political programme in the Capital Territory. As such, the scheme has a profile in the press and it indicates the collaboration of the Sanstha with the local administration. In this sense it may be said to represent a kind of interface to political and civil society through which the Sanstha is able to demonstrate its particular values. In fact, although the scheme provides the opportunity for publicity, the author’s own experience of the Sanstha’s daily operation (during a visit in November 2008) was that it was relatively low profile. The kitchens of the Akshardham, which provide food for the many visitors to the complex through its extensive canteen, provides meals each day at a site in Nizamuddin, close to the Akshardham site, which is primarily occupied by Bengali Muslim migrants living in makeshift shelters. The meals are delivered by *satsangis* from the back of a van to about a hundred people each midday. Perhaps the only real sign of the influence of the Sanstha, apart from the uniforms of the *satsangis*, is the orderly queues, which are controlled regularly by a municipal worker in charge of a nearby public toilet, who made an agreement with the *satsangis* to take on this role in return for food.

Seva, in this example, is carried out effectively and without any flamboyance. Indeed, this lack of flamboyance may be seen as an indicator of the selflessness of the act, which, as indicated earlier, is critical to its legitimation as *seva*. This point was reiterated by the two Swaminarayan Sadhus who accompanied the author on his visit to the scheme. At the same time, the presentation of *seva* activities such as this forms a major element of the Sanstha's self image, its representation of itself on its websites and in its literature. This is understandable, given the charitable nature of these activities and the need to fund them through donations,¹⁸ but it also didactically projects the values of the Sanstha. These values, as noted above, are transnational in scope. In Neasden we noted the way in which these transnational values were imbricated with new notions of British citizenship fashioned in terms of community cohesion through, for example, the simultaneous celebration of St David's Day and Holi. At the Akshardham, they appear to be primarily imbricated with a discourse of Indian nationalism, or perhaps more precisely, Indian civilisation.

Ong notes the development of a "civilisational discourse" in a South East Asian context, where governments have conflated Islamic ideals with notions of regional distinctiveness to fashion a kind of "Asian Renaissance" in response to the West. She quotes the then deputy prime minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim, to demonstrate this point:

The Renaissance of Asia entails the growth, development and flowering of Asian societies based on a certain vision of perfection; societies imbued with truth and the love of learning, justice and compassion, mutual respect and forbearance, and freedom and responsibility. It is the transformation of its cultures and societies from its capitulation to Atlantic powers to the position of self-confidence and its reflowering at the dawn of a new millennium. (Ong 1999: 227)

In an Indian context, this passage is interesting for the resonance that it has with a similar kind of discourse which has developed in India during the colonial and postcolonial period. The idea of Vedic civilisation as deeply sophisticated and spiritual is a feature of nineteenth century reformist approaches to Hinduism, and persists in a range of political, cultural and religious interpretations of India in the contemporary period (see Lipner 1994: 63–73). Indeed, there is more than a hint of this in the High Level Committee's discussion of culture and the diaspora noted above. The exhibits at the Akshardham draw deeply on this civilisational discourse, projecting it not just as a kind of pride in India's past, but as an inspiration for what can be achieved now—as the BJP politician L. K. Advani comments: "Just until now, people who come to India, who are visitors, who are keen to see what are the marvels of India, they invariably go to Agra, to Taj Mahal, to several other places, where they get a glimpse of India's architectural achievements and a glimpse of history as well. But if they come to Akshardham in Delhi, they would see how spiritualism has flowered in India—how India has become a spiritual giant in the

¹⁸The Sanstha's charitable activities are now coordinated by BAPS Charities, which was registered as a charity in the United States in 2000—see www.bapscharities.org

world” (<http://www.akshardham.com/opinions/national.htm>; last access: 9 June 2010). Advani’s comment projects the idea of a vital role for the “spiritualism” of Indian/Vedic civilisation as represented by Akshardham in the modern world. As with Ibrahim’s “Renaissant Asia,” this spiritualism is implicitly offered as an antidote to the materialist rapacity of “Atlantic powers,” providing an indication of the new role which Asian civilisations can play in the development of global culture and global values (the very same kind of values as are extant in the development of a global “discourse of faith”).

Ong goes on to argue that the civilisational discourse deployed in South East Asia operates as a kind of weapon of exclusion and suppression wielded by governments; it “lends spiritual authority to the practices of individual regimes in managing and suppressing profane others, who are excluded by such discourses” (1999: 231). Advani’s pointed reference to the Taj Mahal (above) is a possible indication of the way in which an Indian civilisational discourse could also be deployed in this manner. To a certain extent, this kind of approach is reflected in the Swaminarayan representation of Indian civilisation. It is no surprise, for example, that Islamic India and even to a certain extent low caste India is elided in the Akshardham’s exhibits.¹⁹

The confluence of civilisational, spiritual, and welfare discourses in the Swaminarayan Sanstha provides us with an interesting example of how the Indian state’s aspirations to develop an ethnically-configured flexible citizenship, in the context of transnationalism, may be developing some concrete manifestations. The Sanstha is self-evidently a transnational organisation which, at times, erases borders in the name of a global community, in a way that seems to echo the idea of the global Indian community invoked by the OCI scheme. This transnational organisation is also clearly a carrier of Indian culture in the way envisaged by the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora. Not only does it preserve and promote Indian culture in the diaspora, but it also supports the regeneration of that culture in India itself. In addition, it contributes to the development agenda of the committee and the state through philanthropic activity, channelling diaspora resources towards welfare and educational work in India, including state-led schemes such as Aap ki Rasoi.

Conclusion

In his exploration of postcolonial Indian citizenship, Mitra suggests that at the heart of the developing notion of “the prototype Indian citizen,” a set of “core systemic values” needs to be established as a means of mediating the “supra-political identities” of different communities (2008: 365). We have already seen in this chapter how the moral vision of the Sanstha, building on a global discourse of

¹⁹ It is notable, for example, that the statues of national figures in the Garden of India do not include BR Ambedkar.

religion as community value, is able to work with the community cohesion agenda in the United Kingdom, to popularise the idea of ethnic citizenship being developed in that context. There is a discernible similarity between the idea of community cohesion and that of “core systemic values” in India. The analysis in the second half of this chapter suggests that this transnational organisation is able to deploy its infrastructure and its approaches to society in a way which sits comfortably in both environments. In particular, it produces hybrid concepts of civic virtue/*seva* and narratives of Hindu/Indian civilisation which flow between these sites, constructed in different but connected ways according to context, and persistently framed by a globally resonant discourse of religion. The Sanstha in this sense operates as a resource of order and coherence, making sense of the disorderliness of transnationalism for these two very different nation states in overlapping, interconnected ways. To return to a notion drawn from Ong in the introduction, this situation seems to demonstrate some of the “interdependencies and entanglements between transnational phenomena and the nation states,” through which concepts of citizenship as cultural and conceptual flow travel between contemporary Europe and Asia.

References

- Asad, Talal. 1993. *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Beckerlegge, Gwilym. 2006. *Swami Vivekananda's Legacy of Service: A Study of the Ramakrishna Math and Mission*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Beckford, Robert. 2001. *God of the Rahtid: Redeeming Rage*. London: Darton, Longman & Todd.
- Benhabib, Seyla. 2002. “Political Theory and Political Membership in a Changing World”. In *Political Science: State of the Discipline*, edited by Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Benhabib, Seyla. 2007. “Twilight of Sovereignty or the Emergence of Cosmopolitan Norms? Rethinking Citizenship in Volatile Times”, In *Dual Citizenship in Global Perspective: From Unitary to Multiple Citizenship*, edited by Thomas Faist and Peter Kivisto. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Brekke, Torkel. 2002. *Makers of Modern Indian Religion in the Late Nineteenth Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Carter, Bob. 2000. *Realism and Racism: Concepts of Race in Sociological Research*. London: Routledge.
- Dickinson, Jen and Adrian J. Bailey. 2007. “(Re)membering Diaspora: Uneven Geographies of Indian Dual Citizenship.”, *Political Geography* 26: 757–774.
- Fitzgerald, Timothy. 2000. *The Ideology of Religious Studies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Flood, Gavin D. 1999. *Beyond Phenomenology: Rethinking the Study of Religion*. London: Cassell.
- Furbey, Robert, and Marie Macey. 2005. “Religion and Urban Regeneration: A Place for Faith?” *Policy and Politics* 33 (1): 95–116.
- Hefner, Robert W. 1998. “Multiple Modernities: Christianity, Islam and Hinduism in a Globalizing Age.” *Annual Review of Anthropology* 27: 83–104.
- High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora. 2001. ‘Report’.
- Hirst, Jacqueline S. and John Zavos. 2005. “Riding a Tiger? South Asia and the Problem with ‘Religion’”, *Contemporary South Asia* 14 (1): 3–20.

- Joppke, Christian. 1999. "How Immigration is Changing Citizenship: A Comparative View." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22 (4): 629–52.
- Joppke, Christian. 2007. "Transformation of Citizenship: Status, Rights, Identity." *Citizenship Studies* 11 (1): 37–48.
- Knott, Kim. 2005. *The Location of Religion: A Spatial Analysis*. London: Equinox.
- Kymlicka, Will and Wayne Norman eds. 2000. *Citizenship in Diverse Societies*. Oxford: University Press.
- Kymlicka, Will. 2000. "Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies: Issues, Contexts, Concepts." In *Citizenship in Diverse Societies*, edited by W. Kymlicka and W. Norman. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Levitt, Peggy and Nina Glick-Schiller. 2004. "Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A Transnational Social Field Perspective on Society." *International Migration Review* 38 (3): 1002–1039.
- Lipner, Julius. 1994. *Hindus: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices*. London: Routledge.
- Maduro, Otto. 2004. "'Religion' Under Imperial Duress: Postcolonial Reflections and Proposals." *Review of Religious Research* 45 (3): 221–234.
- McKean, Lise. 1996. *Divine Enterprises: Gurus and the Hindu Nationalist Movement*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McLoughlin, Seán. 2005. "The State, 'New' Muslim Leaderships and Islam as a 'Resource' for Public Engagement in Britain." In *European Muslims and the Secular State*, edited by Jocelyne Cesari and Seán McLoughlin. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Metcalf, Thomas R. 1989. *An Imperial Vision: Indian Architecture and Britain's Raj*. London, Boston: Faber and Faber.
- Metcalf, Thomas R. 1995. *Ideologies of the Raj*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mitra, Subrata K. 2008. "Level Playing Fields: The Post-Colonial State, Democracy, Courts and Citizenship in India." *German Law Journal* 9 (3): 343–366.
- Ong, Aihwa. 1999. *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality*. Durham NC: Duke University Press.
- Parekh, Bhikhu. 1997. *Dilemmas of a Multicultural Theory of Citizenship*. Malden: Blackwell.
- Putnam, Robert. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Putnam, Robert. 2007. "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century - The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30 (2): 137–174.
- Taylor, J. 2002. "After Secularism: Inner City Governance and the New Religious Discourse: A Case Study." PhD Dissertation, London: SOAS..
- Veer, Peter van der. 2002. "Colonial Cosmopolitanism." In *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context and Practice*, edited by Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Veer, Peter van der. 2004. "Transnational Religion; Hindu and Muslim Movements." *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies* 7: 4–18.
- Vertovec, Steven. 2000. *Hindu Diaspora: Comparative Patterns*. London: Routledge.
- Warrier, Maya. 2005. *Hindu Selves in a Modern World: Guru Faith in the Mata Amritanandamayi Mission*. London: Routledge.
- Williams, Raymond B. 1998. "Training Religious Specialists for a Transnational Hinduism: A Swaminarayan Sadhu Training Center." *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 66 (4): 841–862.
- Zavos, John. 2008. "Bin Laden is One of Us! Representations of Religious Identity at the Parliament of the World's Religions." *Culture and Religion* 9 (1): 45–61.
- Zavos, John. 2009. "Negotiating Multiculturalism: The Organisation of Hindu Identity in Contemporary Britain." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 35 (6): 881–900.

Chapter 10

Globalisation, Economic Citizenship, and India's Inclusive Developmentalism

Barbara Harriss-White, Aseem Prakash, and Deepak Mishra

Abstract Harriss-White, Mishra, and Prakash argue that citizenship is a *universal concept* that might have a tenuous bearing on reality. There is no consensus about the concept of economic citizenship, which, they suggest is currently being exported from the European heartland to developing countries in private aid-driven projects of social entrepreneurship. It is replete with tensions. Unlike the concept of political citizenship, economic citizenship is not a concept of formal equality. Harriss-White et al. analyze the role of the state, markets and civil society in furthering the project with a range of proxy labels which de facto advances economic citizenship. Through a case study of Arunachal they show the role of a non-state, non-market institution—ethnicity—in structuring and differentiating economic citizenship.

The notion of citizenship is one of a set of ideas emanating from the enlightenment, which were introduced to India in order to legitimise colonial domination. The concept of citizenship was subsumed under the imperial regime of extractive capitalism until late in the colonial period, but other enlightenment ideas, particularly that of the nation, supplied the intellectual basis for India's political and economic emancipation. Through the nationalist movement, then, the relationship between the individual and the state was nurtured. In exploring its post-independence and contemporary domestic and global evolution and the practices of economic citizenship, we have an analytical lens through which to examine selective exclusion from India's state developmentalism—for there is nothing more

B. Harriss-White (✉)

Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom

e-mail: barbara.harriss-white@qeh.ox.ac.uk

A. Prakash

Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Human Development, New Delhi, India

D. Mishra

Social Sciences, Centre for the Study of Regional Development, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India

basic either to development or to the state than citizenship. In the first part of this chapter we discuss the concepts of citizenship and economic citizenship before turning in the second part to their practice.

Part One: Concepts

Citizenship

The journey of the ideas and practice of economic citizenship follows that of citizenship pure and simple. In the classic formulation of the great sociologist T.H. Marshall (Marshall and Bottomore 1950)¹ one state form is central to citizenship. It is a liberal and democratic state that can guarantee the three kinds of rights he saw permitting universal participation in social life—which is how Marshall saw citizenship. These are civil rights (covering all individuals irrespective of their social status); political rights and duties (formally encoded in written form and extending over a sovereign territory); and social rights (the basics of “human development,” the freedom from the Great Wants, and access to the means of social protection and assistance).² If these rights are incomplete those excluded will not exercise full citizenship, a process conceived by Marshall as long and conflictual. Marshall argued that the acquisition, possession, and defence of these rights are inextricably related to social class.

Even if these rights were to be universally guaranteed however, it does not follow that the mutual obligation of citizens to participate in political and economic life is guaranteed. Marshall’s argument is open to the rejoinder that since “the state” cannot require even full citizens to work, other mechanisms, notably “the market,” are needed to incentivise and discipline this behaviour.³ The market however, while rewarding work, cannot guarantee employment. Nor can it maintain equal or just distributive outcomes. It does not confer status irrespective of a citizen’s position in the economy. Over and above spectacular crises and market failures, the market may—and does routinely—generate oppressive wage work, the miniaturisation

¹ Early versions of parts of this paper have been presented at the South Asia Institute, Heidelberg, 2008, the FICCI-Said Business School Conference on Globalisation and Developing Economies: Concerns of Social Inclusion, Oxford University, 2008; the inauguration of the “India in the World Centre,” Liverpool University, 2008; and the Cambridge University Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities (CRASSH) international workshop “Experiencing the State,” 2009. To everyone who has engaged with it, especially to Binda Sahni, Subrata Mitra, Prasanna Nayak, James Manor, Marcus Pohlmann and Marie Lall, we are very grateful. Marshall, and Bottomore 1950. See Schoettli in this volume for the parallel evolution of similar ideas by Nehru.

² For Beveridge, these were hunger, sickness, ignorance, squalor (lack of shelter and sanitation), and unemployment.

³ See the discussion in Kymlicka and Norman (1994).

(rather than polarisation) of production and trade, labour displacement, and the production of a class of under- and unemployed people. Some scholars see economic activity of this “adversely incorporated” kind as being residual and the informal economy which it creates as being of importance only to this excluded underclass, even conceived as a reserve army eking out subsistence under duress and distress. Partha Chatterjee has controversially coined the term political society for the excluded mass.⁴ But in India the informal economy has been estimated at 60 % of GDP, 93 % of livelihoods and is rising.⁵ It is the mass. The majority of this mass is self-employed. While all the poor work in the informal economy, not all members of the informal economy are poor. All, however, have incomplete rights and responsibilities. The point for theory is that while citizenship involves the exercise of both responsibilities as well as rights, in this liberal framework, rights—and thus the state—must logically and historically precede responsibilities. The state alone can set the parameters for economic participation, including taking responsibility for the limits of its own control and for the conditions under which political citizens are economically active.

Marshall's argument is also open to the second comment that the citizen, in exercising rights and responsibilities, is thought of as an independent individual. But the reproduction of society requires socially constructed relations of dependence (generally within a family) at various stages of the bio-social life cycle. Those who are rendered dependent (such as elderly people, children, and, in most societies, women) and are able to participate in society only through economic relationships mediated by others, also have rights as citizens. For them too, rights must logically and historically precede responsibilities.⁶ But the responsibilities of states are often mediated through other social relations, often male biased ones.

From both of these qualifications, it then follows that rights and responsibilities may not only be construed formally (and in general and abstract terms) but are also instituted in specific social and political forms. It is also expressed through many kinds of social and cultural power and domination such that citizens may be marginalised not only through economic exclusion and expulsion but also through cultural identity. In masking the specifics of identity, universalist conceptions of citizenship privilege a notion and a condition of citizenship which may not exist in reality.

Economic Citizenship

The concept of economic citizenship has aspired to this universalism, embodying the rights to work (to be employed) and have the means to consume, to invest and be

⁴ Chatterjee (2008). See *Economic and Political Weekly* 18 November 2008 for several critical rejoinders.

⁵ For the former view see Altwater (1993), for the latter statistics see Harriss-White (2003).

⁶ The focus of citizenship remains male biased.

entrepreneurial, and the obligation to be taxed.⁷ However, while the liberal concept of political citizenship guarantees a formal equality to all, economic citizenship is not a concept of equality, and an economy can and frequently does function without democratic politics. So there are tensions behind this deceptively simple definition. Here we consider three.

First, economic participation as an employee—the “capacity to work hard”⁸—is on unequal terms with that of an employer of labour, for to work hard for a wage is to be exploited. The International Labour Office has developed the concepts and content of work into a normative project of individual and group rights which provide a floor to exploitation. This is the project of Decent Work. Not only does Decent Work require a right to work, there should also be rights at work (labour standards and safety), rights to organise (the collective right to engage as workers in “social dialogue”) and the individual right to social security. The concept of Decent Work is “one of reasonableness and sufficiency.” The ILO’s international activist project requires the “definition of new categories of individual and collective rights” but even “this increasing standardisation. . . is still a long way off from being backed up by national processes for legal classification and actual implementation.” Serious obstacles further prevent “concepts such as decent work becom(ing) operative.” They prevent “legal elements which force employers in all countries to provide certain minimum work conditions” from being implemented and “governments (from being) determined to create public policies for social development” (Rodgers 2007). Nevertheless, ILO member countries such as India are engaged with the normative project of advancing and evaluating Decent Work.⁹

Second, the means to consume requires the rights to social support and welfare in times of need and of lack of work. These are Marshall’s “social rights” but they affect the quality and supply of labour to the economy. For full economic citizenship individuals must have the right to be economically dependent provided they fulfil certain socially determined conditions (see Pfetsch in this volume for Europe). Among citizens these generally pertain to an incapacity to work due to age (young or old), physiological status, physical and mental disability, health status, and the absence of work opportunities. The parameters of incapacity are not universal but are social constructs. Effective rights are also socially constructed—and change over time—in order to ration eligibility to economic dependence according to the state’s resources. As Binda Sahni (2009) and Niraja Gopal Jayal (2007) have both recently shown in the context of migration, the Indian state can and does produce a class of noncitizen within the territory—politically as well as economically rightless people who are prevented from being eligible for welfare. The process is far from being confined to the Indian state but is widespread—even if it involves a small proportion of a given society’s population.¹⁰

⁷ White (2002).

⁸ Kymlicka and Norman (1994).

⁹ Ghose (2008).

¹⁰ Sahni (2009), Jayal (forthcoming). See Spiess here. See also Harriss-White (2005) on the joint production and criminalisation of destitution by both state and society.

Third, goaded in the West by the emphasis on political citizenship as a process of active exercise of rights,¹¹ the concept of economic citizenship has developed and solidified into an agenda for entrepreneurship, wealth creation, and adaptability to economic and technological change. The active economic citizen should be self supporting¹². Pfetsch shows here (see Pfetsch in this volume) that one of the rights of a European citizen is the right to do business. From the United States and Europe the concept is actively flowing "south" in the outreach initiatives of corporate social responsibility and social entrepreneurship. For instance, the Full Economic Citizen (FEC) initiative, based in the United States, is promoting "a new way of thinking about housing, healthcare and small producers, one that seeks to enable business-social alliances or Hybrid Value Chains to develop products, distribution channels and financing solutions to better serve these undeserved (sic) markets" where "over two billion citizens. . . do not have access to any type of financial services, (and) one billion still live in inadequate housing" (Ashoka). FEC is a private international aid project linking economic citizenship with human development and basic needs.

In the United Kingdom, economic citizenship is a concept of economic literacy of a particular kind. In the school curriculum and syllabus for ages 14–16, when young people are formally socialised for work, economic citizenship requires knowledge of private pensions and money management, competition and prices, the creation of a business plan, the concept of the unique selling point, advertising and marketing, ethics (tensions between competition, labour standards, consumer rights, and the environment), globalisation, outsourcing and labour costs, credit-worthiness and loans, rights (to be explored if the pupil can find work experience), concepts of growth and recession, and taxation and expenditure by the state (Institute for Citizenship 2002). The normative context is the capitalist economy. Here, the Asian "other" appears as a threat to competitive advantage. "Fair trade" is stated in the introduction to be a "key concept" that is "missed out" in the syllabus. So is the work of family makers. Scant attention is paid to the organisation of wage workers and yet the active economic citizen will rarely be an employer and most commonly is a wage worker.

These concepts and practices flowing from OECD heartlands clearly involve "full" participation in a market economy. While planned, command, or socialist economies might provide decent work, social sector provisioning, and basic needs, they do not fulfil the requirements of active individual entrepreneurship in liberal democratic states. Nor can non-market economic arrangements in societies based on reciprocity and subsistence provide access to "financial instruments to leverage asset creation" (Ashoka). But the market economy does not exist in the abstract. The mode of organisation, production, and distribution of surplus is capitalist. Let us remind ourselves of its logic and dynamic.

A capitalist market economy rests on a relation with natural resources that are not free goods but awaiting being given value through technology and human labour. The

¹¹ See Mitra, Manor, Spiess and Pfetsch in this volume.

¹² Kymlicka and Norman (1994).

state supplies the preconditions for this to take place, among which are noncommodifiable provisions such as infrastructure and the means of communications. Capital requires a state to guarantee property rights, and to secure the key institutions through which resources are extracted¹³ and mobilised (but not—under capitalism—restituted). It requires the production of labour, the health and capabilities of which are created outside the circuits of capitalism, generally through the state and the family. The state has to ensure that labour is freed to be employed and to struggle for its own interests, that commodities are produced for profit and profit is reinvested; that money expands using interest and that technology is developed and capitalised. The opposition to this process has to be confronted, destroyed, or bought off, and victims annihilated or compensated.¹⁴ A matrix of state and non-state institutions forms a structure to stabilise the process of accumulation.¹⁵ Not only do these institutional preconditions have to be created, they also have to be maintained by the state against threats to them.

Like economic citizenship, capitalist accumulation is also bound in contradictions: relations that are essential to its functioning but opposed to each other. The most politicised contradiction is that between capital and labour, but there are others: between capital and labour, and nature; between production and consumption, and reproductive/free time.¹⁶ As a result, since the establishment of political, civil, and cultural citizenship is also a historical and contested process through which obligations and rights develop, economic citizenship is a contested process.¹⁷ Institutions have to be fought for by those with material interests in equality in order to be brought into existence, and once in existence they have to be actively defended in order to be maintained in the public interest. Economic citizens are never fully and equally guaranteed by the liberal democratic state. Inevitably, sectors of society are disenfranchised and unable to exercise political and social rights in general and to participate on equal terms in markets in particular.

An alternative normative project of economic citizenship would establish deliberate political and social arrangements which guarantee the primacy of the economic rights discussed above, ensure fairness and equality in outcomes, sustainable metabolic balances, and the willingness of citizens to exercise “restraint in economic demands” and “delays to self gratification.”¹⁸ It would accept, but also check, cultural differences which, if unchecked, will exclude or incorporate people

¹³ There has been a resurgence of recent interest in the process of land seizure: contemporary manifestations of the process of “primitive accumulation” that has actually been ongoing in India since the nineteenth century (see Chatterjee 2008; Khan 2004).

¹⁴ Khan (2004).

¹⁵ McDonough (2007), Harriss-White (2003).

¹⁶ See James O’Connor (1998), Panayotakis (2007).

¹⁷ It requires the creation of mechanisms to ensure obligation, to claim rights, to claim redress for non-provision, to adjudicate claims and enforce the results of that adjudication (see Alston 1994, for the context of the right to food).

¹⁸ Kymlicka and Norman (1994), p. 394.

in an adverse manner. A normative project would protect citizens from exclusion from the economy on that account.

But in a market economy, in a capitalist economy, such a project can only be triggered and advanced by increments through the concerted agency of the state and of political citizens working through civil society.¹⁹ The outline of such a project is out of the scope of this chapter but is attempted elsewhere.²⁰ In what follows, we turn explicitly to India's performance in building economic citizenship.²¹ Rather than analyse the lively marketplace of discourse that is relevant to economic citizenship but does not use the concept, we evaluate recent material progress towards economic citizenship under the prevailing capitalist order. First we examine the roles and relationships of state, market, and civil society in constructing and contesting economic citizenship an All India level. We then turn to one particular state as a case study. This then enables us to look outwards to analyse the conceptual categories and material progress of Indian economic citizenship under globalisation.

Part Two: Practice

The Indian Context One: The Role of the State in Economic Citizenship

The liberal democratic Indian state has responded to the dual process of rapid capitalist transformation on the one hand and democratic assertion through electoral politics on the other with institutions that arguably regulate the economy more fruitfully than those which regulate democratic politics. It has also created a social structure for accumulation—a structure of rents—more successfully than it has developed a framework for Decent Work conditions for labour or a structure of redistributive transfers.²² Since the achievement of significant grain surpluses in the mid 1970s, the secular and expert apparatus of development planning has addressed unequal economic citizenship through a plethora of programmes and projects labelled in every conceivable way (by income, agroecological region, farm size, gender, life cycle, caste/ethnicity, skill level, nutritional status, etc.). But throughout this process, while the discourse of planning has adhered to a universal norm of citizenship, the practices of inclusion have been under funded, reinterpreted by local state bureaucracies, captured by the formally non-eligible, and “transformed

¹⁹ See Manor in this volume.

²⁰ Prakash and Harriss-White (2009).

²¹ See Schoettli in this volume.

²² Let alone fair and equal outcomes. See Harriss-White (2003, 2007), Prakash and Harriss-White 2009.

beyond recognition” in implementation (Harris-White 2008)²³ such that, although practical outcomes vary according to the local balance of social and political forces, they tend to *reinforce* unequal economic citizenship.

Tax cultures of noncompliance, capital flight and money laundering,²⁴ relations of rent seeking, corruption, buy off, the commodification of policy making and the development of a complex architecture of rent protection and conflicts of interest within the state have weakened its legitimacy and the disciplinary/enforcement capacity in a way that privileges capital over labour. Until very recently they have also starved the state of resources²⁵ and qualify its competence—even the necessary competence to regulate capital. As a result, the state is embedded in the same cultures of identity and class relations that are manifested in society and the economy. Instead of the rationalities of state bureaucracy and planning harnessed to the logic of the market, which jointly work to dissolve archaic social relations,²⁶ these forms of authority are reworked to serve the function of economic regulation. They also pervade the practices of the state. They trespass across the boundary between the state and society. As a result, the state is not able to exercise autonomy in the project of economic citizenship.²⁷ Indeed, a parallel “shadow” state develops with its own political arrangements which must also include shadow economic citizenship. The political citizen’s access to mechanisms for the redress of infringements of rights or to enforce the ensuing judgements is also compromised—for some, systematically and severely.

Within the last 5 years, faced with controversy over the extent that brute poverty has been reduced, but with hard evidence of widening inequality and severe and persistent multidimensional poverty among Scheduled Castes and Tribes,²⁸ a set of watchdog commissions have been established. Certain new legal entitlements have been granted through the political projects of a “Common Minimum Programme” and later “Inclusive Development.” The most notable declared responsibilities are for minorities, backward classes, women, scheduled castes and tribes, for enterprises in the unorganised sector and the problem of agricultural debt; and the most notable achievements have been the right to information, the right to education bill, the rural health mission, the proposed Food Security Act and the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). The NREGA can be taken as

²³ Kaviraj (1985), Harriss-White (2008), Fernandez (2008).

²⁴ Not only is over 40 % of the Indian economy black, but also at least 5 % disappears each year in capital flight mainly through the over invoicing of exports and under invoicing of imports at a huge opportunity cost (Kumar 1999; Srinivasan 2007).

²⁵ Roy (1996), used what remains the latest available data to reveal that the leakages from the state due to corruption are one twentieth those due to tax evasion. Tax revenues are at the time of writing (2010) growing more slowly than GDP. While the tax base is increasing, excise duty and corporation tax have fallen short of the 2009–2010 budget target (Mukherjee 2010).

²⁶ As confidently predicted by social theorists such as Weber, Myrdal, and the founding fathers of modern Indian sociology (for example Madan and Srinivas) see Harriss-White 2003.

²⁷ Khan (2004), Prakash (2010), Sud (2007), Banik (2007).

²⁸ See the summary of evidence in Sengupta et al. (2008).

paradigmatic but the entire inclusive development project needs putting into the context of much greater state resources and activism in the privatisation of public services, the creation of autonomous jurisdictions in special export zones (SEZs), the easing of foreign investment, the creation of competition policy, the reregulation of electricity, telecoms, equity and insurance, investment finance and credit (Appendix).

After years of political campaigning, the REGA of 2005–2006 guarantees 100 days of work per year and is the first step towards the ILO's right to work and the Indian constitution's directive principle of the right to an adequate means of livelihood.²⁹ Implemented in all districts from 2008 for self-selected participants, it is a notable step towards economic citizenship. In the absence of a national evaluation, Reddy and Upendranath have synthesised the large literature about the NREG scheme (Reddy and Upendranath 2009). The economic citizenship effects with which this chapter is concerned involve employment, poverty reduction, and the programme's effect on political citizenship. Through water conservation, roadwork and repairs, and afforestation, significant improvements in the employment and self-respect of agricultural labour, women, scheduled castes and tribes have been reported. In some regions a collective work ethos is (re)emerging.³⁰ However, regions where citizens with these attributes are most concentrated have performed least well.

NREG income has indeed been spent on food, healthcare costs, and the repayment of debt. It has empowered some workers to avoid hazardous alternative work. However, only 7 % of households got their entitlement of 100 days' employment.³¹ Other attributes include the flouting of minimum wages, abuse by unauthorised private labour contractors, and caste discrimination. The scheme has been implemented through local government institutions of political participation and empowerment; but they have been notably short staffed, unable to prevent delays in wage payments or to provide decent sanitation and childcare. Other reported problems include lack of a redress mechanism for complaints, lack of coordination with other state development schemes, idiosyncratic interpretations of the rules and an absence of monitoring and evaluation. To date, noteworthy impacts on political participation are few. Wide variations in performance conceal well-implemented schemes in Rajasthan, due to the gingering of NGOs, and in Arunachal Pradesh and Kerala, due to the active involvement of womens' collective Self Help Groups. So, just as Marshall theorised, the process of economic empowerment of citizens continues to be a protracted and uneven process, fraught with disputes.

²⁹ Article 39 and 41 of the Indian Constitution.

³⁰ SCs are 16 % of the Indian population and supply 29 % of all days of work in 2009; STs are 8 % and perform 25 % of work-days; women are 32 % of the labour force but make up 48 % of the workforce on the NREG programme (Reddy and Upendranath 2009: 7–10).

³¹ The average is 48/100 days (Reddy and Upendranath 2009).

The Indian Context Two: The Role of Markets in Economic Citizenship

As an allocative mechanism the market is not neutral between individuals who are unequally endowed. The market responds to the signals of relative prices and effective demand—which are a direct manifestation of social class and its income distribution—not to rights. It responds to the logic of profit and shareholder value, not to equity or inclusive justice. Indian markets are capitalist markets, transferring the price signals for production, reallocating resources between sectors of the economy and—even in restrictively defined markets in which goods are bought, sold, and brokered, insofar as they incorporate transport, storage, and processing—are theatres of exploitation in their own right. They produce commodities by means of commodities. They must expand in two ways: first, through competition, the oppression of labour, and technological change, which reduces the costs of production; and second, through commodification (involving new commodities and commodified services, the commodification of the public sphere, public space, the domestic sphere, the commons including carbon dioxide and human genes).

Capitalist markets develop through the concentration of capital (through economies of scale and economies of risk-minimising portfolio development) as well as through the centralisation of capital alongside the decentralisation of production (through subcontracting and outsourcing in order to minimise costs with or without technical change, to shed risks and avoid regulation by the state). They require a distribution of qualities of “human development” for the social reproduction of labour, in turn either for direct employment or for indirect control through self-employment. And this takes place through an array of institutions and practices of authority and domination that operate outside as well as inside the cycles of production in the economy. These institutions do not operate according to the logic of capital, but are indispensable to it.³²

It follows from this that the economy—the “market”—is often regulated by social custom more than by state law. As we saw with the NREG scheme above, custom often informs the practice of state law. Both capital and labour are segmented not only in the process of formation of social classes but also through structures and institutions of identity—notably gender, caste, ethnicity, religion, locality, language, and age.³³ Women are found to enter the paid work force disproportionately as casual agricultural labour.³⁴ Persistent discrimination is practised not only against women but also against Dalits, Scheduled Tribes, and many Minorities.³⁵ Productivity is increased in low-equilibrium production conditions through the lengthening of the working day and downward pressure on wages with

³² Harriss-White (2003), Wolf (2007).

³³ Gooptu and Harriss-White (2001).

³⁴ Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu (1999).

³⁵ Kapadia (2010), Heyer (2010), Lerche (2007), Shariff (2006), Thorat 1998.

wage reductions.³⁶ The regulative institutions of the state are prey to capture by fractions of capital, and regulative authority is privatised.³⁷ Economic citizenship is class structured and incomplete in ways that are complex and historically specific.

The Indian Context Three: The Role of Civil Society in Sustaining and Challenging Violations of Economic Citizenship

Three kinds of role may be distinguished. All are formal and informal, open and hidden.

First, with respect to the formal role of civil society, despite a massive wave of assertion by Dalits and other oppressed people through the means of party politics, the achievement of an increased space for political pluralism (the expression of a diversity of interests) has not yet been translated into an economic project of inclusion or social plurality. The regional parties, given an electoral mandate to question the regional and social marginalisation that resulted from rule by the formerly dominant political parties, have succeeded much better politically than they have in relation to the economy.

Second, new social movements have demanded the inclusion of social groups excluded from both state-led as well as marketbased development. They lay claim to economic citizenship with the guarantee of the livelihood resources currently at their command and threatened by development-induced displacement (e.g. Narmada Bachao Aandolan, many movements against SEZs, etc.³⁸) On the other hand, powerful political agitations (for instance, Gujjars, who are incorporated into the market-based accumulation process in Rajasthan, Haryana, and UP in 2008³⁹), now demand new guarantees through Reservation under the category of Scheduled Tribe in order to gain access to state-supported livelihood opportunities and development resources.

Third, the informal role of civil society has involved the strengthening of religion and caste in what Satish Saberwal called the "cellular" organisation of civil society. This has accentuated relations both of passive exclusion and active expulsion. Meanwhile, structural violence⁴⁰ constitutes a threat to economic noncitizens (or partial citizens), who have been excluded or expelled from party politics, as well as from the politics of social movements and NGOs.⁴¹

³⁶ Cadene and Holmstrom (1999), Roman (2008), Ruthven (2008).

³⁷ Basile (2009), Chibber (2003).

³⁸ See for one example <http://lalgarh.wordpress.com/2009/12/13/all-india-convention-against-sez-land-grabbing-displacement/> (last access: 20 May 2010).

³⁹ Rajalakshmi (2008).

⁴⁰ Zizek (2008).

⁴¹ Sarkar (2009), Sahni (2009).

The Case of Political and Economic Citizenship in Arunachal

Since the colonial period, India's frontier hills have been regarded as the "master oppositional binary" to the plains.⁴² But the state of Arunachal, formed as late as 1986, may better be seen as an exceptional lens through which its unusual powers to define and protect citizenship point to the very different processes of which Adivasis are subject elsewhere—particularly in central India. Arunachal is unusual both in being militarised (on the frontier between China, Burma, and Bhutan), in being still widely regarded as "a territorial exterior of the theatre of capital," as belonging outside the era of the law⁴³ in its differentiated and asymmetrical formal structures of political, social, and economic citizenship.

The Arunachali state formally and informally enforces a differentiated citizenship, while elsewhere in India a weak state wrecks formal efforts to protect Adivasis. While religion, caste, gender, language, and trade associations regulate the informal economy throughout India, it is ethnic identity that plays a paramount role in economic citizenship in Arunachal. Ethnicity is our lens. Arunachal, however, is not a territorial exterior for the theatre of capital. The new state is undergoing very rapid economic transformation in which, while it is relatively cut off from global communications, it is integrated by effective demand into markets for consumer goods produced in India, China, and South East Asia.⁴⁴

The formal structures of citizenship derive from three kinds of political process which may be found—though not together—in other parts of India. First, protective positive discrimination for indigenous people (Arunachal Pradesh Scheduled Tribes, of which there are over a hundred in a population of over a million). This is enforced by the state. Second, the structure of economic and political rights, which is highly differentiated and unequal, is enforced in the "de facto ethnic homelands" simultaneously through plural spheres of state law and customary procedure, as discussed below. Districts are geographically huge but small entities in terms of population with a correspondingly miniaturised local politics. Third, de facto (informal) discrimination is practised against non-local Indian citizens who have lived in the territory of Arunachal since long before it was a state.

Four conditions of discrimination have been researched: first, the cases of tribal people of the Chakma and Hajong⁴⁵; second, the cases of migrant labour—often Adivasi—from other Indian states; third, non-local, non-Indian working people (Bangladeshis and Nepalis) and fourth, weaker local APST citizens.⁴⁶ This discrimination is enforced outside legal / customary institutions through power politics. As Baruah has recently concluded, this structure of discrimination has led to a "permanent crisis of citizenship. . . a major structural dilemma for the post-colonial

⁴² Baruah (2008).

⁴³ Kar (2008) in Baruah (2008).

⁴⁴ Govt of Arunachal Pradesh (2005), Salam 2007.

⁴⁵ Sahni (2009).

⁴⁶ Harriss-White et al. (2009).

practice of citizenship. The idiom . . . penalises those that the commodity economy dynamises. Those who are mobile are either penalised as being defined as outsiders, or mobility is discouraged because privileges that go with ST status are made specific to habitats to which particular groups are fixed."⁴⁷

Non-Arunachali Indian citizens have highly restricted rights to land and to property; to work (whether self-employed, in a one-generation family business or in wage work), access to which is discretionary depends not only on having an Inner Line Permit from the Government of India⁴⁸ but also on the decision of the local District Commissioner. Non-Arunachali citizens of India also cannot own trade or business establishments, nor can they do business with the government of Arunachal. Outsiders and their descendents remain foreigners. Even when a male outsider marries an APST their children are not full citizens of Arunachal Pradesh. Outsiders, including such children, have highly restricted rights to all posts in the state bureaucracy, except for the highest class of office (Class I) where there is 80 % reservation for local people. They have correspondingly restricted rights to living quarters, promotions and other benefits. Outsiders from elsewhere in India have restrictions on scholarships for education, on their rights to social security, and to pensions. By virtue of the prevailing land relations, development finance is inaccessible as well.

Despite these political categories being "leaky vessels",⁴⁹ class formation, income, and wealth are structured by these restrictions. Local processes of social differentiation have created outright proletarianisation and the very small agrarian capitalist class is dominated by rentier production relations, but there is a wage labour force working in both agriculture and the non-agrarian economy which has migrated from other states of India, from Nepal and Bangladesh, employed and socially quarantined under poor and oppressive conditions. Migrant wage labour has no economic (or social or political) rights. They are economic noncitizens. The non-farm economy—mainly comprising the sphere of distribution and trade—is controlled by capitalists from outside the state, mostly North West India. Constrained by being excluded from ownership of physical resources, profits of non-Arunachalis are repatriated, long-term investment disincentivised, and, where possible, wages are remitted out. An APST elite lives from rents in a fourfold sense—renting out land, property, licences, and seeking rents in a state apparatus which is resourced entirely through fiscal transfers from New Delhi.⁵⁰

What is more subtle is the differentiated economic citizenship of Arunachal's indigenous people themselves. The local state vests rights in tribal collectives so that differentiation within the collective is formally masked, victims of gender exclusion cannot gain redress within the collective, and a tribal citizen of Arunachal

⁴⁷ Baruah (2008):16.

⁴⁸ The Inner Line is as much a colonial artefact as the classification of hills and plains tribes. It was originally established in 1873 and has since been challenged.

⁴⁹ Jim Scott 2000 (in Baruah 2008: 17).

⁵⁰ Harriss-White et al. (2009).

Pradesh is less than equal outside the region of his native tribal group.⁵¹ The political and economic bargaining power of small / minor / (ex)slave tribes is weak and unequal. Since public policy is based by definition on group membership, the principle of individual citizenship and of democratic accountability to the individual is overridden. And religious or chiefly authority may override collective equity. The rights of the income poor are not represented in informal politics. There is no sign of the mobilisation of the poor. In competitively politicised ethnicity, the long-term interests of disadvantaged people are locked into relations of patronage and clientelage through which resources are rationed. Meanwhile, long-term Adivasi residents may only shape claims to APST status through humiliating idioms of bio-cultural primitiveness.⁵²

In Arunachal Pradesh, to explain the process of economic citizenship in Marshallian class terms alone would be to miss the main social relations through which economic citizenship is construed—those of ethnicity.

Neo-Liberal Globalisation

Under the current neo-liberal form taken by globalisation, national citizenship is losing ground to a new model rooted in an increasingly deterritorialised notion of rights. The system of global governance in which rights are being operationalised is emerging in an incomplete and highly selective way. Meanwhile, it is not simply WTO trade rules but also flows of money and commodities across political borders which impede the capacity of individual nation states to develop enforceable policies for the pursuit of nationally specific economic objectives. They also affect the capacity of states to raise resources to pursue redistributive social goals.⁵³ The politics of markets shifts from direct state participation in the economy to new forms of “parametric” regulation. Global telecommunications combine with separable and interdependent production processes controlled by information technology in global value chains. The media, operating in synergy with diasporic communication and remittances—whether from the international workforce (as in the Middle East in India’s case), or from the professional elites (as in the US and UK cases)—all create transnational allegiances, cultural hybrids, and changed consumption patterns. These break down the capacity of states to claim an overriding form of authority. As a result, the identification of elites with the parent nation (either as “parent” or “nation”) weakens. And while a moral attachment may endure,⁵⁴ the moral authority of both the state and the nation dissipates. These transnational developments add novel elements to the concept of citizenship.

Cultural citizenship will be cosmopolitanised by the norms of the country/ies of residence (whether expulsive or inclusive) as well as those of the country of

⁵¹ See Harriss-White et al. 2009 for evidence of the state’s denial of private property.

⁵² Sahni (2009).

⁵³ Harriss-White (2002).

⁵⁴ What Benedict Anderson has called the “imagined community.”

origin—including those of Minorities, Dalits, and others whose citizenship rights in the country of origin are incomplete.⁵⁵ Global citizenship is also being expanded to include the new concept of ecological citizenship and the rights and responsibilities of “citizens” of a finite planet governed by laws of nature, as well as those of politics.⁵⁶

Running through claims to citizenship in Western societies are two common themes. First, the citizens' claims are not on the state, so much as on civil society. Second, that even when the state is the repository of obligation, the claim is made to parastatal agencies or supranational institutions of governance, so that enforcement capacity is mediated through more than one set of institutions.⁵⁷ This is a socially specific, time bound, and politically constructed redrawing of the concepts of citizenship which has been theoretically defined as multiculturalism.⁵⁸ It is prone to contestation in paradoxical ways from economic nationalists who object to the political and cultural consequences of productivity-enhancing migrant labour and capital, and blame the vectors of multiculturalism for economic stresses which immigrants rarely actually do anything but relieve.

Global Citizenship in India One: The Political Economy

India has witnessed sustained and differentiated economic growth, actively supported by the state. The benefits have been concentrated in the 45 million in the top 4 % of the income distribution, gaining in excess of USD 10 per day. By contrast, 70 % of the labour force brings home under INR 20 per day—less than half a dollar.⁵⁹

With respect to economic citizenship, India appears to be following a trajectory that differs from that of the West in several respects. First, it is a member of international organisations regulating trade and commerce; it is the acknowledged leader of the developing world at the WTO, and it articulates the aspirations of developing countries in international negotiations on environment and energy. Second, Indian foreign direct investment has been characterised by a proliferation of mergers and acquisitions of elite businesses in Europe, Latin America, the United States, and Africa. Third, India supplies a crucial workforce to the Middle East.⁶⁰ Fourth, India is economically powerful and politically influential through its highly skilled migrants in top OECD countries (the United States, Canada, Australia, and

⁵⁵ Held (1995).

⁵⁶ van Steenberg (1996).

⁵⁷ E.g. the European Union or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

⁵⁸ Parekh (1997).

⁵⁹ Sengupta et al. (2008), NCEUS (2008).

⁶⁰ Seventy percent NRIs in the Gulf region are semi- or unskilled labour—men in construction and women in domestic service, neither of which sectors have any political clout.

the United Kingdom)⁶¹ as well as newly industrialising countries (Malaysia, Singapore, United Arab Emirates, etc.).⁶²

But this blurring of international boundaries has not resulted in a dilution of social / cultural citizenship in India. The globalisation of Indian capital has not affected national capital, if only because of the huge size of the domestic market. Most FDI in India itself has an Indian partner or is controlled by NRIs themselves, enabling the joint venture better to negotiate with the Indian state, and the Indian state to better protect Indian capital in cases of adverse treatment by, or unacceptable competition from, international capital.⁶³ These factors have contributed to what we think are more general patterns:

- (a) The economic forces unleashed by globalisation have generated parallel and contradictory processes. A very small proportion of Indian citizens are transnational let alone postnational. Their political strength results from their ability to use the Indian state to support their place in the market.⁶⁴ While being postnational in the international arena they do not see reasons to challenge the practices of economic citizenship outlined earlier in this essay.
- (b) As elsewhere in the world so in India, the social authority of the nation over postnational citizens has been considerably weakened. Despite this,⁶⁵ the Indian diaspora, or workers of Indian origin, appeal to the political power of the Indian state to counter their experience of economic marginalisation (as in the case of Malaysia), poor labour conditions (the Gulf), or cultural rejection (e.g. the recent turban case in Canada) on the foreign shores where they reside and work. The Indian state confines the weight of its support to elite migrants.
- (c) There is strong demand for dual citizenship from the NRI diaspora, nurtured by ties of kinship and remittances. For many there is a contradiction between cultural marginalisation in their place of residence (against which they campaign) and citizenship based on cultural exclusion within India itself.⁶⁶ Dual citizenship has been granted to NRIs from only 16 countries, none of which are countries where Indian migrants are low-skilled wage labour.

Global Citizenship in India Two: Politics and Civil Society

During this period of rapid and sustained growth, India has also witnessed democratic pressure from the lower deciles of the income distribution. At the same time,

⁶¹ In medicine, engineering, law, finance, as well as information technology.

⁶² These migrants interact with the domestic Indian economy through remittances (the greatest are from the Gulf not from the two million carefully screened entrants to the United States (Pattanaik 2007). North American NRIs have political clout in their destination country and active promotion in India.

⁶³ See Kim 2008, on India's protection of domestic capital in the liquor sector.

⁶⁴ See Sahni (2009).

⁶⁵ And like so many low status economic organisations within India (Basile 2009).

⁶⁶ See Jaffrelot (1999).

as discussed earlier, the state's developmental and budgetary commitments to economically excluded social status groups—, particularly Dalits, Adivasis and Muslims (and, among them, women in particular)—have risen but have not yet undone their relative and absolute poverty.⁶⁷ Groups whose economic status is the most imperfectly guaranteed have organised themselves politically to articulate their deprivation on many platforms of international civil society and the United Nations.

At the Durban conference, Dalits made a forceful plea for the equation of caste discrimination with racial discrimination.⁶⁸ Subsuming their many differences under a common political identity, they have made several representations to the UN Human Rights Commission, have built global networks with NGOs and civil society groups championing Ambedkar's concept of dignity, and have pressured the governments of other nations to examine discrimination inside India.⁶⁹ The full citizenship rights demanded mean full economic citizenship. The demand is made not only against the state but also against the corporate sector.⁷⁰

In the same way, Adivasis have made several representations to the UN Permanent Mission on Indigenous Issues with a set of demands revolving around economic inclusion combined with special constitutional status for their territories to protect not only their cultures and languages but also their economic resources. Their demands are made to the state.

Muslims have made two parallel responses. The first, from the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind, reiterates their commitment to Islam and is understood as being inclusive as well as exclusive; it expresses opposition to liberalisation because of its distributive impacts; relates American aggression to economic imperialism, and poses an Islamic economic system as a response; and supports secularism understood as

⁶⁷ See Fernandez 2008, for the technologies of bureaucratic power which account for such paradoxes. In the budgets for 2008–2010 allocations for “Inclusive Development” have all increased. In 2010, that for Minorities is planned at Rs 2.6 kcr; for the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment Rs 4.5kcr; pensions for the unorganised sector Rs 0.1 kcr; womens' self-help groups Rs 0.4 kcr; social security for the unorganised sector Rs 1kcr; backward regions Rs 7.3kcr; rural and urban housing Rs 10 and 5.4kcr respectively; rural infrastructure Rs 48kcr; the NREGA Rs 40kcr; rural development Rs 66kcr; health Rs 22 kcr and education Rs 31 kcr. The social sector stood at 37 % of total plan expenditure of Rs 373kcr and rural infrastructure at 25 %. “Inclusive development is an act of faith” (P. Mukherjee 2010, para 72). But Indian growth continues to be polarising. Nearly 80 % of the population continues to live on less than USD 2 per day. According to Sengupta et al. (2008), while in 1993–1994 the poor were 732 m out of a total population of 894 m, 10 years later they were 836 m out of 1,090 m—a decline of only 5 % points. Among the poor 85 % of Muslims and 87 % of Scheduled Castes and Tribes live on under USD 2 per day.

⁶⁸ BBC News: Thursday, 6 September, 2001, 08:35 GMT 09:35 UK Indian groups raise caste question.

⁶⁹ For instance, a team of Conservative Party MPs prepared a report on discrimination against Dalits in India to be followed by a similar report from the Labour Party. See also the Dalit Solidarity Network UK. Dalit Watch UK holds regular meetings in Portcullis House, the annexe of the House of Commons, under the patronage of Labour MPs, mobilising public opinion to discrimination against Dalits in British companies investing in India.

⁷⁰ See www.dgroups.org/groups/Reservation4dalits/docs/thorat.doc.

state neutrality towards religious communities and networks with Jamaat in Kashmir and in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. Their conception of citizenship is universal, while based on Islam. Religion in this case is the basis for inclusion as well as exclusion.

Meanwhile, in a second response, India's Muslim elite have reacted strongly to civil violence and to the international stereotyping of Muslims. With some exceptions, they have tended to withdraw from the public sphere, reinforced their political support for the most powerful party perceived to embody secular politics, and strengthened national and global networks based on Islam. But they have not engaged in any sustained lobbying of the state for particular claims.

While the Indian "counterflow" has contributed dynamically to global society it has not enriched the concept of economic citizenship. The non-party political assertion of Dalits has prioritised economic citizenship without using the concept. But it has neglected the "women's question" emanating from the intersection of relations of authority and domination due to caste, class, and patriarchy. The development of Adivasis requires a state commitment to privileging remote populations over the demands and needs of apex private national and international capital. The political mobilisation of Jamaat Muslims involves a conception of citizenship that would only be realised if the global and national economic systems were to be restructured. Nine of these processes of striving towards a more inclusive political citizenship have made much progress on economic inclusion.

Conclusion

Economic citizenship is not a concept about which there is consensus of definition. It is not a concept native to India⁷¹; nor is it an imported concept that has put down roots yet. Nonetheless, India's state has for decades been planning for the economic inclusion of adversely incorporated citizens through a mass of anti-poverty, participatory, empowering, and labour market interventions in the spheres of production and social reproduction. It has also left nine tenths of all livelihoods outside the scope of its regulative reach. In this essay the authors have therefore interrogated the contested process of economic citizenship by translating conceptual proxies and by examining the practices of civil society and the market, as well as those of the state.

India's far from complete processes of domestic economic citizenship—perhaps at their most formally and informally complex in Arunachal—shape its economic and social differentiation. Ethnicity has been the lens through which the process has been observed in our case study here; but caste, religion, gender, locality, and other

⁷¹ Although Nayak shows in this volume that tribal Orissan society had a notion of citizenship, it is not one of economic citizenship.

kinds of identity cannot be ignored as regulators of the economy either. These then affect the politics of global economic citizenship.

The concept of economic citizenship, framed in terms of markets, ignores the implications for citizenship of these markets being capitalist. Economic citizenship is being forged by the same social forces, as are developing capitalism. The state's practical obligations to the entitlements of registered capital contrast with its idiosyncratic relations of citizenship for the vast mass of informal wage workers and petty commodity producers.

Economic citizenship has a long way to go in India—only a minority are free to exercise individual choice. There are constituent states where non-local Indian political citizens have barely any economic rights at all, and where national territorial security is guaranteed by the manual labour of incoming migrant road workers, many of whom are illegal and have no rights whatsoever. The Indian state has made a start on the right to work⁷²; it neglects rights at work and it confines rights to social security to the labour aristocracy. It focuses on contingent rights to a plethora of interventions, made ever more arbitrary by the agency of NGOs, that cover some of the conditions of social reproduction *outside work*. The NREG scheme, which has been discussed in this chapter, is not exceptional in its funding. It is exceptional in addressing production and work. From a Marshallian perspective these contingent rights are simply part of the incompleteness of the processes of citizenship. But both their incompleteness and their asymmetry are consistent with the requirements of India's informal capitalism. Differentiated economic citizenship is not independent of the processes that leads to other kinds of citizenship—from which it appears from surveys of Indian political citizenship that the process is much further advanced.⁷³ Differentiated economic citizenship is subversive of political citizenship.

Now the state, markets, and civil society must not only deal with challenges from its emigrant capital (visible and invisible) and from immigrant capital, from trans- and post-national, as well as Hindu-national émigré professional classes and emigrant working people along with the demands of incoming global business, communications, politics, and civil society. Some of these incoming forces bear projects of economic citizenship nurtured in the very different conditions of OECD countries. India's state, markets, and civil society must also deal with the painful anti-developmental processes that are structured by class and status identity—and exemplified by newly visible land seizures and displacement of tribal people as cities, towns, expressways, and industrial zones explode outwards, and as national and multinational capital sizes up mineral resources. Domestically, these processes result from, and also contribute to, highly unequal and incomplete economic citizenship.

⁷² Even the NREGA, which has been interpreted as a right, provides a right to 100 days of work and has been implemented unevenly with under half the resources it needs, NCEUS 2008.

⁷³ Mitra in this volume.

Appendix : Institutions supporting economics of market and politics of democracy

Institutions supporting economics of markets		Institutions mandated by politics of democracy	
Market creating	Market regulating institutions	Market legitimising institutions	Institutions giving a call for inclusive development
Withdrawal of state	To attract new players		Watch dog institutions
Foreign Direct Investment Policy 2006 (started with Industrial Policy of 1991)	Foreign Investment Implementation Authority (FIIA)	The Central Electricity Regulatory Commission	National Integration Council/ National Judicial Council/ National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions National Minority Commission National Commission for Backward Classes Act National Commission for Women Bifurcation of National Schedule Caste and National Schedule Tribe Commission
Board for Reconstruction of Public Sector Enterprise (Ministry of Disinvestment)	Committee on Infrastructure	The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India	National Advisory Council (now defunct)
The Fiscal Responsibility and the Budget Management Bill	Public Private Partnership	National Knowledge Commission	Panchayats and Urban Local Bodies
Special Economic Zones (New Model of Industrialisation)	Investment Commission of India	National Farmers Commission/ Report of the Expert Group on Agricultural Indebtedness/Reconstituted National Rainfed Area Authority	National Rural Employment Guarantee Act Right to Education Bill National Rural health Mission Proposed Food Security Act The Schedules Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forests Rights) Act, 2006 Right to Information
	National Manufacturing Competitiveness and Investment Commission	Security Exchange Board of India	
	Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission	Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority Prime Minister Economic Advisory Council	National Urban Street Vendor Policy

References

- Alston, P. (1994) 'International Law and the Right to Food' in B. Harriss-White and R Hoffenberg (eds), *Food: Multi-disciplinary Perspectives*, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 205 + 16.
- Altvater, Elmar. 1993. *The Future of the Market: An Essay on the Regulation of Money and Nature After the Collapse of 'Actually Existing Socialism'*. London: Verso.
- Banik, Dan. 2007. *Starvation and India's Democracy*. London: Routledge.
- Baruah, Sanjib. 2008. "Territoriality, Indigeneity and Rights in the North-East India." *Economic and Political Weekly*. 43 (12): 15–19.
- Basile, Elisabetta. 2009. Local–global Integration and Economic Diversification in Arni's Long term Change. Paper for the International Workshop on Market Town Market Society and Informal Economy, Oxford University.
- Cadene, Philippe and Mark Holmstrom, eds. 1999. *Decentralised Production in India: Industrial Districts, Flexible Specialisation and Employment*. New Delhi, London: Sage.
- Chatterjee, Partha. 2008. "Democracy and Economic Transformation." *Economic and Political Weekly* 43 (16) April 19: 53–62.
- Chibber, Vivek. 2003. *Locked in Place: State Building and Late Industrialisation in India*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Da Corta, Lucia and Davuluri Venkateswarlu. 1999. "Unfree Relations and the Feminization of Agricultural Labour in Andhra Pradesh, 1970–95." *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 26 (2/3): 71–139.
- Fernandez, Bina. 2008. "(En)gendering Poverty Policy in India: Towards a New Feminist Theoretical Framework." D Phil Thesis, Oxford University.
- Ghose A.K. 2008. "Globalisation and Employment in Developing Countries Indian." *Journal of Labour Economics* 52 (4): 497–504.
- Goopu, Nandini and Barbara Harriss-White. 2001. "Mapping India's World of Unorganised Labour." In *Working Classes, Global Realities*, edited by L. Panitch and C. Leys. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Government of Arunachal Pradesh. 2005. *Arunachal Pradesh Human Development Report*, Itanagar. http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/stateplan/sdr_pdf/shdr_ap05.pdf
- Harriss-White, Barbara. 2008. *Rural Commercial Capital*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harriss-White. 2003. *India Working – Essays on Society and Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Harriss-White. 2008. *Rural Commercial Capital*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harriss-White. 2007. 'Developments in India's Informal Economy' pp 181–3 in House of Commons, *Foreign Affairs Committee South Asia*: fourth report on session 2006–7. London: The Stationery Office Ltd.
- Harriss-White, Barbara ed. 2002. *Globalization and Insecurity: Political, Economic and Physical Challenges*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Harriss-White, Barbara Deepak K. Mishra and Vandana Upadhaya. 2009. "Institutional Diversity and Capitalist Transition: The Political Economy of Agrarian Change in Arunachal Pradesh." *Journal of Agrarian Change* 9 (4): 230–66.
- Held, David. 1995. *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press and Polity Press.
- Heyer, Judith. 2010. "The Marginalisation of Dalits in a Modernising Economy." In *The Comparative Political Economy of Development: Africa and South Asia*, edited by Barbara Harriss-White and Judith Heyer. London: Routledge.
- Jaffrelot, Christophe. 1999. *The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics*. New Delhi: Penguin.
- Jayal, Niraja Gopal. 2007. "The Role of Civil Society." In *The State of India's Democracy* edited by Sumit Ganguly, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Kapadia, Karin. 2010. "Liberalisation and Transformations in India's Informal Economy: Female Breadwinners in Working Class Households in Chennai." In *The Comparative Political*

- Economy of Development: Africa and South Asia*, edited by Barbara Harriss-White and Judith Heyer. London: Routledge.
- Kar, Bodhisattva. 2008. "When was the Post-Colonial: A History of Policing Impossible Lines." In *Beyond Counter-Insurgency: Breaking the Impasse in North East India*, edited by S. Baruah, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Kaviraj, Sudipta. 1985. *Citizen and Government: A Textbook for Classes IX and X*. New Delhi: National Council of Educational Research and Training.
- Kaviraj, Sudipta. 1988. "A Critique of the Passive Revolution." *Economic and Political Weekly Special* 23 (45/47): 2429–2444.
- Kim, Y. 2008. "The Outside and Inside Meanings of Alcohol." D Phil Thesis, Oxford University.
- Kumar, Arun. 1999. *The Black Economy in India*. New Delhi: Penguin.
- Kymlicka, Will and Wayne Norman. 1994. "Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory." *Ethics* 104 (2): 352–381.
- Khan, Mushtaq. 2004. "State Failure in Developing Countries and Strategies of Institutional Reform." In *Towards Pro-Poor Policies: Aid Institutions and Globalization Proceedings of World Bank's Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics*, edited by Bertil Tungodden, Nick Stern and Ivar Kolstad. Oxford: Oxford University Press and World Bank.
- Lerche, Jens. 2007. "A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour? Unfree Labour, Neo-Liberal Globalization and the International Labour Organization." *Journal of Agrarian Change* 7 (4): 424–52.
- MacDonough, Terrence. 2007. "Social Structure of Accumulation Theory: The State of the Art." In *Growth and Crisis : Social Structure of Accumulation Theory and Analysis*, edited by Terrence MacDonough, Michael Reich, David M. Kotz and Maria-Alejandra Gonzales- Perez. National University of Ireland Galway. <http://ssagalway.blogspot.com/>.
- Marshall, Thomas H. and Bottomore, Tom. 1950. *Citizenship and Social Class*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- O'Connor, James. 1998. *Natural Causes: Essays in Ecological Marxism*. New York: Guildford Press.
- Panayotakis, C. 2007. "The Third Contradiction." In *Coming to Terms with Nature: Socialist Register 2007*, edited by Leo Panitch and Colin Leys. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Parekh, Bhikhu. 1997. *Dilemmas of a Multicultural Theory of Citizenship*. Malden: Blackwell.
- Pattanaik, Sitikantha. 2007. "Gulf NRIs and Their Remittances to India: The Saga of Overlooked Great Expectations." *Journal of International and Area Studies* 14 (1): 31–53.
- Prakash, Aseem and Barbara Harriss-White. 2009. "Social Inclusion, Discrimination and Economic Citizenship." Paper for the Workshop on Inclusive Development. Institute for Human Development/Oxfam. India, New Delhi.
- Prakash, Aseem. 2010. "Dalit Entrepreneurs in Middle India." In *The Comparative Political Economy of Development: Africa and South Asia*, edited by Barbara Harriss-White and Judith Heyer. London: Routledge.
- Rajalakshmi T.K. 2008 Deal and Discontent Frontline vol 25 issue 14 <http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2514/stories/20080718251403300.htm>
- Reddy D. N. and C. Upendranath. 2009. "National Rural Employment Guarantee: Issues Concerns and Prospects. Paper for the Workshop on Inclusive Development." Institute for Human Development/Oxfam. India, New Delhi.
- Roman, C. 2008. "Learning and Innovation in Clusters: Case Studies from the Indian Silk Industry." D Phil Thesis, Oxford University.
- Roy, Rathin. 1996. "State Failure in India: Political Fiscal Implications of the Black Economy." *Institute of Development Studies Bulletin* 27 (2): 22–30.
- Ruthven, O. 2008. "Metals and Morals in Moradabad; Perspective on Ethics in the Workforce Across a Global Supply Chain." D Phil Thesis Oxford University.
- Sahni, Binda. 2009. "Economic Citizenship in India: A Socio-Legal Comparison of Two Cases." *Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics* No. 49
- Salam, M.A. 2007. *Agricultural Transformation in North East India: With Special Reference to Arunachal Pradesh*. New Delhi: Mittal.

- Sarkar, S. 2009. "Limits of Politics: Dominance and Resistance in Contemporary India." D Phil Thesis, Oxford University.
- Scott, James C (2000): 'Hill and Valley in South-East Asia... or... Why the State Is the Enemy of the People Who Move Around... or... Why Civilisations Can't Climb Hills', unpublished paper, Yale University, Department of Political Science and Department of Anthropology.
- Sengupta A., K.P. Kannan and G. Raveendran. 2008. "India's Common People: Who They Are, How Many They Are and How Do They Live." *Economic and Political Weekly* 18 March: 49–69.
- Shariff, Abusaleh. 2006. *State Strategy for Development and Welfare of Muslims in India - Focus on Education, Employment, Credit Flow and Empowerment*. New Delhi: NCAER.
- Srinivasan, Kannan. 2007. "Moneylaundering and Security." In *Controlling Arms and Terror: Regional Security in Asia and the Pacific*, edited by Marika Vicziany. Massachusetts: Edward Elgar.
- Steenbergen, Bart van, ed. 1996. *The Condition of Citizenship*. London: Sage.
- Sud, Nikita. 2007. "From Land to the Tiller to Land Liberalisation: The Political Economy of Gujarat's Shifting Land Policy." *Modern Asian Studies* 41 (3): 603–638.
- Thorat, Sukhadeo. 2008. *Dalits in India: Search for a Common Destiny*. Los Angeles: Sage.
- White, Stuart. 2002. *The Civic Minimum: The Rights and Obligation of Economic Citizenship*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wolf, Frieder Otto. 2007. "Reproduction, Accumulation and the Division of Labour: What Capital II is Really About." Paper presented at the 4th Historical Materialism Conference SOAS London University, London.
- Zizek, Slavoj. 2008. *Violence*. Fort Washington: Harvest Books.

Chapter 11

Inheritance of “Kingly Citizenship”: Tribals at Crossroads in the Modern State of Orissa

Prasanna K. Nayak

Abstract Prasanna Nayak highlights the *asymmetry* in the flow of citizenship by examining the case of tribal Orissa. Nayak argues that tribals who inhabit the hills and forests of Orissa enjoyed citizenship rights in their traditional set up. Culturally, they had inherited this variant of citizenship as *padarias* (rightful territorial groups) and *khunt-katidars* (early occupants of land, who slashed and cleared tree stumps). Despite many constitutional safeguards the modern state has failed to address this core issue of tribal citizenship and traditional rights. In consequence, tribal areas in Orissa, and those in the neighboring states and elsewhere in India have become the breeding ground of Naxalites. Tribal citizenship in modern India, in Nayak’s view, is at a crossroads.

The main argument in this chapter¹ is that the concept of citizenship germane to the tribal communities predates that extended by the constitution of India after Independence.² The major tribes in India enjoyed their endogenous concept of citizenship in the past, which they valued greatly, being members of distinct ethno-cultural, territorially organised groups, and at the same time subjects of the Kind with a stake in the politics of the state. As citizens they were closely interacting with

¹ In the ethnographic accounts of tribes of Orissa, and of India for that matter that, history, and especially ethno-history has been neglected (cf. Nayak 2001a). The use of the phrase “kingly citizenship” in the chapter is a pointer towards reconsidering tribespeople and their cultures and dispelling some of our misconceptions about them (cf. Nayak 2001b).

² It emerged from an hour-long interview conducted by Professor Mitra with the author of this article at Utkal University, India that “there always was the idea and the concept of citizenship” and the tribals in Orissa inhabiting ethnic territories behaved and acted in every sphere as citizens, and the view that citizenship is an exclusively modern concept is refuted here (cf. transcript by Mitra 2009).

P.K. Nayak (✉)

Department of Anthropology, Utkal University, Bhubaneswar, Orissa, India
e-mail: prasannanayak51@gmail.com

the king.³ They valued the importance of their ethnic territory, the indigenously carved out socio-political unit at the local level and the state or the kingdom at the regional level, as much as they attached importance to their societal functioning. In other words, for them, the state and society were not contradictory, but rather complementary entities. They were conscious of their rights as much as they were conscious of their responsibilities. They were practical about their ownership rights and possession rights over land and territory and individually. They honoured the state as much as they honoured themselves. They were proud of their territory and state as much as they were proud of their own society and culture. They believed in the coexistence of the state and society. In their perception, the territorial political unit and the state secured them their sustenance and, in return for this, they did everything to protect the territory and state. In the recent historical past they were governed by feudatory kings, but in their case their relationship with the king was very special: the king “owned them” and they “owned the king” (Nayak 2007b: 19–69). They had rights over their land and territory and the king rarely interfered with it unless an appeal was made to him. They regarded the territorial chiefs and, for that matter, their village headmen, in the image of the king, as the representatives of the king.

A corollary argument is that indigenously and ontologically, tribal social groups and social institutions were headed by clan chiefs, territorial chiefs, and village headmen. In the incipient form, state formation was very germane to territorially organised tribal societies. Later, they accepted kings, wanted to have a king, in some cases installed kings of their own choice or invited outsiders to be their kings. They expected the same benevolent treatment from the kings and were therefore closer to them and did everything for him and his kingdom. The kings granted them special privileges. Tribals were, thus different. They were kingly citizens, not subjects, unlike others in the kingdom (Nayak 1989: 172–186).

The second point to be made here is that the modern concept of citizenship borrowed from Europe, and the way it is practised today in India seems to be lopsided. The rights are emphasised more, and the duties and responsibilities towards the state and larger society tend to get overlooked; as if the state belongs to them, they do not belong to the state. In all the state-sponsored development activities people expect the state to do everything for them as if they have no active role to play. The state as an institution does not ensure the responsible functioning of its citizens, nor do the so-called citizens act dutifully and responsibly; everything is bureaucratized to the disadvantage of the common citizens. It seems as if the state and citizens have distanced themselves from one another. Participatory citizenship is lacking. In the aftermath of independence citizenship had some sanctity. People holding key positions in every sphere displayed a sense of responsibility and this percolated

³ The author worked together with H. Kulke and B. Schnepel in a research project sponsored by the German Research Council (DFG) to investigate the interaction of the king of the princely state of Keonjhar and the Bhuiyan tribe from historical and ethno-historical perspectives, and came up with the view that the Bhuiyan citizenship is kingly (see Nayak 2010b).

down to the people and the people; the common man in turn was loyal to the state.⁴ Globalisation and liberalisation have made the citizens more alert to their respective rights than to their duties. There is a degradation of moral values and the citizens’ morality is under a cloud. Economic success in India, in recent years, is a leap forward. But foul play in every sphere needs to be tackled. Its citizenry needs to rise above meeting narrow and limited ends and they need to remain in active engagement with the state in their everyday life, and the state needs to create viable conditions that enable citizens to perform their citizenship roles. From this perspective, a citizen in the kingly mode is the ideal citizen, as tribal communities used to be.

As one compares the present with the past, one notices with regret that the tribal variant of citizenship as elucidated above is now lost. After independence, the non-tribal scheduled caste neighbours, who were acting as middlemen and rendering services to the tribals started getting benefits and political rights. In the aftermath of the introduction of Panchayat Raj system of governance, the non-tribal immigrant population, especially the scheduled castes and other castes encroached upon the tribal land and territory and staked their claims to citizenship rights, which consequently lead to rising tensions between the tribals and their non-tribal neighbours. This is the murky state of affairs relating to everyday citizenship in India.

In the present system of democratic governance the institutional bases of functional citizenship of tribals have never been recognised, nor given due regard; rather they have been castigated obsolete. As a consequence, the tribals have been disillusioned, in particular about their citizenship. In recent years, following the extension of Panchayatraj institutions to tribal areas, the village level *Parha*, *Palli*, or *Gram Sabha*, grassroots councils, democratically elected bodies, which are new modern institutions, have failed to meet the hopes and aspirations of the people, and the citizenry is at a loss. Tribes lose their land and forest to either the government or multinational companies under mega development projects. People’s voices, supported by human rights activists, fall on deaf ears. This, some would argue, renders tribals into second rate citizens.

“Kingly Citizenship”: An Explication

“Kingly citizenship” apparently is a kind of citizenship which the tribes people in India, with their strong ethnic and territorial organizations, enjoyed in the recent historical past. They continue to believe in that and behave in this manner even when the modern state undermines this in several ways. Of course, tribal societies and cultures are changing as is the kind or quality of kingly citizenship that they were enjoying.

⁴From my student days I keenly observed the functioning of government officials and people’s willing support for them in realising development goals and the mission of nation building. Today, in every sphere, there is a decline of such support (cf. Nayak 2000, 2004, 2007a, 2010).

“Kingly citizenship” is actually a variant of the general category of citizenship as developed in this book, and the author has used the expression to suggest that citizenship in the kingly mode has an edge over all other modes, for it quintessentially and conveniently conjoins the state with society through individual citizens who in turn form the society and the state. That an individual citizen in a tribal society sees in himself as king, symbolising the state at the political level and representing the ancestor king at the societal plane. Kingly citizenship is reflected in their everyday behaviour and the people are very practical about it. Moreover, in keeping with the premise that they are kingly in every respect they evolved institutional structures through which they upheld the value of this kind of overall citizenship. Although under the rule of native princes, they had acquired this status and recognition, and in many cases they had installed the kings and instituted kingship (most of the major tribes in India and tribes such as the Kondh, the Saora, the Bondo Highlanders, the Koya, the Gond, the Bhiyan, etc. in Orissa). The deep underlying reality that very much concerned them was that they themselves, and their society, could not survive and flourish without the state. It was as if, for them, at one level, the state is primary and the people and their society are secondary. As long as the state is in good shape, they remain in a good condition. In other words, what was warranted was that the state and the people, the ruler and the ruled, needed each other and the interaction between the state and the people were more participatory. It was as if they knew it perfectly and were convinced of the importance of it. That was their perception and rationality. The individuals enjoyed the highest level of freedom and the individual community had its pride and dignity, for which they strove hard to get the patronage of the state.

At this level, the one-to-one interaction between the state and its people with human pride and dignity, each reciprocating with the other connotes “kingly citizenship,” which we all have inherited but downplayed after the intervention of an asymmetrical model of ‘citizenship’ that dictates less but is dictated more. As long as a citizen cannot feel kingly in action, his work output will be detrimental to the society and the state. In tribal societies, such persons, be they socio-political functionaries or ordinary people, are being systematically eliminated/ostracised from the territory/society. This means that tribals obey the rule of law of the society and the state. Territorial membership—citizenship—is withdrawn from these deviants. They can be reintegrated into the society and the territory after being admonished as per the rules. Thus, “kingly citizenship,” is metaphorically used here to mean ideal-typically citizens’ concern for the state, their willing support for the state, and, reciprocally, the state’s concern for its citizens and consideration for what it owes them.

I intend to stretch this argument further and claim that this variant of citizenship is quite explicit and observable in tribespeople in their day-to-day life. As a matter of fact, one comes across this variant of day-to-day citizenship in a lively form across societies and cultures in India; among the rural caste societies, too, especially among those who have not been fully weaned away from the so-called tribal mode. In this respect, this variant of citizenship may be said to have paralleled that of the ancient Greeks and the Romans. With the emergence of modern Europe the

concept of citizenship became heavily loaded with legal codes imposed from above, that is, by the state, bereft of its moral code. With India’s enormous social, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, religious diversities, appalling poverty, and educational backwardness, the European model of citizenship could not be fully adapted and there was a mismatch, a disjuncture, and, it manifested itself as a camouflage only. Citizenship from below, from the level of people, could not be shaped in the right earnest. In the post-modern world, citizenship as a concept warrants being reformulated and tested in the challenging crucible of the pluricultural Indian state. Maybe the kingly variant of citizenship should be invoked while defining the concept in an integrated way, integrating its moral, legal, and rational dimensions. It is imperative therefore to recognise and understand the variant of citizenship which comes from below, as the tribal societies have in the past demonstrated.

What is meant by “citizenship from below,” is that citizenship that comes from the people who express their willing participation and active engagement with the state, and it is enacted by the people bound to a state. People’s primary concern for a collective living, healthy and harmonious social relationships, and cultural satisfaction, impels them to cling to a state which provides them with guidance in their day-to-day affairs and ensures them economic success and overall happiness. Members of collectives and communities are committed to the state from which they in turn derive support and nourishment. Tribals take responsibilities more seriously than rights. At a moral plane, people’s concern for society is as much valued as it is for the state, as if without the state the communities would find it difficult to function properly and societies would wither. This moral dimension of envisioning a positive state has, in the modern world, has become deemed outmoded. It is disturbing when people engaged in debates and discourses on citizenship express views shaped by a Eurocentric bias without evaluating what they have inherited from their own past. Although European models of “citizenship” have influenced modern intellectual discourses on “citizenship rights” and impacted the practices of civil societies, Indian citizens, and elites, intellectuals need to throw fresh light on the concept of citizenship and analyse the Indian situation in the space-time continuum, taking into account its enormous diversity—from ecology to geography to culture—and suggest a model which the postmodern world can effectively use (Figs. 11.1 and 11.2).

The marvels of functional citizenship in everyday life can be observed in Indian tribal, as well as traditional societies of the recent past. Men, women, and the youth never felt that they were subjugated. They were forthright in every matter and upheld high morals for the sake of their society and the state. From early 1970s to the mid-1980s, while travelling through the interior tribal areas of Koraput, Ganjam, Pallahara, and Keonjhar one never saw a tribal begging in the village. People rarely locked their doors when they went out. Theft of land or plant produce was simply unthinkable. Misbehaving with a woman was unthinkable. “Capture” of a ladylove involved nothing rude or coarse and was part of an elaborate social etiquette (Nayak 2007b). One might ask how they succeeded in maintaining all

Fig. 11.1 Kondh sword:
royal insignia



Fig. 11.2 Santal war dance

these practices. The answer could be found in the forms of citizenship that they had inherited. It was not that the king ordained them to maintain that level of discipline in social life; it was done in obedience to a dictate from the “inner king,” which every individual tribal person inherited as a dignified citizen.

Tribals enjoyed utmost freedom and display independence of mind. They valued these immensely. In day-to-day life, subjugation and imposition of any kind, be it from the elderly kinsmen, lineage heads, clan heads, village headmen, territorial chiefs, or, for that matter from the kings, are always vigorously opposed in familial set-ups, as well as in village councils and clan council meetings. Whenever required, they organise themselves to fight against the tyranny of the king. Habitually, every tribal individual, man or woman, young or old, feels free to do his or her work, and independently pursues it within the limits prescribed by his/her community, culture, and society. S/he imbibes this value in the course of her/his enculturation and socialisation. Gender discrimination is almost nonexistent. Parents and kinsmen feel very happy at the birth of a baby girl; they take it as a blessing. Unlike the high caste Hindus, they never feel dejected over the birth of a girl. Women feel safe, secure, and protected in their own hill country. They move freely even in the deep forest. No one has ever noticed a woman being misbehaved with, assaulted, or molested. Young men and women freely mix with one another, work together, and exchange labour through elaborate labour cooperatives. Men and women understand their need for each other. During certain agricultural operations women’s labour is required more and the services of the dormitory maidens are requisitioned for the purpose. The village dormitories in which boys and girls spend nights together with their chosen mates socialize them on how to treat women. Physically, women are equally powerful and capable of doing everything men can do in order to support the family. A woman can run her family in the absence of a man, but a man without a woman fails to make both ends meet and often becomes poor, no matter how much property he might own. Elder sisters in the family willingly postpone their marriages until the younger brother comes of age and takes up the responsibility of supporting the family. No man remains a bachelor for long as it is discouraged.

Women hold positions of responsibility in society and enjoy high esteem. Children are restrained from idling away their time but are never given corporal punishment. They grow freely and their parents inculcate in them independence of spirit. They grow up acquiring the identity of an ethnically territorial unit at the local level and the identity of the kingdom at the macro level. It is as if citizenship rights and responsibilities are ingrained in them from the very beginning of their childhood. The idea of citizenship is apparently *sui generis* and found in situ. The efficacy of every individual matters the most. Everybody is conscious of his/her prowess and at the slightest provocation individuals become embroiled in brawls and fights and acts of retaliation. Every individual commands respect and individuality is maintained. Every member of the society works, or rather enjoys the right to work. Nobody sits idle. One never comes across beggary in tribal societies. The resources were shared among the members of the community. Nobody went hungry. The economically dependent clan members get the same treatment as the dominant members in the village community. The village council elders took decisions about the distribution of land among the villagers and give them the right to cultivate it.

Irrespective of sex and age, the degree of individual independence, freedom, and efficacy enjoyed by tribespeople in their own country and community has no parallel in modern democratic countries. They never feel handicapped by any inhibitions. Everybody knows how to sing and dance. The young and old, men and women dance together. They do not feel shy and express themselves with spontaneity. Institutions such as village dormitories, labour cooperatives, lineage, clan, village and territorial councils, and the observance of territory-based annual rituals and festivals, through which ownership over their land and territory was legitimised, were instrumental in defining citizenship in the tribal world. During territorially organised annual festivals the kinsmen and courtiers of the kingdom were invited to participate in the function. Swords, as insignia of the king, were worshipped before the village deities. Reciprocally, the kings extended invitations to the tribal village headmen and chiefs as representatives of the tribespeople to participate in the annual Dussehra festivals or car festivals organised at the kings' palaces. They were given special treatment by ceremonially adorning them with saris and headgear; thus the tribals were accorded royal treatment and kingly citizenship statuses, unlike non-tribal citizens. The non-tribal neighbours, who usually belonged to low castes (the various denominations of the present day scheduled castes), were treated as servants of the king and the tribe. They never had any ownership rights or primary citizenship statuses (Figs. 11.3, 11.4, 11.5, and 11.6).

King and the Tribes: Interactions and Interrelationships

Before independence, most of the tribal regions of Orissa were ruled by feudatory kings. Twenty-four feudatory estates in Orissa were known as “jungle kingdoms.”⁵ The dominant population of these kingdoms consisted of tribal and tribal-like groups who inhabited the hills and forests and maintained distinct cultural identities of their own, distinct from those of the people living on the coastal plains. They pledged total allegiance to the king's ruling over their land and territory and in return enjoyed patronage of the kings and were granted special privileges and autonomy⁶ (Kulke 2010; Schnepel 2004 and 2005; Tripathi 2010; Nayak 2001a). As citizens the tribals were responsible to the kings and their estates, and exercised rights over the hills and forests, and land and territories under their occupation. The kings granted them special ethnic status and they received appropriate treatment and honours from the kings. Every year, on occasions such as Dussehra and car festival, they received special treatment from the kings. Among all citizens, tribals were the kings' favourite—the most primitive were the favourite. Why were they so special?

⁵ Kulke (2010), Schnepel (2004, 2005) and Tripathi (2010) have dealt with the interaction of kings and tribes extensively.

⁶ A/The? Grant of privileges by the kings of princely states has been elaborately discussed by Kulke (2010), Schnepel (2004, 2005) and Tripathi (2010).

Fig. 11.3 Lanjia Saora village heads with headgear



Fig. 11.4 Lanjia Saora blowing trumpet: observance of a kingly rite



Fig. 11.5 Juang Sardar: territorial chief in council meeting



Firstly, the tribals, in their traditional setup, were socio-politically highly organised groups. They displayed their mirth, valour, and combat outfits wherever defensive or offensive action was called for. Outsiders dared not invade tribal countries. Secondly, tribals were law-abiding and they had high respect for the rule of law. They held freedom and independence in high esteem. Individuals and groups make a concerted effort to maintain harmony and keep peace in the social world they

Fig. 11.6 Dongria Kondha clan chief



inhabit. At times they mobilise themselves to react to unacceptable situations and take revenge on the wrong-doer, be it their own brethren, the lineage leader, village headman, or the territorial chief. For that matter, they would not spare a king who was unjust and would strive to replace him with a king of their choice. And always they would want a king to rule over the kingdom, with a *Majhi*, a *Mondal*, a *Sardar* for their *Padar*, territorial villages. Thirdly, they see themselves as truthful, straightforward, hardworking, sincere, and dutiful. They would rather break than bend. In this sense, every tribal individual thinks he is a “king”. Fourthly, wherever and whenever it is warranted, the tribals render valuable services and extend willing support and unstinted cooperation to the king and his administration. Especially in matters relating to nation building, the tribals play decisive roles to help bring state prosperity, pride, and glory. The king wins the hearts of the people and the people own the king. The dividing line between state and society, community and polity, king and citizens, in the jungle kingdoms of Orissa appear to have been permeable.

Tribal Identity and Citizenship Rights in Jungle Kingdoms

Tribals in their native territories feel proud that they have inherited royal ancestry and often proclaim, “*ame raja loka*,” (we are born kings and we people are king-like). During the author’s field research visits to tribal areas from the early 1970s up

to the 1990s he has come across tribes such as Dongria Kondhs, Bondos, Gadabas, Koyas, Bhuiyans, and Saoras who, in all respects, regard themselves as members of a superior race and consider their non-tribal neighbours as inferior. They would not brook even the semblance of subjugation by anyone. As rightful citizens of the jungle kingdoms they say that they are *Khunt-Kati* people, early settlers, who own *Dongars*, swiddens and *Padaras*, clan-based villages and territories. In real life, the territorial chiefs, the village headmen and the village priests are their sources of strength and they expect their kings to be powerful and just. They toil hard in the jungle, enjoy the fruits of their own labour and lead a happy life. One would never find a single beggar in these tribal villages nor come across a master-servant relationship. Young men and women in tribal societies are the happy “princes and princesses”. The village elders repose faith in the youth and display confidence in them and always expect them to be capable of responsible management of social and community affairs. They feel proud of the contingent of their young men and women who constitute the main workforce. That is why youth dormitories are very vital to them,

Tribal people live a life of dignity and die heroic deaths. They like to enjoy the highest degree of freedom and independence of mind and would never like to become dependent on anybody. They value discipline in life. They are generous and kind; as generous as the kings themselves, especially when it comes to helping the poor and the deprived. The hospitality they offer to their kinsmen and the guests is quite lavish, one would say quite royal. They commemorate the dead over a weeklong feast and erect memory stones. They worship their ancestors as gods and venerate them as they venerate kings. For them the king was their *mai-bap*—parent. They owned the kings as the kings owned them.

They were indeed very close to their kings; they never were unwilling to render services to the kings. They remain loyal to the kings and expect the kings to rule over them and their territories but without any infringement of their rights over the natural resources they depend on for survival and the cultural practices they cherish. They sincerely want to be ruled by a king. They have the strong conviction that the health and happiness of people and the internal harmony in their community living can be ultimately achieved through good governance from above, with the king at the top. Misgovernance is resisted and they unseat by violent means the community leaders and dethrone the kings. Many instances of tribal *melis*, revolts led against tyrannical kings in the not too distant past have been recorded. When their own tribal chiefs and village headmen have proven inefficient in discharging their responsibilities or handling untoward situations they have been forcibly replaced. They have even gone to the extent of slaying their own territorial chiefs, village headmen, and village leaders. People do it openly in an organised way. The people’s concerns are securing protection of their land and territory and ensuring safety and security of their fellow citizens; men, women, and children alike. Customary laws were carried out in full force. That is the reason why buying and selling of land in most of the tribal areas was legally prohibited.

Citizenry in the Traditional Institutional Setups

Despite the linguistic, dialectal, and cultural variations (Nayak 2003) among the tribal communities inhabiting Orissa, each tribe or sub-tribe was governed by the village council at the lowest level, the territorial council at the next higher level, and the vassal king, *thatraja*, at the sub-regional level, and the *Maharja* at the highest level of the regional kingdom, at different periods of history. The terms for village council, territorial council and their functionaries varies from tribe to tribe, territory to territory, sub-region to sub-region and region to region. Some of these retained the indigenous names while others were given names by the highest authorities, the king, and the regime above. The village elders and members of the village/territorial councils sat around the shrine of the village deity and make decisions about day-to-day matters. At a later point in history, council halls, community houses, named as *sadars*, *darbars*, etc. were set up apposed to the village shrines, the structures of which were much bigger than the dwellings that symbolised the royal courts.

As has been mentioned earlier, the tribal people themselves looked upon their village headmen, the territorial chiefs, as their own kings and identified themselves as royal citizenry. When, on festive occasions, the headmen and chiefs come out in the open wearing their headgear and kingly insignia, people greet them the same way that they would the king in the king's palace at the time of Dussehra and car festival, and the former maintain the dignity and deportment similar to those of the king. Common tribal men and women feel proud when adorned with their traditional attire, and display valour and efficacy as kingly citizens. Getting invitations from the kings, the village headmen and territorial chiefs attend and participate in Dussehra, car festivals, and other rituals at the king's palace, and lead the procession carrying their respective ethnic and territorial banners and symbols displaying their citizenship status. Depending on their relative cultural and citizenship status the king offers the tribal participants goats and buffaloes to sacrifice near their respective shrines/deities, which have been installed in the royal capital town. People enjoy the sacrificial meat and enjoy the festival with mirth and excitement, hurling swords, axes, and spears into the air as they celebrate their kingly citizenship. In 1977, the author had the opportunity of observing the participation of Dongria Kondhs in both Dussehra and car Festival, which had been organised by the local administration in the capital town of the erstwhile *thatraja* of Bissam Cuttack, in keeping with the tradition long established by the *thatraja*.

The Plight of Tribals in Modern India

However, the situation has changed under the modern democratic system of governance. Driven by narrow economic motives, land grabbers, unscrupulous traders, and usurpers are making a beeline into the tribal areas. They exploit and overexploit the natural resources and deprive the people of their rights to their own resources. The land alienation regulations of the government hardly have any effect

and the enforcing institutions and agencies have failed to handle the issue of land alienation in tribal areas. In the plan documents of government of India, land alienation keeps surfacing as an unresolved tribal development issue, and the problem has not been addressed.⁷ In order to further the economic development of the country several mega development projects have been taken up in tribal areas, and as a consequence thousands of tribal families have been uprooted from their farms and fields. The irony is that government becomes the chief agent of tribal land alienation. It is painful to see the pitiable plight of the tribals. The people who for many years had enjoyed rights over their land and territory are now homeless; people who behaved like kings have become mine workers and industrial labourers; and people who inherited kingly citizenship are begging citizens’ rights over *jal*, *jangal*, and *jamin*, water, forest, and land, the basic sources of livelihood.

Constitutional provisions have been made for the comprehensive development of tribes, but they are of no avail. Tribal issues have been addressed in various ways since independence and the government officers and agencies have worked hard to realise the goals of tribal development, but the goal is never reached. The problem is that policy makers, planners, and development executives consider tribals as a minority. Their issues have not been addressed from a citizenship perspective. Resounding discourses are heard in politico-administrative and public intellectual spheres about mainstreaming the tribes as if they did not have any link with mainstream Indian social and cultural systems and did not contribute to the growth of Indian civilisation. They need to change in the so-called modern way, not in their way.

As rightful and dignified citizens of yesteryear, their stake in Indian democracy has not been fully appreciated although as bona fide citizens they have every right to claim their autochthonous rights. During the decades after independence they were treated as marginal citizens and, as a result of this, the problem of their deprivation has compounded and remains unresolved. In recent years, civil right organisations have been quite vocal by making demands for the secured indigenous rights of tribals, but will the state apparatus be willing to give them back their rights of which they have been deprived over the years? It would require rethinking and revisiting the tribals, revamping the system, and remodelling the machinery, not in the spirit of the old nationalist agenda but by adopting policies and espousing praxis that bear in mind the postmodern agenda for the tribals.

Identity Politics and Tribals

In recent years, it has been observed that people of various ethnic, regional, and sub-regional groups such as tribes, castes, minority groups, and socio-economically and politically less advantaged groups and regions take active part in electoral

⁷ The unresolved tribal development issues have been mentioned in the Report of Working Group for Empowering the Scheduled Tribes during the Xth V Year Plan 2002, Ministry of Tribal Affairs, Govt. of India.

politics. The paradox is that a large number of well-meaning, well-off, urban-dwelling educated people show indifference to their duty of vote casting. The political culture has become vitiated to the extent that vested interests draw up game plans to win elections by hook or by crook. Tribals being assured of election time pecuniary benefits from political persons and parties participate in elections as if they are taking part in a ritual, a game of cock fight at a public place.

The irony is that, in recent times, non-government agencies and civil society organisations intending to set right the political culture and governance of the country by invoking citizens' rights, minority rights, women's rights, etc., join the bandwagon of the ruling elite and undermine the well-intentioned mission. Such private agencies are mushrooming throughout the country. Especially while working in the tribal areas, these agencies mobilise them to serve their own interests rather than the interests of the tribals. Politicians and members of the ruling elite run not one but a number of such agencies in the names of their kin and affine under the Registered Societies Act 1958. People's expectations are belied they never call the shots. The media acts in collusion with the powers that be. Political, administrative, and forensic institutional reforms in the country are politically motivated. Some argue that people need to be educated. But questions arise here: Are not the educated, educated enough? Are not the unlettered tribals far superior, especially with respect to their citizenship consciousness, to the so-called educated in India today? Are not so-called rationalists less rational than the tribals? The pride of a rightful tribal citizen and his allegiance to the state is gone. They have been disillusioned. Representatives of their own folk share in the booty in the political scramble and the ordinary tribals' interests remain un-served and their fundamental rights are ignored or violated.

Citizens as Subjects: Ill-Fated Tribals

It seems that the political persons, bureaucrats, those who hold power and rule the country have not yet rid themselves of the colonial mindset. In every sphere, in every walk of life, citizens are maltreated like subjects in the colonial style. The rulers behave as brown sahibs. The rule of law has become personalised and subjective. In pursuing one's own personal goals the interests of the society and the state are ignored. It dearly costs the society and the state. Individual citizen's rights, responsibilities, and duties are not attended to. One cannot claim his or her rights with dignity. Either one has to submit to persons holding those powers, or manipulate one's network of socio-political relationships to get justice. Citizens are reduced to mere subjects. The tribals would not have tolerated this; they would have risen in rebellion. Under the present circumstances tribals are looked upon as lesser, second grade citizens. The undesirable consequences of this state of affairs in the country is where citizens suffer indignity and where the rich turn a blind eye to the poor and the impoverished need to be dealt with effectively. Without this, the national economic growth will devour its erstwhile legitimate citizens, such as the

tribals and spell disaster for the populace of the country. It is time India’s national policies and its role in international politics and economics were reviewed from a citizenship perspective. In order to achieve health and happiness of the country the tribal citizens’ rights need to be protected first.

Reflections: Tribes in History—Politics and the Problematic

It can be argued that the problem in history is the historians’ bias itself, that “the State is superior to people”. In their descriptions, kings, queens, events, and affairs of kingdoms receive so much attention that the people who helped build and sustain the kingdoms are simply forgotten. The citizenry is found missing. Even when depicting rebellions and revolts against kings, the historian’s focus is on the kings rather than the rebels. They have much to say about how the rebels were crushed but not much about how well they had fought. In the absence of a people’s history, ethnographers and social anthropologists have produced accounts of peoples, their societies and cultures, by conducting fieldworks in several regions of the world.⁸ Although social anthropologists, in several contexts, have described and discussed tribal polity centring on tribal kings and chieftains, they have paid scant attention to tribal societies’ interaction, liaison, and integration with the larger regional body politic. This perspective is particularly missing in ethnographic writings on Indian tribes. The problem is that whatever we see and experience as tribal is not necessarily tribal *sui generis*. In search of indigenising individual tribes, people found out better political solutions to their social problems. It is time that this problem was addressed, not merely by dealing with tribal citizenship, but also in all intellectual debates where tribals in India matter.

How to Go About Citizenship in Praxis?

India should be reimagined from a citizenship perspective and action plans need to be drawn as follows:

1. Unity in diversity is the key characteristic of Indian society and this has a bearing on the Indian polity. Indian states which have been carved out along linguistic lines must give priority to promotion and enrichment of these state languages; and the national language Hindi must be reinforced, and English as the language for international communication encouraged. Tribal languages need to be preserved and promoted. Ethnic affinity and religious orientations of people have to be reconsidered from the perspective of citizenship rights and responsibilities.

⁸The relevance of history and folk history in anthropological ethnographic reports has been discussed by Schnepel and Nayak (cf. Nayak 2001a; Schnepel 2004).

Citizens should feel at home while communicating in the public sphere and open their mind and intellect to the world beyond their tribe. Language should not act as a barrier for participating in state affairs.

2. Although global influences have impacted the lifestyle of Indian people, the core culture continues to remain vibrantly alive. In many instances, the tradition is reemphasized and reinvigorated and the civilisational values are reiterated. Tribal cultures are often given a raw deal due to our misconceptions about them and their culture, and therefore they need to be reconsidered and the positive aspects of their cultures must be highlighted as part of an educational programme for all citizens of India. A coherent cultural policy should be formulated to keep the tribal culture at the centre of tribal society.
3. A comprehensive environmental education policy needs to be adopted and implemented at all levels in all educational institutions to make the citizens environment friendly. Tribals are very conscious of the environment and attach utmost importance to it for ensuring quality of life. This connection to the earth needs to be inculcated in the minds of the people in a programmatic way, which would provide a fillip towards founding a global citizenship that cuts across ethnic, regional, and national boundaries. A world forum on environment and citizenship rights, duties, and obligations could permit policies and the implementation of programmes that ensure a securer life on earth.
4. Citizenship “from below” and not merely “from above” should be embraced as the motto. Societies and states must have a one-to-one interaction and participatory citizenship needs to be promoted. We draw these lessons of citizenship in practice from our tribals.

Conclusion

The story of “kingly citizenship” is not a complete story,. The submission is that the concept of citizenship, as it is understood in modern terms, suffers from a bias: It as if people in traditional societies have societal biases and cultural moorings from which they are unable to leave to imagine a state and envision citizenship. The little exercise made above challenges such an assumption. Even non-literate tribals that inhabit and occupy hills and forests in India vigorously practiced citizenship, integrating society and the state through assertive individuals.

In the modern world citizenship has emerged as a key issue. Debates address who is and who is not a citizen. Growing regionalism, territorial separatism, linguism in India has posed a challenge, an internal threat to the nation state no less powerful than any external threat. The problem is the functional prerequisites of citizenship, such as awareness of the rights of freedom, equality, and respect for pluralism need to be met quintessentially. Nations and the nation states need to inculcate a spirit of proud citizenship in the citizenry and clearly delineate their rights and responsibilities. This calls for citizenship education. Reform of the Indian state institutions is now even more important than economic reform. During

the past decade, material well-being has reached a higher level but moral well-being has not been attained. In the midst of a booming private economy, many tribals feel that they have been given a raw deal; they are marginalised and deprived of their land and territory rights. In general, there is despair over most basic public services which neglect the poor. When the state’s intervention is needed, it performs appallingly. Almost every transaction of the citizen with the state is morally flawed. Emergence of assertive citizens is the need of the hour. To conclude, one would say, the tribal variant of citizenship could be embraced and espoused as an appropriate tool for ensuring the success of the state and its citizens.

References

- Kulke, Hermann. 2010. “Centres Out There? The Feudatory States of Orissa.” In *Centres Out There? Facets of Subregional Identities in Orissa*, edited by Hermann Kulke and Georg Berkemer. New Delhi: Manohar
- Ministry of Tribal Affairs. 2002. *Report of Working Group for Empowering the Scheduled Tribes during the Xth V Year Plan*. Government of India.
- Mitra, S.K. 2009. Transcript: Interview with Professor P. K. Nayak, Dept. of Anthropology, Utkal University conducted by Professor Subrat K. Mitra on 22 February 2009, Utkal University, India.
- Nayak, Prasanna K. 1989. *Blood, Women and Territory: An Analysis of Clan Feuds of Dongria Konds*. New Delhi: Reliance Publishing House.
- Nayak, Prasanna K. 2000 “Tribal Development: From Sport to Sonata to Science.” *Adivasi*, vol. 39. Bhubaneswar: SCSTRTI.
- Nayak, Prasanna K. 2001a. “Jagannath and the Adivasi: Reconsidering the Cult and its Traditions.” In *Jagannath Revisited. Studying Society, Religion and the State in Orissa*, edited by Herman Kulke and Burkhard Schnepel. , New Delhi: Manohar Publications
- Nayak, Prasanna K. 2001b “Revisiting Tribes and Reconsidering Tribal Development.” *Adivasi*, vol. 40, Bhubaneswar: SCSTRTI.,
- Nayak, Prasanna K. 2003. “Social, Cultural and Linguistic Variations in Tribal Orissa.” *Tribes of Orissa* Bhubaneswar: SCSTRTI.
- Nayak, Prasanna K. 2004. “Tribal Development: Challenges and Responses.” *Adivasi*, vol. 41. Bhubaneswar: SCSTRTI.
- Nayak, Prasanna K. 2007a. “What Tribal Development is Not: Some Reflections”, *Discussion Paper*. Bhubaneswar: DSA Publications, Dept of Anthropology, Utkal University.
- Nayak, Prasanna K. 2007b. “Owning the King: Ethno-Cultural Politics in Bhuiyan Pirha.” *Man in Society* 17: 19–69.
- Nayak, Prasanna K. 2010. “The Rise and Fall of ‘Tribal’ Development in Orissa.” *The NewsLetter* 53: 20–21.
- Schnepel, Burkhard and Georg Berkemer. 2004. “History of the Model.” In *Sharing Sovereignty. The Little Kingdom in South Asia*, edited by Georg Berkemer and Margret Frenz., Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag
- Schnepel, Burkhard and Georg Berkemer. 2005. “Kings and Tribes in East India.” In *The Character of Kingship*, edited by D. Quigley. Oxford: Berghahn Publishers.
- Tripathi, Gaya C. 2010. “The Transformation of a Tribal State into a Centre of Regional Culture: The Case of the Bhanjas of Keonjhar.” In *Centres Out There? Facets of Subregional Identities in Orissa*, edited by Hermann Kulke and Georg Berkemer. New Delhi: Manohar

Chapter 12

Building Citizenship: The Agency of Public Buildings and Urban Planning in the Making of the Indian Citizen

Julia A.B. Hegewald

Abstract Julia A. B. Hegewald explores the significant role played by *visual elements* in the making of citizenship. By focusing on the two sites of New Delhi and Chandigarh, the chapter examines these issues during two crucial periods of Indian political history: the colonial and the post-independence eras. When planning the new capital city in New Delhi architects and urban planners were conscious of the need to address two distinct audiences: the British public at home and the local Indian population. The second case, Chandigarh, illustrates the challenges the Indian postcolonial elite faced after Independence. Although an entirely national approach to building and planning, drawing exclusively on local South Asian traditions and motives could have been taken at this stage, an even stronger borrowing from the West can be observed.

This chapter will explore the significant role played by visual elements, in this context, the design of public buildings and the layout of newly-founded capital cities, in transforming subjects into citizens.¹ By focussing on the two sites of New

¹This differentiates between “subjects” who can be marginal social groups that share the same territorial space as their fellow men and women, but not the same conditions, and “citizens,” who are entitled to enjoy all the political and social rights, and are required to be morally committed to the nation. For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see the comprehensive introduction by Mitra in this volume (2010). With regards to the British colonial period and even to Britain today, the situation is slightly different. According to archaic constitutional powers, the British technically are “subjects” of the Queen and not “citizens” (Dillon 2001). However, also when referring to Britain in this chapter, the same terminology is used, as it was not the aim of empire builders and modern politicians to rule voiceless and inactive subjects, but to create through their buildings and city plans a population which is actively engaged, who feel and behave as citizens. I am grateful to Dr. John Zavos for pointing out this British anomaly in the terminology. Despite this special situation, foreign nationals who wish to apply for UK naturalisation or for permanent residence in

J.A.B. Hegewald (✉)

University of Manchester, School of Arts, Histories and Cultures, Manchester, UK

e-mail: julia.hegewald@uni-bonn.de

Delhi and Chandigarh, this chapter will examine these issues during two crucial periods of Indian political history: the colonial and post-independence eras.

I am aware that the “agency of objects” has been much debated by sociologists and their critics.² In the cases analysed in this chapter, the actors or agents who make ideas flow are at first politicians and rulers, and afterwards the architects and urban planners they hire. However, as I will illustrate in the following paragraphs, nonhuman objects, such as public buildings and city structures have an agency in so far as they trigger associations, feelings and visions in the onlooker, and as such clearly influence their emotions and views. If architecture and urban design did not have a proven psychological effect on humans, much less capital would have been invested by influential people into these powerful forms of art.³

When analysing the shape and decoration of the governmental headquarters⁴ and the plan of a new capital city built under British colonial rule in India, it becomes apparent that architects and urban planners were conscious of the need to address two distinct audiences: the British public at home and the local Indian population. Although this was strongly debated by politicians and architects at the time, the reached consensus aimed to provide an architecture in which both parties were meant to find themselves reflected and to a certain extent represented. The second case, Chandigarh, illustrates the challenges the Indian postcolonial elite faced after independence. Although an entirely national approach to building and planning, drawing exclusively on local South Asian traditions and motifs, could have been taken at this stage, an even stronger borrowing from the West can be observed. As Western modernism was equated with progress, the transcultural flow from Europe to Asia continued with European architects in leading positions in Asian projects. Although it might go too far to call this a reverse cultural flow, there are references to local stylistic and religious aspects in the architecture of European builders in Asia.

Having examined two sites, their public buildings and the logic of their urban plans in detail, the following section examines the comparative case. Are the Indian examples unique or do they reflect more general global approaches and phenomena prevalent at the time of their conception? A number of contemporary illustrations

the United Kingdom need to pass an official government citizenship test. Only then can they apply for UK citizenship (http://www.workpermit.com/uk/naturalisation/life_in_the_uk.htm last access: 18.02.2010).

² Particularly active and influential in this area are the two French sociologists Bruno Latour and Michel Callon and the British sociologist John Law. All three support the concept of the “Actor-network theory” (ANT), in which institutions have both material and semiotic significances.

³ See, for instance, publications such as *Morality and Architecture* (Watkin 1984), *Architecture & Order: Approaches to Social Space* (Pearson and Richards 1994), *Experiencing Architecture* (Rasmussen 1995) and *Building Ideas* (Hale 2000), which examine the psychological powers of architecture and structured space.

⁴ The wider category of public buildings contains railway stations, post offices, museums, public libraries, schools and universities, and an entire range of other institutions. In this preliminary chapter on the subject, however, the emphasis will mainly be on governmental headquarters at national and state levels.

from South Africa, Australia, China, Bangladesh, Brazil, and Pakistan outline similarities as well as differences, leading to valuable conclusions with regards to the agency of architecture and urban planning in the area of citizenship making in India.

It is fascinating that there is a more recent shift in Asian architecture, starting roughly in the 1980s, towards the creation of new, national or state-level parliamentary complexes, South Asian and modern in style, by local South Asian architects.

The conclusion sets the specific material examined in this chapter into a wider context and investigates questions of the cultural and conceptual flow in citizenship making, the case of the “reluctant citizen” in connection with visual tools and of a reverse flow. The latter started with the Orientalist style of the Victorian age but continues in different forms to the present day. The mechanics of counter flow are based on power relationships. Flow used to be asymmetric because of the underlying uneven power relationship. With booming economies in the East, cultural flow has started to reverse. A number of recent constructions, public buildings designed by South Asian architects throughout the Western world, illustrate Asian architects as global citizens contributing to a counter flow of ideas and visual images back to the West.

Public Buildings and Citizenship in India

The following two sections will examine the design choices encountered in colonial government buildings in New Delhi and in those of the modern Capital Complex in Chandigarh. This will outline various exchanges between Western and Eastern ideas and architectural traditions. Palaces, the residences of rulers and governments and legislative buildings have always played a vital part in representing the state and its citizens. The following quote emphasises the particular importance of public buildings for society and the creation of a national identity.

In the history of mankind, temples and palaces have been the most important buildings for the representation and protection of cosmic and temporal power. Without these two building types, the foundation of empires would have been inconceivable. Moreover, a national identity cannot develop without architectural representations of these sources of power. (Volwahn 2004: 7)

A crucial role in providing governmental edifices with a distinct national, local, or supranational colonial face is played by symbols and motifs which have been employed in the imagery of these public edifices. The present chapter will focus on the exterior image of these buildings. Security concerns usually provide obstacles when studying and documenting the interior of these control centres of power. However, because ordinary citizens are not provided with direct access to governmental residences and parliamentary and legislative assemblies either, architects had to rely on conveying their message to the citizens through the exterior shape of buildings and the decoration of their facades.

The Design of the New Government Buildings in New Delhi

Public buildings, as visual expressions and symbols of state and government, play a crucial part in allowing the public to identify with the ruling elite, and in turning mere accidental subjects into conscious and committed citizens. This fact was clearly utilised by the British colonial rulers when deciding on and planning the design of their governmental headquarters in New Delhi in the early twentieth century. At the Coronation Durbar on 12 December 1911, at which Queen Mary was proclaimed Empress of India, King George V announced that the seat of government would be transferred from Calcutta to Delhi.⁵

This demanded the construction of new governmental buildings and a conscious decision about their style. King George and the Viceroy favoured the application of the Indo-Saracenic style of architecture to the governmental buildings as an appropriate representation of the empire and its diversity in stone. The Indo-Saracenic style usually combines elements from Mughal architecture with the characteristic elements of the Gothic revival, which was popular in the Victorian Britain of the late nineteenth century. However, at the same time, the Indo-Saracenic style refers to a combination of classical and Mughal architecture, which was the combination to be used in the case of Delhi's new public architecture. The Indo-Saracenic style appealed especially to British politicians as it was seen to make a fitting political gesture towards India (Tillotson 1989: 105). The Viceroy, Lord Hardinge of Penhurst, who was Viceroy from 1910 to 1915, wanted the public buildings of the new capital to appear Indian to reflect the position of Indians in the colonial government. However, in order not to offend the British in India and at home, a compromise in the form of a blended style, which would integrate Indian features and motifs, was suggested. Because of the significance attached to this choice of style, which would send political messages to the people of India, to those in Britain and in the wider world, and due to the enormous expense associated with raising entirely new government headquarters on the flat ground of the Delhi plains, these issues were extensively discussed in House of Commons in London.⁶

Appointed with the task of designing the new capital and its major buildings were the two British architects Sir Edwin Lutyens (1869–1944) and Sir Herbert Baker (1862–1946). They were advised by a group of other architects including Sir Samuel Swinton Jacob (1841–1917), who was responsible for the Indian

⁵ Although King George did not provide reasons for this relocation, several issues are believed to have played a role. One aim was to remove the government from the increasingly tense political conditions of Bengal and from the instability of Calcutta, and a second was to escape the relatively uncomfortable climate of hot and humid summers (Tillotson 1989: 103; Metcalf 1989: 211, Volwahn 2004: 11). Another reason, which will be explored in more detail later in this chapter, is the historical associations of the site of Delhi with great ruling dynasties. Furthermore, the new capital was located in a strategically more central position within the country. Volwahn stresses the importance of creating a clearly visible sign of British rule over the princely states of India (2004: 18, 78).

⁶ For further details on these debates, see Tillotson (1989: 105) and *The Parliamentary Debates* (1912–13, 5th ser. Vol. 41, pp. 1910, 1919), on which he bases his analysis.

architectural details.⁷ However, his involvement was not strongly felt as he had recently retired and returned to England.

The use of the Indo-saracenic style was a political gesture which created much controversy at the time. Particularly at home in England, some felt that Britain should set a clear example and build a city which showed the greatness of the empire and was distinctly British in nature and design. There were clear voices in Parliament and in the British press at the time who warned that an integration of Indian motifs and anything less than a confident and purely Western style would threaten the survival of the empire.⁸ Others, such as the architects John Begg, F. O. Oertel and E. B. Havell, rejected the application of a Western style of architecture and favoured a purely Indian architecture to reflect the present and future of the country and the significance of erecting buildings at a historically important site in India (Metcalf 1989: 215–216). Interestingly, for them, Indian architecture was largely Mughal architecture, exemplified by Akbar's strongly Hinduised palace buildings at Fatehpur Sikri (1571–1585 CE) in Uttar Pradesh.⁹ Baker and Lutyens, taking the side of those favouring a Western style were initially strongly opposed to the integration of Indian details as prescribed by the politicians. Baker argued that “it is the spirit of British sovereignty which must be imprisoned in its stone and bronze”, which led him to conclude that it was the style of public buildings in Britain which should be reproduced in India (Baker 1912: 8). Because of their reluctance to engage with Indian architecture, the Viceroy sent Lutyens and his assistants on a study tour of Agra and Jaipur to view Mughal and Rajput buildings in the spring of 1912, and to Dhar and Mandu to study early sultanate architecture in the following December (Tillotson 1989: 106; Volwahren 2004: 179). Lutyens commented after his return that “there are lots of, but no real architecture and nothing is built to last not even the Taj . . . Personally I do not believe there is *any* real Indian architecture or any great tradition” (Lutyens 1991:123).

The fact that the political associations and significance of such seemingly decorative details were at the forefront of the architects' minds is clear from an article in *The Times*, in which Baker argued that he hoped that the interweaving of elements from different traditions would “symbolize a ‘happy marriage’ of political ideas” (Tillotson 1989: 118). E. B. Havell, who strongly supported local crafts and building traditions, hoped that the cooperation of Indian builders and British architects “would prove that Indian and British Imperial interests were not antagonistic, but really and truly identical” and lead to a “reconciliation between Eastern and Western ideals” (Metcalf 1989: 214). The combination of styles was a clear

⁷ Samuel Swinton Jacob is the author of the *Jeypore Portfolio*, a twelve volume work on architectural details including 713 detailed plates, prepared under the patronage of His Highness Maharaja Sawai Madhu Singh of Jeypore (Jaipur) and published by B. Quaritch in London between 1890 and 1913.

⁸ Supporters of this countermovement looked primarily to the classical style of buildings designed by Inigo Jones (1573–1652), Sir Christopher Wren (1632–1723) and their followers in the eighteenth century as desirable models for representing the might of the British homeland in the colonies (Tillotson 1989: 106).

⁹ According to Oertel, this was due to the merging of Hindu and Muslim styles in the palace at Fatehpur Sikri in a “really national Indian style” (Metcalf 1989: 216).

attempt by the British to win over the Westernised English-educated Indian elite, whose active engagement in the areas of law and politics was becoming increasingly risky to the rule of the British Raj in India.¹⁰

Lutyens was responsible for the design of the Viceroy's House, the official residence of the Viceroy,¹¹ which was given a prominent position in the overall layout of the government buildings and the surrounding city. Baker was in charge of designing the Secretariats, divided into the north and the south blocks. Together, these public buildings were grouped on a low hill known as Raisina.¹² Slightly later, Baker was also delegated the design of the Council House, which served as the central legislative assembly.¹³ Lutyens was in control of designing the layout of the streets around the governmental headquarters and the All India War Memorial arch, nowadays better known as India Gate. New Delhi and its public buildings were formally opened and inaugurated in February 1931.

Both Lutyens and Baker accomplished similar results in the design of their eclectic buildings, although Lutyens has generally been credited with achieving more of a fusion of East and West.¹⁴ Both began with classicism as the basic style of their buildings. The classical tradition was seen as an embodiment of order and rationalism and regarded as a style suitable for symbolising the empire, which regarded itself as an embodiment of these specific qualities. For Baker, the classical style symbolised the "conception of orderly government" (Tillotson 1989: 121).

To this classical core, Lutyens and Baker added various Indian architectural elements. The buildings were furnished with the characteristic dripstones, locally known as *chajjas*. These allow rainwater to run off, provide a certain amount of shade, and play a central role in structuring the facades of indigenous historic buildings. In the architecture of New Delhi, they take the place of friezes in classical architecture. There are regular occurrences of domed pavilions, *chattris*, and of protruding balconies, *jharokas*. These are supported on elaborate brackets and often integrate pierced stone work, called *jalīs*. Following the local Hindu and Jaina technique of construction, openings, such as doorways and windows, are frequently bridged by corbelled arches.¹⁵ In other situations, we find arches making

¹⁰ This issue has been discussed in more depth in Metcalf (1989: 218).

¹¹ Today, the Viceroy's House is the official residence of the President of India, and known as Rashtrapati Bhavan, commonly translated as President House or the Presidential Palace.

¹² The fact that Baker's two Secretariats were also constructed on Raisina Hill, which was not initially intended, upset Lutyens' original design and led to a design fault, whereby the Secretariats obscure the view towards the Viceroy's House due to the steep gradient of the approach road leading up the hill. Amongst others, this issue has been explored by Irwin in his chapter "Quarrel at Rasina" (1981: 142–165) and by Tillotson (1989: 123–124).

¹³ The circular Legislative Building was planned and constructed between 1919 and 1928. Today, it is known as Parliament House.

¹⁴ This becomes clear in the design achieved by these artists and in the writings they produced on their works and on the task they saw themselves confronted with. See, for instance, the discussion in Tillotson (1989: 118–122).

¹⁵ These are not true arches made of a van of voussoirs, which are wedge-shaped building blocks held together by a coping stone at the top, but are based on a post and lintel system, which is horizontal in construction.

Fig. 12.1 Indian architectural elements have been combined with classical features in the design of Herbert Baker's Secretariats in New Delhi



reference to the tradition of Mughal architecture in India. Also the colour scheme of the new government buildings, combining locally available red and buff-coloured sandstones, alludes directly to the prominent use and celebration of this striking colour combination specifically in Mughal architecture (Fig. 12.1).¹⁶

There are even more direct references to Indian motifs, for example, in Lutyens' Viceroy's Court. The pillars are adorned with bell and chain motifs, known from indigenous temple architecture. There are sculpted elephants, which in an indigenous context are prominently found at the entrance, for instance, to Jaina temples. There are fountainheads in the shape of snakes and many references to lotus designs, both of which are central elements of Indian architectural decorations.

Another remarkable reference to local architectural traditions is to be found in the towering element above the roof of Viceroy's House. The central dome or tambour makes direct reference to early Buddhist stupa architecture at Sanchi (third century BCE) in Madhya Pradesh. This becomes particularly clear with regards to the hemispherical dome and the railings associated with stupa number three at the site.¹⁷ Visual references to Sanchi are not simply aesthetic but bear a political message. The pilgrimage centre was founded by the Emperor Ashoka, who succeeded for the first time in Indian history to unite almost all of the territory of the modern state of India under his rule. To have such a clear symbol of a unified Indian empire, raised above the seat of the representative of the British Crown in

¹⁶ The combination of red and white is already used in earlier Islamic architecture in India, such as the Alai Darwaza, constructed in 1311, in the complex of the Quwwatul Islam Masjid in Delhi. However, during the later Mughal period, and especially in the buildings raised under the patronage of Shah Jahan, this colour scheme gained an iconic significance. Jains too frequently combine these two contrasting colours in the outer design of their temple structures. In Hinduism red is linked to blood and white to milk, two essential substances used in Hindu ritual. To mark the sacredness of temple precincts, their walls are often painted in red and white stripes.

¹⁷ Parallels can furthermore be drawn between the shape of the central dome on Viceroy's House and the domed towers of the fort at Gwalior, located in central India as well. The reference to the architecture of Sanchi, however, is more direct.

India, would very likely have been meant to show the fusion of the Indian and the British empires under British rule. A clear reference to Islamic structuring of space is found in the water gardens surrounding the stately residence. The formal gardens with water basins and fountains lining King's Way at the front, and those lying behind Viceroy's House directly reflect the tradition of formal Mughal water gardens.

It is fascinating to observe that the architecture of the government buildings on Raisina Hill can be related to certain architectural models in the West as well. The government buildings at Washington D.C. in the United States of America are similarly raised on a low mound and there are undeniable parallels in the design of the central rotunda of Viceroy's House and the Capitol in Washington. Further parallels can be established with the architecture of the Pantheon in Rome and with St. Paul's Cathedral in London.

Making direct reference to the classical orders of architecture, the style of the new governmental buildings by Lutyens was called the "Delhi Order" (Tillotson 1989: 122). This described the pillars, combining elements of a classical column with the design of hanging bell chains and their capitals, reminiscent of Ashokan examples. One might argue that because the Indian contribution to the governmental buildings in New Delhi largely consists of inserted details, it is questionable whether we are dealing with a real "combination," with a "fusion" or even a "synthesis" of styles, or whether it simply is an "interpolation" of styles and elements.

Baker and Lutyens initially strongly tried to resist the creation of an eclectic or hybrid style of architecture and were very outspoken about this.¹⁸ It is noteworthy that when the government commissioned one of the members of the Archaeological Survey of India, Gordon Sanderson, to make a survey of contemporary Indian architecture in 1913, he concluded that some of the structures he saw were weak in design. Interestingly, Sanderson attributed this deficiency to Western influence and not to the mixing of styles or to the weakness of the indigenous architecture (Tillotson 1989: 110–111, 125). For the local people, however, the style of the new government buildings appears to have worked. When in 1947 the British departed, Indians generally had no problems with accepting these buildings as representative symbols of the new independent India.

The discussion in this paragraph has illustrated that "the architects of Imperial Delhi and the British Viceroy knew exactly how closely interdependent political power was to architectural style" (Volwahn 2004: 7). At the case of New Delhi, I have illustrated the central function of symbols and architectural motifs in the design of public buildings as reflections of the state and its citizens. The integration of local Indian elements into the architecture of government served as a conscious statement and a step towards the Indian citizens of the British crown.¹⁹ Although

¹⁸ See, the quotes provided in Tillotson (1989: 106–107). It is surprising that following their initial hesitation they produced such balanced hybrid constructions.

¹⁹ See footnote 1 at the start of this chapter for the specific constitutional case in Britain and how this is to be understood in the context of this discussion.

the architecture aimed to impress, to represent order and Western philosophical ideals of the enlightenment, it is Indian and local at the same time. The architects involved in this important venture might initially have considered this as a concession, but few would disagree that a certain strength and potency lies in this form of architectural dialogue. The aim of the public buildings at the centre of power in New Delhi was to serve as symbols of a British world empire and India's place within it. They were designed to suggest visions of continuity and to strike allegiances with the past, but at the same time express ideas of change, progress, and modernity.

The Capital Complex at Chandigarh

The latter three points were particularly imperative after independence in 1947. Independent India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964),²⁰ dedicated great importance to the creation of a new capital city for the Punjab. For him, the city had to symbolise the new India, which was meant to be modern, progressive, and forward looking. To Nehru, as to most of India's educated elite at the time, modernism meant Westernism. As chief architect of Chandigarh, Nehru appointed the iconic founder of the modern architectural movement, the Swiss-French architect and town planner, Charles-Édouard Jeanneret-Gris, better known as Le Corbusier (1887–1965).²¹ Le Corbusier was required by Nehru to give India a new architecture, which was free from the traditions of the past (Bahga and Bahga 2000: 43). This was grounded on the self-perception that India was static and trapped in its traditions, that it had to be transformed by what were believed to be the universal if not the enlightened values of modernism (Prakash 2002: 11). These values included scientific progress, the political system of democracy—and in architecture: pure forms and concrete as building material. Le Corbusier's architectural designs were intended to express the transformation India was progressing through and to signal the novel aspirations of a new Indian nation in architecture. This is what Le Corbusier, his cousin Pierre Jeanneret, and their team of European and Indian architects and urbanists set out to deliver between 1951 and 1964.²²

²⁰ As the longest serving prime minister of India, Nehru served from 1947 till his death in 1964.

²¹ Le Corbusier's official title was: Architectural Advisor to the Government of Punjab (Prakash 2002: 4).

²² It is intriguing to compare the modernist architecture of the public buildings of Chandigarh with the design of the contemporary Vidhan Sabha (also known as Vidhan Saudha or Soudhan) in Bangalore, which houses the Legislative Assembly of Karnataka. The foundations for the large legislature were laid on 13 July 1951 by Prime Minister Nehru. However, the edifice combines Western architectural styles with Mughal and local Dravidian features and in this respects stands in the former tradition of the British who aimed to create a hybrid style reflecting the diversity of an empire which in 1951 was long gone.

Fig. 12.2 Le Corbusier's Assembly Hall in Chandigarh borders a water tank and makes direct reference to local palace architecture that overlooks picturesque lakes



Le Corbusier was responsible for the design of the city centre, the Museum Complex and above all the city's Capital Complex.²³ The latter included the prominent buildings of the High Court, the Secretariat, and the Palace of Assembly (Vidhan Bhavan), which houses the State's Legislative Assembly. One of Le Corbusier's major concerns was the dialogue between the buildings, which were set on a vast open plain, and the towering Himalayan ranges behind them to the north. Due to their location on the plains, Le Corbusier recognised that even the smallest building would look monumental.²⁴ Although, in actual fact, Le Corbusier practically tried out and tested the proportions and precise location of individual buildings by employing workmen holding up survey rods (Prakash 2002: 99), he argued that these were derived from a logical planning process based on a system of 400-m². Proportions of all the buildings in the Capital Complex were created by applying his universal measure, the "Modulor Man," a six-foot idealised representation of a human being with one arm pointing up to heaven. At first glance, there are few details available that indicate Le Corbusier's engagement with the specific Indian spectator and with questions of Indian identity. In a way this is what one would expect. Modernism as an international style aims to be devoid of local and historical references.²⁵

However, although the buildings of the new state capital aimed to be modern and Western—or at least international—there are local continuities in the architectural design of the government buildings at Chandigarh. One can argue that water, one of the eternal themes of Indian architecture, continued to occupy an important position in Le Corbusier's designs, especially in the Assembly Hall and the High Court, which face one another across the Capital Plaza and both border water tanks (Fig. 12.2).

²³ His cousin Pierre Jeanneret, Maxwell Fry, and Jane Drew were responsible for the designs of the residential areas and the educational quarters of the new city (Bahga and Bahga 2000: 15).

²⁴ This is an issue which Le Corbusier discussed in his text on proportions, *The Modulor*. In this he writes "We are in (on) a plain, the chain of the Himalayas locks the landscape magnificently to the north. The smallest building appears tall and commanding" (Le Corbusier 1958: 214).

²⁵ See Hajime Yatsuka (1999: 166–189) for a detailed discussion of issues of internationalism and regionalism in modern architecture.

There is a whole line of government buildings and palaces in South Asian architectural history which illustrate this theme. The water visualises the divide between the ruler and his subjects, between the royal or governmental area and the ordinary, and between the private and the public spheres.²⁶ Also the play with mirror images is a central theme, providing connections to the past in approach and design.

The architectural historians William J. R. Curtis and Peter Serenyi have suggested that the portico of the Assembly (parliament) and the front of the High Court at Chandigarh have been derived from Mughal architecture, more specifically from the early seventeenth-century Diwan-I-Am in the Red Fort at Delhi (Serenyi 1983: 110, 113; Curtis 1987: 277; Prakash 2002: 21–22).²⁷ Curtis does not necessarily argue for a direct inspiration or copying, but more for correspondences in principles principals.

Probably amongst the clearest references to indigenous Indian architecture are the roof elements on the Assembly, known as the “solar sculpture.” This has been derived from astronomical constructions, such as the Jantar Mantar in Delhi. Sun symbolism reoccurs in the decorations of the Assembly’s main entrance, a revolving door, which has been embellished on both its sides with a large colourful painting in enamel of animals, such as the bull, and the sun above, representing an abstract depiction of the Punjabi countryside. It is noteworthy that Le Corbusier wrote to Nehru asking him for suitable symbols expressing current ideas relating to social, political, and cultural trends, to be applied to the door. Nehru replied that neither he nor the friends he had consulted were able to solve his problem (Bahga and Bahga 2000: 95). Because the buildings of the Capital Complex are basically in grey concrete, the enamel door with its colourful design can clearly be seen from a distance when approaching the Assembly from the esplanade. It has been suggested that the rough and unadorned concrete architecture of the buildings has been derived from the mud architecture of the villages surrounding the site of Chandigarh (Serenyi 1983: 113). However, it was the material preferred by the architect in most of his other creations worldwide as well.

Returning to the superstructure of the Assembly, it is fascinating to observe that the roof sculpture did not start as a clear reference to astronomical instruments. On his way to the airport in Ahmedabad in June 1953, Le Corbusier noticed and drew the hyperbolic paraboloid cooling towers of the Sabarmati Power Plant, a thermal power station. Impressed by their shape and monumentality, Le Corbusier integrated these into the roof design of the Assembly, which until then had not differed much in design from the neighbouring Secretariat. It is debatable whether one wants to call this an indigenous Indian influence or a Western modernist motif.

²⁶ For further details on this particular issue, see Hegewald (2002: 86–87). See the same publication on the questions of continuity and modernity in South Asian water architecture (2002: 216–219).

²⁷ Curtis refers here to the openness of the design. Earlier sketches of the Assembly Hall indicate that Le Corbusier had envisaged it as a building with an arched front (Bahga and Bahga 2000: 93), which would have been more akin to Islamic forms of planning in India. The realised version, however, reflects a trabeate, post and lintel construction, more akin to traditional Hindu and Jaina building techniques.

The latter interpretation would accord well with Nehru's ambitions to bring about a technological revolution in India. Supporting the former, however, is the fact that Le Corbusier used the hyperbolic tower to admit light to the assembly chamber and that he was concerned that it should resemble a large sundial, throwing light onto crucial objects below and expressing a special symbolic significance. This is further expressed in the decorations affixed to the outside of the tower, which have been derived from the Jantar Mantar mentioned above. The symbolic dimension of the Assembly's tower is further enhanced by Le Corbusier associating the "hump" provided by this tower on the back of the building with the ancient symbol of the bull. As carrier animal of the Hindu god Shiva, but also because of its ancient significance on the seals and in the sculpture of the neighbouring Indus civilisation, this animal carries strong symbolic associations. Probably relating it to a series of studies by Pablo Picasso, Le Corbusier used the French term "taureau(x),"²⁸ to name a series of drawings and paintings that he made on the subject, as well as the "sculpture" on top of the Assembly.

A detailed examination of the buildings of the Capital Complex, the occasional decorative element on the architecture, the sketches made by Le Corbusier in India, and reports on the encounters he had with local architecture, indicate an engagement at least with formal aspects, with shapes and spatial approaches in Indian architecture. Most uninformed observers, however, would probably find it much harder to establish clear parallels with local architectural styles in the architecture of the governmental headquarters at Chandigarh than at Delhi.²⁹ The architect Balkrishna Doshi provides some deeper interpretations of some of the buildings with regards to questions of governance. He explains that the positioning of the main edifices: High Court, Assembly, and Governor's Palace³⁰ as a triangle were "set up to symbolize people's participatory governance" (Bahga and Bahga 2000: 89). However, clarifications such as this demand insider information not readily available to the common observer.

However, a central question that arises is whether feelings of association and belonging can only be reflected with regards to the past and local tradition. I would like to argue that providing India and its population with a visual expression of a modern, progressive and technically-oriented future might have infused people with pride and confidence and would have united them as citizens believing in and fighting for a vision of the future. Whether one considers Le Corbusier's state

²⁸ Balkrishna Doshi, who was travelling with Le Corbusier in Gujarat, recorded his encounter with the cooling towers near Ahmedabad airport. This story and the association with sun and bull are narrated in Prakash (2002: 111–122). For further details, see Bahga and Bahga (2000: 96–97).

²⁹ There are not only references to Indian symbolism but also to the Indian climate. The Secretariat has been oriented in such a way as to benefit from cross ventilation due to the prevailing wind direction. In the High Court, a double roof provides double protection against the heat of the sun and the presence of two superimposed roofs allows air to move freely and to cool the interior of the building (Bahga and Bahga 2000: 102, 109).

³⁰ What was initially planned to be the Governor's Palace was later replaced with the Museum of Knowledge.

buildings a success or not, the influence these creations had on Indian architecture and on the position of architects in Indian society cannot be underestimated.

The analysis of the architectural shapes, the motifs and symbols in the governmental buildings in colonial Delhi and independent Chandigarh, have indicated an engagement of largely foreign architects not only with characteristics of Western architectural styles regularly employed in their home countries, but also with local building traditions common to the Indian cultural area. Feelings of belonging, of association and of citizenship, have been expressed through references to the familiar as well as through citations of “the other” and the foreign. This can be the imperial, and at its root Western grandeur of the Commonwealth, or the international style of modernism, symbolising progress and independence.

The Imagery and Layout of Newly-Designed Indian Capital Cities

Following the analysis of colonial and modern approaches to public buildings from the viewpoint of affecting and inspiring the way people feel about their heads of state, be they a monarch from a distant country or a democratically elected representative, the following will examine the importance of urban planning in the same context. The British and Le Corbusier were not the first to plan cities in South Asia. The region has a long tradition of sacred and trading centres. The following analysis will illustrate that historic and strategic reasons played a significant role in the shaping of India’s colonial and modern city foundations.

Although it might initially seem surprising that the layout of a new settlement might aid the transformation of mere subjects into committed citizens, there is a close relationship between seats of government and capital cities. The urban layout provides a stage for and an approach to the public buildings. Volwahren reminds us that “Both the temple and the palace require an urban environment, not only during periods of construction, but also in order to function” (2004: 7). The poignant statement that “having conquered the world, Alexander the Great controlled it not by the marshalling of troops, but by the founding and establishing of cities of Greek design,” published in 1912,³¹ illustrates that the builders of Delhi were aware of the political importance and the impact their creation would have on the empire and its people.³²

³¹ This quote comes from the 1912 edition of *The Builder* (Tillotson 1989: 106).

³² Easily forgotten are the private lands which were lost and the settlements which had to be moved to make space for large town-planning schemes. We are led to believe that the area providing the ground for New Delhi was mere empty desert, but anybody who has travelled around India is acutely aware that every space is used for some purpose. With regards to Chandigarh, we know that the area was used for farming and contained 24 villages, the inhabitants of which had to be rehoused (Bahga and Bahga 2000: 43). On this level, urban planning aims to create citizens, but at least temporarily can at the same time cause alienation particularly for less affluent groups of society. I am grateful to Professor Barbara Harris-White for drawing my attention to this aspect.

The British were not the first foreign power to annex Indian land and to build political symbols in the form of new city structures. One of the most pronounced statements in this area was made by the Mughal emperor Shah Jahan (1592–1666). Between 1639 and 1649, Shah Jahan built a palace, known as the Lal Qila (Red Fort), and adjacent to it founded the city of Shahjahanabad (Old Delhi) at Delhi. The structuring of space inside his palace and the adjoining city strictly follow Islamic principles of layout. The buildings and streets are formally laid out and based on geometric and axial arrangements. The principal axis of the city, the main commercial thoroughfare known as the Chandni Chowk leads to the palace fort located at its eastern end. The approach towards and into the palace complex symbolises a movement from the public and common to the private and royal areas of the city. The approach from the town towards the palace, and meeting with the sovereign at the end of the axis, was carefully and psychologically planned. The aim was to impress and to intimidate the visitor, with the emperor as the final climax in the long approach.

The site for Shah Jahan's new capital city had been consciously chosen and was loaded with historic and political meaning. The emperor chose a site well-known for previous royal cities, both Hindu and Muslim and, by doing so, Shah Jahan placed himself, his rule, and his citizens, into a long line of powerful dynasties, who had all ruled from Delhi. Shah Jahan's settlement represents the seventh city foundation on this site.

Western and Eastern Inspirations in the Street Plan of New Delhi

In the light of the continuity of the site of Delhi, King George V's announcement of the transfer of the capital of British India from its former location at Calcutta to Delhi, takes on a specific significance. On the plains outside Shahjahanabad, the seventh city at Delhi, the British raised the eighth capital city at this historic location. Contrasting with the earlier "Purana Dilli" or "Old Delhi," they named their new foundation "New Delhi." This was designed to symbolise the enduring supremacy of the British Raj in India. George V's decision was motivated by a wish to stabilise India by uniting the different princely chiefdoms and territories under his rule. His plan has generally been judged a success. The Raj are believed to have developed a new national identity, and the *maharajas* of India, who had lobbied for a transfer of power to northern India, largely regarded it as an honour to have their residences in new imperial Delhi (Volwahren 2004: 7, 11).

The form and layout of the city were predominantly shaped by Lutyens and Baker. The town plan and the streets surrounding the centre of government in particular were designed on a hierarchical plan. This aimed at emphasising the might of the Raj, and is in many ways similar to the carefully designed Mughal approach towards the emperor in the Red Fort. The axial layout of New Delhi, focussing on the linear layout of the dominating central avenue of King's Way, now known as Rajpath, was designed to celebrate the authority and might of the Viceroy

as the representative of the British crown, seated on his throne in the Durbar Hall of Viceroy's House.

The clearly planned and geometrically designed layout of New Delhi reveals references to a number of Western city models, indicating a flow of ideas from West to East. As an architect and planner, Lutyens was strongly influenced by the classical tradition and specifically the monuments of ancient Rome and the Italian Renaissance. Typical of his time, Lutyens had largely worked in the British Georgian style, which incorporates elements from Palladianism and from the classicism of continental Europe. This formal canon, with an emphasis on clarity, symmetry, and frontality, in which Lutyens had been trained, was believed to agree well with the colonial objectives of international British foreign policy at this time (Volwahren 2004: 33). From a background of perceived unlimited military strength and a belief in the cultural superiority of the colonial overlords, various Western monumental city models were considered by the British architects and urban planners.

Amongst these archetypal historic city models, employed as inspirations for the new imperial capital of British India, was Georges-Eugène Haussmann's plan of Paris. The radical transformation of the capital city of France by Napoleon III under the guidance of Haussmann was largely implemented between 1852 and 1870. There are direct parallels between the Arc de Triomphe in Paris, with its twelve radiating avenues, and the layout of the All India War Memorial standing at the centre of a similar star of streets.³³ The hexagonal street pattern surrounding the Champs Élysées in Paris is supposed to have acted as a model for the street layout around King's Way in Delhi. Particularly pronounced is the axial sequence of the Louvre palace, followed by the obelisk in the Place de la Concorde and the triumphal arch of the Arc de Triomphe, which were directly reproduced in the new capital of India. In New Delhi, the three consecutive architectural elements are the Viceroy's House, the Jaipur column and the All India Memorial.³⁴

Although the Parisian model probably had the strongest bearing on the British imperial planners, there are a number of earlier but related capital cities which also appear to have impacted on the design. Sir Christopher Wren's unrealised plan for the rebuilding of central London after the Great Fire of 1666, for instance, shows similar frameworks of radial street patterns, which were further developed in the plan for Paris. It is likely that both were based on an even earlier example of axial road patterns found in the urban plan of ancient Rome.³⁵ The town plan for imperial

³³ Although the All India War Memorial changed its name to India Gate, it is fascinating to observe that the renamed triumphal arch—and New Delhi as a whole—were not destroyed or torn down as the disliked symbols of unpopular colonial rulers. The concept of re-use offers the opportunity for some elements to survive but to be given a different position or meaning in a new framework. On the concept of re-use see Hegewald and Mitra ([forthcoming](#) 2010).

³⁴ For further details on the Parisian model in the urban plan of New Delhi, see Volwahren (2004: 34–37).

³⁵ This can, for instance, be observed in the road pattern at the Piazza del Popolo in Rome. Volwahren has written on this connection (2004: 38).

Fig. 12.3 Connaught Circus, the circular commercial centre of New Delhi planned by R. T. Russel is related to ancient and contemporary Western models



Delhi includes other allusions to Classical architecture and to town planning elements of the Italian Renaissance. A sketch by Lutyens dated 14 June 1912, indicates that he studied the space created at the front of Bernini's colonnades which forms St. Peter's Square in Rome, when designing the area in front of the Viceroy's House.³⁶

Interlinked to the centre of power, the palace of the Viceroy and its representational parade streets is the commercial centre of New Delhi. Connaught Circus forms the centre of this trading hub. Between 1928 and 1931 it was planned on a strictly circular plan by Robert T. Russel, the Chief Architect to the Government of India (Fig. 12.3).

At the centre is a large public garden, Connaught Place. Based on ideas raised in the last paragraph which connect the architecture of New Delhi with Classical models, the circular layout of this market area can be linked to the architecture of the Coliseum in Rome, though with the outer facade turned inwards in Delhi's case (Volwahren 2004: 41–42). Furthermore, the layout of Connaught Circus is directly related to similar round and oval-shaped plazas in England with some of the best known illustrations in Bath in the West Country. These are John Wood's circular arrangement of town houses known as the Circus, realised between 1754 and 1768, and the semi-circular Royal Crescent, designed by his son John Wood the Younger, dating from 1767 to 1774.

Similar in layout is the early nineteenth-century semi-circular terraced crescent designed by John Nash at the foot of Regent's Park in London, called Park Crescent. As symbols of fashionable living for the bourgeoisie, these well-known urban layouts were replicated throughout the country, for instance, in Pittville Circus Road in Cheltenham and in Park Town in Oxford—and then throughout

³⁶ A reproduction of this drawing has been published in Volwahren (2004: 83).

the empire.³⁷ Contrasting with the commercial use of this design in India is the strictly residential nature of the earlier architectural models in Britain. Furthermore, the architectural arrangement in Delhi is much larger than any of the British examples, and Connaught Circus consists of two concentric rings of buildings. The application of this striking geometric town-planning concept in India, however, appears not only to present the transfer of a popular fashionable design, but also to carry deeper symbolic meanings. John Wood Senior was a Freemason, and his son and much of British society and royalty at the time, were interested in Masonic concepts of geometry. The street layouts in Bath reflect on a gigantic scale the stellar bodies of the sun and moon (Curl 1991: 91), and many of the buildings in the Circus at Bath, bear decorations of Masonic symbols in the form of the square and the compass and other architect's tools which are used in Masonic ritual. (Volwahren 2004: 40, 42). There are other elements in the town plan of New Delhi which will be analysed in the following, which indicate an influence of the symbolism of the Freemasons.

The town plan of New Delhi with its hexagonal arrangement of wide streets and the positioning of key monuments at important junctions, which are often roundabouts, can moreover be related to the layout of Pierre Charles L'Enfant's plan of Washington D.C., in North America. President Washington established the city of Washington D.C. in 1790 as the capital of the new United States of America. It is not surprising that when, in 1911, Britain's King George V in his capacity as Emperor of India, founded a new capital, he turned to and took inspiration from this famous centre of power, and by relating his new foundation to the prosperous capital of the United States of America, made significant symbolic connections.³⁸ Herbert Baker and Lord Hardinge clearly expressed their appreciation of the design of the city and the Viceroy ordered plans of Washington D.C. (and of Paris) for the Delhi town planning team before work commenced (Volwahren 2004: 44). There are clear connections in the layout of the Capitol and its radiating avenues in Washington D.C., specifically in the mall leading to the triumphal arch, and the government buildings on Raisina Hill at Delhi. Both reflect an earlier Parisian archetype. Interestingly, the plan of the new capital of the United States combines other elements from prominent European city models and illustrates that eclectic town planning, as emphasised in the example of Delhi. It was not unique and almost

³⁷ The appeal of these crescent-shaped streets was that they provided the upward-moving groups of society of the time with affordable terraced housing that had a distinct quality of appearance and appeal. The strictly planned semi-circular residential street known as Park Town in Oxford was planned by Samuel Lipscomb Seckham (1827–1900) between 1854 and 1855. It consists of two crescents of town houses at the end of a straight approach lined by large town houses. The central area of the crescent forms a public garden.

³⁸ At the same time, Washington D.C. served as model for the newly-founded city of Rabat in Morocco, planned and realised by Henri Prost between 1910 and 1920. Rabat is characterised by a similar radial street network and is known as the "Washington D.C. of Morocco" (Çelik 1999: 197). Ten years later, the same system served as a plan for Ernst Hébrards urban extension of Hanoi in French-Indochina.

generally practiced in the process of designing new capital cities which were meant to signal some cultural and imperial continuities.³⁹

In the urban plan of Washington D.C., the connection with symbols and concepts of the Freemasons is even more pronounced than in the plazas discussed in England. Washington D.C. displays a clear grid pattern in its street layout, which is punctuated by diagonal roads creating hexagonal and triangular shapes. The triangle and the hexagram are established Masonic symbols.⁴⁰ Even more than in Paris and Washington D.C., these provide the basic pattern of imperial Delhi's town plan. Since the eighteenth century, members of the Royal Arch of English Freemasons have worn the hexagram in a circle as their emblem, and many members of the Royal Family and of British high society in the early part of the twentieth century are supposed to have been Freemasons. Therefore, the triangle and the hexagram as prime planning principals in the urban plan of Delhi seem not to have been an unintentional choice. Tillotson judges the layout of Delhi as "not successful. It is a confusing web of triangles stacked in hexagons with a roundabout at each junction" (1998: 124). However, the previous analysis explains one side of the double symbolic significance of this basic layout based on the symbolic forms of triangle and hexagram. In addition to the Western Masonic symbolism in the plan of Delhi, these shapes can be related to indigenous Indian traditions—Mughal and Hindu or Jaina—as will be argued in the following.

The presence of triangular and hexagonal shapes in the urban plan of Delhi makes clear reference to traditional indigenous Indian architecture. Especially in abstract architectural decorations from the Mughal period, the combination of hexagrams (star-like shapes formed from two equilateral triangles) and hexagons (created at their centre and often surrounding them) figure prominently. The use of these designs in Lutyen's town plan can therefore be argued to demonstrate a link between the British crown and the past splendour of the Mughal Empire, which was already celebrated in the choice of the site. The same symbolic shapes are encountered in sacred diagrams of Hindus, Buddhists, and Jainas, such as *yantras* and *mandalas*, used for visualisations and meditation, but at the same time for planning sacred space.⁴¹ Particularly from a Hindu background, clear evidence is available that illustrates the use of symbolic shapes in the planning of temple complexes and

³⁹ In addition to planning concepts taken from Paris, London, and Washington D.C., there are references to urban elements from the plans of Madrid, Amsterdam, Naples, Venice, and Florence (Volwahren 2004: 43).

⁴⁰ A hexagram is produced by superimposing two triangles, one pointing up (to heaven) and one pointing down (to earth). In Freemasonry, the hexagram is the symbol of "The Great Architect of the Universe" (The Almighty).

⁴¹ In Hindu *yantras* in the shape of a hexagram, the two triangles represent the union of the male (*purusha*) and the female (*prakriti*) principles. In Shiva *yantras*, they symbolise Shiva and Shakti. It is intriguing that the same shape of the hexagram also plays a focal role in Judaism in the form of the Star of David and in the Chinese I Ching. We know that through his wife, Lady Emily, who was a member of the Theosophical Society, Edwin Lutyens was familiar with sacred Hindu symbolism and symbolic shapes (Volwahren 2004: 64). For a detailed study of *yantras*, see Khanna (1994).

cities.⁴² Consequently, motifs derived from indigenous traditions can also be shown to figure prominently in the urban plan of New Delhi.

The new imperial capital of the Raj at Delhi aimed to combine the might and splendour of the great European capitals, such as Paris and London, and that of the United States of America. Although these three models figure most prominently, additional ideas came from the Piazza del Popolo and the Pantheon in Rome. The political significance of the choice of powerful city models as inspiration for Delhi has been well expressed by Volwahren. He writes “It was a matter of which motif, perspectives and spatial orders most effectively illustrated the British Crown’s claim to leadership” (Volwahren 2004: 33). Further inspiration came from the model of the English garden city, such as the then Hampstead Garden Suburb near London.⁴³ Delhi as a subtropical garden city integrated large areas with lawns and gardens into its new layout and reflected the idea of life close to nature, which was propagated in the ideal of the English garden city.⁴⁴ These foreign imported ideas of spatial planning were applied to an ancient Indian site, associated with great Hindu and Muslim ruling dynasties, and combined with Indian symbols, prominently figuring in the street layouts of this new imperial capital. This created a process of town planning which was neither English nor Indian and transformed New Delhi into one of the great international and cosmopolitan cities of the world.

The imperial capital was of significance in the establishment and development of an emerging national consciousness in India. This is clearly expressed by the fact that after independence the importance of the capital did not decline. In June 1948, when the last Viceroy Lord Mountbatten, who had served for another 10 months as governor general, left Delhi, the president of the Republic of India moved into the palace of the British Viceroy, a democratically elected parliament took up its seat in the Legislative Building and the former imperial city of the Raj functioned instantly as the capital of an independent India.

⁴² Drawings illustrating the underlying *yantra* and *mandala* shapes below temples and city plans can, for instance, be found in Khanna (1994: 147–148), Stierlin (2002: 65) and Fischer, Jansen, and Pieper (1987: 13).

⁴³ Interestingly, Lutyens appears to have been chosen at least in part for the great project in Delhi because of the planning experience he acquired whilst planning Hampstead Garden Suburb (Tillotson 1989: 104). Today, Hampstead is part of London. More generally, the concept of the English garden city was developed as a solution to many problems of residential living in the late nineteenth century. Giedion has written on the reasons for the creation of this ideal of living (Giedion 1965: 466). For more details on the influence of the English garden city on New Delhi, see Volwahren (2004: 48–51).

⁴⁴ Tillotson questions the success in the application of ideas of the English Garden City in Delhi by saying that “Its debt to the Garden City makes it less of a city than a giant cantonment” (Tillotson 1989: 124). Volwahren wrongly attributes this quote and Tillotson’s criticism of the hexagonal street patterns quoted before to Sten Nilson (Volwahren 2004: 51, footnote 16).

Planning a New Capital City of the Punjab

After independence and partition, which had led to the loss of Lahore as the traditional state capital of the Punjab, one of Nehru's principal concerns was the creation of a modern state capital. A number of Indian civil servants, foremost amongst them A. L. Fletcher and P. L. Varma, worked on the plan in the initial stages. It is remarkable that in 1949 there was substantial opposition, even from Nehru himself, to have the plans of the city drawn up by a Western architect who would not be sufficiently acquainted with local conditions in India.⁴⁵ In this light, the American urban planner Albert Mayer (1897–1981), who at that time was already working in Uttar Pradesh, seemed to offer a reasonable compromise. Interestingly, Nehru had recommended Otto Koenigsberger for the post but he was not selected (Prakash 2002: 159, f.n. 18). Koenigsberger drew the master plan for the new state capital of Bhubaneswar.⁴⁶ Mayer drew up the first two study master plans for the urban layout of Chandigarh and commissioned the Polish-born American architect Matthew Nowicki (1910–1950) to work on the design of individual buildings.⁴⁷ Nowicki died unexpectedly in a plane crash and the government of Punjab reassessed the entire team of town planners. P. N. Thapar, the state administrator, and P. L. Varma, the chief engineer, were sent to Europe with a list of possible candidates drawn up by Otto Koenigsberger (Bahga and Bahga 2000: 12) and this led to the commissioning of the British architect couple Maxwell Fry and Jane Drew with responsibilities for the architecture of the residential and civic structures, who recommended Le Corbusier for the urban planning. Under the condition that his cousin and architectural partner Pierre Jeanneret would be employed on the project as well, Le Corbusier agreed. As has been discussed above, the Swiss-French master of modernism designed the key government buildings of the Capital Complex although his main focus was the urban layout of the city of Chandigarh in the form of the master plan. As much as its public buildings, the new capital city aimed to express ideas of modernism, progress and independence. This was Nehru's vision who had outlined this in rousing words:

(...) this shall be the new city of free India, totally fresh and wholly responsive to the aspirations of the future generations of this great country, and that the city shall be free from all shackles and shall be unfettered by the traditions of the past—the city shall be so built

⁴⁵ Nehru wrote to Varma in 1949 “I wonder if you have explored the possibilities of getting the master plan made in India. . .there is too great a tendency for our people to rush up to England and America for advice. The average American or English town-planner will probably not know the social background of India. He will therefore be inclined to plan something which might suit England or America, but not so much India” (Prakash 2002: 39). This was further supported by the Chief Minister of Punjab, Gopi Chand Bhargav, who wrote to Fletcher and Varma, a “Town Planner from abroad will not know the conditions of India” (Prakash 2002: 39).

⁴⁶ Koenigsberger's layout of Bhubaneswar and the design of the governmental buildings of this newly-founded city will be explored in a longer version of this chapter.

⁴⁷ His birth name was Maciej Nowicki.

and nurtured that it shall be a model for our glorious future growth of the country. (Bahga and Bahga 2000: 43)

For Le Corbusier, the urban project of Chandigarh, which involved the building of an entire city from scratch, represented the largest and most ambitious realised project of his career (Prakash 2002: 21).

Le Corbusier worked at Chandigarh between 1951 and 1964. Contrasting with Mayer's earlier plan and with traditional Indian settlements, most of which have grown organically over long periods of time and are typically characterised by narrow and complex networks of lanes, Le Corbusier's plan consists of a spacious and strictly ordered grid of wide streets. This appears to have been a reaction to the urban implosion he had witnessed in many cities around the world, which lacked structure and design and had housing and transportation problems. Le Corbusier's aims in city planning in general were the decongestion of city centres, improvements in the infrastructure, and an increase in open green areas for cities (Bahga and Bahga 2000: 41). These are issues which he clearly implemented in the design of the new capital of the Punjab.

The urban design of Chandigarh generally works well for its more affluent levels of society, who own lavish bungalows set in large gardens and travel around by car. For ordinary Indians, however, the city plan displays a number of flaws, and has been described as "un-Indian" (Prakash 2002: 33). This is because the city does not harmonise with a need for shade in the hot Indian climate or with the general use of open public spaces for markets and socialising. Particularly at the time of Chandigarh's formation, the majority of its population did not use automobiles for their everyday travel needs.⁴⁸ Although this criticism has also been voiced in connection with cities such as Delhi, which have been designed on the idea of the English garden city, and with regards to British cantonments in India, Chandigarh has such a low density of inhabitants and of built fabric that it lacks a clear sense of place.

Chandigarh further aimed to break with traditional patterns of urban design. The city was structured into sectors, so-called "superblocks," which all contained housing for lower, middle, and higher income groups (Bahga and Bahga 2000: 44). This deliberate mixing of groups of society is counterintuitive to the social stratigraphy based on castes and professions known from traditional Asian cities. Traditional spatial structuring based on profession and social position has been best preserved in the layout of sacred temple cities in the south of India.⁴⁹ Despite the criticism expressed of the urban framework of Chandigarh, subsequently planned urban centres, such as Gandhinagar, the new capital city of Gujarat conceived in the early 1970s, and the smaller Goindwal Sahib near Amritsar, which was planned in the early 1980s, make direct reference to Le Corbusier's modernist city layout.

Although Nehru demanded the new capital city to be modern and Western in style, it is clear when contrasting Chandigarh with Le Corbusier's other conceptions

⁴⁸ These issues have been explored in more detail in Tillotson (1989: 128).

⁴⁹ At the other end of the Indian subcontinent, there have been a number of studies outlining social structuring of space in cities in the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal (Gutschow 1982).

that he did engage with local Indian conventions, at least on certain levels. Private houses throughout the city are usually only two or three stories high and differ clearly from the high-rise constructions associated with Le Corbusier, for instance, in the south of France. This even applies to the ten-storied Secretariat. Earlier designs for the elevation of the building show it as a much taller skyscraper.⁵⁰ The bungalow style of free-standing residences set in gardens and a city divided into separate sectors also reflects the ideal of the garden city already popularised by Lutyens in Delhi.⁵¹

It is fascinating to note that Le Corbusier compared architecture and cities to a human body. In architecture this was expressed through the image of the “Modulor.” For Le Corbusier towns have a brain, a heart, lungs, limbs, and arteries (Bagha and Bagha 2000: 45). The Capital Complex was placed at the top of the urban structure because Le Corbusier associated it with the brain or head of the imagined underlying human being. The city centre with its office buildings and commercial areas represented the heart, parks, and the green belt surrounding the city symbolised the lungs, the educational and industrial areas of the city stood for the extremities, and the streets and footpaths corresponded to the circulation system in this imagined anthropomorphic city. Although no direct evidence can be provided for Le Corbusier’s knowledge of traditional Indian city plans and their link with underlying demonic or divine figures, it is remarkable that this is an area which is highly-developed in religious town planning in South and Central Asia. According to local mythology, a demoness rests below the city of Lhasa in Tibet⁵² and anthropomorphic interpretations of the city of Suchindram in Tamil Nadu depict a female goddess womb below the town. The central Shiva temple occupies the space of the underlying womb of the female divinity as if she was pregnant with the central god of the town.⁵³

Another sacred image, popular in India, and allegedly responsible for providing the logic for the network of roads leading into the city of Chandigarh, is that of the tree or the leaf (Bahga and Bahga 2000: 47–48). Although many of the city’s roads are tree-lined, it is hard to detect a foliage pattern in the rectilinear road layout. At times the planners used language to describe their conceptions, which more strongly express sociological ideas than urban realities.

⁵⁰ See the earlier drawing of a design suggestion for the elevation of the Secretariat and the later design in which the building has been “laid flat” in Prakash (2002: 68–69, Figs. 2.7 and 2.8).

⁵¹ The ideas of the garden city and bungalows in gardens leading to a very low density of inhabitants were already promoted by the city’s first urban planner, A. L. Fletcher, and continued under the Americans Albert Mayer and Matthew Nowicki, before Le Corbusier’s engagement in the project (Prakash 2002: 12–13, 39).

⁵² The earth demoness is supposed to have been subdued by Padmasambhava (Guru Rinpoche), one of the most important promoters of Buddhism in Tibet. Padmasambhava is said to have pinned her down to the ground and Lhasa’s principal temple, the Jokhang, was constructed above the heart of the underlying demoness.

⁵³ A reproduction of the city plan of Suchindram, illustrating these issues, has been published by Pieper (1987: 53).

Clearer evidence for a motif underlying the positioning of key buildings at Chandigarh, however, is provided in a sketch drawing by Le Corbusier. The drawing juxtaposes the plans of two capital cities: Delhi and Chandigarh, and shows that he looked towards Delhi in his positioning of the government headquarters.⁵⁴ This fact was directly referred to in Le Corbusier's opening speech when he acknowledged that New Delhi had served as the model for his work at Chandigarh (Volwahren 2004: 8).

Searching for indigenous models of Chandigarh, one might look back even further to the cities of the Indus Valley culture, dating from the third millennium BCE, to discover similar grid patterns in street layouts. It is difficult to prove whether the rectilinear street grids in Le Corbusier's Chandigarh reflect the ancient ideal of town planning in the neighbouring Indus Valley, whether they constitute a reference to classical Greek town planning, or whether oriented structured grids express a common approach to spatial planning and structuring not linked to one specific context or tradition. Similar street patterns provide the basis also for many modern American cities, such as Manhattan in New York, and can be found all around the world.

This section has focussed on the newly-founded capital cities of New Delhi, planned and built by the British between 1911 and 1931, and the state capital of the Punjab, Chandigarh, commissioned by Nehru and designed and raised by Le Corbusier and his urban team between 1951 and 1964. The founding of New Delhi in particular illustrates a combination of indigenous and foreign ideas and city models in order to represent New Delhi's position as an imperial capital of what was then one of the world's most influential powers and its connection with Indian soil. In Delhi, the case for a combination of different approaches, indigenous Eastern and imported Western, can be made more easily than in connection with Chandigarh. With regards to Nehru's dream to construct a city and an architecture which lack any association with the past, one has to question whether this would at all have been possible. Nehru's powerful statement, however, clearly illustrates the desire for change and a new dynamic beginning, which motivated politicians and citizens alike at this crucial point in India's history. Although one can argue for indigenous continuities in the plan of Chandigarh, its primary aim was to provide a new vision, a break with the past, a new order, and to reflect the position of the new India through technological progress, modernity and prosperity.⁵⁵ Chandigarh is not known for revolts and civil unrest. Might this indicate that the order of the city was successful in shaping committed citizens?

⁵⁴ For a reproduction of this drawing by Le Corbusier, see Prakash (2002: 48, Fig. 2.6). This author includes another sketch juxtaposed with an aerial photograph of the axis of King's Way leading to the government buildings, which further support this point (Prakash 2002: 47, Fig. 2.5).

⁵⁵ It is interesting that Le Corbusier's work in the West has been perceived in the same terms. Whereas Indians might have associated Modernism with the West, modern architecture in Europe constituted as much a break with the past and with tradition as it did in India. Le Corbusier used the expression "l'esprit nouveau" to indicate this rupture and applied the expression as the title of a journal and a series of books, which he edited (Le Corbusier 1960: 48, 58).

Although the colonial power and Indian elected politicians thought carefully about the design of their newly-founded capitals, it is debatable how much ordinary people were aware of these underlying models. The same, however, can be argued about indigenous planned cities and even about traditional temple complexes. Although when seen on a plan, they appear logical and ordered, experiencing them as a visitor, the feeling is more that of a maze and a sequence of small interrelated spaces without a clear understanding of the whole.

Both cities, Delhi and Chandigarh, aimed to create a vision of grandeur, might, and prosperity, a dream and an idea of something new which had never been created on this level and on this scale before. This would very much have sent signals of confidence, feelings of national identity, and of belonging to its inhabitants and to the wider Indian public.

Urban Planning and Public Buildings: The Comparative View

The analysis above has outlined colonial and modern approaches to the design of public buildings and the layout of newly-established capital cities in British and independent India. Delhi and Chandigarh were not conceived in isolation. At the same time government headquarters and capital cities were planned or redesigned in other regions of the world. The question arising from this material is whether the Indian case reflects a common international trend or whether it is unique in certain ways. The following will present a brief examination of a number of related architectural and urban conceptions. A much deeper examination would, however, be required to draw more detailed conclusions.

South Africa, Australia, and China in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries

Sir Herbert Baker, the driving force behind many of the Indian colonial government buildings had an active architectural career in South Africa before starting his work in New Delhi. He accepted his first commission at the Cape in 1893 and designed private houses and mansions, commercial properties, as well as public buildings. Amongst the latter, his earliest creation was Pretoria railway station, designed between 1909 and 1910, followed by a number of memorials, educational and cultural establishments, parts of the Royal Observatory, the Reserve Bank of South Africa, and most famously the Union Buildings, completed in 1913.

Towering above terraced gardens, the Union Buildings form the seat of the government and accommodate the prime minister's office and his ministers and departments. Like most of his South African designs, the buildings are made of the local light-coloured sandstone combined with some elements made of the local

granite. The main inspiration for the layout of the Union Buildings was the Acropolis at Athens and the building, which forms a crescent shape, makes visual reference to the shape of an amphitheatre. Besides the Greek associations found in the Union Buildings, most of Baker's African architectural conceptions reflect the influence of styles prominent in Baker's home country, England, and the Dutch colonial styles used in Holland. The Union Buildings are raised in the neoclassical style, which imitates the Italian renaissance, combined with elements of Edwardian style and Cape Dutch styles. The Union Building which commemorates the unification of South Africa under British rule in 1910 has two wings representing the Boorish (Boerish, Afrikaans) and the English segments of society. Noteworthy, however, and contrasting clearly with the approach to the design of public buildings in New Delhi, there are no references to indigenous local South African society or its architectural and stylistic traditions. The buildings indicate a dialogue between the two colonial powers without a reference to their subjects. The message communicated would probably have been one of external control and might, but not one of persuasion, integration, and citizenship building.⁵⁶

In terms of colonial city planning, the decision to establish a new state capital for a federated Australia known as Canberra predates King George V's decision to establish a new capital at Delhi. The site in the state of New South Wales was selected in 1908 and, following an international competition, the American architects Walter Burley Griffin and Marion Mahony Griffin were commissioned to design an entirely planned city in 1913.⁵⁷ As such, the planning of Canberra and Delhi are contemporary, but Canberra was inaugurated in May 1927, about 4 years earlier than Delhi (February 1931). Following the general spirit of the time, Canberra too was planned as a garden city. Interestingly, Canberra also has a ceremonial axis connecting Parliament House on Capital Hill through a parade street (ANZAC Parade) with the Australian War Memorial. Through the raising of the government buildings on a hill and the creation of radiating streets from this high point,⁵⁸ Canberra stands in a long line of capital cities that make clear references to Washington D.C. and Paris in particular.⁵⁹ However, the street pattern of the city is based on a wheel-and-spoke pattern, radiating out from a centre. Based on this one example, there are a number of parallels in the urban designs of these almost contemporary new colonial city foundations.

⁵⁶ There are a few selective architectural examples from a French colonial background, which, similar to the Indian case, indicate a certain representation of local features in colonial architecture in Tunisia and Vietnam (French-Indochina). These date from the start of the twentieth century (Çelik 1999: 198–200). A detailed exploration of this material will form part of a more comprehensive publication on the issues raised in this chapter.

⁵⁷ The conditions of the competition were problematic and no British architect or urban planner entered into it (Volwahren 2004: 51).

⁵⁸ The streets leading away from Capital Hill lead to the civic and the commercial centres of the city and form a triangular shape. For an illustration, see the map reproduced in Volwahren (2004: 53, Fig. 44).

⁵⁹ Even later, in 1937, Albert Speer developed a similar grand axis for Berlin which was meant to be larger and more imposing than any of its predecessors. This was part of a plan for the modernisation and restructuring of Berlin which, however, was never implemented. For further details, see, Volwahren (2004: 55–57).

A contemporary city project in Asia is the new capital city of Nanjing in China.⁶⁰ It is one of two planned cities, formed after post-imperial and before communist rule in China, which were designed under the considerable influence of the American architect Henry K. Murphy (1877–1954).⁶¹ Murphy arrived in China in 1914, opened an architectural practice and after having designed a number of individual buildings and segments of university campuses, he became the principal advisor on the urban capital plan of Nanjing under Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek.⁶² He worked on this major urban plan mainly between 1923 and 1930. In his designs for individual edifices as well as in his city planning he had to counterbalance two prominent forces: the pull of tradition and the push of modernity, which required the melding of two very different cultural traditions in his architecture and urban planning (Cody 2001: 173, 181). At times he was commissioned to undertake designs in Chinese traditional styles and at other times in Western architectural traditions. Despite these different dynamics, Murphy's involvement brought American municipal modernity to China. Murphy was hired in 1928 as the chief architectural adviser to the Nanjing plan. He was assisted by a number of American assistants and by British and American-trained Chinese engineers.

Murphy's dream was to create a truly modern but culturally wholly Chinese city. He aimed to achieve this by preserving what remained of ancient Nanjing, by raising buildings in the Chinese tradition, but by combining these with wide streets and pavements to ease traffic circulation and to create an ordered city. An interview conducted by the journalist Chester Rowell indicates clearly that architects and observers were aware of similar urban foundations in the past, such as L'Enfant's plan of Washington, but that they were equally aware of contemporary planning activities at New Delhi in, India and at Canberra in, Australia (Cody 2001: 183). Nanjing was conceived as an icon of nationalist political ideals. It aimed to reflect the pride of the nation and to serve as a symbol of trust and respect for the government (Cody 2001: 1984–195). The Government Centre or Capitol Hill at Nanjing was located on the eastern outskirts of the capital and was connected by an axis with Sun Yat-sen's tomb. Although this axis recalls similar arrangements described in the West, at the same time it reflects traditional Chinese ideas of spatial planning. Nanjing was planned as a structured but wholly Chinese modern capital. Although only parts of it were ever built, Chiang Kai-shek made Nanjing China's state capital in 1927. Its further expansion and realisation were forcefully stopped through the destructive bombardment of the city by the Japanese in 1937, which destroyed nearly 90 % of all the city's buildings.

⁶⁰ I would like to thank Professor Rudolf Wagner for suggesting a comparison with the utopian plan of Nanjing.

⁶¹ Murphy participated in an earlier American-Chinese cooperation in the city of Guangzhou between 1911 and 1921 and again between 1921 and 1927 (Cody 2001: 173–182).

⁶² Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) was a Chinese revolutionary and political leader. He played a leading role in overthrowing the Qing Dynasty in 1911 and in establishing the Republic of China in 1912. The political and military leader Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) was Sun Yat-sen's successor who defended nationalist values and fought the establishment of communism in China.

The case of Nanjing appears to be unusual for its period. It was not commissioned by an imperial power but by an independent China, which gives the impression of being more open to Western and industrial approaches to city planning than its principal urban planner, an American concerned with preserving the Chinese character of the city.⁶³ However, it further emphasises an international fascination with the founding of new capital cities in non-Western countries as a reflection of new beginnings and modernity in the period between the two world wars. It also illustrates an alternative approach to the general tension between local, traditional, and Western styles of architecture in non-Western art, architecture, and city planning at the start of the twentieth century, namely a stronger emphasis on local features than has usually been realised in a colonial context.

Modern Approaches in Bangladesh, Brazil, and Pakistan

Moving forwards in time, a good comparable case with regards to the public buildings of the Capital Complex at Chandigarh is roughly contemporary with National Assembly Complex in Dhaka in Bangladesh. In 1961 the government of Bangladesh, at that time regulating the areas of West and East Pakistan, appointed Louis I. Kahn (1901–1974), an American architect from an Estonian Jewish background, to provide them with the design for the new governmental headquarters. The complex, locally known as Sher-e-Bangla Nagar, is one of the largest legislative complexes in the world. It took more than 20 years to complete and building on the complex continued well after the death of its creator.⁶⁴ Kahn designed the Assembly Buildings, consisting of three edifices (plazas), residences for the members of the parliament and set these into an artificially designed landscape of lakes and lawns spreading over an area of nine hundred acres.

The buildings were designed as monumental abstract sculptures with geometrical cut-out shapes as openings, which seem to float on water. The literature on the Dhaka Assembly often stresses the links to ancient and local themes and traditions (Iffrig 2008), however, as in the case of Chandigarh, these are not easily discovered. The architectural historian Lawrence Vale writing about post-colonial governmental complexes writes “To a large degree, many post-colonial capitol complexes are, like ancient citadels, a refuge for rulers rather than a vehicle for the sharing of political power.”⁶⁵ The view expressed by Vale with regards to these monumental modern buildings is shared by many citizens of Bangladesh, who find it difficult to

⁶³ Questions of the preservation and protection of indigenous architecture also played a role in the British and the French colonial environment, but were at least initially seen as a separate issue from the building programs of the colonial power and their self-representation.

⁶⁴ Work on the complex commenced in 1962. Louis Kahn died in 1974 and the National Assembly Building was completed between 1982 and 1983.

⁶⁵ This section comes from Lawrence J. Vale’s *Architecture, Power and National Identity* (1959), as quoted in Khan (1995: 20).

associate themselves with the abstract neutral shapes and the monumentality and brutalism of the architecture.⁶⁶ In many ways, the architecture of Chandigarh and of Dhaka expresses similar approaches, but in Chandigarh, the public buildings were set into a newly-designed urban framework.

With regards to planned capital cities, which are more or less contemporary with Chandigarh, I want to focus on two sites in particular. One borders the modern state of Punjab, and the other is far removed from India. Starting with the latter, after an open public competition for the design of the new capital city in 1957, Brasilia was planned and developed by two of the best known Brazilian urban planners and architects: Lúcio Costa (1902–1998) and Oscar Niemeyer (born in 1907). Costa was largely responsible for the urban plan and Niemeyer, one of the most important names in international modern architecture, for the design of the principal buildings. In less than 3 years, the city was planned from scratch in the underdeveloped Brazilian hinterland. From 1960 it formally acted as the national capital of Brazil. As in Nanjing and Chandigarh, there is a strong emphasis on wide roads and unobstructed traffic flow in Brasilia. Therefore, the focal axis of the city is a six-lane highway cutting through the city from north to south. A second axis is lined by federal and civic buildings. At the heart of the city lies the Square of Three Powers, surrounded by the executive, judicial, and legislative buildings. The city as a whole is in the form of an irregular cross, suggesting the image of a bird or butterfly, or, from a modernist viewpoint, that of an airplane. Similar to Chandigarh, the city is divided into superblocks and these too combine housing for different social classes. In many ways, Brasilia and Chandigarh express a similar zeitgeist, a utopian project in which the car, traffic arteries, and monumental concrete buildings dominate the cityscape. Brasilia, however, with its more than three and a half million citizens, was conceived on a much larger scale.⁶⁷ This has amplified the problems highlighted already with regards to Chandigarh. Although since 1987 Brasilia has been a UNESCO World Heritage Site, it was not designed for pedestrians and its vast vistas are largely empty and deserted.

Contemporary with Brasilia, and the geographically close Chandigarh, is the newly-founded capital city of Islamabad. Karachi acted as temporary state capital after partition in 1947. Because Karachi had been the old colonial centre, had a reasonably hot climate, and was strategically vulnerable, being located on the coast of Pakistan, a transfer of the capital was decided. In 1958, a site in the north, on the edge of the Himalayas, not far from Rawalpindi, was selected, which would also counterbalance the distribution of commerce and wealth in the country. Islamabad, the “city of Islam,” was formally planned and built as a modern city divided into eight individual sectors or zones in the 1960s. The sectors measure about two kilometres square and are as such about four times the size of a sector at Chandigarh (Bahga and Bahga 2000: 54). Contrasting with British, American, and German involvement, as outlined in Indian and Chinese capital cities above, the master plan

⁶⁶ For high-quality reproductions of the complex see Brownlee and De Long (1991: 232–257).

⁶⁷ Based on the 2001 census, Chandigarh has roughly 1.16 million inhabitants.

of Islamabad was drawn up by Konstantinos Apostolos Doxiadis of the Greek firm of architects known as Doxiadis and Associates. Major changes have been undertaken since the plan was completed, but originally it was designed in the shape of a triangle or fan with a formal grid plan for roads. At the tip of the triangle is the Red Area containing the government buildings and cultural institutions.

It is easy to get lost in detail when comparing the situation outlined in India with other public buildings and capital cities of comparable date around the world. The essential conclusions of this last paragraph, that focusses on the comparative view, are that the British colonial approach to the design of the new government headquarters in New Delhi, which aimed to combine Western with local Indian elements, turns out to be relatively unique for its time. We are led to believe by the architectural format employed after much discussion, that the aim of Lutyen's and Baker's architecture on Raisina Hill undoubtedly was to impress and possibly even to intimidate, but equally to offer elements of recognition and integration to the *maharajas* and the Indian public. From this point of view, they are particularly interesting in our study of public buildings as "agents" in transforming ruled colonial subjects into responsible and engaged citizens.

Although less obvious in the architecture at first glance, a similar approach became visible to us the more we penetrated into the reasons behind the design of the Capital Complex at Chandigarh. From a distance they appeared to fulfil their role as illustrations of a modern international style, devoid of local influences. However, the roof sculpture on the Assembly, the enamel door with its symbols, the water basins, and other elements suggest levels of engagement, which are not at first obvious. Based on this lack of immediate understanding one has to ask, however, whether these references to local traditions would have been apparent to the ordinary Indian observer or whether it was more the aspect of the novel forward-looking design, indicating a technologically-based modern future for India, which was seen in these concrete structures.

Striking, especially with regards to city planning, is the prevalent engagement of foreign architects, may they be the British, German, or Swiss-French architects in India, an American in China, or a Greek in Pakistan. Brasilia is the only major modern urban conception discussed here which was planned and built by Brazilian urban planners and architects. Writings on these cities often stress the absence at that time of qualified local town planners, trained in modern techniques.

A Confident Modernity in South Asia

It is noteworthy that in the late 1970s a shift towards a more confident approach to local architecture can be noticed, and from the 1980s it appears to have become more common for South Asian architects to be involved at least in the design of public buildings.

The Sri Lankan architect Geoffrey Bawa (1919–2003), who planned the New Parliament Complex at Kotte in Sri Lanka, is a good example of this. Whereas

Bawa's early work still reflects the neutrality of the international modern style as represented by Le Corbusier, later designs such as the Triton Hotel at Ahungalla (1979–1981), de Soya House (1985), and the Kandalama Hotel at Dambulla (1991) clearly illustrate the development of a local regional modernism.⁶⁸ This form of contextual modernism, which is more akin to the climate and cultural traditions of Sri Lanka were also applied in the new parliamentary buildings outside Colombo. The New Parliamentary Complex at Sri Jayawardenepura, Kotte, is located on an island in a lake, makes ample references to Sri Lankan traditional roof forms and decorations, and is still a modern and future-oriented construction which expresses the aspirations of a modern government and confident, proud Sri Lankan citizens.⁶⁹

Similarly, the Indian architect Charles Correa (born in 1930, Hyderabad) designed the Vidhan Bhavan, the local state government of Madhya Pradesh at Bhopal between 1980 and 1996. The entire complex of buildings is conceived on a circular plan, divided into nine areas. Local associations with three by three square *mandalas* immediately spring to mind when examining the plan.⁷⁰ The nine segments are divided into five cross-like central areas, accommodating halls, courtyard spaces, and gardens. Sequences of open and enclosed spaces are common in traditional Indian architecture, such as palace buildings. In the Vidhan Bhavan the four corner elements form the Lower House (Vidhan Sabha), the Upper House (Vidhan Parishad), the Combined Hall and the library. The buildings are decorated, the hemispherical roof of the Vidhan Sabha makes direct reference to the ancient Buddhist architecture situated in the state, and as may be seen in other of Correa's conceptions, a courtyard mirrors the pyramidal step formations of local water places in the form of *kundas*.⁷¹

Like Bawa, Correa's work has been praised for succeeding in adapting modernism to local conditions and to non-Western cultures. The buildings of the state government of Madhya Pradesh are modern but are seen as very immediate reflections of the state, its traditions and culture, and its people, who are modern empowered citizens. It is constructions such as the ones discussed in this paragraph which have to a large extent contributed to a contemporary reverse-flow of ideas back to the West, which will be discussed in the following. However, there are already earlier occurrences of this reverse-dynamic.

⁶⁸ For photographs illustrating early and later projects by Bawa, see the excellent webpage of the Geoffrey Bawa Trust (<http://www.geoffreybawa.com/>).

⁶⁹ Further details on the architecture of the new Sri Lankan Parliament can be found in Taylor (1995) and Hegewald (2002: 219).

⁷⁰ For a plan and photographs of the parliamentary complex, visit the architect's own webpage (<http://www.charlescorrea.net/>).

⁷¹ This is not the only place where Correa has made use of this particular feature. For an analysis of similar *kunda*-like step formations in courtyards in the Bharat Bhavan at Bhopal (1982), the Jawahar Kala Kendra at Jaipur (1986–1990), and the Centre for Astrophysics at Poona (1992), see Hegewald (2002: 216–217).

Conclusion: Cultural Flow and Reverse-Flow

The present publication, of which this contribution forms one chapter, considers the creation of citizenship and citizenship making as a conceptual flow of ideas and influences. This chapter has focussed on visual elements, the architecture of public buildings and the layout of capital cities, in the process of citizenship building. In this context, a number of areas have been outlined in which actors—monarchs and presidents, politicians, architects, and urban planners—have consciously employed and transferred architectural shapes and motifs, as well as urban shapes and concepts of spatial structuring, in order to generate a conceptual and cultural flow of ideas. Concepts “flow” because these agents consciously chose to transfer ideas in order to establish parallels, create continuities, or clear-cut breaks and partake in grand conceptions of the past or future in order to set the ruler or government and its citizens into a wider and more clearly defined historical and ideological framework.⁷²

The material presented above has indicated a number of areas in which Western elements and styles—such as classicism or the Georgian style—as well as idealised plans of Western capital cities—such as Paris and Washington D.C.—have travelled eastwards. In addition, we have outlined instances of more localised flows within the East, such as the integration of the hexagram, which plays a prominent role in decorations from a Mughal Islamic background, in Hindu and Jaina *yantras*, and in Buddhist *mandalas*. This local flow can be identified in the modern period as well, for example, in the Sun Sculpture and the Sun Door by Le Corbusier. To a certain extent, this can be identified as a reverse flow but only in conceptual terms, as it is Western architects employing Eastern motifs in their work—but only in Asia.

I have argued that there are two important strands or approaches in the formation of citizenship through visual means. One emphasises the “known” or “familiar,” the “traditional,” and offers continuity to the people. This might have been achieved by integrating chain and bell decorations and elephant, snake, and lotus motifs into the colonial public buildings when addressing an Indian audience, and by employing classicism as a basic architectural framework when bearing a British clientele in mind.⁷³ This indicates that in less homogenous societies, distinct laws, but also particular visual elements, may speak to different sections of the population. A second approach, more typical of the modern period, offers the subject a novel vision, a glance into the future, and persuades him or her, by offering a break with

⁷² This links up very well with issues raised in the chapter by Mitra in this publication, in which he outlines Homi Bhaba’s conceptualisation of the “third space.” Mitra says “Homi Bhaba’s conceptualization of the ‘third space’ captures the spirit of the concept of citizenship, seen as a thread that strings together the past and the future into a coherent design of which the present is the most immediate and accessible evidence” (Mitra 2010: footnote 35).

⁷³ S. Giedion has written on the “Verlangen nach Kontinuität,” “the desire for continuity” especially in urban planning (Giedion 1965: 38).

Fig. 12.4 The headquarters of the British Council in New Delhi were designed by the Indian architect Charles Correa and opened in 1993



the past leading to what is being promised to be a happier and brighter future. Based on debates between politicians and architects, we are aware that the choice of design for public buildings and the use of spatial models for cities were seen as practical tools in citizen making.

In a way, the initial reluctance of Baker and Lutyens to engage with indigenous architecture and to create a hybrid style indicates to a certain extent “reluctant citizens.” They do not revolt and plant bombs but publicly speak out against the representation of indigenous Indian elements in the visual language of the empire. In their eyes and in many of the British public at home, as reflected in newspaper articles and debates in Parliament, the empire was British and Western and should be represented as such. Baker’s and Lutyen’s problem was not that they did not regard themselves as citizens, but that they differentiated between two classes of citizens and favoured representing only one in the imagery of the empire. Similarly, after independence, not everybody shared the idea that India’s future should present a break with the past and an opening towards the West and Western technological progress, as reflected in the architecture of the international modern style. This indicates that the unity of a nation or of an empire, as well as its associated cultural and artistic expressions, are constructs rather than fixed realities, which can be influenced through laws and politics but equally through the use of powerful symbols and commonly understood and recognised styles or spatial concepts.

Although I have indicated an indirect reverse flow in the architectural designs of Western architects in India, the analysis so far has identified a relatively asymmetrical relationship between Europe and Asia in terms of conceptual flow. However, there are areas where a reverse flow of ideas can be outlined. An interesting case is the British Council headquarters in New Delhi. Whereas in the past it was an exclusive domain of British architects to design edifices representing British affairs abroad, the building of the most important British cultural relations organisation in India was built by the local architect Charles Correa in 1993 (Fig. 12.4).

Likewise, the Indian architect Raj Rewal designed housing for the staff of the British High Commission in New Delhi (1994).⁷⁴

There are even clearer cases of a counter flow from Asia, affecting the architecture of British and other European countries. This can be seen in the Orientalism of Victorian architecture in Britain and in contemporary architecture, for instance, in Germany and Belgium.⁷⁵ Whereas chinoiserie was particularly popular in continental Europe,⁷⁶ there are clear examples of architecture in Britain where Islamic, Byzantine, and Egyptian elements were combined with classical and gothic styles to create hybrid forms of architecture. Especially striking amongst these are the Royal Pavilion in Brighton (converted into an Asian-styled building by John Nash between 1815 and 1823), the Crystal Palace in London (designed by Joseph Paxton for the first Great Exhibition in 1851), and many of the public buildings of Liverpool, Manchester, and Glasgow. It is fascinating that at this stage references to architectural styles of the colonies in a British context aided the solidifying of concepts of citizenship and national pride in Britain by providing evidence of the diversity, wealth, and exoticism of the British Empire back at home.

There also are instances where South Asian modern architects today participated in a reverse flow by building in the West. Charles Correa is again a good example. Prominent conceptions in public places are his Memorial Gate, a triple gateway on Constitutional Hill in London (1999), which transfers a common Indian theme in architectural history to England. Correa designed the Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations in New York (1985–92), the MIT Neuroscience Center in Boston (2000–2005), the Ismaili Centre in Toronto (since 2000), and the Champalimaud Centre in Lisbon (since 2007). Amongst further countless projects in Asian countries, Correa's projects are found in Mexico and Peru. Similarly, Raj Rewal's projects are found in Western countries, as exemplified by his housing project in the Olympic Village in Paris (2000), and the Ismaili Centre in Lisbon (2000). Most of these building projects directed by Indian architects in the West are modern and Asian at the same time, transferring South Asian cultural concepts, such as the religious and aesthetic qualities of water, to Europe and America. The creation of hybrid architectural styles, at first in the Asian colonies and then in the West, indicates the development of citizenship in a transcultural and transnational context, an area which continues to change and evolve in our present era of globalisation.

⁷⁴ Interestingly, he also designed the French Embassy Staff Quarters in New Dehi in 1967.

⁷⁵ Good illustrations are the Chinesische Teehaus (Chinese tea house), planned and built by Johann Gottfried Buring between 1755 and 1764 in the Schloss Park in Sanssouci, and the Dampfmaschinenhaus, a pump house built by Ludwig Persius in the centre of Potsdam between 1841 and 1843, which looks like a mosque. Chinese pavilions were raised in other palace gardens, as can be seen in Schwetzingen in the south of Germany.

⁷⁶ Chinoiserie describes a "Chinese-influenced" style popular in much of Europe since the seventeenth century. In architecture, this led to the creation of oriental influenced tea pavilions (e.g. in Potsdam) and pagoda towers. An example of the latter is Sir William Chambers' Pagoda in the Royal Botanical Gardens at Kew near London, a replica of which can be found in the Englischer Garten (English garden) in Munich.

References

- Bahga, Sarbjit, and Surinder Bahga. 2000. *Le Corbusier and Pierre Jeanneret: Footprints on the Sand of Indian Architecture*. New Delhi: Galgotia Publishing Company.
- Baker, Herbert. 1912 (3 October), "The New Delhi - Eastern and Western Architecture - A Problem of Style." *The Times*, pp. 7–8.
- Brownlee, David B. and David G. De Long. 1991. *Louis I. Khan: In the Realm of Architecture*. (Los Angeles: Rizzoli, New York and The Museum of Contemporary Art.
- Çelik, Zeynep. 1999. "Schnittstelle der Kultur: Eine Neue Sicht auf Architektur und Stadt im 20. Jahrhundert." In *Am Ende des Jahrhunderts: 100 Jahre Gebaute Visionen*, edited by Russell Ferguson. Osfildern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz Verlag.
- Cody, Jeffrey W. 2001. "*Building in China: Henry K. Murphy's 'Adaptive Architecture' 1914–1935*." Seattle: The Chinese University Press, Hong Kong, and the University of Washington Press.
- Curl, James Stevens. 1991. *The Art and Architecture of Freemasonry: An Introductory Study*. London: B.T. Batsford Ltd.
- Curtis, William J. R. 1987. *Modern Architecture since 1900*. Oxford: Phaidon Press.
- Giedion, Sigfried. 1965. *Raum, Zeit, Architektur: Die Entstehung einer neuen Tradition*. Ravensburg: Otto Maier Verlag.
- Gutschow, Nils. 1982. *Stadtraum und Ritual der newarischen Städte im Kathmandu-Tal: Eine architekturanthropologische Untersuchung*. Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln, Mainz: Verlag W. Kolhammer.
- Hale, Jonathan A.. 2000. *Building Ideas: An Introduction to Architectural Theory*. Chichester: John Wiley.
- Hegewald, Julia A. B. 2002. *Water Architecture in South Asia: A Study of Types, Developments and Meanings, Studies in Asian Art and Archaeology Vol. 24*. Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill.
- Hegewald, Julia A. B. and Subrata K. Mitra. Forthcoming 2010. *Re-use: The Art and Politics of Integration and Anxiety* (New Delhi: Sage).
- Iffrig, Andreee, 2008 (8. August), "Capital Complex in Bangladesh: Louis Kahn's Architectural Masterpiece for Dhaka". http://architecture.suite101.com/article.cfm/capital_complex_in_bangladesh (accessed on 21.12.2009)
- Khan, Hasan-Uddin. 1995. *Contemporary Asian Architects*. Köln: Taschen.
- Khanna, Madhu. 1994. *Yantra: The Tantric Symbol of Cosmic Unity*. London: Thames and Hudson.
- Le Corbusier, Charles Edouard Jeanneret. 1958. *Modulor 2*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Le Corbusier, Charles Edouard Jeanneret. 1960. *Mein Werk*. Stuttgart: Verlag Gerd Hatje.
- Lutyens, Mary. (1980) 1991. *Edwin Lutyens*. London: Black Swan Book.
- Metcalf, Thomas R. 1989. *An Imperial Vision: Indian Architecture and Britain's Raj*. London, Boston: Faber and Faber.
- Mitra, Subrata K. 2010. "Citizenship as Conceptual Flow: Model, Method and Design for a Comparative Study". Draft paper for Bhubaneswar Conference, January.
- Parliamentary Debates. 1994. "The Parliamentary Debates - 1912–13, 5th ser., vol. 41." In *Architecture & Order: Approaches to Social Space*, edited by Michael Parker Pearson and Colin Richards. London, New York: Routledge.
- Pieper, Jan. 1987. *Das Labyrinthische: Über die Idee des Verborgenen, Rätselhaften, Schwierigen in der Geschichte der Architektur*. Braunschweig und Wiesbaden: Vieweg & Sohn.
- Prakash, Vikramaditya. 2002. *Chandigarh's Le Corbusier: The Struggle for Modernity in Postcolonial India*. Ahmedabad: Mapin Publishing.
- Rasmussen, Steen Eiler. (1959) 1995. *Experiencing Architecture*. Cambridge: The MIT Press, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
- Serenyi, Peter. 1983. "Timeless But of Its Time: Le Corbusier's Architecture in India." *Perspecta* 20: 91–118.

- Stierlin, Henri. 2002. *Hindu India: From Khajuraho to the Temple City of Madurai*. Köln, London, Madrid, New York, Paris and Tokyo: Taschen.
- Taylor, Brian Brace. 1995. *Geoffrey Bawa*. Revised Edition. London: Thames and Hudson.
- Tillotson, Giles H. R. 1989. *The Tradition of Indian Architecture: Continuity, Controversy and Change Since 1850* (Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras: Oxford University Press).
- Volwahren, Andreas. 2004. *Imperial Delhi: The British Capital of the Indian Empire*. Munich: Prestel.
- Watkin, David. 1984. *Morality and Architecture: The Development of a Theme in Architectural History and Theory from the Gothic Revival to the Modern Movement*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Yatsuka, Hajime. 1999. "Internationalismus and Regionalismus." In *Am Ende des Jahrhunderts: 100 Jahre Gebaute Visionen* Russell Ferguson. Osfildern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz Verlag.

Notes on Contributors

Harriss-White, Barbara: University of Oxford, Queen Elizabeth House, United Kingdom.

Hegewald, Julia: University of Manchester, School of Arts, Histories and Cultures, United Kingdom.

Lall, Marie: University of London, Institute of Education, Department of Educational Foundations and Policy Studies, United Kingdom.

Manor, James: University of London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, United Kingdom.

Mishra, Deepak: Associate Professor, Social Sciences, Centre for the Study of Regional Development, Jawarhalal Nehru University, New Delhi, India

Mitra, Subrata K.: Heidelberg University, South Asia Institute, Department of Political Science, Heidelberg, Germany.

Nayak, Prasanna: Utkal University, Department of Anthropology, Bhubaneshwar, Orissa, India.

Pfetsch, Frank: University of Heidelberg, Institute of Political Science, Germany.

Prakash, Aseem: Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Human Development, New Delhi, India.

Schöttli, Jivanta: Heidelberg University, South Asia Institute, Department of Political Science, Heidelberg, Germany.

Spiess, Clemens: Heidelberg University, South Asia Institute, Department of Political Science, Heidelberg, Germany.

Zavos, John: University of Manchester, School of Arts, Histories and Cultures, United Kingdom.

Bibliography

- Acharya, Ashok. 2001. "Equality, Difference and Group Rights: The Case of India." Doctoral Thesis, University of Toronto. www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp05/NQ63760.pdf
- Adeney, Kathrine and Marie Lall. 2005. "Institutional Attempts to Build a 'National' Identity in India: Internal and External Dimensions." *India Review* 4 (3): 258–286.
- Alston, P. (1994) 'International Law and the Right to Food' in B. Harriss-White and R Hoffenberg (eds), *Food: Multi-disciplinary Perspectives*, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 205±16.
- Alston, P. 1994. "International Law and the Right to Food." In *Food – Multidisciplinary Essays*, edited by B. Harriss-White and R. Hoffenberg. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Altvater, Elmar. 1993. *The Future of the Market: An Essay on the Regulation of Money and Nature After the Collapse of 'Actually Existing Socialism'*. London: Verso.
- Andersen, Hanne. 2000. "Kuhn's Account of Family Resemblances: A Solution to the Problem of Wide-Open Textures." *Erkenntnis* 52 (3): 313–337
- Anderson, Benedict. (1983) 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Angenendt, Steffen, ed. 1997. *Migration und Flucht*. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung).
- Appadurai, Arjun. 1990. "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy". *Public Culture* 2 (2) 1–24.
- Asad, Talal. 1990. "Multiculturalism and British Identity in the Wake of the Rushdie Affair". *Politics and Society* 18 (4): 455–480.
- Asad, Talal. 1993. *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Bahga, Sarbjit, and Surinder Bahga. 2000. *Le Corbusier and Pierre Jeanneret: Footprints on the Sand of Indian Architecture*. New Delhi: Galgotia Publishing Company.
- Banik, Dan. 2007. *Starvation and India's Democracy*. London: Routledge.
- Baruah, Sanjib. 2008. "Territoriality, Indigeneity and Rights in the North-East India." *Economic and Political Weekly*. 43 (12): 15–19.
- Baruah, Sanjib. 2009. "The Partition's long shadow: the Ambiguities of Citizenship in Assam, India." *Citizenship Studies*. 13 (6): 593–606.
- Basile, Elisabetta. 2009. Local–global Integration and Economic Diversification in Arni's Long term Change. Paper for the International Workshop on Market Town Market Society and Informal Economy, Oxford University.
- Basu, Durga Das. 1991. *Introduction to the Constitution of India*. New Delhi: Prentice-Hall.
- Beckerlegge, Gwilym. 2006. *Swami Vivekananda's Legacy of Service: A Study of the Ramakrishna Math and Mission*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Beckford, Robert. 2001. *God of the Rahtid: Redeeming Rage*. London: Darton, Longman & Todd.

- Bellamy, Richard, and Alex Warleigh. 2001. "Cementing the Union: The Role of European Citizenship." In *A Soul for Europe: Vol. 1 A Reader*, edited by Furio Ceruti and Enno Rudolph. Sterling: Peters Leuven.
- Bendel, Petra. 2007. "Everything under Control? The European Union's Policies and Politics of Immigration". In *The Europeanization of National Politics and Politics of Immigration*, edited by Thomas Faist and Andreas Ette. Houndmills: Palgrave.
- Benhabib, Seyla. 2002. "Political Theory and Political Membership in a Changing World". In *Political Science: State of the Discipline*, edited by Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Benhabib, Seyla. 2007. "Twilight of Sovereignty or the Emergence of Cosmopolitan Norms? Rethinking Citizenship in Volatile Times", In *Dual Citizenship in Global Perspective: From Unitary to Multiple Citizenship*, edited by Thomas Faist and Peter Kivisto. Basingstoke: Macmillan
- Béteille, André. 1999. "Citizenship, State and Civil Society". *Economic and Political Weekly*, 34 (36): 2588–2591.
- Beyme, Klaus von. 2001. "Citizenship and the European Union." In *European Citizenship: Between National Legacies and Post-National Projects*, edited by Klaus Eder and Bernhard Giesen. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bhabha, Homi K. 1994. *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge.
- Bhargava, Rajeev. 2002. "What is Indian Secularism and What is it for?" *India Review*, 1 (1): 1–32.
- Bhargava, Rajeev. 2005a. "Introduction" In *Civil Society, Public Sphere and Citizenship*, edited by Rajeev Bhargava and Helmut Reifeld. New Delhi: Sage.
- Bhargava, Rajeev and Helmut Reifeld, eds. 2005b, *Civil Society, Public Sphere and Citizenship: Dialogues and Perceptions*. New Delhi: Sage.
- Birsl, Ursula, Renate Bitzan, Carlota Sole, Sonja Parella, Amado Alarcon, Juliane Schmidt, Stephan French. 2003. *Migration and Interkulturalität in Großbritannien, Deutschland und Spanien: Fallstudien aus der Arbeitswelt* (Opladen: Leske und Budrich).
- Bochasanwasi Shri Akshar Purushottam Swaminarayan Sanstha n.d. *Annual Review 2007–8*. London: BAPS Swaminarayan Sanstha UK.
- Bommes, Michael and Werner Schiffauer, eds. 2006. *Migrationsreport 2006: Fakten, Analysen, Perspektiven*. Frankfurt a. Main: Campus.
- Bose, Subhas Chandra. 1952. *The Indian Struggle (1935–42)*. Calcutta: Chakravarti, Chatterjee & Co.
- Bratton, Michael. 2008. "Poor People and Democratic Citizenship in Africa". In *Poverty, Participation and Democracy: A Global Perspective*, edited by Anirudh Krishna. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brekke, Torkel. 2002. *Makers of Modern Indian Religion in the Late Nineteenth Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brodie, Janine. 2004. "Introduction: Globalisation and Citizenship Beyond the National State". *Citizenship Studies*, 8 (4): 323–332.
- Brownlee, David B. and David G. De Long. 1991. *Louis I. Khan: In the Realm of Architecture*. (Los Angeles: Rizzoli, New York and The Museum of Contemporary Art.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Bulmer, Martin and Anthony Rees, eds. 1996a. *Citizenship Today: The Contemporary Relevance of T.H. Marshall*. London: UCL Press.
- Bulmer, Martin and Anthony Rees, eds. 1996b. "Citizenship in the Twentieth Century." *Citizenship Today: The Contemporary Relevance of T.H. Marshall*. London: UCL Press.
- Cadene, Philippe and Mark Holmstrom, eds. 1999. *Decentralised Production in India: Industrial Districts, Flexible Specialisation and Employment*. New Delhi, London: Sage.
- Carnoy, Martin. 2000. *Globalisation and Educational Restructuring*. Paris: International Institute of Educational Planning.
- Carter, Bob. 2000. *Realism and Racism: Concepts of Race in Sociological Research*. London: Routledge.

- Çelik, Zeynep. 1999. "Schnittstelle der Kultur: Eine Neue Sicht auf Architektur und Stadt im 20. Jahrhundert." In *Am Ende des Jahrhunderts: 100 Jahre Gebaute Visionen*, edited by Russell Ferguson. Osfildern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz Verlag.
- Cerutti, Furio and Enno Rudolph, eds. 2001. *A Soul for Europe*. Vols. 1 and 2. Leuven: Peeters.
- Cesarani, David and Mary Fulbrook, eds. 1997. *Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe*. London, N.Y.: Routledge.
- Chandra, Sudhir. 2005. "Subjects' Citizenship Dream: Notes on the Nineteenth Century." In *Civil Society, Public Sphere and Citizenship: Dialogues and Perceptions*, edited by Rajeev Bhargava and Helmut Reifeld. New Delhi: Sage.
- Chatterjee, Partha. 1995. "Religious Minorities and the Secular State: Reflections on an Indian Impasse." *Public Culture* 8: 11–39.
- Chatterjee, Partha. 2008. "Democracy and Economic Transformation." *Economic and Political Weekly* 43 (16) April 19. 53–62.
- Chemin, Anne. 2009. "Le nouveau visage de la France, terre d'immigration." *Le Monde*, December: 22–23.
- Chibber, Vivek. 2003. *Locked in Place: State Building and Late Industrialisation in India*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Clements, Kevin P., Volker Boege, Anne Brown, Wendy Foley, and Anna Nolan. 2007. "State Building Reconsidered: The Role of Hybridity in the Formation of Political Order." *Political Science*, 59 (1): 45–56.
- Cody, Jeffrey W. 2001. *Building in China: Henry K. Murphy's "Adaptive Architecture" 1914–1935*. Seattle: The Chinese University Press, Hong Kong, and the University of Washington Press.
- Cohen, Jean-Louis. 1999. "Urbane Architektur und die Krise der modernen Metropole." In *Am Ende des Jahrhunderts: 100 Jahre Gebaute Visionen*, edited by Russell Ferguson. Osfildern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz Verlag.
- Comaroff, Jean and John L. Comaroff. 2005. "Naturing the Nation: Aliens, Apocalypse, and the Postcolonial State." In *Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants and States in the Postcolonial World*, edited by Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Curl, James Stevens. 1991. *The Art and Architecture of Freemasonry: An Introductory Study*. London: B.T. Batsford Ltd.
- Curtis, William J. R. 1987. *Modern Architecture since 1900*. Oxford: Phaidon Press.
- Da Corta, Lucia and Davuluri Venkateshwarlu. 1999. "Unfree Relations and the Feminization of Agricultural Labour in Andhra Pradesh, 1970–95." *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 26 (2/3): 71–139.
- Dagger, Richard. 1997. *Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship and Republican Liberalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Dahl, Robert Alan. 1989. *Democracy and its Critics*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Dahrendorf, Ralf. 1994. "The Changing Quality of Citizenship." In *The Condition of Citizenship*, edited by Bart van Steenberg. London: Sage.
- Datta, P. K. 2003. "Hindutva and its 'Mystery'." In *Seminar* no. 522 'Rewriting History', February. Last access: 17.05.2010. <http://www.india-seminar.com/2003/522/522%20pradip%20kumar%20datta.htm>
- Deutsch, Karl, W. Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Jr. Maurice Lee. 1957. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dickinson, Jen and Adrian J. Bailey. 2007. "(Re)membering Diaspora: Uneven Geographies of Indian Dual Citizenship." *Political Geography* 26: 757–774.
- Eder, Klaus and Bernhard Giesen, eds. 2001. *European Citizenship between National Legacies and Postnational Projects*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Embee, Ainslee T. 2002. "Religion in Public Space: Two Centuries of a Problem in Governance in Modern India." *India Review* 1 (1): 52–76.

- Esteva, Gustavo and Madhu Suri Prakash. 1998. *Grassroots Post-Modernism: Remaking the Soil of Cultures*. London: Zed Books.
- Faist, Thomas and Andreas Ette, eds. 2007. *The Europeanization of National Policies and Politics of Immigration*. Houndsmill: Palgrave.
- Fassmann, Heinz and Rainer Münz, eds. 1996. *Migration in Europa: Historische Entwicklung, Aktuelle trends, Politische Reaktionen*. Frankfurt a. Main and New York: Campus.
- Ferguson, Russell, ed. 1999. *Am Ende des Jahrhunderts: 100 Jahre Gebaute Visionen*. Osfildern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz Verlag.
- Fernandez, Bina. 2008. "(En)gendering Poverty Policy in India: Towards a New Feminist Theoretical Framework." D Phil Thesis, Oxford University.
- Fischer, Klaus, Michael Jansen and Jan Pieper. 1987. *Architektur des indischen Subkontinents*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Fitzgerald, Timothy. 2000. *The Ideology of Religious Studies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Flood, Gavin D. 1999. *Beyond Phenomenology: Rethinking the Study of Religion*. London: Cassell.
- Fox, Jonathan. 2005. "Unpacking 'Transnational Citizenship'." *Annual Review of Political Science* 8 (1): 171–201.
- Fraser, Nancy. 1992. "Rethinking the Public Sphere." In *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, edited by Craig Calhoun. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Friedman, Thomas. 2007. *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*. 2nd ed. Picador: New York.
- Furbey, Robert, and Marie Macey. 2005. "Religion and Urban Regeneration: A Place for Faith?" *Policy and Politics* 33 (1): 95–116.
- Gallie, Walter Bruce. 1955–6. "Essentially Contested Concepts." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 56: 167–198.
- Gamarnikow, Eva. 2009. "Education in Network Society." In *International Handbook of Comparative Education*. Vol. 1, edited by R. Cowen and A. M. Kazamias. London: Springer.
- Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand. 1999. *Hind Swaraj and Other Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ghose, Ajit K. 2008. "Globalisation and Employment in Developing Countries." *Indian Journal of Labour Economics*, 51 (4): 497–504.
- Giddens, Anthony. 2002. *Runaway World: How Globalisation is Reshaping our Lives*. London: Profile Books Limited.
- Giedion, Sigfried. 1965. *Raum, Zeit, Architektur: Die Entstehung einer neuen Tradition*. Ravenburg: Otto Maier Verlag.
- Gooptu, Nandini and Barbara Harriss-White. 2001. "Mapping India's World of Unorganised Labour." In *Working Classes, Global Realities*, edited by L. Panitch and C. Leys. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Gopal, Sarvepalli, Mushirul Hasan and Mridula Mukherjee, eds. 1987. *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, 1st ser., vol. 3. New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund.
- Gopal, Sarvepalli, Mushirul Hasan and Mridula Mukherjee, eds. 1987. *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, 1st ser., vol. 5. New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund.
- Gopal, Sarvepalli, Mushirul Hasan and Mridula Mukherjee, eds. 1987. *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, 1st ser., vol. 6. New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund.
- Gopal, Sarvepalli. 1988. "Nehru and Minorities." *Economic and Political Weekly* 23 (45/47) Special Number: 2463, 2465–2466.
- Government of India Planning Commission. 2004. *Public Private Partnership, Report of the PPP Subgroup on Social Sector*. November. New Delhi. http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/rep_ppp.pdf.
- Government of Arunachal Pradesh. 2005. *Arunachal Pradesh Human Development Report, Itanagar*. http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/stateplan/sdr_pdf/shdr_ap05.pdf.
- Government of India. 2000. *Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora*. New Delhi: GoI. <http://indiandiaspora.nic.in/contents.htm>.

- Gramsci, Antonio. 1992. *Prison Notebooks*. Edited by Joseph A. Buttigieg. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Gupta, Dipankar. 1999. "Survivors or Survivals: Reconciling Citizenship and Cultural Particularisms." *Economic and Political Weekly* 34 (33): 2313–2323.
- Gupta, Dipankar. 2003. "Civil Society or the State. What Happened to Citizenship?" In *Civil Society and Democracy. A Reader*, edited by Carolyn M. Elliot. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Gutschow, Nils. 1982. *Stadtraum und Ritual der newarischen Städte im Kathmandu-Tal: Eine architekturanthropologische Untersuchung*. Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kolhammer.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 1992a. *Faktizität und Geltung: Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats*. Frankfurt a. Main: Suhrkamp.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 1992b. "Citizenship and National Identity: Some reflections on the Future of Europe." *Praxis international* 12 (1): 1–19.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 1996. "Inklusion – Einbeziehen oder Einschließen? Zum Verhältnis von Nation, Rechtsstaat und Demokratie, in id." *Die Einbeziehung des Anderen. Studien zur politischen Theorie*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Hale, Jonathan A.. 2000. *Building Ideas: An Introduction to Architectural Theory*. Chichester: John Wiley.
- Hansen, Randall. 2003. "Citizenship and Integration in Europe." In *Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States*, edited by Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska., Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hardgrave, Robert. 1986. "The Breast-Cloth Controversy." *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 2 (June): 171–187.
- Harriss-White, Barbara, ed. 2002. *Globalization and Insecurity: Political, Economic and Physical Challenges*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Harriss-White, Barbara, ed. 2003. *India Working – Essays on Society and Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Harriss-White, Barbara, ed. 2005. "Destitution and the Poverty of its Politics". *World Development* 33 (6): 881–92.
- Harriss-White, Barbara, ed. 2006. "Poverty and Capitalism." *Economic and Political Weekly* April 1: 1241–6.
- Harriss-White, Barbara, ed. 2007. 'Developments in India's Informal Economy' pp 181–3 in House of Commons, *Foreign Affairs Committee South Asia* : fourth report on session 2006–7. London: The Stationery Office Ltd. <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmfaff/55/55we26.htm>.
- Harriss-White, Barbara, ed. 2008. *Rural Commercial Capital*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harriss-White, Barbara and Judith Heyer, eds. 2010. *The Political Economy of Development: Africa and Asia*. London: Routledge.
- Harriss-White, Barbara Deepak K. Mishra and Vandana Upadhaya. 2009. "Institutional Diversity and Capitalist Transition : The Political Economy of Agrarian Change in Arunachal Pradesh." *Journal of Agrarian Change* 9 (4): 230 – 66.
- Harriss-White, Barbara and Anushree Sinha, eds. 2007. *Trade Liberalisation and India's Informal Economy*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Hayward, Jeremy. 2002. *Economic Citizenship a Key Stage 4 Teacher Resource*. London: Institute for Citizenship.
- Heater, Derek Benjamin. 1999. *What is Citizenship?* Oxford: Polity Press.
- Hefner, Robert W. 1998. "Multiple Modernities: Christianity, Islam and Hinduism in a Globalizing Age." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 27: 83–104.
- Hegewald, Julia A. B. 2002. *Water Architecture in South Asia: A Study of Types, Developments and Meanings, Studies in Asian Art and Archaeology Vol. 24*. Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill.
- Hegewald, Julia A. B. and Subrata K. Mitra. 2011. *Re-use: The Art and Politics of Integration and Anxiety*. New Delhi: Sage.
- Held, David. 1995. *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press and Polity Press.

- Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perrato. 1999. *Global Transformations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Heyer, Judith. 2010. "The Marginalisation of Dalits in a Modernising Economy." In *The Comparative Political Economy of Development: Africa and South Asia*, edited by Barbara Harriss-White and Judith Heyer. London: Routledge.
- Hindness, Barry. 2005. "Citizenship and Empire." In *Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants and States in the Postcolonial World*, edited by Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hirst, Jacqueline S. and John Zavos. 2005. "Riding a Tiger? South Asia and the Problem with 'Religion'", *Contemporary South Asia* 14 (1): 3–20.
- Hönig, Patrick. 2009. "India between Scylla and Charybdis: Negotiating the Cliff of Federalism." *Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics* (50) October. <http://hpsacp.uni-hd.de>.
- House of Commons, United Kingdom. *The Parliamentary Debates* (1912–13). 5th ser. Vol. 41: 1910, 1919.
- Irvin, Robert Grant. 1981. *Indian Summer: Lutyens, Baker and Imperial Delhi*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Jacob, Samuel Swinton. *Jeypore Portfolio of Architectural Details*. 12 vols. London: B. Quaritch.
- Jaffrelot, Christophe. 1999. *The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics*. New Delhi: Penguin.
- Jaume, Lucien. 2003. "Citizen and State under the French Revolution." In *State and Citizens: History, Theory, Prospects*, edited by Quentin Skinner and Bo Strath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jayal, Niraja Gopal. 2007. "The Role of Civil Society." In *The State of India's Democracy* edited by Sumit Ganguly, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Jha, Shefali. 2003. "Rights Versus Representation: Defending Minority Interests in the Constituent Assembly." *Economic and Political Weekly* 38 (16) 1579–1583.
- Johnson, Peter. 2002. "Secularism in the Constituent Assembly Debates, 1946–1950." *Economic and Political Weekly* 37 (30) 3175–3180.
- Johnson, Peter. 2006. "Unravelling Foucault's 'Different Spaces'." *History of the Human Sciences* 19 (4): 75–90.
- Joppke, Christian. 1999. "How Immigration is Changing Citizenship: A Comparative View." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22 (4): 629–52.
- Joppke, Christian. 2007. "Transformation of Citizenship: Status, Rights, Identity." *Citizenship Studies* 11 (1): 37–48.
- Kakar, Sudhir. 1978. *The Inner World: A Psycho-Analytic Study of Childhood and Society in India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Kakar, Sudhir, ed. 1979. Preface, *Identity and Adulthood*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Kalia, Ravi. 1994. *Bhubaneswar: From a Temple Town to a Capital City*. Bombay, Calcutta, Madras: Oxford University Press.
- Kapadia, Karin. 2010. "Liberalisation and Transformations in India's Informal Economy: Female Breadwinners in Working Class Households in Chennai." In *The Comparative Political Economy of Development: Africa and South Asia*, edited by Barbara Harriss-White and Judith Heyer. London: Routledge.
- Kar, Bodhisattva. 2008. "When was the Post-Colonial: A History of Policing Impossible Lines." In *Beyond Counter-Insurgency: Breaking the Impasse in North East India*, edited by S. Baruah. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Kastoryano, Riva. 1996. *La France, L' Allemagne et leurs immigrés: négocier l'identité*. Paris: Armand Colin.
- Kaviraj, Sudipta. 1985. *Citizen and Government: A Textbook for Classes IX and X*. New Delhi: National Council of Educational Research and Training.
- Kaviraj, Sudipta. 1988. "A Critique of the Passive Revolution." *Economic and Political Weekly Special* 23 (45/47): 2429–2444.
- Kelly, George Armstrong. 1979. "Who Needs a Theory of Citizenship?" *Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* 108 (4): 21–36.

- Khan, Hasan-Uddin. 1995. *Contemporary Asian Architects*. Köln: Taschen.
- Khan, Mushtaq. 2004. "State Failure in Developing Countries and Strategies of Institutional Reform." In *Towards Pro-Poor Policies: Aid Institutions and Globalization Proceedings of World Bank's Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics*, edited by Bertil Tungodden, Nick Stern and Ivar Kolstad. Oxford: Oxford University Press and World Bank.
- Khanna, Madhu. 1994. *Yantra: The Tantric Symbol of Cosmic Unity*. London: Thames and Hudson.
- Kim, Y. 2008. "The Outside and Inside Meanings of Alcohol." D Phil Thesis, Oxford University.
- Kivisto, Peter and Thomas Faist. 2007. *Citizenship – Discourse, Theory and Transnational Prospects*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Knott, Kim. 2005. *The Location of Religion: A Spatial Analysis*. London: Equinox.
- Kofman, Eleonore. 1995. "Citizenship for Some, but not for Others: Spaces of Citizenship in Contemporary Europe." *Political Geography* 14: 121–37.
- Kothari, Rajni. 1988. *State Against Democracy: In Search of Humane Governance*. New Delhi: Ajanta.
- Kreienbrink, Axel. 2004. *Einwanderungsland Spanien: Migrationspolitik zwischen Europäisierung und Nationalen Interessen*. Frankfurt am Main: IKO.
- Kuisma, Mikko. 2008. "Rights or Privileges? The Challenge of Globalisation to the Values of Citizenship." *Citizenship Studies*.12. (6): 613–627.
- Kulke, Hermann. 2010. "Centres Out There? The Feudatory States of Orissa." In *Centres Out There? Facets of Subregional Identities in Orissa*, edited by Hermann Kulke and Georg Berkemer. New Delhi: Manohar.
- Kumar, Arun. 1999. *The Black Economy in India*. New Delhi: Penguin.
- Kumar, Ravi. 2009. "State, Inequality, and Politics of Capital: The Neoliberal Scourge in Education." In *The Developing World and State Education – Neoliberal Depredation and Egalitarian Alternatives*, edited by David Hill and Ellen Rosskam. New York: Routledge.
- Kymlicka, Will. 1995. *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kymlicka, Will. 2000. "Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies: Issues, Contexts, Concepts." In *Citizenship in Diverse Societies*, edited by W. Kymlicka and W. Norman. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kymlicka, Will and Wayne Norman. 1994. "Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory." *Ethics* 104 (2): 352–381.
- Kymlicka, Will and Wayne Norman, eds. 2000. *Citizenship in Diverse Societies*. Oxford: University Press.
- Lall, Marie. 2001. *India's Missed Opportunity*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Lall, Marie. 2005. "Indian Education Policy Under the NDA Government." In *Coalition Politics and Hindu Nationalism*, edited by Katherine Adeney and Lawrence Saez. London: Routledge.
- Lall, Marie. 2009. "Globalisation and the Fundamentalisation of Curricula – Lessons from India." In *Education as a Political Tool in Asia*, edited by Marie Lall and Edward Vickers London: Routledge.
- Lall, Marie and G. Nambissan., eds. Forthcoming. *Education and Social Justice in the Era of Globalisation*. New Delhi: Routledge.
- Le Corbusier, Charles Edouard Jeanneret. 1958. *Modulor 2*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Le Corbusier, Charles Edouard Jeanneret. 1960. *Mein Werk*. Stuttgart: Verlag Gerd Hatje.
- Lee, Kyu Young. 2008. "The European Union Migration Policy: Focusing on Continuities and Changes after the Fifth EU Enlargement." *The Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 26 (2): 131–158.
- Lerche, Jens. 2007. "A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour? Unfree Labour, Neo-Liberal Globalization and the International Labour Organization." *Journal of Agrarian Change* 7 (4): 424–52.
- Levitt, Peggy and Nina Glick-Schiller. 2004. "Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A Transnational Social Field Perspective on Society." *International Migration Review* 38 (3): 1002–1039.
- Low, Murray. 1997. "Representation Unbound: Globalization and Democracy." In *Spaces of Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local*, edited by Kevin R. Cox. New York: Guilford Press.

- Lijphart, Arend. 1971. "Cultural Diversity and Political Integration." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 4 (1): 1–14.
- Lipner, Julius. 1994. *Hindus: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices*. London: Routledge.
- Lutyens, Mary. (1980) 1991. *Edwin Lutyens*. London: Black Swan Book.
- MacDonough, Terrence. 2007. "Social Structure of Accumulation Theory: The State of the Art.", In *Growth and Crisis : Social Structure of Accumulation Theory and Analysis*, edited by Terrence MacDonough, Michael Reich, David M. Kotz and Maria-Alejandra Gonzales-Perez. National University of Ireland Galway. <http://ssagalway.blogspot.com/>.
- Madan, T.N. "Secularism in its Place," *The Journal of Asian Studies* Vol.46, No.4 (1987): 747–59.
- Maduro, Otto. 2004. "'Religion' Under Imperial Duress: Postcolonial Reflections and Proposals." *Review of Religious Research* 45 (3): 221–234.
- Mahajan, Gurpreet. 2002. "Secularism as Religious Non-Discrimination: The Universal and the Particular in the Indian Context." *India Review* 1 (1): 33–51.
- Majumdar, Ramesh Chandra, Hem Chandra Raychaudhuri and Kalikinkar Datta. 1961. *An Advanced History of India*. 2nd ed. London: Macmillan.
- Manor, James. 1979. "The Failure of Political Integration in Sri Lanka." *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* March: 21–46.
- Manor, James. 1989. *The Expedient Utopian: Bandaranaike and Ceylon*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Manor, James. Forthcoming. "Did the Central Government's Poverty Initiatives Help to Re-elect It?" In *The UPA in Power: New Dimensions of Politics in India*, edited by Lawrence Saez and Gurhpal Singh. London: Routledge.
- Marshall, Thomas H. and Bottomore, Tom. 1950. *Citizenship and Social Class*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McKean, Lise. 1996. *Divine Enterprises: Gurus and the Hindu Nationalist Movement* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McLoughlin, Seán. 2005. "The State, 'New' Muslim Leaderships and Islam as a 'Resource' for Public Engagement in Britain.", In *European Muslims and the Secular State*, edited by Jocelyne Cesari and Seán McLoughlin. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- McCarthy, Thomas. 1999. "On Reconciling Cosmopolitan Unity and National Diversity." *Public Culture* 11(1): 175–208.
- McKean, Lise. 1996. *Divine Enterprises: Gurus and the Hindu Nationalist Movement*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McLoughlin, Sean. 2005. "The State, 'New' Muslim Leaderships and Islam as a 'Resource' for Public Engagement in Britain." In *European Muslims and the Secular State*, edited by Jocelyne Cesari and Sean McLoughlin. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Melo, Marcus., Njuguna. Ng'ethe and James Manor. Forthcoming. *Against the Odds: Politicians, Institutions and the Struggle against Poverty*. London: Hurst & Co.
- Metcalf, Thomas R. 1989. *An Imperial Vision: Indian Architecture and Britain's Raj*. London, Boston: Faber and Faber.
- Metcalf, Thomas R. 1995. *Ideologies of the Raj*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Michels, Robert. 2008. „Über einige Ursachen und Wirkungen des englischen Verfassungs- und Freiheitspatriotismus.“ In *Soziale Bewegungen zwischen Dynamik und Erstarrung*, edited in Timm Genett. Berlin: Akademieverlag.
- Mill, John Stuart. (1861) 1977. *Considerations on Representative Government*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Ministry of Tribal Affairs. 2002. *Report of Working Group for Empowering the Scheduled Tribes during the Xth V Year Plan*. Government of India. http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/10th/volume2/v2_ch4_2.pdf
- Mitra, Subrata K. 1991. "Room to Maneuver in the Middle: Local Elites, Political Action, and the State in India." *World Politics* 43 (3) : 390–413.
- Mitra, Subrata K. 1992. *Power, Protest and Participation: Local Elites and the Politics of Development in India*. London: Routledge.

- Mitra, Subrata K. 2001. "Kashipur Revisited: Social Ritual, Electoral Politics and the State of India." In *Jagannath Revisited: Studying Society, Religion and the State in Orissa*, edited by Hermann Kulke and Burkhard Schnepel. New Delhi: Manohar.
- Mitra, Subrata K. 2005. *The Puzzle of India's Governance: Culture, Context and Comparative Theory*. London: Routledge.
- Mitra, Subrata K. 2008. "Level Playing Fields: The Post-Colonial State, Democracy, Courts and Citizenship in India." *German Law Journal* 9 (3): 343–366.
- Mitra, Subrata K. 2011. *Politics in India: Structure, Process, Policy*. London: Routledge.
- Mitra, Subrata K. 2010. "Citizenship as Conceptual Flow: Model, Method and Design for a Comparative Study." Draft paper for Bhubaneswar Conference, January.
- Mitra, Subrata K. and V. B. Singh. 2009. *When Rebels Become Stakeholders: Democracy, Agency and Social Change in India*. New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- Naipaul, V.S. 1990. *India: A Million Mutinies Now*. London: William Heinemann.
- Nandy, Ashis "The Anti-Secularist Manifesto," Seminar, Vol.314 (Oct. 1985): 14–24;
- Nambissan, Geetha B. 2006. "Terms of Inclusion: Dalits and the Right to Education." In *The Crisis of Elementary Education in India*, edited by Ravi Kumar. New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- Nayak, Prasanna K. 1989. *Blood, Women and Territory: An Analysis of Clan Feuds of Dongria Konds*. New Delhi: Reliance Publishing House.
- Nayak, Prasanna K. 2000 "Tribal Development: From Sport to Sonata to Science." *Adivasi*, vol. 39. Bhubaneswar: SCSTRTI.
- Nayak, Prasanna K. 2001a. "Jagannath and the Adivasi: Reconsidering the Cult and its Traditions." In *Jagannath Revisited. Studying Society, Religion and the State in Orissa*, edited by Herman Kulke and Burkhard Schnepel., New Delhi: Manohar Publications.
- Nayak, Prasanna K. 2001b "Revisiting Tribes and Reconsidering Tribal Development." *Adivasi*, vol. 40, Bhubaneswar: SCSTRTI.
- Nayak, Prasanna K. 2003. "Social, Cultural and Linguistic Variations in Tribal Orissa." *Tribes of Orissa* Bhubaneswar: SCSTRTI.
- Nayak, Prasanna K. 2004. "Tribal Development: Challenges and Responses." *Adivasi*, vol. 41. Bhubaneswar: SCSTRTI.
- Nayak, Prasanna K. 2007a. "What Tribal Development is Not: Some Reflections", *Discussion Paper*. Bhubaneswar: DSA Publications, Dept of Anthropology, Utkal University.
- Nayak, Prasanna K. 2007b. "Owning the King: Ethno-Cultural Politics in Bhuiyan Pirha." *Man in Society* 17: 19–69.
- Nayak, Prasanna K. 2010. "The Rise and Fall of 'Tribal' Development in Orissa." *The NewsLetter* 53: 20–21.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal. 1934. *Recent Essays and Writings*. Allahabad: Kitabistan.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal. 1942. *The Unity of India: Collected Writings 1937–1940*. 2nd ed. London: Drummond.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal. 1985. *The Discovery of India* .4th ed. New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Fund.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal. 1981. *Letters from a Father to his Daughter*. New Delhi: Children's Book Trust.
- Neuman, Gerard L. 2002. "Review [untitled] of *Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices* by T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer, eds." *The American Journal of International Law*, 96, (2) : 514–517.
- Neunreither, Karlheinz. 1995. "Citizens and the Exercise of Power in the European Union: Towards a New Social Contract?" In *A Citizens' Europe: In Search of a New Order*, edited by Allan Rosas and Esko Antola. London: Sage.
- Obeyesekere, Gananath. 1977. "Social Change and the Dieties: Rise of the Kataragama Cult in Modern Sri Lanka." *Man*. 12: 377–396.
- Obeyesekere, Gananath. 1984. "The Origins and Institutionalisation of Political Violence." In *Sri Lanka in Change and Crisis*, edited by James Manor. London: Croom Helm.
- O'Connor, James. 1998. *Natural Causes: Essays in Ecological Marxism*. New York: Guildford Press.
- Ong, Aihwa. 1999. *Flexible Citizenship: Tthe Cultural Logics of Transnationality*. Durham NC: Duke University Press.

- Oommen, T.K., ed. 1997. *Citizenship and National Identity: From Colonialism to Globalism*. New Delhi: Sage.
- Oommen, T.K., 2004. "Socio-Political Transition in the Indian Republic and the European Union." *European Journal of Social Theory* 7 (4): 519–37.
- Oommen, T.K., 2005. *Crisis and Contention in Indian Society*. New Delhi: Sage.
- Painter, Joe. 2002. "Multi-Level Citizenship, Identity and Regions in Contemporary Europe." In *Transnational Democracy: Political Spaces and Border Crossings*, edited by James Anderson. London: Routledge.
- Painter, Joe. 2008. "European Citizenship and the Regions." *European Urban and Regional Studies* 15 (5): 5–19.
- Panayotakis, C. 2007. "The Third Contradiction." In *Coming to Terms with Nature: Socialist Register 2007*, edited by Leo Panitch and Colin Leys. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Parekh, Bhikhu. 1997. *Dilemmas of a Multicultural Theory of Citizenship*. Malden: Blackwell.
- Parekh, Bhikhu. 2002. "Reconstituting the Modern State." In *Transnational Democracy: Political Spaces and Border Crossings*, edited by James Anderson. London: Routledge.
- Parliamentary Debates. 1994. "The Parliamentary Debates – 1912–13, 5th ser., vol. 41." In *Architecture & Order: Approaches to Social Space*, edited by Michael Parker Pearson and Colin Richards. London, New York: Routledge.
- Pattanaik, Sitikantha. 2007. "Gulf NRIs and Their Remittances to India: The Saga of Overlooked Great Expectations." *Journal of International and Area Studies* 14 (1): 31–53.
- Pfetsch, Frank R. 2005. *Die Europäische Union*. Paderborn: Fink/UTB.
- Pfetsch, Frank R. 2001. "The Politics of Culture and Identity." In *A Soul for Europe*, vols. 1 and 2, edited by Furio Cerutti and Enno Rudolph. Leuven: Peeters.
- Pieper, Jan. 1987. *Das Labyrinthische: Über die Idee des Verborgenen, Rätselhaften, Schwierigen in der Geschichte der Architektur*. Braunschweig und Wiesbaden: Vieweg & Sohn.
- Prakash, Aseem. 2010. "Dalit Entrepreneurs in Middle India." In *The Comparative Political Economy of Development: Africa and South Asia*, edited by Barbara Harriss-White and Judith Heyer. London: Routledge.
- Prakash, Aseem and Barbara Harriss-White. 2009. "Social Inclusion, Discrimination and Economic Citizenship." Paper for the Workshop on Inclusive Development. Institute for Human Development/Oxfam. India, New Delhi.
- Prakash, Vikramaditya. 2002. *Chandigarh's Le Corbusier: The Struggle for Modernity in Postcolonial India*. Ahmedabad: Mapin Publishing.
- Preuß, Ulrich K. and Ferran Requejo, eds. 1998. *European Citizenship, Multiculturalism, and the State*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Putnam, Robert. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Putnam, Robert. 2007. "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century – The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30 (2): 137–174.
- Rasmussen, Steen Eiler. (1959) 1995. *Experiencing Architecture*. Cambridge: The MIT Press, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
- Reddig, Melanie. 2005. *Bürger jenseits des Staates? Unionsbürgerschaft als Mittel europäischer Integration*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Reddy D. N. and C. Upendranath. 2009. "National Rural Employment Guarantee: Issues Concerns and Prospects. Paper for the Workshop on Inclusive Development." Institute for Human Development/Oxfam. India, New Delhi.
- Reese-Schäfer, Walter, ed. 1999. *Identität und Interesse. Der Diskurs der Identitätsforschung*. Opladen: Leske & Budrich.
- Rey, Annette. 1997. *Einwanderung in Frankreich 1981 bis 1995: Ausgangsposition und Handlungsspielraum im Hinblick auf eine gemeinsame europäische Einwanderungspolitik*. Opladen: Leske & Budrich.
- Riesenberg, Peter N. 1992. *Citizenship in the Western Tradition: Plato to Rousseau*. London: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Rikowski, Glenn. 2002. "Globalisation and Education." Paper prepared for the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs, London.

- Rodriguez, Valerian. 2005. "Citizenship and the Indian Constitution." In *Civil Society, Public Sphere and Citizenship: Dialogues and Perceptions*, edited by Rajeev Bhargava and Reifeld, Helmut. New Delhi: SagePublications.
- Roman, C. 2008. "Learning and Innovation in Clusters: Case Studies from the Indian Silk Industry." D Phil Thesis, Oxford University..
- Rosch, Eleanor and Carolyn Mervis. 1975. "Family Resemblances: Studies in the Internal Structure of Categories." *Cognitive Psychology* 7 (4): 573–605.
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1915. *The Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*. Cambridge: C.E. Vaughan.
- Roy, Anupama. 2008. "Between Encompassment and Closure: The 'Migrant' and the Citizen in India." *Contributions to Indian Sociology* 42 (2): 219–48.
- Roy, Rathin. 1996. "State Failure in India: Political Fiscal Implications of the Black Economy." *Institute of Development Studies Bulletin* 27 (2): 22–30.
- Rudolph Lloyd I. and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph. 1987. *In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rudolph Lloyd I. and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph. 2008. *Explaining Indian Democracy. A Fifty-Year Perspective, 1956–2006. Volume II. The Realm of Institutions. State Formation and Institutional Change*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Ruthven, O. 2008. "Metals and Morals in Moradabad; Perspective on Ethics in the Workforce Across a Global Supply Chain." D Phil Thesis Oxford University.
- Sahni, Binda. 2009. "Economic Citizenship in India: A Socio-Legal Comparison of Two Cases." *Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics* No. 49
- Salam, M.A. 2007. *Agricultural Transformation in North East India: With Special Reference to Arunachal Pradesh*. New Delhi: Mittal.
- Sarangapani, Padma M. 2003. *Constructing School Knowledge: Ethnography of Learning in an Indian Village*. New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- Sarkar, S. 2009. "Limits of Politics: Dominance and Resistance in Contemporary India." D Phil Thesis, Oxford University..
- Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar. (1923). 1949 *Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?* 4th ed. Poona: Gokhale.
- Schama, Simon. 1989. *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution*. London: Viking.
- Schnepel, Burkhard. 2002. *The Jungle Kings: Ethnohistorical Aspects of Politics and Ritual in Orissa*. New Delhi: Manohar.
- Schnepel, Burkhard and Georg Berkemer. 2004. "History of the Model." In *Sharing Sovereignty. The Little Kingdom in South Asia*, edited by Georg Berkemer and Margret Frenz., Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag.
- Schnepel, Burkhard and Georg Berkemer. 2005. "Kings and Tribes in East India." In *The Character of Kingship*, edited by D. Quigley. Oxford: Berghahn Publishers.
- Scott, James C. 2009. *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia*. Yale: Yale University Press.
- Sengupta A., K.P. Kannan and G. Raveendran. 2008. "India's Common People: Who They Are, How Many They Are and How Do They Live." *Economic and Political Weekly* 18 March: 49–69.
- Serenyi, Peter. 1983. "Timeless But of Its Time: Le Corbusier's Architecture in India." *Perspecta* 20: 91–118.
- Shariff, Abusaleh. 2006. *State Strategy for Development and Welfare of Muslims in India – Focus on Education, Employment, Credit Flow and Empowerment*. New Delhi: NCAER.
- Skinner, Quentin and Bo Strath, eds. 2003. *States and Citizens: History, Theory, Prospects*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sleeter, Christine. 2004. "Critical Multicultural Curriculum and the Standards Movement." *English Teaching: Practice and Critique* 3 (2): 122–138.
- Smith, Vincent. 1919. *Oxford History of India: From the Earliest Times to the End of 1911*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Sonntag, Selma K. 2004. "National Minority Rights in the Himalayas." *Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics* (21) June. <http://hpsacp.uni-hd.de/>.

- Spencer, Jonathan. 1984. "Popular Perceptions of the Violence: A Provincial View." In *Sri Lanka in Change and Crisis*, edited by James Manor. London: Croom Helm.
- Spies, Clemens. 2011. "Another Form of Re-use? Institutional Continuity and 'Indigenisation' of Westminster Parliamentarianism and Western Party Politics in Post-Colonial India." In *Re-use: The Art and Politics of Integration and Anxiety*, edited by Julia Hegewald and Subrata K. Mitra. New Delhi: Sage.
- Srinivasan, Kannan. 2007. "Moneylaundering and Security." In *Controlling Arms and Terror: Regional Security in Asia and the Pacific*, edited by Marika Vicziany. Massachusetts: Edward Elgar.
- Steenbergen, Bart van, ed. 1996. *The Condition of Citizenship*. London: Sage.
- Sternberger, Dolf. (1982) 1990. "Verfassungspatriotismus." In *Werke* Bd. 10. Frankfurt a. Main: Insel.
- Stierlin, Henri. 2002. *Hindu India: From Khajuraho to the Temple City of Madurai*. Köln, London, Madrid, New York, Paris and Tokyo: Taschen.
- Stokes, Eric. 1959. *The English Utilitarians and India*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sud, Nikita. 2007. "From Land to the Tiller to Land Liberalisation: The Political Economy of Gujarat's Shifting Land Policy." *Modern Asian Studies* 41 (3): 603–638.
- Tagore, Rabindranath. 1950. *Nationalism*. London: Macmillan.
- Taylor, Brian Brace. 1995. *Geoffrey Bawa*. Revised Edition. London: Thames and Hudson.
- Taylor, Charles. 2007. Cultures of Democracy and Citizen Efficacy, *Public Culture* 19 (1): 117–150.
- Taylor, Jennifer. 2002. "After Secularism: Inner City Governance and the New Religious Discourse: A Case Study." PhD Dissertation, London: SOAS.
- Thorat, Sukhadeo. 2008. *Dalits in India: Search for a Common Destiny*. Los Angeles: Sage.
- Thranhardt, Dietrich. 1996. *Europe – A New Immigration Continent: Policies and Politics in Comparative Perspective*. Münster: Lit Verlag.
- Thranhardt, Dietrich and Uwe Hunger, eds. 2003. *Migration im Spannungsfeld von Globalisierung und Nationalstaat*. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Tillotson, Giles H. R. 1989. *The Tradition of Indian Architecture: Continuity, Controversy and Change Since 1850* (Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras: Oxford University Press).
- Tiwary, Uma Kant. 1967. *The Making of the Indian Constitution*. Allahabad: Central Book Depot.
- Tripathi, Gaya C. 2010. "The Transformation of a Tribal State into a Centre of Regional Culture: The Case of the Bhanjas of Keonjhar." In *Centres Out There? Facets of Subregional Identities in Orissa*, edited by Hermann Kulke and Georg Berkemer. New Delhi: Manohar.
- Turner, Bryan S. 1990. "Outline of a Theory of Citizenship." *Sociology* 24 (2): 189–217.
- Turner, Bryan S. 2006. "Citizenship and the Crisis of Multiculturalism." *Citizenship Studies* 10 (5): 607–618.
- United Nations Development Programme. 1999. *Human Development Report*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Varma, Vishwanath Prasad. 1985. *Modern Indian Political Thought*. Vol. II. Agra: Lakshmi Narain Agarwal.
- Veer, Peter van der. 2002. "Colonial Cosmopolitanism." In *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context and Practice*, edited by Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Veer, Peter van der. 2004. "Transnational Religion; Hindu and Muslim Movements." *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies* 7: 4–18.
- Veer, Peter van der. 2005. "Virtual India: Indian IT Labor and the Nation-State." In *Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants and States in the Postcolonial World*, edited by Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Vertovec, Steven. 2000. *Hindu Diaspora: Comparative Patterns*. London: Routledge.
- Volwahren, Andreas. 2004. *Imperial Delhi: The British Capital of the Indian Empire*. Munich: Prestel.

- Walzer, Michael. 1989. "Citizenship." In *Innovation and Conceptual Change*, edited by Terence Ball, James Farr and Russell Hanson. Political New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Walzer, Michael. 1997. *On Toleration*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Warrier, Maya. 2005. *Hindu Selves in a Modern World: Guru Faith in the Mata Amritanandamayi Mission*. London: Routledge.
- Watkin, David. 1984. *Morality and Architecture: The Development of a Theme in Architectural History and Theory from the Gothic Revival to the Modern Movement*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Werner, Michael and Bénédicte Zimmermann. 2006. "Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity." *History and Theory* 45 (1): 30–50.
- White, Stuart. 2002. *The Civic Minimum: The Rights and Obligation of Economic Citizenship*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wiener, Antje. 1998. *'European' Citizenship Practice: Building Institutions of a Non-State*. Boulder: Westview.
- Williams, Raymond B. 1998. "Training Religious Specialists for a Transnational Hinduism: A Swaminarayan Sadhu Training Center." *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 66 (4): 841–862.
- Wolf, Frieder Otto. 2007. "Reproduction, Accumulation and the Division of Labour: What Capital II is Really About." Paper presented at the 4th Historical Materialism Conference SOAS London University, London.
- Yatsuka, Hajime. 1999. "Internationalismus and Regionalismus." In *Am Ende des Jahrhunderts: 100 Jahre Gebaute Visionen* Russell Ferguson. Osfildern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz Verlag.
- Yeatman, Anna. 2007. "The Subject of Citizenship." *Citizenship Studies* 11 (1): 105–115.
- Young, Iris Marion. 1989. "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship." *Ethics* 99 (2): 250–274.
- Young, Iris Marion. 1990. *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Yuval-Davis, Nira. 1999. "The 'Multi-layered Citizen': Citizenship in the Age of 'Glocalization'." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 1(1): 119–136.
- Zavos, John. 2008. "Bin Laden is One of Us! Representations of Religious Identity at the Parliament of the World's Religions." *Culture and Religion* 9 (1): 45–61.
- Zavos, John. 2009. "Negotiating Multiculturalism: The Organisation of Hindu Identity in Contemporary Britain." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 35 (6): 881–900.
- Zizek, Slavoj. 2008. *Violence*. Fort Washington: Harvest Books.

Index

A

- Alien, 31, 76, 144, 153
Ambedkar, B.R., 36, 40, 127, 129, 134, 184, 203
Article 370 (of the Indian Constitution), 135
Article 371 (of the Indian Constitution), 60, 79, 135, 136
Asymmetry, xiii, 2, 6, 8, 16, 18, 19, 26–28, 83, 205

B

- Beveridge Report, 30
Bhabha, Homi K., 27
Bhargava, Rajiv, 35, 45, 50, 53, 58, 68, 69, 73, 79, 81, 157, 164
Border-crossing, 4, 5, 11, 16, 20, 147
Bose, Subhas Chandra, 127–130
British colonial rule, 16, 58, 126, 131, 144, 230, 232

C

- Citizen
 excluded, xi, 11, 45–62, 65, 66
 reluctant, 7, 17, 49, 50, 52–54, 231, 260
Citizenship
 differentiated, 20, 46, 47, 49, 50, 55, 56, 58, 59, 79, 81, 198
 entangled, 11, 19, 20, 66, 69, 76–78, 143
 European citizenship, xii, xiii, 12, 47, 48, 56, 59, 60, 70, 87–105, 126, 154, 156, 191
 group-sensitive, xi, 11, 57, 58
 layered, 2, 10, 138, 145, 146
 multi-level, xi, xii, 11, 13, 45–62

- multiple, 12–14, 20, 101, 156
 national citizenship, 12, 17, 19, 20, 52, 53, 59, 60, 66, 99, 101, 104, 146, 156, 157, 200
 transnational, 19, 20, 52, 66, 146, 156
Class, 11, 14–17, 25, 26, 29, 30, 33, 47, 72, 77, 140, 146, 158, 159, 164, 188–190, 194, 196, 197, 199, 200, 204, 205
Communitarianism, 128
Conceptual flow, 1, 3, 4, 6–8, 13–15, 17, 18, 26, 45, 46, 50, 74, 76, 131, 143, 163, 168–170, 185, 231, 259, 260
Consociationalism, 55, 146
Constituent Assembly Debates, 26, 31, 36, 47, 57, 58, 134, 135
Counter-flow, 3, 7, 17, 20, 38, 56, 142–147, 204, 231, 261
Cultural flow,
Curricula
 ‘hidden’ curriculum, 163
 school curriculum, 155, 191

E

- Economic reforms, 157, 159, 162, 163, 165, 226
Education, 1, 29, 54, 79, 111, 128, 151–165, 177, 194, 215, 238
Equity and social justice, 158, 196
European Citizenship, xii, xiii, 12, 47, 48, 56, 59, 60, 70, 87–105, 126, 154, 156, 191
European Union (EU), xii, 2, 3, 12, 17, 48, 58–60, 88, 89, 92, 93, 95, 96, 98–102, 156, 161, 201
Evolution, xii, 2, 12–14, 66, 68, 70, 74, 83, 121–147, 157, 187, 188

F

Fabianism, 29, 42
 Federal division of powers, 161, 163
 Flow, 2, 26, 45, 66, 94, 123, 152, 167, 191, 230

G

Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand, vii, 29, 32, 122, 127–130, 145
 Globalization, ix, xiii, 2, 4, 5, 7, 15, 19, 47, 76, 83, 146, 156, 167
 Glocalisation, 162
 Gramsci, 152
 Greek city states, 9, 20, 69
 Gurdwara, 146

H

Hegemony, 9, 19, 72, 121, 152, 155, 159
 Hindu Code / Hindu Code Bills, 33, 40–42
 Hindu-Muslim relations, 33–34, 42, 53, 78, 173, 233, 242, 247
 Hindutva, xii, 13, 48, 122, 129, 132, 143, 154, 163
 Histoire croisée, 6, 8, 19, 76, 77, 124
 Hybridisation, 1–20, 74, 122, 131, 133, 147

I

Identity, 1, 36, 46, 65, 88, 121, 151, 168, 189, 217, 231
 Immigrants, xii, 4, 13, 17, 19, 46, 50, 54–56, 61, 65, 67–69, 71, 76, 94, 95, 98, 122, 138, 144, 201, 205, 213
 Indian Constitution, 14, 35, 37, 38, 41, 57, 60, 78, 79, 146, 154, 195
 Indian Diaspora, 154, 178–184, 202
 Indian National Congress, 132, 144, 153
 India's Northeast, 52, 56, 59–61, 74
 Involution, xii, 13, 14, 121–147

J

Judicialisation, 80
 Jus sanguinis, 49
 Jus soli, 49

K

Kashmir, vii, xii, 6, 12, 13, 28, 41, 48, 52, 53, 57, 60, 67, 80, 122, 135, 137, 140, 143, 144, 204
 Khalsa, xii, 13, 122, 143

Khuntkatidar, xiii, 16, 74, 75
 Kymlicka, Will, 20, 53, 55, 60, 72, 156, 158, 161, 171, 173, 188, 190–192

L

Laski, Harold, 29, 30
 Liminal space, 7

M

Maissen, Thomas, 18, 70, 71
 Marketisation, 152, 159
 Marshall, T.H., xi, 11, 16, 25–42, 46, 47, 49, 51, 66, 67, 70, 77, 78, 83, 84, 158, 188–190, 195, 200, 205, 241
 Middle classes, 3, 15, 34, 131, 152, 153, 158–162, 165
 Migration, xii, 2, 5, 12, 18, 47, 50, 51, 62, 74, 89, 94–96, 98–101, 179, 190
 Minorities, 9, 31, 33–36, 41, 46, 55, 56, 60, 61, 67, 68, 109, 118, 132, 157, 161, 162, 164, 194, 196, 201, 203
 Minority Rights, 26, 33, 36–38, 41, 79, 224
 Multiculturalism, 46, 56, 57, 67, 171, 181, 201

N

Nagarik Maastricht treaty, 123, 144
 National Citizenship, 12, 19, 20, 53, 59, 60, 101, 104, 146, 156, 157, 200
 National Council for Education Research and Training (NCERT), 164
 Nationality, 56, 58, 59, 68, 88, 89, 95, 96, 98, 134, 145, 171
 National Knowledge Commission, 159, 206
 Naxalites, xiv, 16, 66, 126, 144
 Nehru, Jawaharlal, xi, 11, 25–42, 119, 127–131, 133, 144, 154–156, 162, 163, 188, 206, 237, 239, 248–249, 251
 Nehru, Motilal, 29
 Nehruvian doctrine, 129, 154, 155, 162–164
 Non-Resident Indian (NRI), 48, 154, 163
 Northeast, vii, 48, 52, 56, 57, 59–61, 66, 74, 79, 122, 143

O

Ong, Aihwa, 14, 167–170, 183–185
 Oomen, T.K., 78
 Orissa, ix, xiii, xiv, 16, 37, 66, 74, 75, 204, 211–226
 Overseas Citizen of India (OCI), 179, 180

P

Panchayati Raj, 162
 Path dependency, 130–133
 Person of Indian Origin (PIO), 49, 154, 179, 180
 PIO card, 138, 154, 179, 180
 Politics of difference, 10, 47, 49, 50
 Post-Colonial State, viii, 3, 35–37, 58, 123
 Praja andolan, 131
 Private schools, 158, 159, 175

R

Rational construction, 121–147
 Rights and duties, 5, 55, 67, 88, 133, 136, 151–154, 157, 159, 188

S

Scheduled castes, 57, 161, 194, 195, 203, 213, 218
 Scheduled Tribes, 57, 140, 196–198, 223
 Secularism, 32, 33, 35, 36, 38–42, 155, 157, 162, 203
 Social Imaginary/imaginarie, 8, 26–28, 37, 42
 Stake holders, 10, 80, 146, 153

T

Tagore, Rabindranath, 34, 127–129
 Taylor, Charles, 27

Third space, 8, 10, 66, 76–78, 82, 145, 168, 259
 Tool kit, xi–xii, 12, 65–84, 123, 131
 Transcultural,
 Transfer of power, 109, 132, 144, 242
 Transnational, xi–xiii, 2, 4, 6–8, 12–16, 19, 20, 48, 50–52, 55, 58, 59, 62, 66, 67, 76–78, 84, 89, 92, 102, 125, 146, 156, 167–185, 200, 202, 261
 Tribals, viii, xiii, 3, 7, 16, 60, 66, 74–76, 79, 122, 155, 198–200, 204, 205, 211–227
 Two nation theory, 144, 162

U

Uniform civil code, 33, 38, 40–42, 47
 Utilitarianism, 29, 37

W

Walzer, Michael, 9, 46, 179
 Wanjei, 75, 76
 Wansa, 75
 Weber, Max, 28, 194

Z

Zimmermann, Bénédicte, 8, 19, 76, 77, 124